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Journal of Social Sciences & Humanities
About the Journal
Overview
Pertanika Journal of Social Sciences & Humanities (JSSH) is the official journal of Universiti Putra Malaysia 
published by UPM Press. It is an open-access online scientific journal which is free of charge. It publishes 
the scientific outputs. It neither accepts nor commissions third party content.
Recognized internationally as the leading peer-reviewed interdisciplinary journal devoted to the 
publication of original papers, it serves as a forum for practical approaches to improving quality in issues 
pertaining to social and behavioural sciences as well as the humanities.  
JSSH is a quarterly (March, June, September and December) periodical that considers for publication 
original articles as per its scope. The journal publishes in English and it is open to authors around the 
world regardless of the nationality.  
The Journal is available world-wide.
Aims and scope
Pertanika Journal of Social Sciences & Humanities aims to develop as a pioneer journal for the social 
sciences with a focus on emerging issues pertaining to the social and behavioural sciences as well as 
the humanities. 
Areas relevant to the scope of the journal include Social Sciences—Accounting, anthropology, 
Archaeology and history, Architecture and habitat, Consumer and family economics, Economics, 
Education, Finance, Geography, Law, Management studies, Media and communication studies, Political 
sciences and public policy, Population studies, Psychology, Sociology, Technology management, Tourism; 
Humanities—Arts and culture, Dance, Historical and civilisation studies, Language and Linguistics, 
Literature, Music, Philosophy, Religious studies, Sports.
History
Pertanika was founded in 1978. A decision was made in 1992 to streamline Pertanika into three journals 
as Journal of Tropical Agricultural Science, Journal of Science & Technology, and Journal of Social 
Sciences & Humanities to meet the need for specialised journals in areas of study aligned with the 
interdisciplinary strengths of the university. 
After almost 25 years, as an interdisciplinary Journal of Social Sciences & Humanities, the revamped 
journal focuses on research in social and behavioural sciences as well as the humanities, particularly in 
the Asia Pacific region.
Goal of Pertanika
Our goal is to bring the highest quality research to the widest possible audience.
Quality 
We aim for excellence, sustained by a responsible and professional approach to journal publishing.  
Submissions are guaranteed to receive a decision within 14 weeks. The elapsed time from submission 
to publication for the articles averages 5-6 months. 
Abstracting and indexing of Pertanika
Pertanika is almost 40 years old; this accumulated knowledge has resulted in Pertanika JSSH being 
abstracted and indexed in SCOPUS (Elsevier), Thomson (ISI) Web of Science™ Core Collection 
Emerging Sources Citation Index (ESCI). Web of Knowledge [BIOSIS & CAB Abstracts], EBSCO 
and EBSCOhost, DOAJ, Google Scholar, TIB, MyCite, ISC, Cabell’s Directories & Journal Guide.
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Future vision
We are continuously improving access to our journal archives, content, and research services.  We have 
the drive to realise exciting new horizons that will benefit not only the academic community, but society 
itself. 
Citing journal articles
The abbreviation for Pertanika Journal of Social Sciences & Humanities is Pertanika J. Soc. Sci. Hum.
Publication policy
Pertanika policy prohibits an author from submitting the same manuscript for concurrent consideration 
by two or more publications.  It prohibits as well publication of any manuscript that has already been 
published either in whole or substantial part elsewhere. It also does not permit publication of manuscript 
that has been published in full in Proceedings. 
Code of Ethics
The Pertanika Journals and Universiti Putra Malaysia takes seriously the responsibility of all of its 
journal publications to reflect the highest in publication ethics. Thus all journals and journal editors are 
expected to abide by the Journal’s codes of ethics. Refer to Pertanika’s Code of Ethics for full details, or 
visit the Journal’s web link at http://www.pertanika.upm.edu.my/code_of_ethics.php
International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)
An ISSN is an 8-digit code used to identify periodicals such as journals of all kinds and on all media–print 
and electronic. All Pertanika journals have ISSN as well as an e-ISSN. 
Journal of Social Sciences & Humanities: ISSN 0128-7702 (Print);  ISSN 2231-8534 (Online).
Lag time 
A decision on acceptance or rejection of a manuscript is reached in 3 to 4 months (average 14 weeks). 
The elapsed time from submission to publication for the articles averages 5-6 months. 
Authorship
Authors are not permitted to add or remove any names from the authorship provided at the time of 
initial submission without the consent of the Journal’s Chief Executive Editor.
Manuscript preparation
Refer to Pertanika’s Instructions to Authors at the back of this journal.
Most scientific papers are prepared according to a format called IMRAD. The term represents the first 
letters of the words Introduction, Materials and Methods, Results, And, Discussion. IMRAD is simply 
a more ‘defined’ version of the “IBC” [Introduction, Body, Conclusion] format used for all academic 
writing. IMRAD indicates a pattern or format rather than a complete list of headings or components of 
research papers; the missing parts of a paper are: Title, Authors, Keywords, Abstract, Conclusions, and 
References. Additionally, some papers include Acknowledgments and Appendices. 
The Introduction explains the scope and objective of the study in the light of current knowledge on the 
subject; the Materials and Methods describes how the study was conducted; the Results section reports 
what was found in the study; and the Discussion section explains meaning and significance of the results 
and provides suggestions for future directions of research. The manuscript must be prepared according 
to the Journal’s Instructions to Authors.
Editorial process
Authors are notified with an acknowledgement containing a Manuscript ID on receipt of a manuscript, 
and upon the editorial decision regarding publication. 
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Pertanika follows a double-blind peer-review process. Manuscripts deemed suitable for publication 
are usually sent to reviewers.  Authors are encouraged to suggest names of at least three potential 
reviewers at the time of submission of their manuscript to Pertanika, but the editors will make the final 
choice. The editors are not, however, bound by these suggestions. 
Notification of the editorial decision is usually provided within ten to fourteen weeks from the receipt 
of manuscript.  Publication of solicited manuscripts is not guaranteed.  In most cases, manuscripts are 
accepted conditionally, pending an author’s revision of the material.
As articles are double-blind reviewed, material that might identify authorship of the paper should be 
placed only on page 2 as described in the first-4 page format in Pertanika’s Instructions to Authors 
given at the back of this journal. 
The Journal’s peer-review
In the peer-review process, three referees independently evaluate the scientific quality of the submitted 
manuscripts. 
Peer reviewers are experts chosen by journal editors to provide written assessment of the strengths and 
weaknesses of written research, with the aim of improving the reporting of research and identifying the 
most appropriate and highest quality material for the journal.
Operating and review process
What happens to a manuscript once it is submitted to Pertanika?  Typically, there are seven steps to the 
editorial review process:
1. The Journal’s chief executive editor and the editorial board examine the paper to determine 
whether it is appropriate for the journal and should be reviewed.  If not appropriate, the 
manuscript is rejected outright and the author is informed. 
2. The chief executive editor sends the article-identifying information having been removed, to 
three reviewers.  Typically, one of these is from the Journal’s editorial board.  Others are 
specialists in the subject matter represented by the article.  The chief executive editor asks 
them to complete the review in three weeks.  
Comments to authors are about the appropriateness and adequacy of the theoretical or 
conceptual framework, literature review, method, results and discussion, and conclusions. 
Reviewers often include suggestions for strengthening of the manuscript.  Comments to the 
editor are in the nature of the significance of the work and its potential contribution to the 
literature.
3. The chief executive editor, in consultation with the editor-in-chief, examines the reviews and 
decides whether to reject the manuscript, invite the author(s) to revise and resubmit the 
manuscript, or seek additional reviews.  Final acceptance or rejection rests with the Edito-
in-Chief, who reserves the right to refuse any material for publication.  In rare instances, 
the manuscript is accepted with almost no revision.  Almost without exception, reviewers’ 
comments (to the author) are forwarded to the author.  If a revision is indicated, the editor 
provides guidelines for attending to the reviewers’ suggestions and perhaps additional advice 
about revising the manuscript. 
4. The authors decide whether and how to address the reviewers’ comments and criticisms and 
the editor’s concerns.  The authors return a revised version of the paper to the chief executive 
editor along with specific information describing how they have answered’ the concerns 
of the reviewers and the editor, usually in a tabular form. The author(s) may also submit 
a rebuttal if there is a need especially when the author disagrees with certain comments 
provided by reviewer(s).
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5. The chief executive editor sends the revised paper out for re-review.  Typically, at least one of 
the original reviewers will be asked to examine the article. 
6. When the reviewers have completed their work, the chief executive editor in consultation 
with the editorial board and the editor-in-chief examine their comments and decide whether 
the paper is ready to be published, needs another round of revisions, or should be rejected. 
7. If the decision is to accept, an acceptance letter is sent to all the author(s), the paper is sent to 
the Press. The article should appear in print in approximately three months. 
The Publisher ensures that the paper adheres to the correct style (in-text citations, the 
reference list, and tables are typical areas of concern, clarity, and grammar).  The authors are 
asked to respond to any minor queries by the Publisher.  Following these corrections, page 
proofs are mailed to the corresponding authors for their final approval.  At this point, only 
essential changes are accepted.  Finally, the article appears in the pages of the Journal and is 
posted on-line. 
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Preface
This thematic edition of the Pertanika Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities explores 
current issues and challenges in Iran within the scope of the social sciences. A total of 
14 articles are presented in this edition of the journal and all the articles are written by 
Iranian scholars and researchers who are academic staff and researchers of the University 
of Tehran (UT). Although the issues discussed in this edition of the journal are very much 
central to Iran and Iranian communities, they will strike a chord with Malaysian readers 
because Iran and Malaysia share certain common characteristics that include religious 
affiliation as well as cultural expression, to some extent. These articles present significant 
contributions as they highlight issues that are current and therefore, pertinent to the 
people of Iran, reflecting as they do on the country’s development across all sectors.
All the papers published in this edition underwent Pertanika’s stringent peer-review 
process involving a minimum of two reviewers comprising internal as well as external 
referees. The papers have been revised accordingly by their authors based on the 
comments and suggestions provided by the reviewers. This was to ensure the quality of 
the papers justified the high ranking of the journal, which is renowned as a heavily-cited 
journal not only by authors and researchers in Malaysia but by those in other countries 
around the world as well.
The guest editors of this issue of the journal wish to sincerely thank the Faculty of 
Social Sciences, University of Tehran (UT) for its support and commitment towards 
publishing this special issue. We would also like to state that we have learnt much from 
our collaboration with Universiti Putra Malaysia in preparing this special edition for 
publication.
We thank the Chief Executive Editor, Dr. Nayan Kanwal, for his tremendous efforts, 
leadership, courage and dedication to improving the quality of this issue. Through 
this experience, we have been able to deepen our own knowledge of the demanding 
processes involved in publishing with a journal of tremendous international standing 
such as Pertanika.
Last but not the least, we wish to thank all those who have contributed, either directly or 
indirectly, in the successful publication of this thematic edition of the Pertanika Journal 
of Social Sciences and Humanities.
Guest Editors:
Aini Ideris (Prof. Datin Paduka Dato’ Dr.), UPM, Malaysia
Abbas Ghanbari Baghestan (Dr.), UT, Iran
Zaid Ahmad (Prof. Dr.), UPM, Malaysia
February 2018
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ARTICLE INFO
Iranians’ Attitudes about the Ideal Spouse: Preferences for 
Spouse Selecting and Transformations in Recent Decades  
Seyed Mahdi Etemadifard 
Department of Sociology, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Tehran, Ale-Ahmad Ave., Tehran, Iran. 
P.O. Box: 14395-773
ABSTRACT
Family is the primary institution in which the initial experiences of social relations take 
shape. Human beings are born into families and form their own families in return. The 
present study concerns the major preferences and criteria that Iranians hold for selecting 
the right spouse. The main question of the study is about the transformations that spouse 
choosing, and its underlying criteria, have undergone. It assesses the attitudinal aspects 
regarding the “ideal spouse” and is concerned about the choice of either husband or wife. 
The chief method of the study is secondary analysis of quantitative data gathered at the 
national level. The sources of the research are comprised of all surveys that measure Iranians 
15 years old and above. The findings of the research indicate that the changes of Iranians’ 
understanding of the “ideal spouse” have been next to nothing. People’s behavioural 
patterns in choosing a spouse do not entirely match their attitudinal preferences; in other 
words, despite the change in behaviour, Iranians’ preferences for the ideal spouse has 
hardly changed in attitude.    
Keywords: Attitudinal preferences, background variables, cultural change, ideal spouse, preferred wife, 
preferred husband, spouse selecting   
INTRODUCTION
Family in Iran is one of the determining 
factors of social status and any transition 
in this regard would affect understandings 
of the whole social realities (Azadarmaki, 
2007; Koutlaki, 2010). Among the major 
transitions in the past decades in relation 
to the Iranian family are those in people’s 
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attitudes about the ideal spouse and its 
characteristics (Daniel & Mahdi, 2006). 
The diagnosis of Iranians’ criteria and 
preferences for the ideal spouse is key 
to understanding family transitions, 
specifically, and social transformations, 
generally. In other terms, understanding the 
characteristics of the ideal spouse enhances 
the understanding of a stratum of more 
general social transformations; because, 
following the gradual encounter with 
various social groups and the consequential 
evolution of their mindsets, individuals’ 
choices, including spouse selection, a critical 
decision in one’s personal life, changes as 
well. Individuals are increasingly liberated 
from family hierarchical power relations, 
thanks to the educational, occupational, and 
skill acquisition procedures they normally 
undergo in their modern lifestyle. The variety 
of alternative lifestyles, other than what 
family background traditionally dictated 
to individuals, presumably fundamentally 
changes people’s spouse selection habits 
and ideal spouse criteria (Abbasi-Shavazi 
& McDonald, 2012). The increased level 
of education for both sexes, the equal 
allocation of facilities for public education 
regardless of sex (in contrast to the norm in 
previous decades, especially pre-revolution) 
(Asadi, 1975; Touba, 1971), the escalation 
in urbanization, and the diversity of skills 
and specializations, have entailed the social 
mobility for both sexes. Diversified social 
encounters, in its own turn, have improved 
the opportunities in front of social actors. 
For example, the propagation of proper 
circumstances for higher education has 
provided the mating age youth with wider 
choices in spouse selection. Individuals 
are no longer obliged to choose from 
among the narrow list of alternatives their 
families recommend them. This very fact 
has optimized cultural intermingling of 
different family types (Azadarmaki, 2007; 
Behnam, 1992). 
The assessment of spouse choosing 
behaviours and ideal spouse attitudes 
is vital for the analysis of the changes 
in the Iranian family not only because 
marriage is a family indicator, but also 
since the process of family dissociation 
and related social issues are explained 
based on spouse selection behaviour and 
the transition hereby taking place (Strong 
& Cohen, 2016). Divorce, late marriage, 
celibacy, and more are among such issues 
that could be explained relying on a proper 
understanding of spouse choosing patterns 
(Azadarmaki, 2016; Ember & Ember, 2003). 
On the other hand, there is no literature that 
presents a comparative analysis of spouse 
choosing behaviour and the transformation 
in Iranians’ attitude about the ideal spouse, 
mostly having sufficed to briefings on the 
condition of spouse choosing behaviours. 
This is another indicator that highlights the 
significance of the present study. 
Considering the Iranian shifting 
social structures, the present study aims 
to understand the Iranians’ attitude about 
the “ideal spouse”. The central question 
of the study asks about the quality of 
attitudinal changes regarding the ideal 
spouse; considering the growing rate of 
exogamy among the new generations of 
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Iranians, what changes have taken place 
in their attitudes about the ideal spouse 
compared to other generational groups? The 
peripheral question of the study concerns the 
theoretical explanations behind the situation. 
Other than the descriptive approach of the 
study in investigating the two-spouse 
choosing behaviour, and the preferable 
spouse attitudes, it tries to outline the 
influential factors bringing about changes.
Review of Literature
Several books, articles, and studies deal 
with transformations in spouse-choosing 
marriage patterns among Iranian families. 
There are analytical studies in relation 
to the family transition. A canonical 
survey on the attitudinal and behavioural 
transitions regarding spouse selecting in 
Iran is Jacqueline Touba that was conducted 
in Shiraz city of Iran (Touba, 1971). 
Furthermore, Family Structures and Kinship 
in Iran is one of the first books that deals 
with various aspects of family and marriage 
transition being predisposed to urbanization 
and industrialization sways (Behnam, 1971). 
The author posits that chief transitions in 
family and marriage patterns are dictated 
by migration, occupational mobility because 
of specialization, and the consequential 
geographic mobility, especially of the 
youth (Ibid). In Family Transitions, the 
same author investigates various aspects of 
family as influenced by modernization and 
brings international examples to materialize 
his thesis (Behnam, 1992). In his belief, the 
future prospect of family transitions will 
be determined by demographic changes, 
senility, fertility, urbanization, migration, 
and scientific progresses (Ibid). What these 
studies share with the present study is the 
emphasis they put on patterns of spouse 
choosing by referring to secondary data in 
the field. What Behnam has demonstrated 
in these two surveys is the transformation 
of spouse selecting habits of Iranians under 
the influence of social variables which is 
adopted by the present study.
The disadvantage of these studies, 
nonetheless, is the perceptible lack of a 
comprehensible theoretical structure in their 
analysis of statistical data. Another series of 
studies have researched family transitions 
by emphasising demographic and biological 
discussions like that of cousin marriage 
(Abbasi-Shavazi & Askari Nadoushan, 
2005; Abbasi-Shavazi, McDonald, & 
Hoseini Chavoshi, 2003; Kazemipour, 
2004; Mahmoudian, 2004; Mirzaei, 1999; 
Zanjani, 2006). Others source to regional or 
local surveys and examine various aspects 
of family transitions, again including 
the manifest case of cousin marriage, in 
specified regions and localities (Abbasi-
Shavazi & Torabi, 2006). 
Considering family transition as a 
consequence of globalisation, a number 
of surveys by non-Iranian and Iranian 
researchers are concentrated on spouse 
selecting and its transformations. The 
attitudinal and behavioural transformations 
in this regard are among the variables 
concerned in the present study. Some of 
these surveys study the condition of Iran 
under the global transformational trends 
(Abbasi-Shavazi & McDonald, 2012; Daniel 
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& Mahdi, 2006; Koutlaki, 2010). Some, 
on the other hand, have elaborated on the 
general trends influencing family transition 
and spouse selecting in different societies 
(Blossfeld & Timm, 2012; Henriksen & 
Kurten, 2012). 
Theoretical Framework
Theoretical approaches in investigating 
attitudinal and behavioural changes towards 
spouse choosing are divisible into two 
categories: the first puts the emphasis on 
the structural aspects and the institutional 
changes resulting from them. Outstanding in 
this category is William Good’s convergence 
theory of family. Based on the institutional 
approach, modernization and development 
cause families to gradually follow western 
and European models. According to Parsons’ 
structural functionalism, the institution of 
family manifests gradual differentiations 
in various dimensions towards the ultimate 
independence of actors from a priori models. 
As a result, not only do family structures 
change in household, role systems, hierarchy, 
and spouses’ relationships, but patterns of 
spouse choosing have a propensity toward 
exogamy, as exogamy is perceived to better 
match structurally differentiated models and 
gives the youth greater roles for choosing. 
The more traditional paternalistic hierarchy 
is extinguished, the more diverse spouse 
choosing patterns become. Under his 
discussion of universal family revolution, 
Good suggests a pattern of changes in 
family structures in which the preference 
is for a nuclear family. In his opinion, 
families gradually change into universal, 
homogeneous configurations (Good, 1970). 
In Good’s model of family transition, the 
structure of families keeping pace with 
development finds the potential to break 
off the foundations of traditional order and 
gives way to the modern patterns of spouse 
choosing that better match with parents’ 
control-free way of life. This explanation 
applies to a class of bourgeois families that 
develop with modernization and the canon 
of freedom (Poster, 1988). 
According to this model, the change in 
spouse choosing patterns would presumably 
be simultaneous with changes in youth’s 
(as the marriage age group) attitudes 
about the preferred spouse; because the 
freedom in spouse choosing is concomitant 
with structural changes in the social life 
experience, and free patterns of choice are 
expected to find more primacy in shaping 
attitudes. In other words, changes toward 
the realization of nuclear, independent 
families obtain concrete as well as attitudinal 
dimensions. 
The second category of theories gives 
more weight to the attitudinal aspects and 
emphasizes the role of cultural changes 
and value system in causing transformation 
in behaviours and mentalities. Prominent 
among others, the second demographic 
transition theory (SDT) analyses fertility 
transitions in the industrial west in 
association with changes in attitudes, 
mindsets, and family and parenting values, 
to acknowledge the synchronized impact 
of social, economic, and cultural facts on 
family changes. These factors, combined, 
have contributed to family transitions 
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becoming an independent, liberated 
institution (Sobotka, 2008). 
According to this theory, again, spouse 
choosing has tended toward exogamy, 
with a shift from the previous constrictions 
towards individual freedom taking place. 
The second class of theories differs from 
the first in that, besides the already taken-
for-granted role of socio-economic and 
technological transitions, they recognize 
in their analyses of family transition the 
role of the actors’ attitudes and mindsets, 
too. As a result, it becomes essential to 
reach an explanation of the emerging 
family patterns that conform to the ongoing 
cultural transitions. According to SDT, the 
progressive increase in individual freedom 
morally, religiously, and politically is the 
basic cause for family transition. Secularism, 
freedom movements, post-materialist 
values of individual improvement and self-
expression, mistrust in organizations, and 
intolerance toward any outsider exercise 
of power in one’s personal matters are 
principles of the value transition that, in 
its own turn, has contributed to the idea of 
self-determination with one’s personal life 
(Rosina & Fraboni, 2004). 
Based on either theory, it is expected 
that modernization and development bring 
concomitant changes to family structures 
and patterns of spouse choosing. The 
theoretical advantage of the second class 
of theories is its recognition of facilitating 
mentalities based in cultural backgrounds. 
The present study inclined by this approach 
is going to comparatively investigate the 
condition of spouse choosing behaviour 
and attitudes in Iran. According to Good, 
the diversity in spouse choosing patterns 
is essentially entwined with the liberation 
from the declining tradition of paternalistic 
hierarchies. Such transformations are in 
concurrence with the universal homogeneous 
transitions that enforce Europeanization and 
the nuclearization of families dictated by 
the inexorable modernization. Based on 
the second set of theories, these transitions 
are explained by referencing the attitudinal 
transformations. Under these circumstances 
caused by the concurring socio-economic, 
cultural, and technological transitions, the 
prospect for individual autonomy in spouse 
choosing improves. 
METHODS
To answer the questions of the study, 
comparative methods are required for 
data analysis. Comparative study is a 
conventional method in sociological studies 
that investigates the transformations in one 
field, culture, or time setting and compares 
the results with changes in parallel fields, 
cultures, and settings. Therefore, dynamics 
study is a form of comparative study of 
phenomena across time and place. The major 
method in the present study is secondary 
analysis of quantitative data gathered from 
national surveys to investigate the trend of 
changes in spouse choosing patterns. In this 
study, several national surveys whose results 
provide the opportunity to compare are put 
to analysis.
One of the oldest surveys investigating the 
attitudinal and behavioural transformations 
in Iran is “Cultural Orientations and Social 
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Attitudes in Iran”, conducted by Asadi 
in 1975. Parts of the survey examine the 
familial behaviours and orientations in 
Iran with emphasis on marriage, spouse 
choosing, and ideal husband/wife indicators 
(Asadi, 1975). In 2004, a parallel survey 
was conducted by Goudarzi with the aim 
of comparing the results with the 1975 
findings. Goudarzi used the main items 
of the Asadi survey, including indicators 
for measuring family-related attitudes 
and behaviours in Iran, and enacted slight 
modifications and supplementations to make 
the three-decade-long social change trends 
comparable (Goudarzi, 2005). Another 
national survey among the sources for 
cross-sectional and longitudinal studies 
is the one Goudarzi conducted in 2004 
titled, “Iranians’ Attitudes and Orientation: 
Second Wave”. The first part of the survey 
is concerned with family values, including 
marriage norms and patterns of spouse 
choosing (Goudarzi, 2004). The last survey 
analysed here is Ghafari’s 2015 national 
survey on Iranians’ Attitudes and Values. 
Among the indices he evaluates is Iranians’ 
attitudes and preferences in spouse selecting. 
Beside these three, Mohseni (2000) is also 
considered as a complementary source for 
the present evaluation. 
It is important to reinstate the lack of 
inclusive data that covers the whole duration 
of the study, as some of the time settings 
have passed unsurveyed. This has entailed 
many restrictions in performing statistical 
analyses; the comprehensive understanding 
of the situation requires thorough and 
compact data from all time spans under 
study, while the review of literature does 
not direct to thematic results in the form 
of distinct surveys and research. All that is 
available is a series of large-scale surveys 
that have intermittently measured aspects 
of spouse choosing patterns. Consequently, 
a selective approach confines this study to 
the distinct indicators that measure Iranians’ 
values, attitudes, and behaviours. Among 
the literature at hand, Asadi’s survey, the 
parallel survey by Goudarzi, and the second 
wave of surveys, complemented by a set of 
other sporadic data found in the literature 
of the field, comprise the main sources of 
this study. 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Iranians’ behaviour in spouse choosing
In recent decades, spouse choosing patterns 
have dramatically changed (Azadarmaki, 
2016). Based on data available in Table 1 and 
considering generational variables, it seems 
that despite the decrease in generational gap 
in spouse choosing patterns in three decades, 
the youth are still more oriented toward 
exogamy than other generations. This can 
be explained by the fact that the exposure 
to more diverse situations and groups in 
comparison to previous generations has 
propelled them to exogamic choices. 
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Education level is another variable that 
influences spouse choosing behaviours. 
Based on the data in Table 2, the more 
educated people are, the less their preference 
for cousin marriage. It should also be noted 
that the whole rate of cousin marriage 
among all groups has noticeably lowered. 
Table 1 
Spouse choosing patterns in three decades by generational groups (1975-2005)
Variable Attitude 1975 2005
Youngster Adult Elderly Youngster Adult Elderly
% % % % % %
Cousin marriage 35 46.5 52.5 20.9 26.5 28.4
Exogamy 44 33.5 26.5 51.7 49.5 45.7
No difference 19 17 17 25.9 23 25.5
No Response 2 3 4 1.5 1 0.4
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Asadi (1975); Goudarzi (2005)
Table 2 
Spouse choosing patterns in three decades by education (1975-2005)
Variable Attitude 1975 2005
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Cousin marriage 52 35 16 13 12 35.9 28.8 22.4 17.9 15.1
Exogamy 27 46 61 65 65 39.8 49 53.4 52.4 53.3
No difference 17 17 20 19 22 23.4 21.5 22.9 28.5 29.8
No Response 4 2 3 3 1 0.9 0.7 1.3 1.2 1.8
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Asadi (1975); Goudarzi (2005)
Just as the attitudinal preferences in spouse 
choosing behaviours do, behavioural aspects 
corroborate the gradual decline in cousin 
marriage rates concurring with the pace of 
modernization (Good, 1970; Poster, 1988). 
No comprehensive study has yet examined 
the issue. According to Behnam (1971), 
the closer to urban areas, the lower the 
rate of marrying relatives Abbasi-Shavazi, 
McDonald and Chavoshi (2008). The 
comparison between the rural areas (such 
as Torbat Heidariyeh in Khorasan Province) 
and Tehran neighbourhood of (Javadiyeh 
and Salmaniyeh) with family samples in 
Tehran during 1970s shows that the rate 
of cousin marriage in rural areas is about 
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32 to 33 percent compared to 29.2 percent 
in Tehran, neighbouring country, and 25.1 
percent in Tehran, main city. Among relative 
marriages, marriage between paternal first 
cousins is of highest frequency both in 
country areas and in cities. 
A key point to note in this regard is the 
logic of transformation in spouse choosing 
patterns not showing an even decline. 
Cousin marriage remains a yet ideal type, 
even with the decrease in age and increase 
in education, equalling exposure to new 
circumstances, expectations, and priorities, 
with the pattern changing considerably. 
Data related to the objective condition 
of changes in cousin marriage after three 
decades imply a smooth trend in various 
provinces. The findings of Abbasi-Shavazi 
and his colleagues (2003) in four Western 
Azerbaijan, Sistan and Balouchistan, Gillan, 
and Yazd show the rate of such marriages at 
approximately 40 percent. Sistan province, 
with 77.4 percent, obtains the highest rate 
of cousin marriage, followed by Yazd 
(46.3 percent), Western Azarbayjan (32.6 
percent), and Gillan (24 percent). 
The findings of Sa’adat and his 
colleagues in all provinces corroborate the 
smooth continuation of cousin marriage in 
Iran. Data in this study indicate a fluctuation 
from 16 percent in the north to 47 percent in 
the east. The central, northwestern, western, 
and southern parts of the country rates are 
35 percent, 39 percent, 41 percent, and 43 
percent respectively (Abbasi-Shavazi & 
Torabi, 2006). 
Table 3 
Cousin marriage pattern by generational groups 
(2004)
Variable 
Attitude
Youngster Adult Elderly
% % %
Disagree 59 53.5 52.6
Uncertain 12 11.2 12.3
Agree 29 35.3 35
Total 100 100 100
Statistics 0.057
Sig 0.000
Source: Goudarzi (2004)
According to the studies on spouse 
choosing patterns, it seems that cousin 
marriage is still the preferred style of 
marriage among parts of the population 
in Iran. As modernization progresses, the 
general rate of cousin marriage declines, 
but a relative smoothness in the continuation 
of cousin marriage is still detected. The 
findings of 1970s were indicative of kinship 
not only as central in spouse choosing 
patterns but also in all respects of family 
life and controlling conjugal relationships 
(Behnam, 1971). The findings of more 
recent surveys show a partial sovereignty 
of family hierarchy in exogamic marriages 
in a way that even marriages with non-
relatives is supervised by the extended 
family (Azadarmaki, 2007). 
Speaking based on the second wave 
of surveys on attitudes and values which 
is presented in Table 3, it seems that the 
almost all generations are against cousin 
marriage, while above 25 percent prioritize 
it. The findings are generalizable to the 
entire population with 99 percent accuracy. 
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This tells about the relatively smooth 
trend in levels of cousin marriage preference 
among parts of the population (comprising 
one fourth of Iranians) despite its declining 
status due to diversifying experiences and 
the already discussed exposure to new 
circumstances (Goudarzi, 2004). 
Attitudinal changes concerning the 
ideal spouse
As with respondents’ opinion about the ideal 
spouse, presented in Table 4, amicability 
and courteousness are atop the list of the 
ideal spouse among all generations in three 
decades (Asadi, 1975; Goudarzi, 2005). 
Then comes fondness for family. Although 
honesty and decency have downgraded 
within the list, this might be due to the two 
terms connotational changes. Decency is 
a concept that suffers ambiguity due to 
different meanings it finds based on the 
situation; in the case of women, it implies 
modesty and adherence to hijab, while it 
denotes the observance of gaze among 
men (Moghissi, 2007). What matters is the 
permanence of the attitudinal hierarchy 
and the durability of dominant preferences 
among Iranians.
Table 4 
Ideal spouse criteria in three decades by generational groups (1975-2005)
Variable Attitude 1975 2005
Youngster Adult Elderly Youngster Adult Elderly
% % % % % %
Family fondness 15 16.5 15 8.5 9 9
Amicability and 
courteousness
36.5 33 36.5 46.9 45.7 45.7
Activeness 9.5 12 13 4.9 5.6 6.4
Occupation 2.5 2 2.5 8.5 5.8 5.9
Literacy 4 3 1.5 2 1.7 0.6
Honesty and decency 23.5 26.5 25.5 1.2 2 1.8
Source: Asadi (1975); Goudarzi (2005)
Based on education and as observed in 
Table 5, amicability and courteousness 
are the primary characteristics for an ideal 
spouse in most respondents’ beliefs. At 
odds with what is conceived in everyday 
observation, beauty and charm are among 
the peripheral characteristics favoured by 
only one percent of respondents and only 
mentioned under the item “other”. The 
terminological explanation of the change 
in the hierarchical rank of decency that 
was explained above could be verified by 
interpreting data based on education, too. 
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The value-laden hierarchy in shaping 
Iranians’ mentalities toward the ideal spouse 
is the central issue that must be considered 
and, in this respect, changes in certain 
peripheral attributes should not mislead 
and undermine top priorities among the 
value-laden sequence of attributes, namely 
amicability and courteousness. 
In the early decades after the revolution, 
due to the imposed Iran-Iraq war and 
various sanctions enacted upon the country, 
the scope of national surveys was lost. 
Governments, rather than contemplating 
social research, should have try to provide 
the people with their primary needs and 
fight the war. Hence, no valid surveys have 
remained from the first post-revolution 
decade. About 15 years after the Revolution, 
in 2000, Manuchehr Mohseni conducted a 
national survey (Mohseni, 2000).
In the 1975 survey by Asadi, where 
Mohseni was the second researcher and 
Asadi’s assistant, the preference for women 
in hijab was examined (Asadi, 1975). 
In the 2000 survey, however, there is no 
item specifically asking about the attitude 
or behaviour of people regarding hijab. 
Therefore, the 2000 survey does not directly 
relate to the present article, since there is 
no question of hijab and its dimensions 
in it. Despite this, the closest part of this 
survey to the present article is the item 
Table 5 
Ideal spouse criteria in three decades by education (1975-2005)
Variable Attitude 1975 2005
Ill
ite
ra
te
Pr
im
ar
y 
sc
ho
ol
M
id
dl
e 
sc
ho
ol
D
ip
lo
m
a
H
ig
he
r 
ed
uc
at
io
n
Ill
ite
ra
te
Pr
im
ar
y 
sc
ho
ol
M
id
dl
e 
sc
ho
ol
D
ip
lo
m
a
H
ig
he
r 
ed
uc
at
io
n
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Family fondness 13 19 19 15 15 4.6 6.6 9 10.3 14.7
Amicability and 
courteousness
34 37 37 38 38 50 49.9 45.5 44.4 39.9
Activeness 11 11 9 7 12 6.7 5.7 5.4 5 4
Occupation 2 2 2 2 1 9 7.3 8.7 5.5 4.3
Literacy 3 3 3 7 8 0.7 0.8 2.2 2 2.7
Honesty and decency 27 23 20 22 28 1.5 1.7 1.4 1.8 1.7
Source: Asadi (1975); Goudarzi (2005)
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put forward by respondents in response to 
one of the survey questions. This question 
is about measuring the most important 
characteristics of the “ideal woman.” The 
first choice offered by people is “decency” 
as the most important feature of an ideal 
woman. One of the meanings of “decency” 
in Persian is clemency and chastity, and the 
opposite is misconduct (Dehkhoda, 2006). 
The notion of decency generally indicates a 
lady to be covered and not exposed to others’ 
attention, especially by men. Therefore, this 
option has the closest meaning to the subject 
of the present article, i.e. hijab and cover. 
In Table 6, the attitude of the respondents 
towards the “ideal woman” is shown:
Table 6 
Attitude towards the most important characteristics of an “Ideal Woman” (2000)
Variable 
Attitude
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Disagree 40.8 24.6 14.3 4.9 2.8 0.3 0.2 10.1 2 100
Source: Mohseni (2000)
As shown in the table above, more than 
40% of the respondents described the most 
important feature of an “ideal woman” 
as “decency”. For this reason, the most 
important feature of the “ideal woman” for 
40% of the respondents was being covered 
and not being seen by men. From the above 
data, the minimum tendency of 40% of 
respondents is to observe the necessity 
of hijab for an ideal situation. In Table 7, 
respondents’ attitude to the most important 
characteristic of “ideal woman” comes from 
the following underlying variables: 
Seyed Mahdi Etemadifard
12 Pertanika J. Soc. Sci. & Hum. 26 (T): 1 - 20 (2018)
Ta
bl
e 
7 
At
tit
ud
e 
ab
ou
t t
he
 m
os
t i
m
po
rt
an
t c
ha
ra
ct
er
is
tic
s o
f t
he
 “
Id
ea
l W
om
an
 B
as
ed
 o
n 
Ba
ck
gr
ou
nd
 V
ar
ia
bl
es
 (2
00
0)
”
Va
ria
bl
e 
A
tti
tu
de
G
en
de
r
A
ge
Ed
uc
at
io
n
In
co
m
e
Men
Women
16-24
25-34
35-44
45-54
55 and over
Illiterate
Primary
Secondary
High School 
Graduated
Higher diploma
BA and higher
to ۲۰
21-30
31-50
51-100
101 and over
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
D
ec
en
cy
40
.7
40
.8
40
.4
40
.3
40
.3
42
41
46
.6
41
.7
42
41
.2
36
.7
32
.4
44
.2
45
38
.7
35
.6
27
.9
C
ou
rte
ou
sn
es
s
22
.6
26
.7
24
.1
25
.2
25
.3
23
.3
25
.4
32
.9
33
.4
26
.1
18
.9
16
13
.8
27
.1
26
.4
26
.8
18
.1
18
.4
Li
te
ra
cy
3.
1
2.
5
4
2.
1
2.
5
2.
7
3.
1
3.
2
2
4.
4
3.
1
1.
8
3.
3
2.
1
2.
7
2.
2
4
3.
4
Fa
m
ily
 o
f o
rig
in
15
.3
13
.4
14
.3
15
.3
15
.1
15
.2
11
.5
7.
8
8.
5
10
.8
20
.4
24
.9
19
.6
12
.4
13
14
.4
19
.3
17
B
ea
ut
y
0.
4
0.
2
4
4
3
4
0
5
2
3
0
1.
2
1
0.
1
0.
1
0.
1
0.
8
2
W
ea
lt
h
0.
2
0.
2
0.
1
0.
4
0.
3
0
0
0
0
0.
2
0.
4
0
0
0
0.
3
0.
3
0
0
H
om
em
ak
in
g
5
4.
8
6.
3
3.
7
4.
2
4.
4
6
4.
5
4.
9
5.
9
5.
3
3
3.
1
4.
7
6.
1
5
5
2
O
th
er
10
.5
9.
8
6.
8
9
9.
3
8.
4
10
.2
0
7.
5
7.
6
9
13
.6
22
.2
7.
4
5.
3
10
.6
15
.5
28
.6
U
nk
no
w
n
2.
2
1.
6
0
0
0
0
2.
8
0
0
0
1.
7
2.
8
4.
6
2
1.
1
1.
9
1.
7
0.
7
To
ta
l
98
98
10
0
10
0
10
0
10
0
97
10
0
10
0
10
0
98
97
95
98
99
98
98
99
St
at
is
tic
s
10
.8
3
33
.4
4
28
6.
4
16
8.
1
Si
g
0.
14
0.
2
0.
00
0
0.
00
0
So
ur
ce
: M
oh
se
ni
 (2
00
0)
Iranians’ Attitudes about the Ideal Spouse
13Pertanika J. Soc. Sci. & Hum. 26 (T): 1 - 20 (2018)
As can be seen in the table above, there 
was no difference between men and women 
in prioritizing “decency” for an “ideal 
woman”. For this reason, the relationship 
between gender and the most important 
characteristics of the “ideal woman” was not 
significant. This suggests that women like 
to be covered and not exposed. Of course, 
this does not mean the absence of women in 
society, but that women, like men, consider 
an ideal woman to have hijab. Among 
different age groups, there is no significant 
difference in the preference of “decency” 
as the most important characteristic of an 
“ideal woman”. Hence, there is an age 
unity between distinct groups in prioritizing 
“decency”. Various levels of education 
had a significant impact on respondents’ 
attitude towards “decency”. As education 
increases gradually, the decency priority 
is reduced. Illiterate respondents who 
consider “decency” as the most important 
“ideal woman” priority are 14.2 percent 
more than those who are educated with a 
bachelor’s degree (46.6 percent versus 32.4 
percent). With the increase in income level, 
the importance of “decency” gradually 
decreases, so the gap between the lowest 
income groups and the highest is 16.3 
percent (44.2 percent versus 27.9 percent). 
Among the variables, the level of education 
and then the income level of the head of 
family had the most significant effect on the 
attitude of the respondents.
For understanding the attitudes toward 
the ideal spouse more properly, the data of 
the second wave survey on attitudes and 
values in 2004 are observed based on the 
same variable. In this survey, different items 
ask about the attributes of the ideal spouse, 
the ideal husband, and the ideal wife. Table 
8 presents the data related to the popular 
opinion about the ideal wife:
Table 8 
Ideal wife criteria (2004
Attitude Percent
Decency 19.4
Faithfulness and piety 17.9
Amicability and courteousness 15.9
Honesty 8.9
Homemaking 7.4
Judgment 5.7
Contentment 5.3
Hijab observance 3.9
Docility 3.5
Mutual understanding 3.4
Family fondness 2.8
Forgiveness 1.7
Literacy 1.5
Beauty 0.5
Other 2.2
Total 100
Source: Goudarzi (2004)
Open-ended questions have the advantage 
of giving more freedom to the interpreter 
for manoeuvre, as the range of answers 
to these questions is not limited to pre-
determined items. In Table 8, findings are 
graded from the highest to the lowest. 
Accordingly, the main characteristic for the 
ideal wife is “decency”. When applied to 
women, decency connotes the observance 
(by women) for being covered in front of 
male gaze. Far from the perception of public 
exclusion of women, this means to optimize 
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protected public participation of them. The 
next major attributes after decency are 
faith and piety, together with amicability 
and courteousness. It could be inferred 
that in people’s opinion, religion and 
morality together form the basis for the main 
characteristics of the ideal wife. People’s 
religiosity has found deeper moral quality 
compared to the past. This why religious 
variables rival moral ones as top spouse 
choosing preferences. The viewpoint of 
respondents toward the first item, decency, 
has serious moral connotations, too, being 
associated with the culture of women’s 
dressing in Iran. Other criteria of honesty 
and contentment similarly have moral 
connotations. It could be deduced that the 
determining element in shaping people’s 
attitude about the ideal wife is more of a 
moral and religious nature than economic 
or physical (beauty and charm). This is 
a sincere consideration to the extent that 
docility is placed in the lower ranks at odds 
with the paternalistic culture in Iran. 
Based on the findings in Table 8, sex 
is significantly influential in shaping the 
popular preferences for the ideal wife. Men 
prioritize decency as the characteristic of the 
ideal wife more than women do. Based on 
the definition of decency mentioned earlier, 
a similar difference is observed about hijab, 
as men have preferred hijab for the ideal 
wife three times as much as women have. 
Women have preferred other moral qualities 
instead. Therefore, both sexes prefer moral 
attributes; for men, this is manifested in form 
of the preference for hijab and decency, and 
for women it is manifested in the form of the 
preference of amicability, courteousness, 
faithfulness, piety, and honesty. Age is 
also significant in determining the ideal 
wife attributes. As the age of respondents 
increases, religious attributes find more 
force and distinction. On the other hand, 
with younger ages, the moral aspects are 
highlighted. The middle-aged and elderly 
respondents who are supposedly married 
admire women’s domesticity and fondness 
for family compared to the youth. The 
same distinction applies to marital status, 
as married respondents who are practically 
engaged in conjugal matters are sterner in 
demanding women’s homemaking duties 
than singles are. The degree holders are more 
concerned about the education of the wife 
than the illiterate. Concerning occupation, 
housekeeping is mainly considered a 
women’s activity in Iran, as married women 
are the major contributors to homemaking 
at home. They prioritize domesticity and 
homemaking, their own attributes, more 
than other groups do. People who are more 
in daily contact with other groups do place 
more emphasis on the women’s interactive 
capabilities and, for this reason, prioritize 
hijab and decency for the ideal wife more 
than other groups. Married respondents who 
have entered actual conjugal relationships 
are also concerned about hijab and decency 
compared to the singles that prioritize moral 
attributes such as honesty. The main priority 
among all groups is with moral and religious 
attributes while physical beauty gains the 
lowest rate at less than one percent (with 
a minute rise among pupils). Imagined 
characteristics like economic affluence (of 
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the ideal wife) is not mentioned at all or 
has so little importance as to be put under 
the item “other”. Comparing the practical 
behaviour and attitudinal preferences 
of individuals shows that people act in 
ways that are not totally compatible with 
their ideals. In better words, not always 
is there congruity between attitudinal and 
behavioural spheres. 
Because the preferences for the ideal 
wife and the ideal husband vary, the 
respondents’ views about the latter are 
presented, too. Table 9 gives the general 
respondents’ views about the ideal husband:
attributes of the ideal husband in the Iranian 
mindset. Nor do economic and physical 
attributes rival with religious and moral 
ones. Therefore, seemingly important 
attributes of proper occupation, acceptable 
economic situation, and education have no 
place among people’s opinion about the 
ideal husband. 
Amicability is more important in 
women’s view than men, because women 
are the ones who become the men’s spouses 
and they prefer well-mannered men. Like 
the ideal wife, in choosing the ideal husband, 
age matters in religious preferences as it 
finds more force with the rise in age, and is 
replaced by moral concerns among lower 
age groups. For youth who are seriously 
concerned with finding a proper occupation, 
occupation is more vitally the attribute 
of the ideal husband. It is evident that 
people’s actual situation is effective in their 
preferences. Therefore, the respondents’ 
occupation determines their attitude, as 
among those who are newly entering the 
workforce, like pupils and university 
students, having a proper occupation is more 
critically an attribute of the ideal husband. 
As the education increases, moral attributes 
such as honesty gain priority (Abbasi-
Shavazi et al., 2008). Therefore, moral 
concerns are central among all education 
groups, but they are more consciously 
adopted as the education increases. As a 
result, moral concerns decline in general, 
but concerns with specific moral attributes 
such as honesty are on the rise. Among 
the married who deal with conjugal issues 
directly, religious attributes are more 
important than moral ones. It is inferred that 
Table 9 
Ideal husband criteria (2004)
Attitude Percent
Faithfulness 22.7
Amicability and courteousness 21.1
Honesty 14.6
Responsibility 6.5
Mutual understanding 5.7
Activeness and hardworking 4.9
Judgment 4.9
Occupation 4.5
Authority 4.5
Health 2.5
Wealth 2.4
Decency 2
Nobility 1.9
Literacy 1.3
Other 0.5
Total 100
Source: Goudarzi (2004)
According to the data in Table 8, popular 
opinion about the ideal husband is similarly 
religiously and morally oriented. “Decency” 
has no considerable place among the 
Seyed Mahdi Etemadifard
16 Pertanika J. Soc. Sci. & Hum. 26 (T): 1 - 20 (2018)
moral attributes are more important among 
singles because morality helps them to shape 
their mental preferences, while religious 
determinations keep the conjugal life of the 
married ordered and principled. 
In 2015, the popular opinion about the 
“ideal wife” was measured once again. Table 
10 gives the findings of this survey:
Based on Table 10, moral and religious 
aspects continue to be of utmost influence in 
shaping preferences toward the ideal wife. 
“Chastity” in this survey denotes a similar 
meaning to the “decency” that was observed 
in the findings of the 1975 and 2005 surveys. 
People’s attitudes about the ideal wife has 
not changed significantly since. Rather, 
it has become more consciously adopted, 
having learned from the general morality or 
decency characteristics more concrete traits 
like chastity. Visual measures of beauty and 
economic preferences are not determining 
factors in respondents’ opinion about the 
ideal wife, comprising less than two percent 
of all (Asadi, 1975; Goudarzi, 2005). 
Since the preferences for the ideal 
husband differ from those for the ideal wife, 
the survey evaluates the characteristics of 
the “ideal husband” as well. Responses are 
presented in the following table. 
Table 10 
Ideal wife criteria (2015)
Attitude Percent
Chastity 16.5
Faithfulness and piety 15.5
Amicability and courteousness 15
Hijab observance 8.8
Nobility 8.3
Family of origin 6.7
Honesty 3.3
Modesty 3.1
Literacy 2.7
Courtesy 2.6
Judgment 2.2
Beauty 2
Homemaking 1.6
Religious observances 1.3
Docility 1
Contentment 1
Health 0.9
Forgiveness 0.7
Mutual understanding 0.6
Occupation 0.5
Wealth 0.5
Family committedness 0.4
Age 0.4
Economic standing 0.4
Sameness and complementarity 0.2
Other 2.3
No response 1.5
Total 100
Source: Ghaffari (2015)
Table 11 
Ideal husband criteria (2015)
Attitude Percent
Occupation 22.1
Amicability and courteousness 19.6
Faithfulness 16.1
Nobility 5.1
Family of origin 4.6
Honesty 4.3
Chastity 3.6
Health 3.2
Literacy 2.9
Judgment 1.9
Wealth 1.9
Economic standing 1.2
Modesty 1.2
Islamic rearing 1.2
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CONCLUSION
Family in Iran is an endemic social institution 
that has experienced immense transition 
under modernization (Azadarmaki, 2014). 
A measure for understanding family 
transition in Iran is spouse selecting 
patterns and the attitudes toward the ideal 
spouse (Azadarmaki, 2007). Changes 
in this regard have been immense in the 
past decades and proportionate to the 
growing individual autonomy in spouse 
choosing behaviour (Azadarmaki, 2016; 
Ezazi, 1997). Nevertheless, the stable 
permanence of cousin marriages has 
established it as a major consideration 
among all items. Approximately one fourth 
of respondents from various groups and 
generations have manifested a preference 
for cousin marriage (Behnam, 1992). 
On the other hand, data show that youth 
and university degree holders alternate 
exogamy (Abbasi-Shavazi et al., 2008). 
Surprisingly, the very groups that continue 
to arrange their exogamic marriages are in 
concert with the priorities of their extended 
families. Sometimes, even in urban areas, 
the commitment is extended to the whole 
kinship (Behnam, 1971). Individualism has 
in one respect contributed to the primacy of 
exogamic marriages; however, this needs 
to be analysed with caution (Behnam, 
1992). The convergence theory of family 
does not provide the explanatory tool 
for investigating the totality of spouse 
choosing transformations (Blossfeld & 
Timm, 2012). The model of the western 
Vigor 0.9
Forgiveness 0.8
Adequate income 0.7
Family committedness 0.5
Accommodation 0.5
Courtesy 0.5
Beauty 0.4
Mutual understanding 0.3
Clothing manner 0.3
Family friendliness 0.2
Sublimity 0.2
Other 3.4
No response 2.4
Total 100
Source: Ghaffari (2015)
Table 11 (continue)
Attitude Percent
Accordingly, moral and religious preferences 
are suggested along with occupational 
concerns. This reveals that people’s concerns 
in their attitude about the ideal husband are 
becoming more transparent. Since similar 
economic concerns are mentioned under 
income or accommodation items, it seems 
that by occupation, respondents mean 
something more, namely, self-sufficiency 
in the satisfaction of primary needs. Once 
more, the conclusion could be made that 
physical and material concerns remain 
below two percent among respondents. 
However, the arrangement of responses 
suggesting occupation along with moral 
and religious concerns underscores the 
autonomous connotations of the choice, 
rather than the material tendencies of the 
respondents (Azadarmaki, 2016). 
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nuclear family does not illuminate family 
structures and spouse choosing patterns in 
every respect. As a result, the theories that 
consider the attitudinal and value changes, 
such as second demographic transition, 
better met the purpose of this study in 
evaluating spouse choosing transformations 
(Sobotka, 2008). Based on such analysis, 
the attitudinal preferences about the ideal 
spouse and the resulting attitudinal pyramid 
of marriage has not changed dramatically; 
morality and religion continue to dominate 
the structure of Iranians’ mindset about the 
ideal spouse (Asadi, 1975; Goudarzi, 2005; 
Ghaffari, 2015). Wealth and beauty occupy 
no significant place in this pyramid. This 
might not suggest the congruence between 
the objective and attitudinal respects but 
highlights the permanence of the prevalent 
pattern of earlier decades (Goudarzi, 2004). 
Of importance is a degree of stability in both 
objective and attitudinal patterns of spouse 
choosing, a reality that goes unnoticed 
in organizational and functional theories. 
Undoubtedly, Iranians’ preferences in 
choosing the ideal spouse stems from their 
morality and religion. Another conclusion 
is that individual Iranians’ mindsets have 
become plainer in structure. In the past, 
Iranians preferred a woman as the ideal wife 
who was decent and pious in manner (Asadi, 
1975; Fathi, 1985). Decency continues to 
shape preferences about the ideal wife but 
has evolved to denote proper manner and 
modesty in behaviour best exemplified 
in observing hijab. In this regard, men 
appear more agreeable with women’s social 
participation (Goudarzi, 2005), although it 
seems that this conformity diverges from 
their real preference for the ideal wife 
(Goudarzi, 2004; Pourrezaanvar, 2003). 
In other words, men agree with women’s 
public participation in general, but do 
not admire it as such for their own wives 
(Asadi, 1975; Goudarzi, 2004; 2005). 
In general, the Iranians’ agreement with 
women’s participation is provisioned by a 
preference for hijab and modesty (Faraji 
& Hamidi, 2014). What has changed about 
the ideal husband is the identification of 
self-sufficiency as an indicator emphasized 
under the term “occupation”. The value 
hierarchy of respondents clarifies the idea 
behind suggesting occupation as a top 
priority; by occupation, the respondents 
intend less wealth or income and mean 
more self-sufficiency in satisfying personal 
primary needs. Such a moral interpretation 
better fits the other items, as items such as 
economic standing, adequate income level, 
and accommodation are relegated to the 
lowest two percent and even half percent 
(Ghaffari, 2015; Goudarzi, 2005). People 
admire a husband who can fulfil his needs, 
and this is translated into maintaining a 
proper occupation. It seems that popular 
opinion about the ideal husband is still moral 
in nature but attached more precision; it has 
distanced from the cliché amicability and 
courteousness and found exact instances. 
Comparison of data in the past four decades 
clarifies that the foundations of Iranians’ 
preferences about the ideal spouse has not 
changed dramatically but has evolved to be 
more concrete. Iranians continue to prefer 
the morally and religiously observant spouse 
Iranians’ Attitudes about the Ideal Spouse
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(Henriksen & Kurtén, 2012). It seems that 
their religious tendencies have found moral 
interpretations, as moral groundings are 
underscored among the youth’s responses. 
Finally, attitudinal and behavioural 
dimensions do not essentially overlap 
(Joseph & Najmabadi, 2007). What 
constitutes Iranians’ actions does not reflect 
their attitudes to the full; rather, attitudes 
are to express the deep idealized and, 
probably, unfulfilled beliefs. The absence 
of congruity neither suggests disagreement 
nor discrepancy; such a conclusion requires 
more detailed longitudinal data that measure 
both attitudinal and behavioural aspects. 
Based on the existing sources and findings 
reviewed in this study, the general inference 
is that people’s criteria for the ideal spouse is 
not the basis for their actual spouse selecting 
behaviour. The present study attempted to 
assess behavioural as well as attitudinal 
aspects of Iranians’ mindset about spouse 
choosing, to reach as much comprehensive 
a sketch of the future family transition as 
possible. 
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ABSTRACT
Marginality or informal settlement is an important subject in urban issues that generates 
negative and destructive consequences for the mental health of those who reside in such 
areas. It is of such significance that is addressed in macro-policies of the Fifth Development 
Plan of Iran. Given the importance of marginality as a concerning issue, this paper explores 
the relationship between social capital and mental health of the inhabitants of marginalised 
areas of the city of Kermanshah using field method and survey technique. The statistical 
society includes all inhabitants of marginalised areas of Kermanshah city aged 18 years 
and older. A total of 384 individuals were examined as the sample using the Cochran 
formula. Results indicate that there are significant and positive relationships between 
the total social capital (P=0.34) and its various aspects, including social trust (P=0.40), 
social solidarity (P=0.32), social participation (P=0.37), social support (P=0.30) and social 
awareness (P=0.24), with mental health. Results from AMOS show that, in general, the 
effect of social capital as a dependent variable on the mental health of the youth living in 
the marginalised area is 0.48. Social capital is a main source of mental health among people 
living in marginal areas. A society that is 
rich in social capital can provide people with 
higher levels of social and health benefits by 
providing more social support for members, 
developing social participation and trust, 
and raising individual and social awareness. 
Keywords: Kermanshah city, marginalised area, 
mental health, social capital   
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INTRODUCTION
In regard to the advancement of national 
objectives and ideals of the society, mental 
health is of remarkable significance in terms 
of saving on material and spiritual costs of 
society members. Results of recent research 
show that mental disorders are among the 
most important elements in the overall 
burden of diseases. It is predicted that by 
2020, the share of mental and neurological 
disorders in the overall burden of diseases 
will increase by 50% and change the current 
share of 5.10% to 15%. Attention to mental 
health in every aspect of life, including 
personal, social, and career life, therefore, 
is remarkably important (Cheng, Kawakhi, 
Coakley, Schwartz, & Colditz, 2000). 
Mental health is an important element of 
public health. This term is used to describe 
the level of psychological and emotional 
well-being and also to show absence of 
mental disorders. According to the World 
Health Organisation [WHO] (2011), there is 
no distinct definition for mental health, and 
cultural differences, personal evaluations, 
and rival specialised theories affect the way 
this term is defined.
Given the fact that in today’s life, a 
major portion of different diseases (whether 
mental or physical) in developing countries 
is highly connected with social factors 
and models, the impacts of such models 
reveal their effectiveness for a long-term 
period. Issues, such as poverty, failure in 
education, living in rather-improper physical 
environments (such as marginalised areas), 
and a high level of insecurity in the society 
(such as violence and accidents), along with 
factors like negative personal incidents, 
including parental separation, losing a job, 
or forced migration, are among social factors 
that significantly affect an individual’s 
mental health. Any decrease in the mental 
health of society members will lead to a 
decrease in their performance, which, in 
turn, provokes fundamental problems, not 
only for the individual, but for society as 
well (Woolcock, 2001). 
As mentioned earl ier,  l iving in 
improper physical environment, such as 
marginalised areas, is one of the factors 
that decrease individual mental health. 
Usually, marginalised residencies are made 
up of non-standard and strictly dense houses 
that are unhealthy, unstable, and socially 
inappropriate. From a cultural viewpoint, 
marginality is at the lowest level and 
includes both social and physical aspects. 
Marginalised areas are in undesirable 
conditions and are of low quality in terms 
of health and service installations and 
equipment. They lack the basic welfare 
facilities. Open and non-sanitary toilets, as 
well as an environment contaminated with 
waste and rubbish, generate an expedient 
context for different diseases. In winters, 
alleys become full of filth and mud and 
on-street water slants through these areas, 
which results in an increase in diseases and 
fatality of the children living there (Ladan 
& Rezghi, 2009).
Marginality is a feature in many 
developing countries, including Iran. With 
the explosive pace of urbanisation and 
the emergence of urbanisation patterns 
in Iran, a considerable portion of urban 
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spaces and residential areas were occupied 
by a phenomenon known as marginality 
or informal settlements, which are at a 
large extent in different cities. From the 
early decades of the current solar century 
and with the arrival of industry in Iran, 
social reforms and land reforms in rural 
communities, injection of oil revenues into 
cities, reduction on fatality and, eventually, 
the Islamic Revolution and the subsequent 
war, along with other factors, forced a large 
part of the rural population and work force to 
migrate to cities, resulting in the expansion 
of marginalisation.
Marginality or informal settlements is 
considered an important urban issue that 
has brought about negative and destructive 
consequences for the mental health of those 
living in such areas. As a result, this issue 
is explicitly addressed in macro-policies of 
the Fifth Development Plan of the country. 
One of the factors linked with mental 
health of individuals is their social capital. 
The term ‘social capital’ is defined as 
the capitals people use to solve general 
problems. As an axiom, social capital is 
considered a solution to various social 
problems, such as poverty, crime, lagging 
economy, and a low-yielding government. 
Social capital is deeply connected to 
concepts such as civil society and social 
communications (Adam & Roncevic, 2003). 
Social capital positively affects various 
aspects of physical and mental health. It 
boosts self-confidence, generates social 
support, helps individuals obtain resources, 
and serves as a shield against stressful events 
of life (Salazar, Wingood, Diclemente, 
Lang, & Harrington, 2004). 
Patel believes that the role of social 
factors in mental health is considerably 
specified. Increased attention towards such 
social factors and their role in mental health 
in third-world countries coincides with the 
development of social capital and it creates 
social models of mental health (Harpham, 
Carant, & Rodriguez, 2003). Lynch and 
Kaplan define social capital as a type of 
capital accumulation and networks that 
create social solidarity, social commitment 
and, consequently, self-esteem and health in 
individuals (Iman, Hoseini Roudbati, 2008; 
Lahsaeizadeh & Moradi, 2007). Given these 
explanations, therefore, an exploration 
into the relationship between social capital 
and mental health in marginalised areas is 
fundamental and of great importance. In 
this regard, this paper seeks to examine 
the relationship between social capital 
and mental health of people who live in 
marginalised areas of City of Kermanshah 
as one of Iran’s metropolises where nearly 
25 to 30 percent of the population live in 
marginality in poor conditions.
Though in Iran, social capital as 
well as mental health has been studied in 
many respects, research that examines the 
relationship between these two variables 
is rarely conducted. Particularly, the issue 
of social capital and mental health in 
marginalized areas has been neglected 
and has not been addressed scientifically. 
This is while people living in marginal 
areas are always exposed to social and 
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psychological harm. Therefore, considering 
the lack of research in this regard, the 
relationship between these two variables is 
a fundamental and scientifically verifiable 
problem.
Literature Review
Nekoonam, Ahmadi and Abbasi Jari (2015) 
conducted a research titled “An Examination 
on the Impact of Social Capital (in-group and 
out-group) on Mental Health of university 
Students (subjects: students of Tabriz 
University)”. The results of their research 
suggested that there was a significant 
relationship between social capital (in-group 
and out-group) and mental health, while 
there was a reverse meaningful relationship 
between social capital (in-group and out-
group) and anxiety, social dysfunction, and 
depression. Results also indicated that there 
wasn’t a significant relationship between 
social capital (in-group and out-group) and 
physical symptoms.
Razavizadeh, Noghati and Yousefi 
(2012) conducted a research t i t led 
“Relationship between Social Capital and 
Mental Health among Students of Ferdowsi 
University of Mashhad”. The methodology 
included a survey and the sample consisted 
of 304 students of Ferdowsi University of 
Mashhad. The results showed that, although 
independent variables of trust, support, 
social relationships, self-esteem and mental 
health supportive behaviour did not have 
individual meaningful impact on anxiety 
and severe depression simultaneously, the 
impact of trust, support, and social relations 
on these two variables is significant.
Shoja, Nabavi, Kasaee and Bagheri 
Yazdi (2011) conducted a research titled 
“Factor Analysis of Social Capital and its 
Relationship with Mental Health of the 
Elderly of Tehran’s 9th District”. Results 
demonstrated that there was a relationship 
between social capital’s elements of 
individual trust and social solidarity and 
support and mental health of the elderly. 
However, no meaningful relationship was 
observed between social capital’s elements 
of social trust and association relations with 
mental health of the elderly.
Shakerinia (2010) conducted a research 
titled “Relationship between Social Capital 
and Significance of Life with Mental Health 
in Victims of Wife Abuse”. Results suggested 
that there was a meaningful relationship 
between social capital, significance of life, 
and mental health of the women studied 
in this research. Moreover, step-by-step 
regression analysis showed that variables 
of social capital and significance of life 
managed to predict the mental health of the 
subjects.
Hamano et al. (2010) examined the 
relationship between social capital and 
mental health in a study using a multi-level 
approach. They realised that both types of 
social capital (cognitive and structural) can 
affect mental health at the neighbourhood 
level. 
Ma lbe rg  (2010)  examined  the 
relationship between social capital and 
mental health among Norwegian social 
clients. Results indicated that there was a 
positive correlation between the elements 
of bonding social capital, such as social 
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trust and trust, in social workers with mental 
health. 
Another research on social capital and 
mental health was conducted by Harpham et 
al. (2003) titled “Mental Health and Social 
Capital”. The sample consisted of 1168 
individuals aged 15 to 25 years whose mental 
health was evaluated on a 20-point scale. 
Moreover, the variable of social capital was 
measured in cognitive and structural aspects. 
Results of this research showed that social 
capital affected individual mental health 
both in terms of its structural aspect (civil 
participation, membership and activity in 
official and unofficial organisations) and in 
terms of its cognitive aspect (trust, mutual 
relationships, norms).
In a research titled “How Much Can 
Social Capital Affect Health”, Roose and Wu 
(1995) examined the relationship between 
social capital and health. According to the 
results and data analysis, they concluded 
that social capital (engagement in or exit 
from official and unofficial social networks, 
friends and individuals that one relies on in 
the time of sickness, having control over 
life, and trust) affects individual health 
more than human capital (social base, age, 
sex, income).
Theoretical Framework: Mental Health 
Theories
Freud believed that most of the people are, to 
different degrees, neurotic, and that mental 
health is an ideal, not a statistical norm. 
He believed that the first characteristics 
of mental health is self-awareness, which 
means anything that returns to (me) in 
the unconscious. Eventually, true self-
awareness is not possible unless the person 
has managed to pass through the levels of 
sexual mental health successfully and is 
not over-fixated in either of these levels. 
A mentally healthy person uses defense 
mechanisms, such as altruism, humor, piety, 
and austerity (Corsini, 1999).
According to Glasser, everyone has an 
implicit identity through which they feel 
relative success or failure. In general, a 
healthy person, according to Glasser, is one 
who has the following characteristics: 
1) He / She does not deny the reality 
and does not ignore painful situations 
through denial; rather, he/she faces such 
situations objectively. 
2) He / She has a successful identity (e.g. 
loves and is loved). He / She feels 
valuable and others confirm this feeling 
of theirs. 
3) He / She accepts the responsibility 
of their life and behaviour and acts 
accordingly. Responsibility is the 
perfect sign of mental health. 
4) Their attention to long-term joys are 
more rational and in accordance with 
reality. 
5) He / She emphasises the present and 
future not the past while their emphasis 
of future is a foresight not a fantasy.
Glaser’s reality therapy is based on the three 
principles of acceptance, judgment, and 
responsibility. Any person who manages 
to realise these three principles is mentally 
healthy (Khodarahimi, 1995).
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Maslow calls a healthy human ‘self-
actualised’ and explains that those who seek 
to reach self-actualisation meet their low-
level needs, such as physical needs, security, 
belonging, love, and respect. They are not 
psychotic or neurotic and do not have other 
pathological disorders. They are role models 
of maturity, wisdom, and health. They utilise 
all of their potentials and capabilities to 
reach self-actualisation. They know who 
they are, what they are, and where they are 
going (Schultz, 2012). Maslow proposes 
13 clinical criteria for realisation of self-
esteem and self-actualisation: 1) A good 
perception of reality, 2) ability to accept 
one’s self, others, and nature, 3) ability to 
maintain will, 4) relative achievement in 
fundamental issues, 5) having freedom and 
enthusiasm for life, 6) increasing autonomy 
and resistance in formation of groups, 
7) initiation in judgment and richness in 
motivation, 8) numerous experiences, 9) a 
good sense of identification with humanity, 
10) improving relationships with others, 
11) easement in accepting others, 12) 
developing creativity, and 13) mobility in 
the system of values (Ganji, 2000).
Frankel believes that a mentally healthy 
or self-transcending person has the following 
qualities: freedom and choice of action, 
accepts the responsibility of their life and 
fate, and is not affected by external forces. 
This type of person has found a meaning 
to their life, has conscious control over 
their life, goes beyond self-attention, and is 
attracted to external meanings. He / She has 
career commitment, has a specific mission, 
and is well aware of it. He / She also has the 
ability to give and receive love and, finally, 
thinks about the future and pays attention to 
their future goals and duties.
Skinner is an experimental psychologist 
and a key figure in the Behaviourist approach. 
He believes that the past experiences of 
individuals make them conditional and 
that all human behaviours are a function of 
environment. If we manage to consciously 
change the social environment and optimise 
it, we can create more desirable qualities 
in them. 
In short, the mental health of a healthy 
person, according to Skinner, is equal to 
behaviours that are consistent with rules 
and regulations of the society in a way that 
the person receives positive reinforcements 
from the environment and others due to 
these behaviours (Corsini, 1999). Dragotis 
defines mental health as the ability to live 
with joy, productivity, and a trouble-free life, 
along with the absence of nine symptoms of 
mental illness, including depression, anxiety, 
aggression, physical illnesses caused by 
mental illnesses, obsessive-compulsive 
disorder, interpersonal sensitivity, phobia, 
paranoid, and schizophrenia (Dragotis, 
1994).
Kawachi and Brekman believe that areas 
with a higher level of social capital have 
better access to social and health services. 
Besides, such areas have the capability to 
enforce a campaign against the government 
in protest to budget or to prevent closure 
of a school or a hospital. These areas can 
also create official pressure groups to 
make health organisations available to the 
public. During crisis, war, or drought, for 
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example, areas with in-group and out-group 
social capital are more able to protect their 
residents, support them, and provide them 
with health services (Kawachi & Brekman, 
2000).
Social Capital Theories
James Coleman maintains that social 
capital is not a unitary entity and consists 
of several elements, all of which have two 
features in common. First, social capital lies 
in the structure of the active (both real and 
legal) relations and, second, social capital 
facilitates social activities (Tajbakhsh, 2005 
as quoted by Moeinoddini, Sanatkhah, & 
Dadkhahfar, 2013).
James Coleman puts social capital in the 
company of executives in social structures. 
Coleman considers social capital as a 
testator in the relations between and within 
the executives in a society in that it benefits 
some and doesn’t benefit others. Social 
capital is not a single unit but a spectrum 
of different units that have two common 
features. All include aspects of a social 
structure and they help certain executives 
present in the structure. The development 
of social capital is defined as the aspects of 
trustworthiness, obligations, and effective 
norms maintained by the participants in 
networks. It depends on the maintenance 
of progressing opportunities and resources. 
Coleman believes that the formation and 
destruction of social capital depends on the 
relationships within network groups. He 
also evaluated different aspects of social 
structures within different ideologies, 
as well as the role of governmental aid 
frequency, in social capital development. 
Even though some scholars have revised it, 
Coleman’s definition of social capital still 
excels recent sociological works (Salmani, 
Taghipour, Ramexanzadeh, & Jalili, 2010).
Putnam claims that participation in 
community, like official and unofficial 
networks of the society, is the core to the 
concept of social capital (Hashemianfar 
& Heidarkhani, 2012). He states that 
volunteering in a community, which has 
inherited an enormous social capital in 
form of norms of reciprocity and social 
participation networks, is better (Putnam, 
2001). Social networks encourage people 
to work together and trust others, rather 
than isolate themselves for personal interest 
purposes (Tajbakhsh, 2005). Contrary to 
economic capital, social capital is a public 
commodity. That’s probably why it is 
often undervalued and not much is done 
to increase its value. Putnam considers 
the following features for social capital 
as a locally-obtained social solidarity: 1) 
A dense set of local social organisations 
and networks; 2) High levels of civil 
commitment in local social networks; 3) 
Strong and positive local identity along with 
a sense of consistency and equality with local 
community members; 4) Generalised norms 
regarding trust and mutual contribution 
between local community members and 
whether they know each other in person or 
not; and 5) Civil participation networks are 
the embodiment of the previous successful 
cooperation which can serve as a cultural 
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model for future cooperation (Azkia & 
Ghafari, 2008 as quoted by Mohseni Tabrizi 
& Aghamohseni, 2010).
For Putnam, indicators of social capital 
include trust, norms, and social participation 
networks that improve the performance of 
society by facilitating actions (Hashemianfar 
& Heidarkhani, 2012).
In the 1980s, Bourdieu developed the 
concept of social capital, although this 
was less paid attention to as compared 
to other parts of his social theory (Field, 
2003). One of the theoretical foundations 
of Bourdieu’s sociology was to consider 
society as a multiplicity of social domains. 
Various forms of capital (economic, cultural, 
and social) are the main elements defining 
the positions and possibilities of different 
actors in each domain. For him, capitalists 
can manifest themselves in two basic 
forms: economic capital, which has the 
ability to convert to money and may be 
institutionalised in the form of ownership 
rights; social capital, which consists of 
social requirements (communication) and 
in certain conditions has the ability to 
convert to economic capital and may be 
institutionalised in the form of aristocracy 
or nobility (Majedi & Lahsaeezadeh, 2006). 
Francis Fukuyama discusses social 
capital in an economic framework. He used 
the concept of social capital to compile a 
theory on social trust, which states that the 
power and performance of social capital 
in society depends on society members’ 
commitment to common norms and values 
and their ability to overlook personal 
interests in favour of public good and 
prosperity (Mohseni Tabrizi & Aghahasani, 
2010, p. 150).
Bert defined the structural split 
theory in order to conceptualise social 
capital. Structural split theory is based 
on interpersonal relationships between 
an individual and their colleagues in a 
social network, which automatically is 
of value for the society (Mohseni Tabrizi 
& Aghahasani, 2010). According to this 
theory, if an individual in a social network 
established a relationship with colleagues 
with whom he/she has none or little 
relationships, he/she will have optimised it. 
Thus, the reinforcement of split networks 
has advantages, such as rapid information 
evaluation, double bargaining power, 
and increased control over resources and 
outcomes (Cybert, Kraimer, & Linden, 
2001).
Brian Turner believes that social capital 
can be considered a paradigm for the 
definition of differences in health and 
illness among social groups in the public 
health domain. For Turner, this domain of 
social capital discussions is rooted in classic 
theories, especially in Durkheim sociology. 
He defines social capital as a membership 
of individuals in official and unofficial 
groups, as well as official and unofficial 
institutions, degree of social cohesion, social 
solidarity, and social membership density in 
local groups, voluntary associations, mutual 
social ties, and social trust (Turner, 2003).
In societies where social ties are not at 
a desirable level due to different reasons 
and where people avoid rational social 
interactions, the formation and development 
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of social capital take place slowly. Therefore, 
a phenomenon called ‘selfish individualism’ 
grows in these societies, which leads to an 
increase in social solidarity. Decrease in 
social interactions causes social isolation to 
individuals. As a result, a sense of isolation 
and loneliness spreads in the society and, 
with the escalation of this situation, negative 
mental states emerge in individuals while 
their mental health decreases. He also 
proposes that high social capital is a means 
through which individuals are protected 
against mental illnesses because social 
investments create a supportive environment 
for them (Turner, 2003).
Theoretical and Empirical Framework 
of Research
This research uses various theories. 
However, only those theories that serve 
as the basis for the hypotheses form the 
theoretical framework of the research.
From Kawachi’s and Berkman’s 
viewpoint, areas with higher social capital 
have more access to social and health 
services. Besides, such areas have the 
capability to enforce a campaign against 
the government in protest to budget or to 
prevent closure of a school or a hospital. 
These areas can also create official pressure 
groups in order to make health organisations 
available to the public. During crisis, war, 
or drought, for example, areas with in-group 
and out-group social capital are more able 
to protect their residents, support them, and 
provide them with health services (Kawachi 
& Brekman, 2000).
Turner believes that, in societies where 
social ties are not at a desirable level due to 
different reasons and where people avoid 
rational social interactions, the formation 
and development of social capital take 
place slowly. Therefore, a phenomenon 
called ‘selfish individualism’ grows in 
these societies, which leads to an increase 
in social solidarity. Decrease in social 
interactions causes social isolation to 
individuals. As a result, a sense of isolation 
and loneliness spreads in the society and, 
with the escalation of this situation, negative 
mental states emerge in individuals while 
their mental health decreases. He also 
proposes that high social capital is a means 
through which individuals are protected 
against mental illnesses because social 
investments create a supportive environment 
for them (Turner, 2003).
Hamano et al. (2010) realised that 
both types of social capital (cognitive and 
structural) can affect mental health at the 
neighborhood level. Malberg and Himonan 
(2010) showed that there is a positive 
correlation between the elements of bonding 
social capital, such as social trust and trust 
in social worker, and mental health. 
Roose and Wu (1995) demonstrated 
that social capital (engagement in or exit 
from official and unofficial social networks, 
friends and individuals who one relies on 
in the time of sickness and having control 
over life and trust) affects individual health 
more than human capital (social base, age, 
sex, income).
Hence, the main hypothesis is extracted 
from the above-mentioned theories and 
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research: There is a relationship between 
social capital and mental health.
Moreover, according to various theories, 
social capital in the current research is 
evaluated in terms of social trust (Bourdieu, 
Putnam, Coleman), social solidarity 
(Putnam), social participation (Putnam), 
social awareness (Bourdieu), and social 
support (Turner). Thus, the sub-hypotheses 
are stated as follows:
There is a relationship between social 
capital (social trust, social participation, 
social solidarity, social awareness and social 
support) and mental health.
Figure 1. Theoretical model of research
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RESEARCH HYPOTHESES
Main Hypothesis 
There is a relationship between social capital 
and mental health of the individuals living 
in marginalised areas.
Sub-hypotheses
Hypothesis 1: There is a relationship 
between social solidarity and the mental 
health of people living in marginalised areas.
Hypothesis 2: There is a relationship 
between social participation and the mental 
health of people living in marginalised areas.
Hypothesis 3: There is a relationship 
between social support and the mental health 
of people living in marginalised areas.
Hypothesis 4: There is a relationship 
between social trust and the mental health 
of people living in marginalised areas.
Hypothesis 5: There is a relationship 
between social awareness and the mental 
health of people living in marginalised areas.
METHODS
Based on the data gathered and analysed, 
this research is a quantitative one and, 
Social Capita Land Mental Health in Marginalised Areas
31Pertanika J. Soc. Sci. & Hum. 26 (T): 1 - 42 (2018)
in regard to its manner of addressing the 
problem, it is a field study. The technique 
used in the research is survey. In the field 
study, Goldberg’s standardised mental 
health questionnaire, as well as a researcher-
made social capital questionnaire, was 
used to collect data. The General Health 
questionnaire (GHQ) was designed by 
Goldberg (Goldberg & William, 1979).
To verify the rel iabi l i ty  of  the 
questionnaire, several university instructors 
and experts were consulted, and the 
Cronbach’s alpha test was used. Based on the 
alpha coefficient, the reliability coefficient 
of the mental health questionnaire is 0.83, 
while the reliability coefficient of the social 
capital questionnaire is 0.74. 
The statistical population of this study 
consisted of all individuals aged 18 years 
and older in the marginalised areas of 
Kermanshah City. Since it was naturally 
impossible to study the opinions of all of 
the inhabitants of these areas, sampling 
was applied to determine the opinions of 
the subjects. According to the Cochran 
formula, a number of people (384 people) 
were selected and studied as the sample 
of the statistical population. The sampling 
method of this research consisted of two 
steps, including cluster sampling and simple 
random sampling. After data were collected, 
they were analysed using statistical software 
SPSS. Proper statistical tests were applied 
in accordance with each hypothesis to test 
them.
CONCEPTUAL AND OPERATIONAL 
DEFINITION OF VARIABLES
Social Capital
Conceptual definition: The term social 
capital refers to capitals, such as social 
trust and the norms and networks that 
people devote to solving general problems. 
Social capital is said to be linked with 
concepts, such as civil society and social 
communication (Adam & Ransowicz, 2003)
Operational definition: This research 
investigates social capital with indicators of 
social solidarity, social participation, social 
support, social trust, and social awareness.
Mental Health
Conceptual definition: Mental health is the 
ability to find a balance in life and resist 
problems. Psychological problems impose 
a considerable amount of pressure on 
communities (Fata, Mutabi, Shakikba, & 
Barouti, 2008).
Operational definition: This research 
investigates mental health with indicators 
of physical symptoms, anxiety, severe 
depression, and disruption in social function.
DATA ANALYSIS
Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive statistics included variables of 
sex, education and age. Results of the sex 
variable show that 54.0% of the respondents 
were male and 46.0% female. Results of 
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the variable of age indicate that 18.0% of 
the respondents were aged 15 to 18, 25.0% 
were aged 19 to 22, 30.0% were aged 23 to 
26, and 24.0% were aged 27 to 29 years.
Table 1 
Descriptive statistics of mental health
Component status Descriptive Indicators Research Variables
Total Very high 
(1)
High
(2)
Average 
(3)
Low
(4)
Very low
(5)
Standard 
deviation
Mean
384 69 77 70 83 85 0.91 3.09 symptoms of 
physical problems
384 49 90 80 90 75 0.87 3.13 anxiety
384 18 30 75 106 155 0.92 3.91 severe depression
384 34 59 85 100 106 0.88 3.48 disruption in social 
functions
384 0.90 3.40 Total mental health 
score
Findings of the mental health variable are 
in a way that the direction of the questions 
is the reverse. That is, the very high level of 
each variable indicates low mental health 
and its coefficient is 1, while the very low 
level of each variable indicates high mental 
health and its coefficient is 5. The findings 
showed that among the indicators of mental 
health, the mean of symptoms of physical 
problems is 3.91, anxiety is 3.13, severe 
depression is 91.3, and disruption in social 
function is 3.48. The overall mental health 
score of 3.40 indicates that the mental 
health of respondents is slightly higher than 
average.
 
Results of the variable of education 
indicate that 28.0% of respondents have a 
diploma, 37.0% have an associate degree, 
29.0% have a bachelor’s degree, and 6.0% 
have a master’s degree or higher. 
Descriptive Statistics Regarding Mental Health Variable
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Unlike the findings of the mental health 
variable, whose indicators have a reverse 
direction, social capital indicators have a 
direct direction. This means that very high 
social capital is estimated with coefficient 5, 
while very low is estimated with 1. Findings 
show that among social capital indicators, 
social cohesion has the highest mean (3.35) 
while social support has the lowest mean 
(2.66). Moreover, the general status of social 
capital components shows that, in all of the 
components, respondents acknowledge that 
social capital in the marginalised areas of 
Kermanshah is less than average (3) while 
the total score of social capital indicates that 
social capital in marginalised areas is low 
and near average (2.92). 
FINDINGS
Inferential Statistics
Normal Distribution of Data
To use parametric tests, some preconditions 
are required, which include normalised data. 
To investigate the normality of the factors, 
the Kolmogorov-Smirnov single sample test 
is used as follows.
Ho :  data are normally distributed 
H1 :  data are not normally distributed 
Table 2 
Descriptive statistics of social capital
Component status Descriptive Indicators Research Variables
Total Very high 
(1)
High
(2)
Average 
(3)
Low
(4)
Very low
(5)
Standard 
deviation
Mean
384 42 73 140 97 32 0.97 2.99 social trust
384 74 101 138 31 40 0.87 3.35 social solidarity
384 48 60 129 85 62 0.94 2.86 social participation
384 39 60 121 94 70 0.93 2.75 social awareness
384 47 50 101 100 86 0.92 2.66 social support
2.92 total social capital 
score
Table 3 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test to determine the normality of research variables 
Subscales
indicators
Social trust Social 
solidarity
Social 
participation
Social 
awareness
Social 
support
Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
values
2.65 2.92 2.88 2.63 2.36
Significance level (two 
domains)
0.21 0.25 0.07 0.08 0.13
Descriptive Statistics of the Social Capital Variable
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According to Table 3, it can be concluded 
that, since the values of significance level of 
all research variables are more than 0.05, 
data are normally distributed and, thus, 
parametric tests may be used for the analysis 
of the research hypotheses.
Testing the hypotheses
There is a relationship between different 
aspects of social capital (social trust, 
social participation, social solidarity, social 
awareness, and social support) and mental 
health of those residing in marginality. 
The Pearson correlation coefficient test 
was used to investigate the research 
hypotheses regarding the relationship 
between different aspects of social capital 
(solidarity, participation, support, trust, and 
awareness) with mental health. Results are 
presented in the following table.
Table 4 
Correlation between independent and dependent variables 
Mental Health
Variable Indicators Correlation coefficient Significance level
Social capital Social solidarity 0.32 0.000
Social participation 0.37 0.000
Social support 0.30 0.000
Social trust 0.40 0.001
Social awareness 0.24 0.001
Total social capital 0.34 0.000
Results suggest that there is a significant, 
positive, and direct relationship between 
all aspects of the social capital and mental 
health from the viewpoint of inhabitants 
of marginalised areas. Meanwhile, the 
relationship between social trust and mental 
health (P = 0.40) had the highest correlation 
coefficient, while the relationship between 
social awareness and mental health had the 
lowest correlation coefficient (P = 0.24). 
Also, there is a positive and significant 
relationship between social participation 
(P = 0.37), social solidarity (P = 0.32), 
and social support (P =0.30) with mental 
health from the perspective of the youth 
living in marginalised areas. Therefore, it 
can be argued that, from the perspective 
of inhabitants of marginalised regions, the 
higher the rate of social capital (P = 0.34) 
and its aspects, the higher the level of mental 
health. All the hypotheses of the present 
research are confirmed.
Regression analysis
How does each independent variable explain 
the dependent variables of the research?
Social Capita Land Mental Health in Marginalised Areas
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Dependent variable: mental health of 
inhabitants of marginalised area
The table above lists the values of 
coefficients in the regression equation 
and probabilistic sizes based on the linear 
relationship between the predictive variables 
and dependent variables. According to the 
table, the social trust variable (β = 0/37) 
plays a larger role than other ones. This 
indicates that, for each unit of change in 
the standard deviation of social trust, a 0.37 
change occurs in the standard deviation of 
the dependent variable. Subsequently, the 
social participation variable (β = 0.31), 
social solidarity variable (β = 0.27), social 
awareness variable (β = 0.21), and social 
interaction variable (β = 0 / 18) contributed 
to the prediction of the dependent variable. 
It should be noted that multi-correlation 
of predictive variables with mental health 
is relatively high (R = 0.60). Also, five 
significant variables in general managed 
to significantly explain a change in the 
variable of mental health of inhabitants of 
marginalised regions by 0.36 (R2 = 0.36). 
Structural Equation Model (AMOS)
A structural equation model was used to 
determine the intensity and direction of 
the effect of social capital on mental health 
among the inhabitants of marginalised areas 
of Kermanshah in different situations. Nine 
visible variables are present in this model, 
where the variables h1, h2, h3, h4, and h5 
are representatives of the hidden variable 
of social capital, while the visible variables 
F1, F2, F3, and F4 are the representatives 
of the hidden variable of mental health. 
The error variables, z and d, represent 
the measurement error of the nine visible 
variables. 
Table 5 
Multiple regression test 
DW F R2 R Tol VIF sig t β B Predictive variables
1.89 21.84 0.36 0.60 - - 0.000 2.95 - 1.734 Fixed value
0.59 1.76 0.000 3.76 0.37 0.103 Social trust
0.70 1.42 0.000 3.33 0.31 0.079 Social participation
0.72 1.52 0.000 2.96 0.27 2.065 Social solidarity
0.74 1.30 0.000 2.65 0.21 0.0244 Social support
0.82 1.29 0.001 2.31 0.18 0.38 Social awareness
DW: Durbin-Watson, Tol: Tolerance, VIF: Variance inflation 
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Given that the direction of the arrows from 
the hidden variable to the visible variable 
that represents the hidden variable, it 
indicates the methodological point that 
the score of each respondent in the visible 
variable is influenced by the situation of the 
respondent, where the hidden underlying 
variable is associated with the visible one. In 
this model, for example, the hidden variable 
is social capital and its visible indicator is 
social solidarity (H1). In other words, the 
weights of H1, H2, H3, H4, and H5 in the 
research model determine the amount of 
respondent’s social capital.
In this model, the dependent and 
hidden variable is the mental health of the 
inhabitants of marginalised areas, while its 
visible indicators are anxiety (0.40), severe 
depression (0.26), symptoms of physical 
problems (0.35), and disruption in social 
function (0.18). 
For example, the effect of the dependent 
variable of the research (e.g. mental health 
on F1 (0.40)) means that hidden variable 
Table 6 
Variable present in the model 
Variable Indicators Graphical symbols in the model
Social capital Social solidarity H1
Social participation H2
Social support H3
Social trust H4
Social awareness H5
Mental health Anxiety F1
Severe depression F2
Symptoms of physical problems F3
Disruption in social function F4 
Figure 2. Structural equation test for the study of the impact of social capital on mental health
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of mental health has the highest potential 
to analyse F1 (or items directly linked to 
anxiety) with the highest coefficient. Social 
trust has the highest potential to analyse this 
variable with a coefficient of 0.59 in the 
hidden variable of social capital. In general, 
the effect of the independent variable of 
social capital on the mental health of the 
inhabitants of marginalised areas is 0.48. 
Table 7 
Model fitness indices
Indices Value Indices Value Indices Value
CMIN 254.04 GFI 0.86 NNFI 0.80
ρ,df 0.000، 231 AGFI 0.81 NFI 0.83
CMIN/DF 12.74 CFI 0.79 RMSEA 0.62
Fitness indices were used to examine model 
fitness. Fitness indices yield statistical 
values that help researchers choose the 
most suitable model. There are many fitness 
indices; however, the most effective one is 
the basis for the other indices and is called 
χ2. The closer the chi-square is to zero, the 
better the fitness of model. Since the chi-
square value is influenced by the sample 
size and the number of relationships of 
the model, one cannot reach a desirable 
conclusion based on this value. Therefore, 
other indices are used along with this one 
to examine model fitness (Ezheie, Fata, 
Mutabi, Shakikba, & Barouti, 2008). 
Another index used to tackle this flaw of 
chi-square is χ2/df. If this index is smaller 
than 3, it confirms the fitness of the model 
(Meyer, Eskandari, Grallath, & Rentsch, 
2006). Based on the principle, Goodness of 
Fit Indices (GFI), Adjusted Goodness of Fit 
Index (AGFI), Confirmatory Factor Index 
(CFI), Normed Fit Index (NFI), and Non-
Normed Fit Index (NNFI) are considered 
90.0-95.0 for good models, while values 
higher than 8.0 indicate a rather good fitness 
of model. Also, if Root Mean Square Error 
of Approximation (RMSEA), suggested by 
Lohin (2004) for fitness, is less than 0.80, 
it shows good fitness, values of 0.80 to 0.1 
show acceptable fitness, and values closer to 
zero indicate higher fitness. The above table 
shows the results of the analysis of the first-
order factor for the above-mentioned model.
CONCLUSION
As mentioned before, mental health in the 
community is one of the main pillars of 
sustainable development and an essential 
part of prosperity and quality of life. A 
society is dynamic and vital only when its 
citizens, whether man or woman, enjoy 
favourable physical, mental, and social 
health. In this way, society can move 
towards improvement and fulfilment and 
reach a reasonable level of development. 
Mental health, especially in marginalised 
Model Fitness
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areas or informal settlements, is one of 
the most important urban issues. Living 
in marginality generates negative and 
destructive consequences for the mental 
health of its inhabitants and, thus, this issue 
is address in macro-policies of Iranian Fifth 
Development Plan.
In this regard, given the importance 
and necessity of an examination of the 
relationship between social capital and 
mental health, this paper analysed and 
investigated different aspects of social 
capital (i.e. social trust, social solidarity, 
social participation, social support, and 
social awareness) as independent variables 
and their relationship to the mental health 
of the inhabitants of the marginalised areas 
of the city of Kermanshah as the dependent 
variable. 
The results confirm a positive, direct, 
and significant relationship between all of 
the independent variables and the dependent 
variable. The higher the level of social 
trust (P = 40/0), social solidarity (P =32/0), 
social participation (P = 37/0), social 
support (P = 30/0), and social awareness 
(P = 24/0) among inhabitants of marginal 
areas, the more likely mental health is to be 
realised for them. Meanwhile, the highest 
correlation with mental health belongs to 
the variable of social trust, while the lowest 
correlation belongs to the variable of social 
consciousness. 
The results of this study concerning 
the relationship between social capital and 
mental health are consistent with the findings 
by Hamano et al. (2010); Malberg (2010); 
Nekoonam et al. (2015); Razavizadeh et 
al. (2012); Shakerinia (2010), and Shoja 
(2011). The findings of all of above studies 
indicate that there is a relationship between 
various aspects of social capital and mental 
health. Also, the results of this article are 
consistent with Kavachi, Brackman and 
Turner theories. Each of the aforementioned 
theorists referred to the connection between 
social capital and mental health in their 
theories. Therefore, the findings of this 
research are completely in line with the 
above theories.
Based on the theoretical discussions and 
the findings of this research, it can be said 
that with the transition of societies from 
traditional to industrial, the mental health 
of the community becomes more important, 
so that mental health is at the forefront of 
the global organization, including the World 
Health Organization. This issue has been 
discussed in Iran as a developing country. In 
the meantime, the existence of a large part of 
the marginalized areas has caused problems. 
Issues and problems affecting the health 
of riders in marginal areas from different 
perspectives. Living in the marginalized 
areas requires the development of a spirit 
of trust, participation, support, coherence, 
engagement, and cooperation, according to 
their particular circumstances. The results 
of the research show that with the increase 
in each of these variables, the mental health 
of marginalized individuals also increases. 
Given that mental health means living in a 
situation where participation, trust, support 
and social interaction are integral to it, it 
provides safe and comfortable conditions, 
especially in marginalized areas with 
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multiple forms of deprivation in which 
one has the power to calm down and relax 
himself and others, is conscious of his inner 
self and emotions, has the power of decision-
making in crisis, and can successfully cope 
with psychological pressures; this is in fact 
the meaning of mental health.
A rich society in terms of social 
capital can provide a higher level of health 
achievements through securing more social 
support, developing social participation and 
trust, and increasing individual and social 
awareness. Solidarity in a social network 
directly creates positive mental states and a 
sense of belonging in individuals which, in 
turn, improve their mental health. Moreover, 
those highly involved in social networks 
have access to broader social sources and 
are in more desirable conditions in terms 
of well-being. Social capital increases 
marginalised inhabitants’ tendency towards 
interaction and cooperation with various 
social groups and creates a network of 
voluntary relationships among such groups 
in various aspects of social life. Social 
capital binds people together like a book 
end and prevents them from separation and 
scattering and, thus, secures their mental 
health.
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ABSTRACT
This article applies rational choice theory to analysis three reformative periods in 19th 
century Iran: the reforms of AmirKabir, Naser-ed-Din Shah and Sepahsalar. It analyses 
the arguments of the advocates and opponents of reforms, as well as the reasons and 
counterarguments of reformers. Using the method of agreement and the method of 
concomitant variation, it examines the triangular rational interaction of opponents, 
reformers, and advocates of reforms. Based on a nominal comparison of the arguments of 
opponents, the reasons they offer in all three reformative periods include: “endangerment 
of Shah’s household”, “homeland security disturbance”, “the danger of losing territorial 
integrity of Iran”, “political dependency of the reformer and/or his advocates on foreign 
countries”, “neglecting people’s rights”, “neglecting the opponents’ position and threatening 
their class benefits”, and “personal manner of the reformer and/or his advocates”. Based 
on an ordinal comparison, the most repetitive arguments offered by distinct groups of 
opponents include: “endangerment of Shah’s household”, “neglecting the opponents’ 
position and threatening their class benefits”, “neglecting traditions by the reformer and/
or his advocates”, and “personal manner of the reformer and/or his advocates”. Analysing 
the triangular interaction of the reformer, advocates, and opponents of reforms indicates 
that the reform of Sepahsalar is the only 
one that demonstrates an interaction among 
reformer, advocates, and opponents. Further, 
it is the only period in which the reformer 
and the advocates react to the most repetitive 
arguments of opponents.    
Keywords: Advocates of reform, AmirKabir, Naser-
ed-Din Shah, opponents of reforms, Qajar dynasty, 
rational choice theory, Sepahsalarl   
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INTRODUCTION
The historical yet ongoing process of 
modernisation and reforms in Iran, along 
with its achievements and failures, has 
been affected the current socio-political 
path of the Iranian society. Duality of 
Modernity and Tradition in the past two 
centuries, the impact of their relationship, 
and its implications on the current social, 
cultural, political, and economic situation 
of Iran are what have been addressed by 
many Iranian scholars. This scrutiny can be 
found in the works of historians and political 
scientists like Abbas Amanat (2004); Abbas 
Milani (2001); Ali MirSepassi (2005); Hairi 
(1988); Mohammad Tohidi (2008). Yet, a 
sociological analysis of the early attempts 
to overcome the ‘boundaries’ of tradition 
and reform various aspects of Iranians life 
is missing.
Focusing on the early reforms conducted 
in the 19th century, during Nasser al-Din Shah 
Era, this article will analyse the arguments 
offered by the opponents and advocates of 
the reforms. Going beyond the common-
sensical pictures which drew the opponents 
of reforms as the traditionalist reactionaries, 
this article specifically concentrates on their 
own arguments that resulted in the failure of 
the reforms. Consequently, this article will 
answer the question “how the opponents 
and advocates of the reforms in Naseri 
Era offered and presented their arguments 
for or against the reforms”. Besides, it 
comparatively analyses the impact of these 
arguments and the reactions of the reformers 
in each of the three reform periods in Nasser 
al-Din Shah Era on the execution of reforms 
and its achievements. 
To give a background on the events 
occurred in these three reformative periods, 
in the following article, first a short account 
on the reforms in these three reformative 
periods will be offered. Moving forward, 
the article briefly introduces Rational 
Choice theory as theoretical framework 
and elaborates on method of agreement 
and method of concomitant variations as 
methodology to approach the questions. 
This setting provides the context to analyse 
the arguments offered by the opponents of 
the reforms as well as its advocates and the 
reformers. 
Historical Background 
The shocking defeat of Iran in the war 
against Russia in the beginning of the 19th 
century, which resulted in the loss of some 
of Iran’s most important territories in the 
North, brought about self-consciousness 
among Iranian elites and alarmed them on 
the West’s increasing developments. As a 
result, Abbas Mirza (1803–1828), the crown 
prince at the time, and his followers in 
Tabriz initiated the first reformative attempt. 
By his death, however, this early attempt for 
reforms ended. To fulfil the goal of Abbas 
Mirza, there were three short-term reforms 
in the Naser-ed-Din Shah era (1848-1896). 
Naser-ed-Din Shah was the descendant of 
Abbas Mirza and one of the most important 
kings of the Qajar Dynasty (1785-1925). 
These three eras of reform were headed 
by Mirza Taqi Khan AmirKabir (Prime 
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Minister, 1848-1851), Naser-ed-Din Shah 
(the king himself 1858–1861), and Mirza 
Hussein Khan Sepahsalar (Prime Minister, 
1871-1873). However, all these attempts at 
reform failed due to the extreme oppositions 
by clergymen, courtiers, government 
officials, and women of the royal harem. 
Mirza Taqi Khan AmirKabir, started the 
first “comprehensive” reforms in Iran as the 
first Prime Minister of Naser-ed-Din Shah, 
which included stabilising internal security, 
introducing an accurate and fair tax system, 
empowering Iran’s military, establishing 
legal justice courts, prohibiting bribery, and 
building the first Iranian college.
However, the first reformative period in 
the Naseri era ended in 1851 due to the wide 
opposition of courtiers, officials, clergymen, 
women of the harem, and foreign embassies. 
A worsening of Iran’s internal and global 
situation in the following seven years under 
Prime Minister Mirza Agha Khan Noori 
resulted in Naser-ed-Din Shah’s decision 
to take the leading role in the upcoming 
reforms in 1858 and to establish the Council 
of the State, the Assembly of the House of 
Consultation, and the government judicial 
bureau. In this period, an enlightening 
informal reformative trend, led by Mirza 
Malkum Khan, complemented formal 
reforms. But just like AmirKabir’s reform, 
the reforms in this period faced extensive 
opposition and were finally halted in 1853 
by the arrest, exile, and murder of the 
advocates of the informal reform. 
Nine years after the defeat of the second 
reformative period in the Naseri Era, Naser-
ed-Din Shah appointed Iran’s ambassador in 
the Ottoman Empire, Mirza Hussein Khan 
Sepahsalar, as the new Prime Minister. 
Sepahsalar immediately emerged as the 
leader of the third reformative period by 
empowering the Iranian army and the 
industrial apparatus, implementing financial 
reforms, and focusing on cultural policies 
like civil rights and providing public 
education in Dar ul-funun. Yet Sepahsalar’s 
reforms were confronted with extreme 
opposition, probably most severe in the 
Naseri era. Because of these oppositions, 
Sepahsalar was forced to resign after his 
return to Iran from a triumphant trip to 
Europe with the Shah himself. Unlike 
the other periods of reforms in this era, 
Sepahsalar was not murdered or arrested, 
and he returned to power shortly after his 
resignation. However, his resignation ended 
the last attempts of reform in the Naser-ed-
Din Shah era.
MATERIALS AND METHODS 
Theoretical Frame
Using historical sociology, this article 
analyses the arguments of reformers, 
opponents, and advocates of reforms by 
applying what James Mahoney (2004) calls 
“general theory” in his article “Revising 
General Theory in Historical Sociology”. 
Introducing functionalist, rational choice, 
power, neo-Darwinian, and cultural theories 
as “general theories” in historical sociology, 
Mahoney emphasises that the core of these 
theories is demonstrated by specific “causal 
agents (i.e., basic units of analysis)” and 
special “causal mechanisms (i.e., abstract 
properties of causal agents that produce 
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outcomes and associations)” (Mahoney 
2004, p. 460). 
According to Ian Craib (2006, p. 92), 
“one of the simplest way to describe rational 
choice theory is analysing it by attempts 
of constructing models of individuals’ 
behaviour when they are acting rational in 
a special circumstance”. In rational choice 
theory, the rational individuals (agents) are 
those whose actions are “instrumental” and 
rely on rationality. This theory is not seeking 
to show that a given individual in a “special 
circumstance” will do a specific action, but it 
seeks to analyse “social outcomes”. In other 
words, according to this theory, even if the 
agent is acting rational, the social outcomes 
still might be irrational and undesirable 
(Hatcher & Kanazawa, 1997, p. 192; Javadi 
Yeganeh, 2008). 
Although the rational choice approach 
has various attitudes toward social actions 
that are examined by different scholars, it is 
mainly trying to explain an individual action 
in terms of rationality of actors. In Norkus’ 
words, “the individual actions are explained 
as the consequences of acts of rational 
choices” (Norkus 2000, p. 260). It is worth 
noting that rational choice theory, especially 
in more recent approaches, is aware of the 
boundaries of this general theory; however, 
stating these boundaries does not negate 
the rationality of individuals’ actions. 
Yet, acknowledging these boundaries and 
limitations in examining the rationality 
of individuals, sociologists came up with 
notions like bounded rationality. 
Rational choice theory, following 
individualistic methodology of Max weber, 
focuses on the social phenomena in terms 
of the rational choice of the social actors. 
There are two forms of rationality in 
Rational Choice Theory, namely forward-
looking rationality and backward-looking 
rationality. In forward-looking rationality 
“actors choose alternatives by predicting the 
social outcome of their choices. […] they 
are assumed to try to choose the alternatives 
that produce the best outcome for them. 
Game theory assumes this forward-looking 
rationality” (Sato, 2010). In the backward-
looking rationality, the actor learns from his 
past and the positive or negative outcomes 
of the alternative outcomes. Yet, it is worth 
noting that rational choice theory, especially 
in more recent approaches, is aware of 
the “boundaries” of this general theory; 
however, stating these boundaries does not 
negate the rationality of individuals’ actions.
Although some recent research has 
applied rational choice theory (Congleton, 
2006; McLean, 2001; Milner, 2002; 
Murshed, 2010), these authors are mainly 
focused on political science and events 
occurring in the late twentieth century as 
opposed to earlier historical incidents. There 
are two notable exceptions, however, in The 
Logic of Evil, the Social Origin of Nazi Party 
1925-1933, William Bernstein explains the 
rise of the Nazi Party in Germany based on 
rational choice theory (Mahoney, 2004), and 
Eskandari Qajar’s (2010) article, “Between 
Scylla and Charybdis; Policy-making under 
conditions of constraint in early Qajar 
Persia,” explains the decision of the first 
kings of Qajar Dynasty for protecting Iran 
in the wars against Russia.
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According to Ian Craib (2006, p. 92), 
“one of the simplest way to describe rational 
choice theory is analyzing it by attempts of 
constructing models of individuals’ behavior 
when they are acting rational in a special 
circumstance”. Rational Choice theory 
doesn’t neglect the irrational acts of the 
players but assumes them as rational actors 
and begins with a rational analysis of the 
social phenomena. 
Therefore, in the following article, 
rational choice theory is applied to 
investigate the arguments of the opponents 
and supporters of reforms in these three 
reformative periods during the era known 
as the Naseri era. Rational choice theory has 
been used to examine historical data. Most 
of the conceptual and historical analyses 
focus on the backwardness of oppositions 
in the Qajar era, seeing them as passive 
reactioners who follow their own financial 
and even sexual desires. In the absence of 
alternative approaches in other research 
reforms in Iran, this article argues that 
rational choice theory—which assumes 
rationality of the individuals and analyses 
the reason of these actions and decisions—
opens a new window unto this realm. In 
other words, this theory enables the authors 
to focus on the “rational” context of the 
choices of these opponents and understand 
the irrational, unwanted outcomes of these 
protests.
METHODS
Investigating the rationality of the agents 
of reform (reformers, advocates of reforms, 
and opponents of reforms) in each period 
of reform in the Naseri Era, this article 
focuses on the arguments as expressed by 
opponents and advocates of reforms. In 
other words, for analysing the rationality of 
their arguments in supporting or opposing 
the reformers, the arguments of opponents of 
reforms (divided in four groups: clergymen, 
courtiers, governmental officials, and 
the women of the royal harem) will be 
discussed, and the responses of the reformer 
and his advocates to opponents’ critics 
will be assessed. Reviewing the archives 
and documents of Nasseri Era regarding 
the arguments of rational actors of the 
reforms – opponents and advocates- four 
categorises has been recognized. Therefore, 
using rational choice theory, applying the 
comparative perspective of the arguments 
proposed by opponents and advocates, 
studying the letters, pamphlets, and books 
written by these opponents, advocates, and 
reformers themselves, and considering the 
arguments offered by them to defend or 
criticize reforms, the categorised arguments 
emerge as follows:
- Religious arguments: the opposition of 
reformative actions with Islam, neglect 
of Islam by the individual reformer and/
or his advocates;
- Financial arguments: the financial 
performance of the reformer and/or 
his advocates, financial corruption of 
reformer and/or his advocates, and the 
erosion of the financial benefits of elites 
by them; 
- Political arguments: the endangerment 
of the kingdom of Naser-ed-Din Shah, 
attempts to abolish the Qajar dynasty, 
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attempts to change the monarch system, 
dereliction of the power of the heir by 
exercising ultra-monarchical power 
by reformer and/or his advocates, 
homeland security disturbance, the 
absolute power of the reformer, the 
interventions of aliens in Iran, the 
danger of losing territorial integrity of 
Iran, the danger of the colonisation of 
Iran, the political dependency of the 
reformer and/or his advocates in foreign 
countries;
- Social arguments: neglecting the 
opponents’ position and threatening their 
class benefits, neglecting the people’s 
rights, low social origins of the reformer 
and/or his advocates, negligence of 
traditions by the reformer and/or his 
advocates, cultural westernisation of 
Iran;
- The personal manner of the reformer 
and/or his advocates.
For analysing the arguments of the 
advocates, this article uses the common 
arguments of the opponents to assess 
the pro-reform reasonings in four ways 
by pointing out the same criticisms of 
opponents, criticising opponents for such 
arguments, denying the accusations of 
opponents, and emphasising the importance 
of the reformative actions. It is worth noting 
that the advocates of reforms—except for 
Mirza Malkum Khan—were not eager to 
defend reforms or offer reasoning to support 
it, unless pressured by the opponents who 
did not hesitate to attack the reforms.
Inspired by John Stuart Mill’s direct 
method of agreement and method of 
concomitant variations and applying the 
nominal and ordinal comparisons explained 
by James Mahoney, this article then analyses 
the arguments of reformers, advocates, and 
opponent of reforms. According to Mahoney, 
nominal comparison “involves the use of 
categories that are mutually exclusive and 
collectively exhaustive” (Mahoney 1999, p. 
1157). In the direct method of agreement, 
which is one of the simplest methods offered 
by Mill (2009), “omitting” is crucial and the 
researcher should try to discover the “firm, 
common, or non-changeable patterns among 
the cases”. Unlike the nominal comparison, 
in an ordinal comparison, which weights 
the causes, the potential causes cannot be 
omitted easily (Taleban 2009, p. 65) As 
Mahoney states: Ordinal comparison entails 
the rank ordering of cases into three or more 
categories based on the degree to which a 
given phenomenon is present (Mahoney 
1999, p. 1160).
Therefore, in this article, in the nominal 
level and based on Mill’s direct method 
of agreement, non-common arguments of 
distinct groups of opponents in the three 
reformative groups in the Naseri era will 
be omitted. In the ordinal level, based on 
Mill’s method of concomitant variations, 
the most and least common arguments 
among advocates, opponents, and reformers 
will be ranked. With nominal comparison, 
using the thin methods of rational choice 
theory, this article focus on the rationality 
of the choices of the opponents of reforms. 
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By so doing, it reveals the arguments that 
demonstrate which groups were influential 
in the failure of reforms. Concentrating on 
the arguments of the opponents in these 
three reformative trends, their arguments 
in an order of twenty-one arguments will 
be categorized. Additionally, the ordinal 
comparison of these twenty-one arguments 
will be offered. Subsequently, the arguments 
of the advocates of reforms and the reformers 
will be analysed based on these twenty-one 
categorised arguments. 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Short-Term Reforms in 19th Century 
Iran
1.  AmirKabir’s Reform
The first round of reforms headed by 
AmirKabir emerged in 1847, the exact year 
Naser-ed-Din Shah ascended to power. In his 
three years as Prime Minister (1848 – 1851), 
AmirKabir conducted widespread reforms 
empowering the army as well as financial, 
social, and political developments. Some of 
his many attempts to modernise Iran include 
stabilising internal security, establishing an 
accurate and fair tax system, empowering 
Iran’s military by hiring military experts 
from Italy and Austria, opening weapon 
factories, controlling and limiting religious 
justice courts (Mahakem-e Shara’) and 
establishing legal justice courts instead, 
prohibiting bribery, performing nation-wide 
smallpox vaccination, building the first 
public hospital, building the first Iranian 
college (Darul-funun), promoting translation 
and publication, hiring technicians from 
Prussia and England for establishing new 
factories, and establishing Iran’s first daily 
paper -Vaghaye’ Etefaghyeh- (Adamiyat, 
1983; Haj Sayyah, 1980; Khormoji, 1984; 
Lesan al-Molk Sepehr, 1958; Mahbobi 
Ardakani, 1975; Makki, 1987; Martin, 2010; 
Mohit Tabatabaei, 1975; Rezvani, 1975; 
Shamim, 1996).
Yet, his reformative actions faced harsh 
criticism and immense opposition from both 
Iranian and foreigner opponents (Amanat, 
2004; Hedayat, 1983; Raadi Azarakhshi, 
1975; Tohidi Chaffi, 2008). Inside Iran, 
there were four major groups opposing 
the performance of AmirKabir: the clergy, 
courtiers, officials, and the women of the 
royal harem. 
1.1.  The Opponents of AmirKabir’s 
Reform
AmirKabir reduced the power of the clergy 
to almost nothing, an act which was not 
common in Iran at that time, and caused 
serious oppositions by clergymen who were 
among the most important political actors in 
Qajar Iran. The strict manner of AmirKabir 
toward clergymen (such as removing one of 
them due to a case of bribery), replacing the 
religious courts by legal courts, nullifying 
the law of taking refuge in a sanctuary 
(which was very common in Iran),1 and 
1It is worth mentioning that due to the humbleness 
attached to taking refuge in a sanctuary as an act 
of commoners, other places were replaced such 
as foreign embassies and even the Shah’s stables. 
The determination of this law limited maneuvering 
power in Iran of foreign embassies and courtesies as 
well as clergymen.
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indulgency of religious minorities ignited 
the anger of clergymen and their countless 
followers. However, considering the lack of 
official historical data in AmirKabir’s era, 
there is no written opposition argumentation 
by clergymen against the Prime Minister.
Courtiers, who were one of the most 
important and influential groups in Qajar 
Iran, were another group that opposed 
the reforms of AmirKabir. One of the 
main and yet basic reasons the courtiers 
opposed AmirKabir was because of his 
humble background. Unaccustomed to this 
in Iran in the 19th century, the courtiers 
found it offensive that a person with a 
low social status could reach the second 
highest position in the country. AmirKabir’s 
irritating approaches gave them even more 
reason to oppose. For example, the Prime 
Minister reduced the governmental budgets 
dramatically and remained himself the only 
one who had unlimited access to the Shah, 
a privilege that bothered all the groups in 
power—especially the courtiers. Moreover, 
AmirKabir was negligent to the status of 
courtiers as the ‘royal family’ and refused 
to consider their royal blood a special social 
or financial privilege for them (Amanat, 
2004; Lesan al-Molk Sepehr, 1958; Makki, 
1987). Like the clergymen, there is no 
written documentation regarding courtiers’ 
opposition toward reforms; however, formal 
historical books, such as Nasekh-ol-tavarikh 
written by Lesan al-Molk Sepehr (1958) in 
the Naser-ed-Din Shah era, provide some of 
the courtiers’ arguments.
Along with courtiers, the officials 
were the most important internal players 
in Iranian policies in the Qajar Dynasty. 
The officials—mostly from the non-royal 
prominent families in Iran—oversaw 
running the government. They were a well-
educated and well-established group who 
had essentially inherited their jobs from their 
ancestors. From the beginning of Naser-ed-
Din Shah’s kingship, officials who preferred 
the Prime Minister to be one of their own 
started to oppose AmirKabir’s campaign. 
However, it was not until after the dismissal 
and murder of AmirKabir that they became 
vocal about their oppositions. The authority 
of AmirKabir, his charisma, and his absolute 
power prevented them from confronting 
directly and, as a result, they tried to express 
their opposition to the Shahs2 (AleDavood, 
2000; Amanat, 2004; Eetemad al-Saltaneh, 
1978a; Eetemad al-Saltaneh, 1978b; Eghbal 
Ashtian, 1961; Mahboobi Ardakani, 1975; 
Makki, 1987; Sasani, 2003).
Finally, there were the women of the 
royal harem—the veiled and hidden power 
of Iran’s Qajar court— who were in some 
cases among the most effective powers in 
the country who stood against AmirKabir. 
Although the women of the royal harem 
were mostly considered “playthings” to the 
powerful men in 19th century Iran, they had 
2For the letter of Mirza Agha khan Noori to Naser-
ed-Din Shah see Aledavood 2000: 220.
For the government announcement regarding 
AmirKabir’s dismissal see Makki 1987: 490.
For the letter of Mirza Agha khan Noori to Russian 
Ambassador to Iran see Aledavood 2000: 213.
For the letter of Mirza Agha khan Noori to Iran 
Ambassador to Russia see Aledavood 2000: 213.
For critics of Eetemad-ol-Saltaneh regarding 
AmirKabir’s reform see Eetemad-ol-Saltaneh 
1978a: 75-83.
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an exciting potential to influence those in 
power in practice, since they had unrivalled 
access to the Shah—who no other man was 
allowed. During AmirKabir’s reformative 
period, these women (in particular Naser-ed-
Din Shah’s mother, Mahd-e Olia) were some 
of the few vocal opponents of the reforms 
(Amanat, 2004; Makki, 1987; Sasani, 2003; 
Tohidi Chaffi, 2008).3 
As mentioned earlier,  there has 
remained no argument from clergymen 
during this period, either due to the poor 
formal historical narrations in the first 
decade of Naser-ed-Din Shah’s era, the lack 
of informal history writing, clergymen’s 
unwillingness to document their personal 
lives, the unsuitable maintenance of 
historical data, or simply because the 
clergymen did not offer arguments (although 
that seems unlikely). Most of the oppositions 
against AmirKabir’s reform came from 
officials. The arguments of opposition are 
mainly focused on political reasoning and 
followed by social ones. Notably, the only 
distinguished opposition to AmirKabir’s 
performance was suggested by women of 
the royal harem focusing on systematic 
“financial corruption”, “the inappropriate 
actions of army soldiers”, and “people’s 
irritation by soldiers”. Interestingly, unlike 
the other reformative periods in the Naseri 
era, the opposition does not indicate any 
religious argument against AmirKabir and 
his reforms.
In nominal comparison, “neglecting 
the opposition’s status and threatening 
their class benefits” and “depriving the heir 
of power from power” are two arguments 
that the three dissenting groups share and, 
therefore, are the most frequent opposition 
arguments.4  The other arguments are 
omitted in the nominal comparison because 
they do not occur in at least one of the 
arguing groups. In ordinal comparison, 
besides the two arguments of nominal 
comparison that are the most frequent, 
“the personal manner of the reformer and/
or his advocates”, “the absolute power of 
the reformer”, and “homeland security 
disturbance” are suggested by two out of 
three opposition groups and, therefore, 
have moderate importance. The remaining 
arguments are suggested by only one of the 
opposition groups and, therefore, have the 
least importance.
In  this  reformat ive per iod,  the 
opposition arguments merely focused on 
class benefits and group interests. In the 
nominal comparison, there were no national 
interests in the arguments of the opposition, 
while in the two other periods of reform in 
Naser-ed-Din Shah’s era, there were shifts 
in the level of arguments from the group and 
class arguments to national and religious 
ones. 
3For the letter of Mahde olia to Shah see Amanat 
2004: 205.
For the letter of Mahde olia to Shah see Aledavood 
2000: 208.
4They are the most frequent arguments based on 
groups who suggest the arguments.
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1.2.  The Advocates of AmirKabir’s 
Reform
In this reformative period, because of the 
shortage of historical data on the one hand, 
and the absent of advocates of reforms 
and reformer’s consultants on the other, 
there are no arguments from the supporters 
of reforms. Regarding the absence of 
arguments by the advocates of reforms in 
AmirKabir’s era, it is essential to focus on 
some facts: 
1. As with AmirKabir’s opponents, his 
advocates were his subordinates. It does 
not seem that they had been consulted, 
and, apparently, they were obeying 
the Prime Minister’s orders instead of 
supporting his ideas or bringing new 
reformative ideas.
2. AmirKabir’s reforms were the first 
to be carried out across the country 
that were not exclusively focused on 
strengthening the army (while the 
previous reforms were). Thus, unlike 
the reformative periods to follow, the 
reformist and his advocates did not 
perceive the importance of arguing and 
reasoning to prove and advocate the 
reformative campaign in the society.5
In fact, it seems that the experience of 
AmirKabir’s reforms brought a condition in 
the following reforms in which the reformer, 
advocates, and opponents were ready to 
5Interestingly, even most of the opponents’ arguments 
are shaped in conversations with foreign countries 
(Britain and Russia) that were objecting the death of 
AmirKabir.
protect the reformative trend or to oppose it. 
As for the reformer, AmirKabir was 
considered a laconic pragmatist who spent 
his time carrying out the reform rather than 
arguing with the opponents. Furthermore, 
the opponents were mostly AmirKabir’s 
subordinates. Therefore, being authoritarian 
in character, AmirKabir did not feel it 
necessary to defend himself. He simply 
gave an “order” to change the opposition’s 
attitude (Adammiat, 2006; Amanat, 2004; 
Sepehr Makki, 1987). Yet, from the letters 
written by AmirKabir after his dismissal 
and before going under arrest, these were 
the arguments he offered to defend his 
performance and answer the opponents’ 
critics: personal manner of the reformer 
and/or his advocates, the absolute power of 
the reformer, and endangerment of Naser-
ed-Din Shah’s kingship. Notably, none of 
these arguments address the most repetitive 
arguments of the opponents, which included 
depriving the heir of power by the reformer 
and/or his advocates, neglecting the 
opponents’ position, threatening their class 
benefits, and neglecting the people’s rights.6
6For the performance report of AmirKabir to Naser-
ed-Din Shah see Amanat 2004: 200-201.
For the letter of AmirKabir to Naser-ed-Din Shah 
before his dismissal see Aledavood 2000: 81.
For the letter of AmirKabir to Naser-ed-Din Shah 
after his dismissal see Aledavood 2000: 78.
For the letter of AmirKabir to Naser-ed-Din Shah see 
Aledavood 2000: 87-89.
For the letter of AmirKabir to Naser-ed-Din Shah see 
Aledavood 2000: 83.
For the letter of AmirKabir to Naser-ed-Din Shah see 
Aledavood 2000: 85-86.
For AmirKabir’s pledge see Eghbal Ashtiani 1961: 
315-317
For the last letter of AmirKabir to Naser-ed-Din 
Shah see Sasani 2003: 35.
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2.  Naser-ed-Din Shah’s Reforms
The assassination of AmirKabir in 1851—
owing to the widespread opposition of 
courtiers, officials, clergymen, and women 
of the harem to AmirKabir’s reforms, and his 
replacement by Mirza Agha Khan Noori—
was the end of the first reformative period in 
the Naseri era. Seven years later, however, 
and due to Iran’s increasingly worsening 
internal and global situation because of 
the inferior performance of the new Prime 
Minister, Naser-ed-Din Shah decided to take 
on his role in reforming the infrastructure 
of the country as well as its cultural and 
social policies. Therefore, he restructured 
his governmental apparatus starting with 
dismissing Noori and abolishing the position 
of Prime Minister. Restructuring some 
governmental parts resulted in a new 
reformative period from 1859 to 1862. 
Among the most important reforms and 
achievements of this period are establishing 
the Council of the State; establishing the 
Assembly of the House of Consultation, 
Majles-e Maslahat-Khaneh (the earliest 
form of parliament in Iran, in which the 
members had been elected by Shah); 
establishing a governmental judicial bureau 
called divan-khana; personally overseeing 
people’s complaints by the Shah; sending 
students to Europe to study; and founding 
the telegraph (Adammiat, 2006; Amanat, 
2004; Katiraei, 1976; Khormoji, 1984; 
Martin, 2010; Mostofi, 1998; Ravandi, 
1999; Schnaider, 2005; Schneider, 2004; 
Tohidi Chaffi, 2008; ZibaKalam, 2003).
This reformative period was a peculiar 
one in which there was an informal and 
unofficial reform running alongside the 
formal and official one. In the formal reform, 
the idea and the performance of the reform 
was led by Naser-ed-Din Shah himself. 
In fact, although the Shah gave decision-
making power in most “prominent issues 
of the country” to the Maslahat-Khaneh, 
and gave pursuing reforms to the ministers 
in the Council of State, he kept the right to 
interfere and make final decisions himself. 
Considering his permanent “Royal” rights 
and the fact that he had been repeatedly 
changing the governmental decisions based 
on his personal opinions, this decision of the 
Shah might be a sign of his personal interest 
and his attempt to play a role as the key 
reformer, rather than his effort to exercise 
his royal authority. 
Yet, one of the most notable events in this 
period was the emergence of an unofficial, 
non-governmental reformative camp. In 
fact, besides the official, governmental, 
royal reforms that were operating by the 
Shah, there were some reformative actions 
in which Naser-ed-Din Shah did not play 
the key role (Elgar, 1990). The two main 
non-governmental reformative actions in 
this period were translating the social and 
political ideas outpouring from the West 
and establishing a missionary society 
called Faramosh-Khaneh. Mirza Malkum 
Khan’s establishment of Faramosh-Khaneh 
was a major part of the non-governmental 
reform in this phase of reforms. Mirza 
Malkum Khan also had a significant role 
in the emergence of formal reforms by 
composing some reformative pamphlets. 
According to Malkum, Naser-ed-Din Shah 
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was informed about the emergence of these 
unofficial reforms (particularly establishing 
of Faramosh-Khaneh) and he approved (or 
at least was not opposed to) them. The letter 
of the Foreign Affairs Minister of Iran to his 
ambassador in Ottoman approves this claim 
of Malkum (for more information about 
Faramosh-Khaneh see: Adammiat, 2006; 
Amanat, 2004; Elgar, 1990; Katiraei, 1976; 
Kermani, 1983; Raeen, 1978; Shamim, 
1996). However, as the previous reformative 
period, these reforms faced great oppositions 
and extreme reactions by clergymen, 
courtiers, and officials, which resulted in 
torture, arrest, and murder of the reformists.7 
2.1.  The Opponents of Naser-ed-Din 
Shah’s Reforms
The focus of clergymen, as one of the 
opposition groups of the 1859-1862 reforms, 
was on Faramosh-Khaneh, which they 
considered as a centre for promoting anti-
religious ideas. Haj Molla Ali Kani, the 
prominent clergyman in the Naseri era, was 
among the fierce opponents of Faramosh-
Khaneh (Adamiyat, 2006; Amanat, 2004; 
PourAmini, 2000). The most important 
document remaining from the clergy in this 
period was an anonymous letter to the Shah 
(Raeen, 1978; Katiraei, 1976), believed by 
some scholars to have been written by Kani 
(Rajabi Davani, 2011),8 who also wrote a 
letter in 1862 to the Shah to express his 
concerns and to object to the beliefs and 
rituals of Faramosh-Khaneh. 
Regarding courtiers, the other opposition 
group in this reformative period, there is no 
first-hand documentation. In fact, some of 
the courtiers had joined Faramosh-Khaneh 
and the meetings were held in the house of 
one of the courtiers, Jalal ed-Din Mirza, 
the ceremonial chief of Faramosh-Khaneh 
(Amanat, 2004; Bamdad, 1992). Yet, the 
arguments of the courtier opponents of 
reform can be found in Ebrat al-Nazerin 
va Ebrat al-Hazerin, a book written in 
the Naseri era by a hawkish opponent of 
reform, Agha Ebrahim Novab Badaie’ Negar 
(Adamiyat, 2006; Sasani, 2003). This book 
is the sum of the most radical arguments 
against reforms.9
In this reformative period, there is no 
confrontation with the formal reforms that 
were headed by the Shah or by officials, 
although there were some officials who 
tried to sabotage the reforms (Adammiat, 
2006; Amanat, 2004; Benjamin, 1984; 
Elgar, 1990).10 In this period, the officials, 
as well as two other groups, mainly focus on 
Faramosh-Khaneh’s instructions, and argue 
against the reforms. The most important first-
hand document of officials who opposed the 
reform is an anonymous pamphlet, believed 
to have been written by Ali Monshi Tabrizi. 
7In the second period of reforms in the Naseri era, 
unlike the first, there was no serious opposition 
against reforms by the women of royal harem. Or 
at the very least, there exists no historical evidence 
on this.
8For the FaramoshKhaneh Report see Katiraei 1976: 
177-193.
9For Mirza Ebrahim Khan badaie’ Negar’s critics see 
Sasani 2003: 169-170.
10Mirza Yusuf Mustawfi al-Mamalik and Mirza 
Saeid Khan are among those who tried to sabotage 
the reforms (Adammiat 2006; Amanat 2004; Elgar 
1990; Benjamin 1984).
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This pamphlet was written in response to 
Malkum’s “Ketabche-ye Faramosh-Khaneh” 
(handbook of Faramosh-Khaneh).11 
“Endangerment of Naser-ed-Din Shah’s 
household” and “neglecting traditions by the 
reformer and his advocates” are the common 
arguments among the groups of opponents 
(clergymen, courtiers, and officials) in 
this reformative period. Two religious 
arguments, “opposition of reformative 
actions with Islam” and “negligence toward 
Islam by the reformer and/or his advocates” 
as well as other arguments such as “attempts 
to change the monarchy system”, “homeland 
security disturbance”, “neglecting the 
opponents’ position and threatening their 
class benefits”, “culture of westernisation 
in Iran”, and “the personal manner of the 
reformer and his advocates” are offered by 
two groups of opponents. The rest of the 
arguments are merely suggested by one 
group of opponents.
As is clear, most of the arguments 
against the reform are political, followed by 
social and religious arguments. Most of the 
arguments in this period have been offered 
by clergymen and followed by courtiers. It 
is worth mentioning that since the reforms in 
this period mostly focused on the structure 
of the power (formal reforms) and the idea 
of modernity and the intellectual aspects 
of reforms (informal reforms), there are 
few financial arguments in this period and 
the opponents do not focus on their own 
class interests. Notably, depriving the heir 
of power from power, one of the main 
arguments found in the informal reform, is 
absent from the formal reforms, since the 
reformer is the Shah himself. 
2.2.  The Advocates of Naser-ed-Din 
Shah’s Reforms
As of the advocates of reforms, members 
of Faramosh-Khaneh, including some of 
the prominent figures among clergymen, 
courtiers, and officials, were the most 
significant advocates of reforms from 
1859-1862. Hassan Ali Khan Garosi, Iran’s 
ambassador to France is another advocate of 
reforms in this period, who had elaborated 
on Iran’s achievement and the importance 
of reform in a letter to the Napoleon III.12 
Yet, the legendary reformist and the most 
significant advocate of reforms in this 
period was Mirza Malkum Khan, who wrote 
six pamphlets in defence of reforms from 
1859-1862. Malkom had been influencing 
the Shah and his formal reform with his 
ideas stated in his book Ketabcheye Ghaybi, 
on the one hand, and leading the informal 
reforms on the other (Adamiyat, 2006; 
Amanat, 2004; Bamdad, 1992; Elgar, 1990; 
Elgar, 1977; Katiraei, 1976; Kermani, 1983; 
Malkom, 2002; Mostofi, 1998; Sasani, 2003; 
Sayex, 2001).  
Most of the arguments by advocates in 
this period are political in nature. However, 
11For the text of this pamphlet see Raeen 1978: 556-
560.
12For Hassan Ali Khan Garosi’s letter to Napoleon III 
see Aledavood 2000: 297-299.
For Mirza Malkom Khan and Welford Scolen Belant 
see Elgar 1990: 12-14
For Malkom’s defense of reform see: Malkom Khan, 
2002.
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for countering opponents’ arguments, the 
advocates of reforms emphasised religious 
and social issues as well. Notably, the 
emphasis on Islam for defending the reform 
highlights the importance of religious 
discussion in opponents’ counterarguments 
and its significant effect in conducting 
public opinion.
In the second reformative period in 
Naser-ed-Din Shah’s era, ten out of fourteen 
arguments offered by the opponents were 
the opposition of reformative actions with 
Islam, financial corruption of the reformer 
and/or his advocates, homeland security 
disturbance, the danger of losing territorial 
integrity, neglecting the opponents’ position 
and threatening their class benefits, 
neglecting people’s rights, neglecting 
traditions, cultural westernisation of Iran, 
and the personal manner of the reformer and/
or his advocates. The advocates did evoke 
the other four arguments, which included 
endangerment of Naser-ed-Din Shah’s 
household, negligence toward Islam by the 
reformer and/or his advocates, colonisation 
of Iran, and the political dependency of the 
reformer and/or his advocates on foreign 
countries. However, the advocates were 
not successful in responding to one of the 
two crucial arguments of the opponents 
against the informal reform, namely the 
“endangerment of Naser-ed-Din Shah’s 
household.”
In this reformative period, just like 
during AmirKabir’s, there is a lack of triple 
interactions among opponents, reformers, 
and advocates. Unlike the previous period 
of reforms, in which the advocates did not 
counterargue against the opponents—and 
therefore the reformer himself had to 
defend his reforms—in this period, it was 
the reformer, Naser-ed-Din Shah himself, 
who did not offer any response to the critics 
of opponents. In fact, given the type of the 
oppositions that were focused on informal 
reforms, Malkum, as the most significant 
figures of reform, defended the reform.
Interestingly, in three reformative 
periods in the Naseri era, only in the 
informal reforms of 1858-1861 is there a 
dialogue between advocates and opponents. 
Although in this dialogue, just like the other 
cases, the first opponent (the writer of the 
report, Faramosh-Khaneh) writes a letter 
to the Shah and Malkum, as an advocate 
of reforms, and answers him, however 
indirectly. In the end, an official answered 
back to Malkum. In fact, it is only during 
this period that the whole attention did not 
focus on the Shah—instead of trying to 
just convince the Shah, both sides tried to 
answer each other. Choosing the audience 
of this informal dialogue is interesting as 
well: while the first one¬¬--the clergyman-
-chose the court and the Shah (indirectly) as 
his audience, Malkum wrote his letter for an 
unknown—Jenab Agha (“His Excellency”, 
most likely Seyed Sadegh Tabatabaei, a 
famous clergyman who had been approved 
the establishment of Faramosh-Khaneh). 
The third one—the official—wrote his letter 
to the people. Yet, the failure of formal 
reformative attempts of the Shah as well 
as the informal reforms from 1859-1862 
resulted in the arrest, torture, and murder 
of the reformists. 
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The Shah, as the reformer of the formal 
reforms in this period, pointed out in some 
of his letters that the performance and the 
attitude of the opponents focused on profit-
oriented actions of courtiers and officials, 
their ignorance toward country’s situation, 
and the false promises of courtiers and 
officials. The Shah addressed the political 
arguments (impracticality of courtiers) as 
well as the financial arguments (profit-
oriented actions of opponents). Yet, in the 
informal reforms, the Shah had no role other 
than an informed advocator; therefore, he 
did not offer any arguments protecting the 
unofficial reforms (if any). Besides, the 
Shah as the highest position in the pyramid 
of power did not need any explanation for 
his wishes and it was expected from all 
individuals to “obey” his “majestic rules”.13 
3.  Sepahsalar’s Reforms
Nine years later, Naser-ed-Din Shah 
appointed Sepahsalar as the new Prime 
Minister of Iran.14 Sepahsalar, the third 
reformer in the Naseri era, had pursued 
plenty of reform movements in the period, 
such as establishing the board of state, 
empowering the army, determining a 
specific time and location for governmental 
affairs, empowering the industrial apparatus, 
and financial reforms. He also focused on 
some cultural policies, like civil rights, 
empowering the Dar ul-funun (the first 
Iranian college), advocating public education 
in Dar ul-funun, and establishing new daily 
papers, which were unique in his time 
(Abbasi, 1993; Adamiyat, 2006; Bayani, 
1978; Ceronin, 2010; Eetemad-ol-Saltaneh, 
2000; Hedayat, 1996; Keddi, 2008;  Mostofi, 
1998; Saeidi Sirjani, 1983; Sasani, 2003; 
Sasani, 1975; Sedigh ol-Mamalek, 1987). 
However, Sepahsalar’s reforms were not 
exempt from the extreme opposition that 
eventually forced him to resign due to the 
widespread protests of the courtiers, elites, 
clergymen, the women of the royal harem,15 
the foreign embassies (particularly Russia), 
and at times, the public.
3.1.  The Opponents of Sepahsalar’s 
Reforms
The clergymen, who viewed this reform 
as an attempt for westernising Iran, were 
undoubtedly one of the most influential 
opponents of Sepahsalar ’s reforms. 
Regulating the judiciary system, reducing 
the appointment of clergymen as judges, 
and prohibiting physical punishment were 
among Sepahsalar’s programs that directly 
and indirectly reduced the power of the 
clergy and put them on the list of opponents. 
13For Naser-ed-Din Shah’s letter to Malkom see 
Teymori 1978: 15
For Naser-ed-Din Shah’s letter regarding reforms see 
Teymori 1978: 2-5
14Four years prior to this time, the title and status of 
Prime Minister was brought back to Iran’s political 
system. 
15Although Anis-od-Doleh, the wife of the Shah, 
is known as one of the most influential opponents 
of Sepahsalar, due to lack of written arguments 
against the reform by her, the women of harem are 
not rostered among the opponents of reform in this 
reformative period. 
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Further igniting their opposition was 
Sepahsalar’s attempt to manage the Shah’s 
travel to Europe, his focus on freedom, 
and the Reuter concession16 (Benjamin, 
1984; Curzon, 2001; Elgar, 1977; Kermani, 
1983; Serena, 1983; Teymori, 1978). 
Although the clergy considered Sepahsalar 
and his consultant team anti-Islamic, their 
opposition was not merely concentrated 
on religious arguments. They offered other 
arguments, including the focus on national 
financial interests and the endangerment of 
Iran’s territorial integrity. Molla Ali Kani, 
the prominent cleric and the prayer Imam 
of Tehran, can be considered as the most 
influential opponents of Sepahsalar who 
expressed opposition to his reforms in a 
letter to the Shah, right after Sepahsalar’s 
involuntary resignation.17 
As of the courtier opponents, Farhad 
Mirza Moatamed od-Doleh (the Shah’s 
uncle) and Masoud Mirza Zel ol-Soltan 
(the Shah’s son) are among those who 
offered arguments against Sepahsalar and 
his reforms (Adamiyat, 2006; AleDavood, 
1992; Bamdad, 1992). Unlike Farhad Mirza, 
however, Zel-ol-Soltan’s (1983) arguments 
were presented years later in his personal 
journals.18 
Regarding the officials, many of them 
opposed Sepahsalar. Mohammad Hasan 
Khan Eetemad ol-Saltaneh wrote one of 
the most important (of the few) written 
arguments by the officials against Sepahsalar 
(Eetemad-ol-Saltaneh, 1978a; Eetemad-ol-
Saltaneh, 2000; Sasani, 2003). The Reuter 
Concession and the railways contract were 
among the main reasons given by Etemad al-
Saltaneh for his opposition against reforms. 
In a letter attributed to Etemad-ol-Saltaneh, 
written right after Molla Ali Kani’s letter 
to the Shah, he highlighted every aspect of 
the contract he considered a catastrophe for 
Iran. Further, in his personal journal, Etemad 
ol-Saltaneh enumerated his differences with 
Sepahsalar, at times harshly criticising him 
(Etemad ol-Saltaneh, 2000).19 
Most of the arguments of opponents in 
this period were political and financial in 
character and concern the Reuter concession 
as one of the most important causes of 
opposition against Sepahsalar. The social 
and religious arguments are not highlighted 
in this period despite the presence of Molla 
Ali Kani, the most powerful clergyman, and 
an active and vocal opponent.20 “Financial 
performance of the reformer and/or his 
advocates”, “endangerment of Naser-ed-
Din Shah’s household”, and “neglecting 
the opponents’ position and threatening 
16Mirza Agha Saleh Arab and Haj Molla Ali Kani are 
among the most important figures who opposed the 
prime minister’s reforms.
17For Molla Ali Kani’s letter to the Shah see: 
Teymori: 1978: 124-126
18For Farhad Mirza’s letter to the Shah see: Teymori: 
1978: 129.
19For critics of Eetemad-ol-Saltaneh regarding 
Sepahsalar’s reform see Eetemad-ol-Saltaneh 1978a: 
97-111.
For Eetemad-ol-Saltaneh’s letter to the Shah 
regarding the Reuter concession see: Teymori: 1978: 
126-129.
20Although Anis-od-Doleh, the wife of the Shah, is 
known as one of the most influential opponents of 
Sepahsalar, due to lack of written arguments against 
the reform by her, the women of the harem are not 
rostered among the opponents of reform in this 
reformative period.
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their class benefits” are the arguments 
offered by all the opposition groups during 
this reformative period and are the most 
important in ordinal comparison. The 
next important arguments, which were 
offered by two opposition groups, are 
“the opposition of reformative actions 
with Islam”, “financial corruption of the 
reformer and/or his advocates”, “depriving 
the heir of power”, “the intervention of 
aliens in Iran”, “the danger of losing 
territorial integrity of Iran”, “colonisation 
of Iran”, “neglecting the traditions by 
the reformer and/or his advocates”, and 
“cultural westernisation of Iran”.  Finally, 
“reformer’s attempts to abolish the Qajar 
dynasty”, “reformer’s attempts to change 
the monarch system”, “homeland security 
disturbance”, “political dependency of the 
reformer and/or his advocates on foreign 
countries”, and “neglecting the people’s 
rights” are the arguments offered by just one 
of the opposition groups.
Regardless of the performance of the 
reformer in these three periods, the arguments 
of opponents in the 1871-1873 reformative 
period compared to the preceding two 
periods of reform in the Naser-ed-Din Shah 
era are the most calculated. In this period, 
opponents offer different political, social, 
financial, and religious arguments against 
the reformer and, at the same time, had 
the foresight not to act on their own class 
and group interests—unlike the opponents 
in AmirKabir’s era, for example. In the 
reformative period of Sepahsalar, “financial 
performance of the reformer and/or his 
advocates” and “endangerment of Naser-ed-
Din Shah’s household” are two arguments 
that the reformer and his advocates argued 
against. Notably, these two arguments, along 
with “neglecting the opponents’ position” 
and “threatening their class benefits” are 
the most important arguments in ordinal 
comparison of oppositions’ groups in this 
period. 
3.2.  The Advocates of Sepahsalar’s 
Reform
As Flour (1987) states, the influence of 
reformists like Malkum Khan, Yousef Khan, 
and Akhondzade in Sepahsalar’s reforms 
is obvious. These reformers, along with 
Majd ol-molk, in their books, pamphlets, 
and letters emphasised the importance and 
necessity of reforms; yet, these emphases 
do not necessarily indicate that these 
reformists supported Sepahsalar’s reforms. 
However, although the Prime Minister had 
some advocates and subordinates, when he 
faced the serious accusations of critics, his 
advocates had no power or voice to defend 
him. Some, such as Naser-ol-Molk, left 
him to join the opponents, while others, 
including his own brother (Yahya Khan 
Moatamed-ol-Molk), remained silent and 
did not defend the reforms (Bamdad, 1992). 
At some point, the line between Sepahsalar’s 
advocates and opponents was vague: some 
who were recognised by their defence of 
reformative actions retracted their support 
later (Bamdad, 1992; Malekara, 1976). 
The advocates of reform in this 
reformative period responded to four 
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criticisms among nineteen arguments of 
opponents. Although the quantity of the 
reformer’s (and his advocates) responses 
are not significant in number, they address 
three of the most important critiques given 
by opponents: “financial performance of 
the reformer”, “endangerment of Naser-ed-
Din Shah’s household”, and “neglecting the 
opponents’ position and threatening their 
class benefits”. However, the reformer and 
his advocates failed to answer the second 
most important criticism of opponents; 
that is, “homeland security disturbance”, 
“attempts to change the monarch system”, 
“attempts to abolish the Qajar dynasty”, 
“the opposition of reformative actions 
with Islam”, “the absolute power of the 
reformer”, “the intervention of aliens in 
Iran”, and “colonisation of Iran”. The 
failure to address these criticisms led to the 
dismissal of Sepahsalar after his return to 
Iran from significant travel with the Shah. In 
fact, it seems that the emphasis of opponents 
on religious arguments (the opposition 
of reformative actions with Islam) and 
the governmental arguments (reformer’s 
attempts to change the monarch system and 
to abolish Qajar dynasty) disarmed the Shah 
in defending his Prime Minister and resulted 
in the failure of the third reformative period 
in the Naser-ed-Din Shah era. 
As discussed above, during the reforms 
from 1871 to 1873, the arguments of the 
advocates focused on the necessity of the 
reform and did not offer any arguments 
against opponents’ performances and 
attitudes. These arguments were generally 
political and there was no religious reasoning 
among oppositions’ arguments.21 One of 
the most significant points regarding the 
advocates is Malkum’s silence during this 
period, given that in the previous reformative 
period (1858-1861), he supported the 
reforms by writing pamphlets in addition to 
detracting the opposition by writing letters. 
During Sepahsalar’s reformative period, 
however, Malkum (the formal consultant of 
Sepahsalar) withheld his opinion and did not 
write any pamphlets in his defence. 
As for the reformer, Sepahsalar tended 
to answer the critiques of his opponents, 
either as the Prime Minister or when he was 
the War or Foreign Minister. In his many 
letters to the Shah, he responded to his 
critics by offering reasons for conducting 
reforms, by refusing the accusations, or 
by highlighting the same critiques in the 
opposition’s own behaviour. Although 
Sepahsalar responded to ten critiques of his 
opponents, he remained silent on the other 
nine. Still, compared to other reformers in 
the Naser-ed-Din Shah’s era, Sepahsalar is 
somewhat more successful in stating the 
importance of the reforms, in addition to 
conducting them. He addressed the three 
most frequent critiques given by opponent 
groups and defended his reforms, including 
21For Garosi’s letter to Malkom see Adamiyat 2006: 
157-158.
For the letter of officials and courtiers’ council for 
approving Reuter concession see Teymori 1978: 105.
For Malkom’s letter to the Foreign Ministry of Iran 
see Sasani 2003: 163-164.
For the letter of a group of officials to the Shah 
regarding the great famine of 1870-1871 see Abbasi 
1993: 30
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“financial performance of the reformer and/
or his advocates”, “endangerment of Naser-
ed-Din Shah’s household”, and “neglecting 
the opponents’ position and threatening their 
class benefits”. Further, Sepahsalar alluded 
to the financial benefits of the opposition 
elites and the endangerment of these benefits 
in his term as the Prime Minister.22 
CONCLUSIONS
Comparative Analysis of Reformers, 
Advocates, and Opponents of Reforms
This article adopts rational choice theory 
as its framework in the analysis of the 
process of reforms in 19th century Iran. By 
using rational choice theory, this article 
was enabled to go beyond the mainstream 
narratives of Iran scholars who claim that 
opponents of these reforms were merely 
reactionaries. Therefore, focusing on the 
arguments of opponents and advocates 
of these reforms and assuming them as 
rational actors, this article has shown 
their progressive and backward rational 
choices. For analysing the arguments of 
the opponents of reform in these three 
reformative periods—AmirKabir’s reforms 
(1848-1851), Naser-ed-Din Shah’s reforms 
(1858-1861), and Sepahsalar’s reforms 
(1871-1873) — this article focuses on a 
combination of opponents’ arguments.23 In 
nominal comparison, the existence/absence 
of arguments in the three periods is analysed 
to understand the arguments that were 
most influential. This analysis continues by 
assessing the similar arguments offered by 
at least one of the opponent groups in each 
period of reforms in the Naseri era. 
The most common arguments which 
were seen in all the periods of reform include 
endangerment of Naser-ed-Din Shah’s 
household, homeland security disturbance, 
the danger of losing territorial integrity of 
Iran, the reformer’s political dependency on 
foreign countries, neglecting the opponents’ 
position and threatening their class benefits, 
neglecting the people’s rights, neglecting 
traditions by reformer and/or his advocates, 
and personal manner of the reformer and/
or his advocates. The other arguments are 
omitted in this analysis due to their absence 
in at least one of the reformative periods.
As mentioned before, most of the 
existing analytical and historical analyses 
focus on the backwardness of the opponents 
and consider them to be passive reactioners 
who chase their own financial and even 
sexual desires. Interestingly, the only 
reactionary arguments offered by the 
22For Sepahsalar’s letter to the Shah see the following: 
Abbasi: 128; Abbasi: 53; Abbasi 1993: 37; Abbasi 
1993: 53-54; Abbasi 1993: 86-87; Abbasi 1993: 87; 
Abbasi 1993: 44-45; Abbasi 1993: 68; Abbasi 1993: 
79; Abbasi 1993: 91-93; Teymori 1978: 41; Teymori 
1978: 43-46; Teymori 1978: 47-48; Abbasi 1993: 84; 
Abbasi 1993: 99-100.
For Sepahsalar’s letter to Malkom see Sasani 2003: 
110-114
23Despite the absence of three groups of opponents in 
the list of opponent groups/reforms, since the purpose 
is the assessment of a collection of arguments in a 
general group as opponents, this absence does not 
disturb analyzing the arguments. In fact, in these 
three reformative periods, the arguments of one 
group affects the arguments of other opponent 
groups and forms the trend of opposing the reform 
in general.
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opponents are “neglecting the opponents’ 
position and threatening their class benefits” 
and “neglecting traditions by the reformer 
and/or his advocates”. In fact, the opponents 
of reforms, consciously, offered many 
well-reasoned arguments against reforms, 
and often tried to argue that reforms were 
a threat to Iran politically, financially, and 
culturally. 
Assessing the repetition of opposition 
arguments in these reforms results in 
an ordinal comparison. Based on the 
number of groups that had mentioned one 
specific argument in these three reforms, 
these are the most repetitive arguments:24 
“endangerment of Naser-ed-Din Shah’s 
household”, “neglecting the opponents’ 
position and threatening their class benefits”, 
“neglecting traditions by the reformer and/
or his advocates”, and “personal manner of 
the reformer and/or his advocates”. Next 
to these arguments in importance are those 
that were repeated by at least four groups 
in these three periods: “the opposition of 
reformative actions with Islam”, “financial 
performance of the reformer and/or his 
advocates”, “depriving the heir of power”, 
“homeland security disturbance”, “the 
absolute power of the reformer”, “the 
danger of losing territorial integrity of 
Iran”, “neglecting the people’s rights”, and 
“cultural westernisation of Iran.” Finally, 
the least common arguments are: “the 
negligence toward Islam by the reformer 
and/or his advocates”, “financial corruption 
of the reformer and/or his advocates”, 
“neglecting the financial benefits of elites”, 
“attempts to abolish the Qajar dynasty”, “the 
intervention of aliens in Iran”, “attempts to 
change the monarch system”, “colonisation 
of Iran”, “political dependency of the 
reformer and/or his advocates on foreign 
countries”, and “the humble social status 
of the reformer and/or his advocates”. 
Although at least one group of opponents 
in one of the three reforms in Naser-ed-Din 
Shah’s era focused on these arguments, the 
other groups of opponents were reluctant to 
mention them. 
The arguments “the opposition of 
the reformative actions with Islam”, 
“financial performance of the reformer 
and/or his advocates”, “depriving the 
heir of power”, “absolute power of the 
reformer”, and “cultural westernisation of 
Iran” has been eliminated from the nominal 
comparison due to their absence in one of 
the reformative periods. They remain in the 
ordinal comparison, however, because of 
the repetition of these arguments in other 
reformative periods.
In analysing the arguments of advocates 
of reforms, there were no arguments from 
the advocates of AmirKabir’s reform. 
Therefore, the comparison of advocates 
of reforms in these three reform periods 
24If all the opponent groups in these three reformative 
periods offered one specific argument, that argument 
in the ordinal comparison would have received 
nine (three opponent groups in each of the three 
reformative periods). However, it is crucial to notice 
that the numbers offered here are not real and do not 
demonstrate the repetition of arguments in “each” 
of opponent groups. But they merely reveal that a 
specific argument has been offered by the number 
of opposing groups, including clergymen, courtiers, 
officials, and women of the harem.
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is not possible. However, comparing the 
arguments of advocates in the other two 
reform periods (the Shah’s and Sepahsalar’s) 
shows that the arguments of advocates in 
Sepahsalar’s era are more concentrated on 
the repetitive arguments of the opponents. 
However, these arguments are fewer in 
number compared to the arguments of 
advocates of the Shah’s reforms. The 
convincing arguments of Sepahsalar’s 
reform advocates are one of the most 
important reasons that Sepahsalar came 
back to power as the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs fifty days after his dismissal—unlike 
the other two reform periods in the Naseri 
era, in which the failure of the reforms 
resulted in the death or imprisonment of the 
reformer and/or his advocates. 25Besides, 
compared to AmirKabir and Naser-ed-Din 
Shah, Sepahsalar offered more accurate 
arguments in defence of his reforms, 
responding to the critiques, and criticising 
them back. However, there was no common 
argument among reforms in the Naseri era 
and, as a result, analysing the common 
arguments is not possible.
Thus, assessing the triple relation of 
the reformers, opponents, and advocates of 
reforms, in two of three periods of reforms 
in the Naseri era (reforms of AmirKabir 
and reforms of Naser-ed-Din Shah), there 
was no mutual counterargument among 
advocates and reformers to retreat the 
oppositions. It was only during Sepahsalar’s 
period that both the reformer and advocates 
of reforms responded to the arguments of 
opponents. Therefore, although all of these 
short-term reforms failed, considering the 
results of the first reform (which led to 
the exile and murder of the reformer) and 
the second reform (which ended in the 
exile, imprisonment, and murder of some 
of the advocates), the return of Sepahsalar 
to power highlights the importance of the 
ability of the reformer and his advocates 
to respond to the opposition. In fact, the 
integration of the reformer and advocates in 
response to powerful opponents gave power 
to the Shah to stand against the pressure of 
the opponents (by insuring his own status). 
Therefore, in the three reformative 
periods during the Naser-ed-Din Shah 
era, whenever the reformer and advocates 
both were successful in offering arguments 
and responding to at least a part of the 
arguments, the chance of the continuance 
of reformative ideas persisted, such as when 
Sepahsalar followed some of his reformative 
efforts as the Minister of State.26 
25In some of the arguments offered by opponents 
and advocates of reforms, the transposition time 
has not been considered. But since these arguments 
are not the only ones discussed, and since they are 
merely some of the many arguments, this non-linear 
narrative has no effect on analyzing the arguments of 
reforms in these three reformative periods.
26It is not merely the accountability that saves the life 
of the reformer and his advocates—there are other 
factors involved in this process including protection 
from foreign embassies. Further, the accountability 
of the reformer had, perhaps, been facilitated by the 
social condition in which the advocates of reforms 
and the reformer found the courage to support the 
reforms and to emphasize their achievements. 
However, this article is focused on the arguments 
offered by the opponents and advocates of reforms 
in these three reformative periods, and consciously 
ignores the other elements.
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ABSTRACT
This paper is an attempt to study the relationship between leisure time and social capital. 
Attention is paid to the theoretical and conceptual aspects of the two constructs in the 
literature of the field. An attempt was made to study the association between leisure time 
and social capital within the framework of extrication between the individual and collective 
leisure times, as well as intergroup and intra-group social capital. Through a secondary 
analysis of national surveys data about the Iranian youth, the linkage between leisure time 
and social capital is statistically analysed.
 Overall, the findings of the study show that the youth who spend most of their leisure 
time in collective leisure activities compared to the youth who spend their time in personal 
activities enjoy more social capital. Society in extending public spaces prepares the 
chance for the formation and promotion of collective leisure-time activities as contrasted 
with private and personal leisure- time activities. In cases where they meet the necessary 
conditions and capabilities, through attending these spaces, youth can reproduce and 
strengthen the constructive indices and components of social capital. 
INTRODUCTION
How people use their leisure time has 
always been a key issue for past and present 
thinkers of social sciences. Leisure can be 
measured in both working and rest times. 
Considering the role of social sciences 
and cultural studies in the modern era, 
leisure and its relationship with other 
social constructs, such as social capital, has 
become highlighted more than before and, 
in contemporary cultural studies, the way 
of spending leisure is known to be a matter 
of lifestyle. 
Keywords: Collective leisure, Iran, leisure time, personal leisure, social capital, youth    
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The focus of this article is on leisure as a 
collective behavior in pastime that generally 
involves withdrawal from formal activities. 
Collective behaviors are associated with 
numerous activities such as spending leisure 
time with others in public spaces. The focus 
of social capital on social relations is in form 
of internal and external relations that are 
called bonding social capital and bridging 
social capital. 
Meanwhile, the quality and quantity 
of leisure time, the ways of using and 
taking advantage of it, and its manifest and 
latent functions have created new fields 
for social and cultural studies to study and 
proposed new questions to answer. One of 
these questions is the relationship between 
different forms of leisure time and social 
capital, the subject of the present article.
Theoretical Framework
Social scientists have expressed different 
views on the conceptual definition of leisure 
time. Leisure, in terms of vocabulary, 
was synonymous with words, such as 
convenience, comfort, ease of work, and 
free from daily work. Therefore, leisure time 
is defined as the daily intervals between the 
imperative activities of the individual that 
can be enjoyed as the person wishes. In 
fact, leisure implies the relief from duties, 
society, family, and religion, and unlike 
occupation, it is not oriented toward profit 
or earning money. However, the ability, 
status, and financial resources available to 
individuals should not be ignored in how 
leisure time differs from occupation or 
assignment. 
Empirical investigations on leisure in 
social sciences started since the second 
decade of the twentieth century. Codifying 
the rule of eight-hour daily work and 
emerging concepts, such as culture 
and leisure community, made it further 
necessary to manage leisure time. In 1924, 
the International Labour Organisation held 
the first international meeting on the free 
time of workers. Most participants in the 
meeting believed that by moderating the 
working hours, leisure activities should be 
more disciplined. Lynd and Lynd’s studies 
about leisure activities in (1957), Lundberg’s 
study in 1934, The Lonely Crowd (2001) by 
David Riesman, and Towards a Sociology 
of Leisure (1966) by Dumazedier are some 
of the endeavours that created new theories 
and added to the empirical data and the 
richness of the sociology of leisure. From 
the perspective of Dumazedier, leisure 
is defined as activities that are free from 
duties and obligations with no economic and 
social purposes. Therefore, it is so pleasant 
as it recognises the individuals’ freedom 
of choice. Dumazedier has expressed 
four types of activities: 1) working for 
a livelihood, 2) family obligations, 3) 
meeting socio-cultural obligations, and 4) 
activities leading to self-expression and 
self-realisation. In his opinion, spending 
leisure time includes a set of activities that 
are willingly performed by a person after 
he is released from the requirements of job, 
family, and society and takes pleasure for 
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relaxation, recreation, self-education and 
studying, or social engagement. Dumazedier 
expressed three functions for leisure time:
1) Rest in order to compensate for physical 
and mental fatigue caused by continuous 
load of work.
2) Have fun in order to relieve fatigue 
caused by uniform daily tasks in the 
workshop, office, or home. 
3) Look for personal growth. Leisure 
releases individuals from daily work 
and routines. It enables the individual 
to grow physically and mentally and, 
thus, is effective in the formation of 
personality. 
These functions are more related to the 
social-psychological dimensions. On the 
other hand, collectivist leisure, in addition 
to the psychological functions, purports 
collectivist functions mainly in improving 
social participation, social cohesion, 
socialisation, and social identity. Therefore, 
a fourth function must be added to the 
above three functions in order to better 
demonstrate the linkage between leisure 
time and social capital. It is known as the 
communicative and participative function. 
The communicative and participative 
function of leisure time helps to strengthen 
social cohesion by providing the opportunity 
to establish family, friendships, teams, and 
professional relationships; it provides a 
basis for collaborative activities. Moreover, 
it increases accountability and civic 
engagement. Although the concept and 
use of leisure time are the fundamental 
issues, it is affected by social and cultural 
differences of communities and, therefore, 
it is an expression of cultural and social 
specificities.
Leisure time and social capital
According to the collectivist, communicative, 
interactive, and participative nature of 
leisure time, its relationship with social 
capital makes it constitutive of quantity 
and quality in terms of the amount of social 
relations it preserves. Hence, there is a 
significant relationship between social and 
cultural scholars’ view. The quantity and 
quality of social relationships has always 
been a major interest of social theorists. 
Nowadays, the concept, as understood by 
many nineteenth-century social scientists, 
is the investigation topic for social capital 
scholars who have revised it in the social 
capital framework with a new format. 
Coleman (1988) defined social capital as 
a variety of entities with two elements in 
common: they all consist of some aspect of 
social structure, and they facilitate certain 
actions among actors. That facilitates 
collective action, generated by networks of 
relationships, reciprocity, trust, and social 
norms.
It is obvious that considering the essence 
of social capital and the content of leisure 
time, a link between these two constructs 
can be thought of and investigated. This 
linkage is mainly interactive and the very 
interaction should be observed in terms 
of the production and reproduction of 
social capital and the erosion of it, as well 
as the role that social capital plays in the 
development of collectivist leisure. In 
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Ingen and Eijck’s opinion (2009), leisure 
activities especially further people’s social 
capital among groups that are already gifted 
with high levels of civic engagement and 
helping. In addition, the effect of various 
forms of social capital, such as inter- and 
intra- group social capital based on the 
extent of relations, should not be ignored. In 
this respect, the relationship between leisure 
time and different forms of social capital can 
be indicated in the following table.
government officials and NGOs, it increases 
the trust in public and state institutions and 
invigorates social capital at a large-scale.
Leisure time as input for social capital
While working hours are necessary for 
producing economic capital, leisure is the 
important input for generating social capital. 
The relationship between leisure time and 
social capital may not be linear and its 
effects are manifested in the production of 
social capital due to the effect it has on social 
inputs, such as social norms, identity, and 
time management. Although the metaphor 
of time as a production factor for social 
capital is not taken for granted unanimously, 
its influence on the quality and quantity of 
relations and interactions is acceptable. The 
time that is spent on affairs relating to the 
interaction with family members, friends, 
obtaining information, mutual assistance, 
protection and preservation of common 
cultural values, emotional support and other 
civic, participatory and collective activities, 
has an important role in the production 
of social capital. With this viewpoint, if 
we consider social capital as an asset and 
also take into account the potentials and 
backdrops that produce this asset, then, the 
role and effect of time cannot be ignored in 
the production of assets and social capital. 
In social capital literature, the concept 
of ‘available time’ was observed to improve 
social capital. In this case, the time devoted 
to mutual aid between friends, neighbours, 
and extended family members, as well as 
activities in the form of formal communities 
and visiting friends and neighbours, enhances 
Table 1 
The relationship between social capital and leisure 
time
Inter-group 
Leisure time
Intra-group Social Capital
Weaker Weak Personalised 
leisure
Stronger Strong Collectivist leisure
On one hand, the linkage between leisure 
and social capital can be also considered 
in the “third space”. The concept of the 
third space or public sphere was used to 
separate public space from the home and the 
workplace. These are places where public 
services are available for leisure. The type 
of space and the quality and quantity of 
services offered in it affects the social capital 
in micro- and macro- scales. The presence 
of appropriate third spaces or public spheres 
increases the possibility of the presence of 
people in these spaces, thereby, improving 
social interactions between intra- and inter- 
groups and promoting social capital in micro 
and macro scales. However, as the services 
provided in the third or public space are 
devised by public policy formulated by 
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trust in society and the feeling of belonging 
to the community. According to the findings 
of Putnam in Italy, Hemingway suggests that 
specific forms of leisure activity contribute 
to the development of social capital central 
to democracy and democratic citizenship. 
Participation in specific forms of leisure 
activity was, in Putnam’s findings, strongly 
and positively associated with the existence 
of social norms of tolerance and trust, 
which, in turn, support democratic attitudes 
and practices. The longer these social norms 
had existed, the greater their association 
with democratic social capital (Hemingway, 
1999). Leisure time and production of 
social capital through the development of 
intergenerational relationships in collectivist 
leisure time is a notable issue.
In Putnam’s belief, television, which 
is one of the main sources of leisure in 
America, is an effective factor in the erosion 
of social connections and the reduction of 
civic activities, with a higher incidence 
seen among the younger generations of 
Americans (Putnam, 2000). He concluded 
that Americans prefer to be alone rather 
than join political and social movements. It 
is observed that, although the relationship 
between leisure and social capital was 
analysed in theoretical and experimental 
ways to reach considerable related data, the 
theoretical results and experimental results 
do not demonstrate the relationship to be 
extensive or persistent. Therefore, firm and 
decisive judgements cannot be achieved 
in relation to the relationship between 
various forms of leisure and social capital. 
By the way, the presence of theoretical 
and experimental consensus should not 
be neglected in terms of the impact and 
interaction between collectivist leisure and 
social capital.
METHODS
This study is based on secondary analysis 
quantitative data. The research method 
includes the analysis of existing data from 
data national surveys that were conducted 
in Iran. In this study, research questions 
were used to collect secondary analysis 
quantitative data. Questions were included 
regarding the relationship between spending 
leisure times and social capital among 
youth. Data were collected through national 
surveys in Iran, including Iranians’ Values 
and Attitudes in 2003; 2005, The Values 
and Attitudes of the Iranian Youth in 2005, 
Measurement of Social Capital in 2015 
and Iranians’ Values and Attitudes in 2016. 
Activity in leisure time is classified in 
two parts: personal activity and collective 
activity. For measuring personal activity in 
leisure time some activities are described 
including watching TV, watching videotapes, 
internet, computer games, listening to 
music, learning artworks, reading books 
and newspapers, listening to radio, and 
watching satellite. For measuring collective 
leisure time, other activities are considered 
such as socializing with friends and with 
family, going to the cinema, theatre, park, 
and recreation centres, traveling, going to 
a friend’s party and going to pilgrimage. 
Social capital is measured by proxy’s 
institutional trust, public trust, association 
participation and number of friends. For 
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the statistical analysis of data, we used the 
statistical ANOVA test to determine the 
mean of three indicators of social capital for 
issues relating to any of the leisure activities, 
and Chi-Square for testing the association 
between variables.
Findings 
The study of the relationship between 
leisure times and social capital demands 
independent quantitative and qualitative 
studies. Nevertheless, in this study, the 
relationship between different forms of 
leisure and social capital was analysed 
according to three indicators and by 
referring to the mentioned surveys. Three 
indicators1 used in this article to measure 
social capital were institutional trust, 
association participation, and number of 
friends. Institutional trust was assessed 
through a combination of trust and belief 
in the success of a set of social, cultural, 
political, and economic institutions. 
Association participation was measured 
based on the number of associations and 
social institutions in which the individual 
participated. The number of friends was 
measured by asking about the number of 
friends of either sex (for both boys and 
girls). The ANOVA technique was used to 
determine the mean of the three indicators 
of social capital for issues relating to any of 
the leisure activities.
1It is clear that social capital indicators are 
much more than the three criteria presented in 
this article. However, as no data was available 
other than the three mentioned indicators, it 
was sufficient to use these three.
Table 2 
The amount and relationship of personal activity in leisure time and social capital
Leisure activities Amount Institutional 
trust
Means
Association 
participation
Number of 
friends
Watching TV a lot 64/97 26/1 73/8
a few hours per week 83/95 37/1 43/8
a few hours per month 29/93 36/1 23/8
rarely 2/96 36/1 22/8
never 23/92 4/1 38/10
total 19/97 28/1 65/8
F 3/5 ¾ 59/0
sig 000/ 002/0 673/0
Watching 
videotapes
a lot 79/96 24/1 47/9
a few hours per week 07/97 24/1 16/8
a few hours per month 38/95 33/1 41/8
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rarely 92/97 36/1 37/8
never 41/99 38/1 78/8
total 18/97 28/1 64/8
F 96/6 5/4 69/1
sig 000/ 001/0 15/0
Internet a lot 78/95 49/1 92/10
a few hours per week 1/95 49/1 7/8
a few hours per month 09/95 39/1 47/8
rarely 93/95 42/1 9/7
never 65/98 14/1 06/8
total 16/97 28/1 64/8
F 31/15 15/40 11/6
sig 000/ 000/ 000/
Computer games a lot 65/97
82/96 38/1
43/1 29/10
16/9
a few hours per week 78/95 35/1 05/8
a few hours per month 35/96 38/1 02/9
rarely 81/97 17/1 83/7
never 16/97 28/1 65/8
total 65/97
82/96 38/1
43/1 29/10
16/9
F 38/3 4/21 47/4
sig 009/0 000/ 001/0
Listening to 
music
a lot 87/95 28/1 01/9
a few hours per week 92/96 28/1 93/7
a few hours per month 51/97 27/1 93/6
rarely 94/99 32/1 87/7
never 85/99 26/1 37/11
total 17/97 28/1 63/8
F 33/14 4/0 17/4
sig 000/ 807/0 002/0
Learning artworks a lot 82/98 45/1 86/10
a few hours per week 8/98 47/1 38/7
a few hours per month 96/96 36/1 48/8
Table 2 (continue)
Leisure activities Amount Institutional 
trust
Means
Association 
participation
Number of 
friends
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The data presented in Table 2 show that the 
average of institutional trust and association 
participation versus watching television in 
leisure time is statistically different among 
the youth under study. Young people who 
spend more time watching TV during leisure 
time have higher institutional trust. Young 
people who spend more time watching 
TV, have a lower association participation 
average. There is no significant relationship 
rarely 8/96 31/1 02/8
never 36/96 04/1 27/9
total 14/97 28/1 64/8
F 84/4 04/43 99/5
sig 001/0 000/ 000/
Reading books, 
newspaper…
a lot 93/96 54/1 08/9
a few hours per week 98 35/1 53/8
a few hours per month 58/96 22/1 9/7
rarely 01/97 09/1 28/8
never 28/96 9/0 5/10
total 17/97 28/1 65/8
F 16/2 14/67 57/2
sig 071/0 000/ 036/0
Listening to radio a lot 69/98 42/1 3/9
a few hours per week 42/98 43/1 62/8
a few hours per month 27/98 44/1 37/8
rarely 13/97 29/1 18/8
never 75/95 14/1 92/8
total 18/97 28/1 66/8
F 51/7 15/28 8/0
sig 000/ 000/ 523/0
Watching satellite a lot 35/92 05/1 48/9
a few hours per week 98/92 28/1 21/9
a few hours per month 47/92 22/1 5/8
rarely 74/93 31/1 17/8
never 93/98 3/1 49/8
total 2/97 28/1 65/8
F 5/43 87/8 15/1
sig 000/ 000/ 329/0
Source: Values and attitudes of Iranian youth (2005)
Table 2 (continue)
Leisure activities Amount Institutional 
trust
Means
Association 
participation
Number of 
friends
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between watching television during leisure 
time and the number of friends of the studied 
youth. 
There is a significant difference 
between watching videotapes and the 
level of institutional trust and association 
participation of individuals. As the amount 
of watching videos during leisure time 
decreases, the level of institutional trust 
and association participation increase. It is 
observed that watching TV and video during 
leisure times is in negative association with 
the level of institutional trust of the studied 
population. This means that by increasing 
the amount of watching TV, the mean level 
of institutional trust increases too. However, 
an increase in watching videos causes a 
reduction in institutional trust. Participants 
with a high volume of watching TV during 
leisure time have an institutional trust mean 
of 96.62, while participants with a low 
volume of watching TV have an institutional 
mean of 92.23. The people who reported 
watching videos “a lot” and “never” in 
their leisure time had an institutional trust 
average of 96.79 and 99.42, respectively. 
The situation is related to the nature and 
scope of authority and choice of the youth. 
Regarding watching videos with a friend, no 
significant difference was observed. Though 
watching TV and watching videotapes 
are both considered as personal leisure 
activities, the limited choice of TV channels 
and programs compared to the wider 
options in watching videotapes may partly 
explain different means in the personal 
experience of watching the two media 
and the consequential varying degrees of 
institutional trust. There is no significant 
relationship between watching videos and 
the number of friends of the studied youth.
There is a significant relationship 
between the time spent on the internet, 
computer, computer games, and learning 
of art works with the three indices of 
social capital, while there is a significant 
relationship between the time spent listening 
to radio and watching satellite with the two 
indices of institutional trust and association 
membership. Reading books has no 
significant relationship with institutional 
trust, but it shows a statistically significant 
relationship with the two indicators of 
association membership and the number of 
friends. There is no statistically significant 
relationship between these two categories 
and the number of friends. Listening to 
music also has a significant relationship with 
institutional trust and the number of friends, 
but it shows no significant relationship 
with association membership. Statistics 
show that by decreasing the amount of 
use of the internet, computer, computer 
games, listening to music, and watching 
the satellite, the mean of institutional trust 
increases. Among the proposed cases that 
spend leisure time personally, increase time 
in listening to the radio and learning artwork 
causes an increase in the institutional trust 
mean. With increasing the use of internet, 
computer, computer games, learning 
artworks, and studying, an increase in the 
average of association membership and the 
number of friends is observed. There is no 
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statistically significant relationship between 
listening to the radio, watching movies, 
watching videos, and watching satellite with 
the number of friends.
Table 3 
The relationship between collective leisure activities and social capital 
Leisure activities Amount Institutional 
trust
Means
Association 
participation
Number of 
friends
Socializing with 
friends
a lot 17/97 42/1 21/10
a few hours per week 14/97 33/1 42/8
a few hours per month 9/96 2/1 38/7
rarely 96/96 18/1 79/6
ever 49/99 95/0 24/7
total 18/97 28/1 66/8
amount F 6/1 3/25 5/9
sig 178/0 000/ 000/
Socializing with 
family
a lot 3/100 34/1 25/11
a few hours per week 98/98 3/1 34/8
a few hours per month 1/96 3/1 2/8
rarely 37/95 27/1 56/8
never 92/94 08/1 98/9
total 17/97 28/1 62/8
amount F 7/17 4/4 7/3
sig 000/ 001/0 005/0
Going to the 
cinema and 
theatre
a lot 41/109 22/1 7/16
a few hours per week 74/99 44/1 24/8
a few hours per month 67/96 33/1 64/8
rarely 8/95 34/1 28/8
never 3/98 21/1 79/8
total 17/97 28/1 66/8
amount F 34/14 9/7 1/7
sig 000/ 000/ 000/
Going to parks 
and recreation 
centres
a lot 39/101 3/1 21/12
a few hours per week 14/100 42/1 82/8
a few hours per month 97 35/1 88/7
rarely 24/96 23/1 21/8
never 17/96 13/1 36/10
total 18/97 28/1 66/8
amount F 54/13 14/15 1/7
sig 000/ 000/ 000/
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Table 3 refers to that part of leisure activities 
that have a more collectivist nature compared 
with those outlined in Table 2. All cases 
presented in Table 3, except socializing with 
friends, which do not show a significant 
relationship with institutional trust, show 
a significant relationship with three social 
capital measures. With the increase in 
Going to 
pilgrimage
a lot 66/92 98/0 4/9
a few hours per week 95 14/1 24/8
a few hours per month 25/99 48/1 95/7
rarely 88/101 73/1 9/8
never 87/105 7/1 98/12
total 19/97 28/1 65/8
amount F 2/0 19/0 09/0
sig 039/0 038/0 008/0
Going to travel a lot 57/111 4/1 27/19
a few hours per week 95/100 45/1 59/7
a few hours per month 99/98 59/1 06/9
rarely 93/96 29/1 3/8
never 78/95 02/1 04/9
total 19/97 28/1 66/8
amount F 02/15 3/44 46/8
sig 000/ 000/ 000/
Doing exercise a lot 9/100 55/1 62/9
a few hours per week 98 45/1 73/8
a few hours per month 02/94 33/1 09/8
rarely 79/95 12/1 04/8
never 74/96 91/0 54/8
total 19/97 28/1 65/8
amount F 68/29 86/88 06/2
sig 000/ 000/ 084/0
Going to a 
friend’s party
a lot 73/99 45/1 81/12
a few hours per week 58/98 32/1 13/9
a few hours per month 08/96 37/1 55/8
rarely 19/96 28/1 93/7
never 18/99 19/1 28/8
total 17/97 29/1 65/8
amount F 89/11 46/8 44/7
sig 000/ 000/ 000/
Source: Values and attitudes of Iranian youth (2005)
Table 3 (continue)
Leisure activities Amount Institutional 
trust
Means
Association 
participation
Number of 
friends
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socializing with friends during leisure time, 
the association participation mean, and the 
number of friends show an increase. With 
increasing socializing with family, going to 
the cinema and theatre, going to parks and 
recreation centres, going on pilgrimages 
and tourism travels, exercising, and going 
to friends’ parties, the means for the three 
social capital indicators increase. A decrease 
in the participation in religious ceremonies 
increases the mean of the institutional trust 
and association participation. The average 
number of friends of individuals who mostly 
participate in religious ceremonies is 9.4 
compared to the average number of friends 
of those who never have participated in the 
religious ceremonies is 12.98.
In Iranians’ Values and Attitudes (2003), 
the data of which is provided in Table 4, the 
relationship between the way of spending 
leisure time (i.e. alone or with others) has 
a significant relationship with the public 
trust among the youth (persons aged 18 to 
29 years). 
Table 4 
Distribution of the relationship between spending leisure time and amount of trust
Public trust Spend leisure time
Alone With others Total
Little 43.9 30.7 31.4
Somewhat 52.6 58.1 57.9
A lot 3.5 11.2 10.7
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Pearson Chi-Square= 12.44   Significance =.002  N=2200  static=.38
Source: Iranians’ values and attitudes (2003)
In Iranians’ Values and Attitudes of (2005) 
as observed in Table 5, this relationship is 
a significant relationship, which indicates 
that collectivist leisure among young people 
has a more positive relationship with social 
trust and is one of the important measures 
of social capital. 
Table 5 
Distribution of the relationship between spending leisure time and the amount of trust
Public trust Spend leisure time
Alone With others Total
Little 40.1 28.3 28.8
Somewhat 51.9 57.1 56.8
A lot 8.0 14.6 14.4
Total 100 100 100
Pearson Chi-Square= 14.9   Significance =.001  N=4389  static=.34
Source: Iranians’ values and attitudes (2005)
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In addition, according to data of national 
surveys (2003; 2005) in Table 6, the general 
trust of young people who spend their 
leisure time alone is less than the general 
trust of the youth who spend their leisure 
collectively with others.
Table 6 
Compared means of general trust
Spend leisure time General trust F sig Eta
With others 38.9441 9,299 .002 .072
Alone 36.7000
Total 38.8431
With others 39.4107 8,998 .003 .052
Alone 37.6746
Total 39.3454
Source: Iranians’ values and attitudes (2003, 2005)
The score of association membership, which 
is an indication of commitment and civic 
participation among young people, who 
spend their leisure time in the community 
with others is also higher than that among 
young people who spend their leisure alone.
Table 7 
Compared means of association participation
Spend leisure time Association participation F sig Eta
With others 1.8789 7.661 .006 .058
Alone 1.3304
Total 1.8510
With others 1.8504 7.474 .006 .041
Alone 1.4368
Total 1.8329
Source: Iranians’ values and attitudes (2003, 2005)
A total mean score of the three indicators of 
social capital for those who spend their time 
on collectivist activities shows higher values 
compared to those who spend their time on 
personal and private activities. Therefore, in 
spite of exceptions in the studied population 
in terms of the use and impact of TV, radio 
and religious ceremonies, the obtained 
experimental findings generally agree with 
the theoretical literature discussed above in 
terms of the of linkage between leisure time 
and social capital. 
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The statistics in the above table shows that 
the mean score of institutional trust among 
the young people who spend their leisure 
time with others is again higher than young 
people who spend their leisure alone.
Table 8 
The compare means of institutional trust
Spend leisure time    Institutional trust F sig Eta
With others 19.7923 3.529 .05 .02
Alone 19.4567
Total 19.7700
Source: Iranians’ values and attitudes (2016)
According to the findings of the survey 
Iranians’ Values and Attitudes (2016), the 
rate of association membership among 
young people who spend their leisure time 
with others is higher than young people who 
spend their leisure time alone.
DISCUSSION
Today, the importance of leisure-time 
activities for improving psychological, 
cognitive, emotional and social development 
of youths is recognized in all societies. 
Scientists of social sciences have argued 
leisure time as an important part of life 
policy and quality of life, not only due to 
social development for individuals but also 
for strengthening growth and extending 
social capital and civil society. Thus, leisure 
time is one of the aspects of life that has 
a major role in the improvement of social 
life. The findings of this article showed that 
collective activities in leisure time associate 
with measures of social capital such as 
institutional trust, public trust, association 
participation and the number of friends, 
measures that are important for social 
integration, dynamic social order, social 
tolerance and social democracy. Thus, for 
governments it is critical to pay attention 
to the contribution Leisure-time activities 
in social and cultural polices. Thus, social 
policy must try to prepare the situation, 
context, and opportunities that give way to 
easier access to collective leisure activities, 
so that more leisure activities are sustained 
in the collective form. In the meantime, 
Table 9 
The compare means of association participation
Spend leisure time Association participation F sig Eta
With others 1.8634 12.386 .000 .05
Alone 1.3812
Total 1.8297
Source: Iranians values and attitudes (2016)
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individuals who spend their time in personal 
and private leisure activities continue to 
do so along with improving their presence 
in the interactive social activities, again 
enhancing the general rate of social capital 
in the society. 
CONCLUSION
For a comprehensive and detailed analysis 
of the subject in this study, further data 
is needed. However, the present article is 
based on secondary analysis of available 
national data and there are limitations as 
a result. Considering the importance and 
role of the social capital construct, in both 
forms of intergroup and collective, the 
social freshness and dynamism needs to 
be measured by the social, cultural, and 
political officials of the society. Among 
different mechanisms that might reinforce 
this construct, collective leisure is one of 
the most important. However, the linkage 
and the interaction between this mechanism 
and the social capital construct should not 
be neglected because, in a society where 
social capital is rich and suitably evolved, 
the formation and development of collective 
leisure activities are more viable. The 
theoretical and empirical literature and 
findings presented in this paper show that 
the collectivist leisure activities have a 
significance relationship with and a notable 
effect on improving the indicators and items 
related to social capital. Consequently, the 
collective leisure strengthens interpersonal 
trust, collaboration and mutual cooperation, 
inter-generational linkages, unity, and social 
cohesion. It is effective in the reproduction 
of social support, generation of trust 
and mutual aid, and contributes to the 
maintenance and stability of social capital. 
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ABSTRACT
The current research pursues an answer to the question of how female peddlers’ verbal 
and nonverbal communication in the subway in Tehran attracts passengers, encouraging 
them to buy, and how they apply lingual and paralingual advertisements to sell their 
commodities. It attempts to analyse the female peddlers’ actions that make the passengers 
shop in the subway. To realise the issue observation, deep interview, consistent presence, 
and frequent attendance in the designated location for the research (different routes of 
the subway trains in Tehran) was employed and after necessary investigations on the 
domain, deliberative results were discovered. For instance, female peddlers in different 
ages-young, middle aged or elderly-pay significant attention to the acquisition of lingual 
skills to advertise their commodities, since the peddlers are growing in number every day; 
some are genius in this regard and invent particular lexis and behaviours, and some others 
imitate lingual and paralingual skills and the body language from other peddlers to sell 
their commodities among the passengers. Due to the excessive number of rivals (female 
peddlers) with comparable products, they are distinguished through the method they use 
to advertise. Putting together the verbal and nonverbal advertising, the applied method 
makes each individual unique and different from the others, thus the peddlers attract the 
passengers’ attention to sell their commodities.    
Keywords: Female peddlers, lingual and paralingual 
skills, method of advertising, subway, Tehran   
INTRODUCTION AND THE 
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
People in society must do economic activities 
for a living, and the activities are chiefly 
Ahmad Naderi and Maryam Hossein Yazdi
84 Pertanika J. Soc. Sci. & Hum. 26 (T): 83 - 102 (2018)
based on a variety of factors such as the 
level of literacy, expertise, efficiency, etc. 
Among these, there are individuals working 
as peddlers for several reasons, including 
the lack of expertise, capital, a second job 
besides their main one, emigration from 
villages to cities, etc.
Peddling is a type of hidden employment; 
the person is occupied through buying some 
commodities and selling them with a special 
amount of interest, and does not have a 
certain location for business. Peddling is 
one of the menial, brittle, and irregular 
jobs which can be explicitly observed in 
big cities and is not merely men’s job, but 
children and especially women have tread 
in the domain as well. The female peddlers 
in the subway are among the new ones who 
are increasing in number daily.
In his dictionary, Nezam-ol-Ateba, 
Dehkhoda defines peddling as, “A retailer 
and peddler who sells his commodity as 
much as the customer wishes, though a 
little” (Dehkhoda, 1957, p.707). Dehkhoda 
states, “one, who sells in the street and 
bazaar with a piece in hand, is a peddler” 
(Dehkhoda, 1957, p.707).
Now it has been a while since the 
wagons of the subway trains in the capital, 
especially women’s, have turned to mobile 
stores. Men, children, and particularly 
women are growing in number every day, 
peddling in the subway stations and wagons. 
Once the number of peddlers increases, 
the competition also rises. They try to sell 
various goods according to the season, 
situation, and different occasions (Nowrooz, 
Mehr month, and the school opening, 
Ramadan, and special dates like Mothers’ 
Day, Fathers’ Day, etc.) to be capable of 
absorbing more customers; therefore, 
lingual skills in advertising, including verbal 
and nonverbal skills and body language, 
are the first and key principles for female 
peddlers to attract customers, and they 
try in the subway to apply verbal and 
nonverbal skills while advertising for their 
commodities.
One of the skills the peddlers use in the 
subway is the selection of the commodity 
to sell. They select goods that are regularly 
used by the passengers. Decorations, 
cosmetics, stationery, socks, women’s 
clothing, and edibles are the biggest part 
of commodities for the peddlers to sell. Of 
course, many goods the peddlers advertise 
in the subway are not included among 
the priorities and necessities of life, but 
they encourage many of the passengers to 
buy, through their lingual and paralingual 
advertising skills. Since these actions are 
repeated every day, a certain brand of 
behaviour forms. Compact commodities, 
cheap products, availability, combined with 
the female peddlers’ verbal and nonverbal 
advertising, and has gifted the passengers’ 
consumerism. The passengers are wooed 
by the peddlers’ skilful advertising, mostly 
buying things unconsciously, presupposing 
that the goods are cheaper than the ones in 
the stores and might be necessary one day.
The expert peddlers know what lexis and 
how to use them, sometimes emphasising 
certain words and sometimes changing 
the tone. They diagnose each situation to 
find a way to convey the meanings through 
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nonverbal messages. “The indirect meaning 
needs inference and deduction of the relative 
utterance, because most of what is intended 
by the speaker is not expressed explicitly. So 
it can be said that the indirect verbal action is 
perceived through the common contexts and 
beliefs between the speaker and listener” 
(Nyota & Mutasa, 2008, p. 93).
While advertising the exceptional 
quality and the sale of the lowest price in 
the subway, the female peddlers are using a 
direct verbal action. When using statements 
in their advertising to inspire the passengers’ 
interests and needs, knowing their principle 
interests, they are telling them indirectly that 
the merchandise, inspiring their interests 
and filling their needs, is available. In other 
words, they are applying indirect verbal 
action when attracting the passengers to 
something further from what they have in 
mind.
The excess population in the subway 
wagons has limited the space for peddlers’ 
extensive advertising to some extent. When 
there is a large population, peddlers are not 
able to pass through the passengers easily, 
so they advertise loudly; which can be 
annoying for the passengers. Clever peddlers 
realise when verbal advertising is a priority 
over the theatrical one, and vice versa. “In 
order to convey the meaning, people do not 
only produce utterances including words 
and grammatical structures, but they also 
act along with the utterances. The actions 
done by the utterances are generally called 
verbal actions” (Yule, 1996, p.47).
When the wagons are busy, peddlers 
can both attract the passengers and advertise 
their goods very skilfully. Watching the 
peddlers’ theatrical actions, the passengers 
are entertained and might never complain 
about the annoyance of advertising in such 
a populated place. Hence the peddlers 
publicise the commodities in the form of a 
show by indirect verbal actions. 
Thus, the questions intended to be 
answered are:
- How does peddlers’ verbal advertising 
in the subway persuade the passengers 
to buy?
- What lingual methods do the peddlers 
apply to win the customers’ best trust?
- To what extent has the peddlers’ lexis 
for advertising been efficacious in 
increasing sales?
Research purposes
The purpose of this study is to investigate 
the methods of lingual and paralingual 
advertising of women peddlers in the 
subway in Tehran, how these influence the 
behaviour of passengers, and what peddlers 
do to attract the passengers’ attention. 
Lingual and paralingual skills of women 
peddlers in the subway has maximised 
their sale; therefore, finding the tricks and 
techniques that these women use to improve 
their skills is another purpose of the study. 
Among such techniques is creating 
new terms with various implications and 
functionality in order to increase their sale. 
These terms are, sometimes, describing 
the commodity and, sometimes, methods 
of accosting the passengers. As a result, 
comprehending the impact of peddlers’ 
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terminology in the subway on the passengers 
is another purpose of this study. 
METHODS
In the field of anthropology, there are various 
tools used to study cultural situations which 
are rarely technical. Among the most 
significant tools is the researcher himself. 
The researcher must perceive the cultural 
situation of the study case in different 
dimensions and attend persistently in the 
designated research location.
T h e  p e r c e p t i o n  o f  a  c u l t u r a l 
phenomenon must be formed in its own 
cultural background. The researcher is 
not the controller of the affairs, but he 
receives the findings from the real world and 
analyses them. “To perceive the subsistent 
experience, the qualitative work has to be 
continued to the point that the researcher 
reaches a theoretical saturation; i.e., the 
researcher feels that the new interviews 
do not raise any new dimensions of the 
study and the answer is almost repeated” 
(Northcutt & McCoy, 2004, p. 87).
The anthropologist completely drowns 
himself in the lives of the people under 
research. In the current research, the 
researcher has tried to attend directly the 
location of the study during successive 
years and observe acutely. During 2010 to 
2018, the researcher in this study observed 
the customers’ behaviour as consumers and 
that of the peddlers in the subway in the 
capital. He spent prolonged periods of time 
in the subway trains as a passenger, from 
the first station to the last, and observed 
the peddlers’ and passengers’ actions and 
reactions deeply. The time process is very 
important in anthropological studies. The 
researcher discovers the cultural phenomena 
through time and will never collect data 
using questionnaires because the method of 
the questionnaire, in short term, might not 
provide the access to a cultural affair.
Observing women’s peddling, their 
social interactions, the peddlers’ treatment 
with each other and with the passengers, the 
method of verbal and nonverbal publicising 
of the commodities by the peddlers are the 
subject of the research at this level of study, 
which have been recorded, completely 
registered, and used as the analytical 
document to register the results. In fact, the 
study of the peddlers’ wording, the lingual 
ways of advertising, and body language 
to attract the passengers’ attention in the 
subway is impossible through quantitative 
methods, because the current research needs 
consistent presence of the researcher in the 
designated location of the study to have 
impartial findings by applying qualitative 
methods. Therefore, deep observation of 
and interviews with informants are the main 
axis of this research. Interviews are recorded 
in the research location and, immediately 
after, the main points were written, revised, 
and collected. Regarding the selection 
of the atmosphere for the interviews, it 
should be noted that the interviews with the 
peddlers were accomplished in the research 
circumference, such as on waiting platforms 
and within wagons in each station.
The process of interviews is conducted 
with the absolute consent of informants and 
they have been completely informed about 
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their voice being taped. Of importance is 
the point that throughout the interviews and 
despite their complete knowledge of the 
study, the names of informants have been 
kept confident and the present article does 
not include their names.
Nowadays, the subway has turned to 
a mobile market. Female peddlers work 
as salespersons and all the passengers 
are customers. The large population and 
the security of the train have provided 
an appropriate  place for  peddlers’ 
salesmanship. Selling goods, the consumers’ 
behaviour, and the peddlers’ lingual and 
non-lingual advertising to sell goods, are all 
part of the process in the subway every day; 
studying such actions are possible through 
anthropological methods.
“Anthropology and specially its 
ethnographic methods are turning to 
popular cumulative resources by which 
some tools are applied to research upon 
marketing and consumer behaviour in the 
20th century” (Olsen, 1995). The approach of 
market research emphasises the relationship 
between studying the consumer’s behaviour 
and the investigation of the action of 
marketing (Finch, 1997).
Research society
In this research, the society is the subway in 
Tehran, the undergrounds where the subway 
trains travel in specific routes. The subway 
undergrounds, train wagons, and all the lines 
and routes the subway in the capital passes 
through form the scope and location of the 
research.
The significance of the research subject
Peddling is considered a menial and brittle 
job in society; the income loss or profit do 
not influence the increase or decrease in 
national revenue, and it is propounded as 
a social problem. The significance of the 
subject deserves deliberation and research 
as the number of female peddlers in the 
subway is growing everyday regardless of 
the obstacles and legal restrictions against 
the job; the peddlers’ solution to their rivals 
is to use a variety of words to publicise their 
goods. The peddlers’ lingual methods of 
advertising are mostly respectful, and one 
can rarely see or hear begging or pleading in 
their publicising and statements. Sometimes 
they also convey a satirical and joking 
manner.
The subway is not merely a means 
of transportation anymore; instead, it 
has become a mobile bazaar. On the way 
towards their destination, the passengers can 
watch a different variety of commodities and 
buy, if necessary. Of course, occasionally 
the variety of commodities, the way of 
advertising, and the certain lexis about 
the high quality of the goods make the 
passengers shop unnecessarily, resulting in 
the formation of fanciful shopping.
In the first years of studying the peddling 
process in the subway, female peddlers 
used to work only inside the wagons, but 
through time and an increase in the number 
of peddlers, the wagons became extremely 
populated. To solve the problem, some 
peddlers sit in the subway platforms and 
begin to advertise their commodities and 
attract the passengers when they detrain.
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In fact, the peddlers evoke thrilling 
emotions within the passengers through 
advertising, and the passengers start to buy 
goods which might not be efficient, so they 
gradually turn to consumerists. Therefore 
this paper intends to study the significance 
of the peddlers’ lingual and paralingual 
skills and body language to persuade the 
passengers to buy.
Theoretical Framework
In The Language of Advertising (1998), 
Goddard assumes that advertisement is 
so axiomatic to the modern audience that 
any question of “what advertisement is?” 
appears as nonsense. He believes that in the 
discussion of advertisement, text should be 
understood in its broadest sense, suggesting 
that text, in this sense, is in the meantime, 
a visual and verbal medium. He reminds 
of the attraction methods in advertising 
as inclusive of shocking pictures, font of 
typing, and the direction of writing.
In Goddard’s opinion, advertisements 
are present everywhere, which is exactly 
why nobody thinks about their nature 
and concept as a lingual discourse. He 
considers discourse as largely limited 
to its direct circumference. Actually, a 
large part of the meaning intended by the 
speaker is conveyed through the physical 
appearance of the conversation, such as 
gesture, body condition, and eye contact. 
Goddard calls the marginal aspects in 
conversation, paralingual factors, including 
cadence, pitch, and loudness of voice. These 
meaningful factors are all performed on 
purpose in daily speech.
In advertising, the mere expression of 
the sentences in written or speech form, 
to be heard or read by the audience, is not 
enough. Uttering the sentences, the pitch 
of the voice, prolonged pronunciation of 
certain sounds, knowing the situation, are all 
important, including which gesture and body 
movement can be more effective for creating 
the feeling of shopping in the customer. 
Some female peddlers in the subway 
advertise the goods deliberatively, and due to 
this intelligence, they are successful in sale. 
They are good at recognising the situation 
considering the time and place. In the 
morning, they advertise and call the names 
of the goods loudly and with prolonged 
sounds, because everyone is happy to go 
work, university, etc.; in the evening, the 
population increases relative to that in the 
morning, and the majority are exhausted 
and going back home. Therefore, the skilled 
peddlers advertise the commodities in a low 
voice, and even are occasionally silent and 
only show the goods to the passengers to 
avoid complaints from an annoying voice.
In The discourse of Advertising, Cook 
(1992) mentions three components of 
advertising as material, text, and people, 
and explains that popular behaviours against 
any discourse arises from individuals’ 
ideological, social, and personal positions. 
However, in his belief, there is a series 
of discourses that highly manipulate 
sensitivities. He continues stating that 
in a time that people confront a flood of 
social and natural problems, advertising 
could prompt them to consume more, 
create dissatisfaction toward the existing 
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commodities in the market, and increase 
anxieties and concerns that lead to the 
demand for better commodities. 
Regarding the advertisement in the 
subway, Cook also explains that while 
people are inside the trains or waiting in the 
stations, they not only see the advertising 
in the trains and platforms but sometimes 
they study them carefully. Cook divides 
the advertisements into two categories of 
hard and soft. He includes the advertising 
with joke and satirical roots in the soft 
category, and the advertisements directly 
inviting people to buy through presenting 
the attributes, not logically, of the goods 
as the hard one. He also mentions the tools 
applied to convey meaning and messages, 
referring to speech, writing, and gestures 
as the basics for communication. Selecting 
the appropriate materials to present an 
advertisement is one of the most important 
parts of advertising, which depends largely on 
the advertiser’s intelligence and innovation 
(Cook, 1992). Some female peddlers in the 
subway are very talented in their approach 
to advertise the commodities. In peddling, 
the more innovative the advertisements 
are, the more commodities are sold, and 
vice versa. So evidently, if female peddlers 
are in the subway wagons, and mention 
only the name and price of the goods, they 
are directly inviting the passengers to buy. 
Such advertising can only be efficient if the 
merchandise itself is attractive, appropriate 
in material, colour, variety, and indicated as 
essential merchandise. However, when the 
commodity is a decoration or not necessary 
to have, in addition to lingual skills, peddlers 
also need paralingual skills to advertise. 
Sometimes, female peddlers advertise 
using satirical and joking statements. They 
directly make the passengers laugh and 
indirectly advertise their goods.
“The appearance of an advertisement 
along with its internal meaning is a type of 
discourse” (Cook, 1992, p. 4). Believing that 
advertising includes three parts of materials, 
context, and people, Cook initially states 
that people’s behaviour towards any kind of 
discourse implies their ideological, social, 
and personal status. He thinks there is a type 
of discourse that stimulates emotions. As he 
says, in a period when people are involved 
in the invasion of social and local problems, 
advertising can affect people’s persuasion to 
consume more, the feeling of dissatisfaction 
with the inferior quality of the existing 
commodities, intensify the feeling of avidity, 
anxiety, and a sort of motivation to wish for 
better goods (Cook, 1992).
“After defining the advertisement as a 
type of discourse, Cook considers several 
factors as influential in advertising, and 
the information about their relation and 
interaction with each other can lead to a 
convincing and influential advertisement. 
Among these  factors  are :  socie ty, 
image, material, discourse, role, other 
advertisements, partners, music, situation, 
language and para language” (Cook, 1992, 
p. 3).
Johnson states that the influence of 
advertisements on daily life has made 
advertising carry not only a meaningful 
and cultural load but become a part of 
the cultural texture in society nowadays, 
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while used to impose itself on people to 
be able to influence the culture (Johnson, 
2007, p. 1). Johnson names seven specific 
elements of discourse which are noticed in 
making and codifying advertisements. The 
seven elements are: ellipsis, connotation, 
paralanguage, tropes, point of view, person, 
and narrative. This paper mostly applies 
paralanguage, person, and narrative. 
“Paralanguage includes several factors such 
as stress, tune, volume, audio features and 
body language. Paralanguage in writing is 
specified as the size, type, and font, and the 
imposition of the text. The factor of person 
has an important grammatical effect on the 
discourse of advertising. The advertiser 
must determine the addressee’s position 
relative to the advertisement and whether 
to address him ‘he’, ‘you’, or somebody 
else. Narrative also makes the style of 
discourse more influential. Television 
advertisements usually use a narrator to 
tell the story of the commodity. Likewise, 
in written advertisements, a narrator might 
be used to show the distinct phases of the 
advertisement” (Johnson, 2007, pp. 9-12).
Being repeated frequently, a behaviour 
is finally institutionalised. Sometimes, 
such a behaviour might be normal or 
even considered irregular. Although it is 
an irregular behaviour and many actions 
have been taken to prevent it, peddlers’ 
advertising in the subway is increasing and 
relatively institutionalised. Entering the 
subway trains, it is impossible not to see 
the peddlers’ advertising. It might be said 
that the peddlers’ presence in the subway 
and advertising have turned into a part of 
the cultural texture in the subway in Tehran.
Barthes is among the thinkers who 
have studied advertising with semiotics 
approach. In the “Rhetoric of the Image”, 
he ponders on the internal relationships 
between image and message in advertising 
to conclude that there are three types of 
messages encrypted in advertisement: 
lingual, message encoded in images, and 
messages apparently given through images 
(cited in Tanaka, 1994, p. 1). He points to 
two levels of interpreting lingual messages, 
namely, implied and apparent messages. 
Putting lingual message aside, we are faced 
with “specific advertising” that is divisible 
into two levels: implied and apparent 
images as the pictorial versions of implied 
and apparent messages. Implied image is 
itself divided into encoded, symbolic, and 
cultural messages. Barthes’ distinction is 
not clear-cut about image because cognitive 
information is not separate from cultural 
knowledge (Tanaka, 1994). 
RESEARCH FINDINGS
To distinguish the skilled and amateur 
peddlers based on the method of 
advertising
The way female peddlers advertise in the 
subway reveals whether they are skilled 
or amateur. The manner some of them sell 
or even walk in the wagons attests to their 
inexperience, and do not actually have the 
necessary skills for peddling. Worry, anxiety, 
and embarrassment is evident on their faces. 
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Additionally, their quiet, trembling, and 
muttering voice while advertising displays 
their inexperience.
The way inexperienced women peddle 
is that they do not start to advertise the 
commodities upon their arrival, but after 
a short pause and hiding among the other 
passengers, they start to advertise with a 
quiet, trembling, and not strong voice; they 
role play as a passenger at one moment and 
as a peddler at the other.
At first the inexperienced female 
peddlers are embarrassed to advertise in 
the wagons. Not only do they merely name 
the goods quietly, but they pass through the 
population quickly and do not pause. They 
travel around the train wagons nonstop from 
the beginning to the end in a brief time. It 
is difficult to stand among the population 
because they are not adjusted to the peddling 
conditions yet, so they do not stand and are 
therefore seen less. After a while, they get 
used to the conditions and find that short 
pauses and standing among the population 
when advertising is efficacious for higher 
sales, because a short pause indirectly helps 
the passengers watch the goods carefully 
and stare at the colours and designs and 
might be persuaded to buy.
As mentioned, the amateur peddlers 
only name the commodities and do not use 
inspiring lexis and exciting words regarding 
the quality, price, and the certain features 
of the goods, whereas the skilled peddlers 
have already discovered the influence of 
verbal and nonverbal communication, 
and they use them to advertise their goods 
skilfully. They publicise the material, 
quality, incomparable prices on sale, use eye 
contact, a special and strong voice, agreeable 
manners, and monotonous tune; in nice and 
proper appearance, they pass through the 
population quickly and continue to advertise 
the goods along the train wagons.
“I have toothbrush, ladies I have 
toothbrush” (an amateur female peddler).
“I have shawl, colourful shawls, I have 
shawl” (an amateur female peddler).
“I have rainbow shawls, I have worn a 
model myself, rainbow shawls only for four 
dollars, it is a sale, ladies” (a skilled female 
peddler).
“I have slimming belts, they are herbal, 
fat burning, six dollars on satellite, four 
dollars in stores, but I sell them only for two 
dollars, ladies who go to the gym and do 
not lose weight, ladies who go on diets and 
are annoyed, you’ll lose weight and be in a 
good shape using these belts, nice bodies, 
everyone was pleased with them” (a skilled 
female peddler).
The skilled peddlers start to advertise 
once they enter the train wagons. Of course, 
the time of advertising also depends on 
the number of the passengers. In the first 
stations where there are fewer passengers, 
the peddlers do not begin advertising but 
they sit on the chairs like the passengers; 
they start to peddle when the wagon is 
populated enough.
Occasionally, the amateur female 
peddlers get intimate with the skilled ones 
and ask for help to sell their commodities. 
They give some of their own goods to 
their friends and ask for help. The amateur 
peddlers’ help request from the skilled ones 
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reveals the impact of verbal skills, certain 
lexis, and tone on the scale of customer 
attraction.
Verbal advertisements
Advertising peddlers’ commodities by 
the passengers
Once a subway passenger buys merchandise 
from a peddler, there usually appears two 
states: the hesitant passengers ask the 
buyer about the quality, or the peddler asks 
the passenger who had already bought 
something to talk about the quality and 
the appropriate price. Hence, if the buyer 
compliments the price and quality of the 
merchandise, it will be an approval for the 
passengers. The same process is true about 
edibles. The peddler says: “I have Razavi 
doughnuts, made today, really fresh, I have 
Razavi doughnuts my lady, anybody wants?” 
One of the passengers buys some and eats, 
then the other passengers ask her about the 
taste and freshness. If the buyer approves 
them, many other passengers will start to 
buy. In other words, when a passenger buys 
a commodity from a peddler, others will be 
encouraged to buy as well. One passenger’s 
shopping means an approval of the material 
and quality of the merchandise.
Even if the passenger is silent and 
does not express a word on the quality, the 
very action of buying is an advertisement 
to sell the peddlers’ goods. It is frequently 
observed that the passengers do not purchase 
anything from the peddlers for a long time in 
a day, but in stations where the passengers 
change lines, most transfer occur, and 
new passengers enter the wagon. Female 
peddlers start to advertise again, and if a 
passenger buys something, many others 
will also start to buy. Therefore, it can be 
said that peddlers’ wording and lingual and 
paralingual advertisings are not always 
effective for them, but the passengers’ 
behaviour, their shopping or avoiding, are 
efficacious in selling or failing to sell the 
commodities.
Thus, the female passengers who choose 
the peddlers’ goods are meticulous, and 
hesitate to buy; the passengers nearby help 
her choose and comment on the better 
colour and quality; in such conditions, 
deciding becomes easier for the buyer. In 
fact, the passengers begin to advertise the 
peddlers’ goods or express that they have 
already bought that merchandise and are 
pleased with the quality. Such statements 
and approvals by the passengers will gift the 
peddlers more sales. It can be stated that the 
skilled peddlers have been able to attract the 
passengers’ attention to their commodities 
through lingual and paralingual methods, 
and sometimes the passengers speak as the 
peddlers and advertise their goods strongly. 
It is frequently observed that a passenger has 
bought some cosmetics from the subway 
peddlers and addresses the peddler and the 
passengers: “I am your permanent customer 
and I always buy cosmetics from you which 
is both well-qualified and relatively cheaper 
than those in the stores.”
As mentioned above, such verbal 
advertisements from the passengers’ part is 
an approval for the quality of the peddlers’ 
goods that leads to selling more.
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Presenting advertising card by the 
peddlers
While advertising their commodities in the 
subway wagons, the peddlers also offer 
the passengers some cards including a 
phone number and tell them: “we give our 
phone number therewith the merchandise, 
to ensure you of the quality and you will 
certainly call and ask for it again.”
By giving cards to advertise their 
commodities, the peddlers become distinct 
from the other peddlers working in other 
locations, such as conjunctions, streets, 
or elsewhere. In this way, they ensure the 
customers that the peddlers are available 
upon request.
Such an action directly wins the 
passengers’ trust and confidence and 
indirectly advertises the goods.
Another female peddler says:” Any time 
and any moment you needed my goods, just 
call on my cell phone, I’ll reach you in any 
line and any wagon. If you wish, you can 
give me your address anywhere and I’ll 
come, and you don’t need to disturb.”
S u c h  v e r b a l  a d v e r t i s i n g s  a r e 
expressive of conveying other meanings 
to the passengers. Availability, high quality 
commodity, and the buyer’s calmness are 
some implicit meanings of such verbal 
advertisements. Finally, the most key factor 
that is essential in purchasing commodities 
is security. Therefore, female peddlers 
indirectly guarantee their goods when 
they present the card including their phone 
number. Lack of a fixed location to sell and 
frequent transferring is a feature of peddling, 
so if the customer is not satisfied with the 
commodity, although inaccessibility of the 
peddler is completely natural, it leads to 
the buyer’s distrust. The peddler giving her 
phone card is a significant step in winning 
the passengers’ trust. When advertising in 
the subway for selling commodities, female 
peddlers say loudly: “Buy the goods, it is 
impossible you don’t call and ask for it 
again, many people have my phone number 
and are permanent customers.” Offering 
phone cards is an action resulting in a 
win-win situation. By giving their phone 
numbers to the passengers, the peddlers are 
both extending the advertising scope further 
out of the subway and developing their 
advertisement (when out of the subway, 
the passengers can still buy the necessary 
commodities through the phone number), 
and the passengers are encouraged to buy 
and no longer worried or anxious about the 
low quality of the goods, because if they 
are not pleased with the products, they can 
complain to the peddlers. Giving the phone 
number improves the peddlers’ accessibility.
Satire, joking, and offering
Provoking emotions and creating excitement 
for the audience is an influential way in 
advertising for sale. Sometimes it is not 
necessary to logically approve the quality. 
Occasionally they must invent a novel 
approach to advertise, like using satire and 
joking while advertising.
The young female peddler with jugglery 
tools says, “Those who like riddles, I have 
riddles for them, a physic riddle; if you solve 
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it, you’ll win a prize; if you wish to buy it, 
I’ll tell you the trick secretly and only for 
two dollars.”
Another female peddler says, “Ladies, 
buy a shawl for your sister-in-law, buy socks 
for your mother-in-law, and buy anything for 
your in-laws from me.”
Another female peddler says, “I make 
fruit-rolls at home and sell in the subway. 
I cut some into pieces and publicise with 
joking and offer the ladies telling them 
‘apparently you like sour, come on and eat, 
my dear, and buy if you like’.”
In the evening, when many passengers 
are on the way home and spent a day 
working, applying satire and joking when 
selling commodities seems an effective 
method, because customers can both enjoy 
watching such scenes and will be willing 
to buy.
Another peddler advertising cosmetics 
humorously says, “Ladies, I have mascara, 
if you buy the mascara and use it, your 
eyelashes will be like Serendipity1’s; ladies, 
is there anyone who likes to have eyes as 
Serendipity’s?”
Satirical verbal speech and joking 
along with offering is an innovation from 
peddlers and delivers the message, “You 
can test the stuff without paying and if you 
are interested you can buy.” This method 
is, on one side, entertaining and interesting 
for the passengers, and on the other, leaves 
them almost a fait accompli, so they are 
encouraged to buy.
1A pink dragon in a cartoon called “the 
unknown island”, with big blue eyes and very 
long eyelashes.
Inventing certain lexis
As previously stated, the wording and 
advertising of commodities are extremely 
efficacious in the scale of the sale, so 
most female peddlers use words like, “my 
flower”, “my lady”, “my dear”, “dear 
ladies”, “my loves”, and “my pretty ones” 
to attract the female passengers’ attention. 
They also use the word “only” to mention 
the low price, like, “Only for two dollars.”
“My flowers, I have Maryami shawls, 
only for one dollar, I have worn a model, 
Maryami shawls only for one dollar” (a 
female peddler).
“The cloth of my shawls will never run, 
it won’t be napped, I sell each only for ten 
two dollars, they sell four dollars in stores” 
(a female peddler).
Female peddlers also use exaggerated 
lexis to be more influential; “miracle” is 
an exaggerated word and widely used by 
peddlers. They say, “Buy, take home, test 
and you’ll see it is a miracle.” 
They also use the word “magic” like 
“magic needles, magic tissues”, which 
means the peddler’s commodities hold 
unique features.
“Iron” is another attribute used in their 
advertising, to express that their goods “last 
long”. “Ladies, buy socks, my socks are 
made of iron and last for life.”
Female peddlers, as already mentioned, 
use exaggerated lexis and statements. Both 
the peddlers and passengers know about 
the exaggeration, but such lexis largely 
influences the sales.
“I have eyeliners ladies, the line remains 
as if you got a tattoo, I have fortifying 
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Collyrium for your eyelashes. My ladies, 
you sleep at night and wake up in the 
morning, you’ll see your eyelashes has 
grown 5 times longer” (a female peddler).
“My colleagues are selling the same 
product twice as much as this price, it’s on 
sale ladies” (a female peddler).
Another commonly used word among 
women is “free size”. When the female 
peddler has clothing as commodity, she 
uses “free size” to infuse the audience that 
regardless of their weight and size, the 
clothing items would fit their body with no 
problems.
“Local”, “home-made”, and “self-
produced” are among the words encouraging 
the passengers and often influencing them 
to buy.
As repeatedly stated, peddlers use 
certain lexis and attributes to describe their 
commodities to attract more customers. 
The more provoking the attributes are 
to the audience, the more influential the 
advertisements; therefore, the peddlers 
who are talented in inventing certain lexis 
will earn more profit. For instance, many 
commodities hold “magic” as an attribute 
or they are introduced as cheaper than the 
commodities advertised on the satellite. 
Upon hearing such lexis, the passengers are 
encouraged to buy the products, so the tone 
and word rhythm used sequentially will lead 
to the attraction of more of an audience.
Imploration and beggary
Few among the peddlers attempt imploring 
and begging language and tone. They 
desperately ask the passengers to purchase 
from them and sometimes succeed as some 
passengers dare to buy not out of real need, 
but sympathy. 
Peddling by imploring is done in two 
methods. Sometimes, the peddlers are well 
dressed and sell socks by stating that:
“For God’s sake, buy from me, buy my 
socks, I have an ill family member [in need 
of drug and care].”
“For God’s sake, buy, may God give you 
what you wish, I’ll pray for you, buy from 
me, I’d not sold anything today.”
“Ladies, may God give you what you 
want, God bless you, buy from me.” 
Sometimes, they wear torn cloths and 
sell cheap items like band stripes, chewing 
gum, etc., for triple the actual price. Since 
they do not carry noticeable goods, they 
do not promote, and beg instead for the 
passengers to pay two or three times for a 
wretched item.
It should be noted that this is within the 
minority among peddlers and the majority 
are skilful in promotion methods, selling 
items by pointing to the high quality and 
low price and enticing the most indifferent 
to buy. 
Nonverbal advertising
Peddlers’ trust in buyers
The peddlers intermittently give their 
commodities to the passengers for them 
to view and choose as they wish; at such 
moments, the peddlers do not stand by 
the passengers, but rather go on with their 
advertisement in a nearby spot in the wagon. 
The passengers may claim they have chosen 
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from among the baggage and pay for it; 
the peddler, then, takes the money and 
calculates without focusing on the condition 
of the remaining goods. This daily cycle of 
trust in the clients continues as the peddler 
moves across spots and sells and advertises 
in the train. 
Figure 1. Proposed framework of factors influencing international students’ satisfaction
     
Figure 1. Passengers scrutinising goods in the absence of the salesperson. 
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the sale.  
When the baggage is overloaded, the peddler divides it into small packages and thrusts 
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The trust the peddlers vest in passengers 
makes potential clients of them. The 
passengers feel good about this trustfulness 
and try to return it by being responsible 
towards the salesperson and her sale. The 
nonverbal method of customer appreciation 
indirectly pushes passengers to become 
volunt er agents for maintaining the 
peddler’s baggage, so that the process of 
promotion and sale throughout the wagon 
becomes easier for the peddler. Moreover, 
a quasi-friendship results from such give 
and takes between the peddler and the 
passenger-customers that facilitates the sale. 
When th  b ggage is overloaded, the 
peddler divides it into small packages and 
thrusts each to groups of passengers so 
that the process of viewing and choosing 
becomes optimal for the passengers. The 
p ddler then uses a strategic promoting 
method by pointing to the passenger who 
holds one of such packages; this encourages 
the assistant passenger to enjoy viewing and, 
perhaps, choose from the available colours 
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and options at hand; the same occurs with 
the passengers who are normally watching 
the process. 
In summary, the strategy to deposit the 
goods in the hands of random passengers 
burgeons trust in passengers and tempts 
the trustee passenger to consider the items 
in her hand and perhaps dare to purchase, 
without having been a serious customer in 
the first place. 
Peddlers as models
A major feature about metro peddlers is 
their clothing style. The more fashionable 
they are, the more inclined the passengers 
are to purchase. Most subway peddlers 
have noticed the rule and count on it 
for promoting their sales. They try to be 
communicative and compassionate to others 
and they always smile. This is part of the 
reason why passengers become clients of 
metro goods despite their low quality and 
cheap price. 
Dependent of what they sell, the 
peddlers use various techniques of selling. 
For example, if she sells odds and ends, 
she hangs the items on her body both as 
a method for advertising and carrying the 
goods. A handful of pins, head flowers, 
bracelets, bangles, and rings are attached to 
her cloths and, as she urges the passengers 
to buy, the items glitter on her cloths. 
“Dear ladies, I have pencil lipsticks, 
a sample is applied on my own lips, it has 
hues, and various hues are applied on my 
hand” (the peddler). 
“Dear madams, all sorts of shawl and 
headscarf only two dollars, a sample is worn 
on my head” (the peddler). 
The peddlers who sell cosmetics tell the 
passengers that they themselves apply the 
items they sell and invite to look at her worn 
makeup. This way, they simultaneously 
show the appearance of the items they sell 
and ensure the health of them. 
“Ladies who are used to go to the pool, 
those who want their makeup to last long 
hours, purchase my mascara, water proof, 
look at my eyelashes, I apply this mascara” 
(the peddler). 
Sometimes,  when peddlers f ind 
passengers wary, they invent methods to 
call for their attention. For example, they 
might begin to apply makeup and ask the 
passengers to carefully consider the quality 
of products. Another might teach in front of 
all passengers how to fasten a head flower 
again and again, to plead them to purchase.
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Peddlers, especially women peddlers, have 
explored that body language is more forceful 
than verbal. Consequently, they play a 
modelling role and use their body parts to 
advertise. 
Passengers as models
When a higher number of peddlers are 
rivalling to sell their goods, diverse sale 
strategies are a must. This is enforced 
by the need for diversity because of the 
general urges in the advertisement industry. 
The peddlers have truly noticed that body 
language is a successful promotion method 
and apply it with all their potency. 
Those who sell cosmetics insist on 
convincing passengers that their own 
makeup is the same they promote. They 
ask passengers who among them might 
wish to test the products. They use verbal 
ploys and eye contact to gain the consent 
of a passenger to volunteer for testing, and 
present an entertaining theatrics performance 
in front of the eyes of passengers. If anyone 
volunteers, the peddler applies her test 
makeup to adorn her in a performative style. 
The rest of passengers are entertained by 
the performance and induced to purchase 
an item. 
“I have face hair remover scissors, 
ladies, easy to use and no need to go to 
salon, remove your own face and hands hair, 
anyone whose hands or face is un-tweezed 
volunteer to test?” (the peddler). 
“I have eyebrow mascara, if you buy 
it you won’t need brow pencil or tattoos, 
in various colours, it has tester too ladies, 
anyone wants me to pencil her brows?” (the 
peddler). 
These types of promotions are very 
amusing for customers and highly relied 
upon by subway peddlers. It has been 
frequently observed that a passenger lady in 
other wagons will move herself, when she 
notices these performances, so that she can 
watch and, in most cases, make a purchase. 
Figure 2. Using one’s own body for advertising: lipstick hues on hands and ends and means hanging on cloths
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CONCLUSION
Tehran, as the largest and most populated 
city of Iran, is not exempt from the rule. 
The inauguration of the subway system 
was devised for facilitating transportation 
in Tehran. The metro has found another 
function other than transportation, becoming 
a site for enterprise and a mobile market for 
peddlers. 
Metro wagons provide a safe haven for 
peddlers since they are so crowded, and 
this crowd is the best potential customer. 
Peddlers usually choose spots that are more 
commuted, as the denser the crowd, the 
higher the sales will be. Therefore, the metro 
is nowadays a place normally frequented by 
peddlers. They do not pay taxes, do not pay 
for rent, and earn well. Despite all efforts 
by metro personnel to eradicate peddlers’ 
disturbances, peddlers are only alarmed 
enough to be more watchful; they have 
thrived in number against all odds. 
Peddlers are comprised of various social 
and age groups: women, men, children, 
youth, and even the elderly are earning a 
life in the subway, but women and girls are a 
solid majority among them. Being educated 
or studying at university, backed by expert 
job experiences, or family negation do not 
prevent them from peddling in the subway, 
even though it is a job perceived to be low 
in prestige. 
Peddlers’ sale strategies are immensely 
diverse. They mix verbal and nonverbal 
communication methods to optimise their 
sales, although it could not be exactly said 
which method is most usually employed by 
them. They know when to increase their tone 
at the right time for all to hear and when to 
pitch lower, as when passengers are few and 
wary. It seems that they are conscious of the 
marginal, but vital, aspects of discursive, 
linguistic, and paralinguistic dimensions of 
communication.
With the passage of time, the number 
of women peddlers in the subway in Tehran 
increases. The increase, on one hand, and 
the sale of various commodities, on the 
other, has promoted rivalry among the 
peddlers. Here, peddlers seek ways to 
optimise sale and attract the passengers’ 
attention among the load of goods and the 
increasing number of peddlers. The best 
methods in this relation are observed in 
their advertising. They attempt to promote 
their goods by upgrading their peddling 
skills. They are knowledgeable that they 
could not rely simply on lingual instruments 
to achieve the purpose and, therefore, 
adopt body language techniques in their 
advertisements. Whenever they solely rely 
on lingual advertisement, they coin lexis that 
are generally innovative and viable. 
Some peddlers dare to coin terms for 
describing their goods. These terms are 
more suggestive of the unrivalled attributes 
of their products. They use adjectives 
like “magic”, “iron”, “domestic product”, 
“immortal”, “cheaper than everywhere”, etc.
Women peddlers amazingly rely on 
the physical manifestations of their body 
and language for promotion; they use eye 
contact and postures and appear as models 
to attract passenger-customers. They also 
use soft advertisement methods containing 
humorous content to flatter passengers. 
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Based on what they sell, the working 
time, density of passengers, and calendar 
occasions, they use lingual and metalingual 
strategies for promotion variations. 
Therefore, when women peddlers 
present a short performance in a wagon, 
they present their real intention of selling the 
product. Since verbal methods are common, 
indirect methods better entertain and absorb, 
enticing customers to unconsciously 
purchase items that they very probably are 
not in need of, but which are so artistically 
presented that they have no power to refrain. 
Peddlers artfully transform passengers into 
customers and turn them to unconscious 
consumerists. Passengers passively observe 
all types of advertisement on their way to 
their destination, sometimes entertained 
and sometimes bored; nonetheless, 
they are drowned in all-encompassing 
advertisements and purchase unconsciously. 
Sometimes, they do not need what they buy, 
but do it out of entertainment, fun, or the 
impulse of consumerism. 
Leaving goods among the passengers is 
peddlers’ best method in motivating them to 
purchase. The peddlers, in this way, achieve 
the highest result. Firstly, the prove to the 
passengers that they are trustworthy and 
there is no need to monitor them during their 
choice and sale, while they indirectly count 
on passengers for monitoring each other. 
Secondly, they provide for the passengers 
to freely search between the items and thus 
become tempted to buy. Lastly, passengers 
are given the opportunity to consult with 
each other on the purchase, and thus, 
become potential advertisers themselves. 
Figure 3. Strategies for women peddlers’ advertising commodities in Tehran subway
Leaving goods among the passengers is peddlers’ best method in motivating them to 
purchase. The peddlers, in this way, achieve the highest result. Firstly, the prove to the 
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become potential advertisers themselves.  
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ABSTRACT
This research is based on descriptive-analytical study on the changes of aesthetic standards 
of Iranian women’s clothing following the discursive politics during the revolutionary 
transition era (1979-1981). Until the Islamic revolution, women’s clothing was one of the 
most controversial politico-cultural issues for decades. The harsh policies of the Pahlavi 
regime for women’s emancipation and unveiling was opposed by the emotional resistance of 
religious leaders and their traditionalist followers. Based on social constructionist discourse 
analysis, this article investigates the aesthetic styles of women’s clothing during turbulent 
era and examines the discursive practices of various dominant and competing groups and 
ideologies. Laclau and Mouffe discourse analysis method is used to analyse the polemics 
and practices carried out by all competing classes and ideological discourses that resulted in 
the domination of hijab at a national level. The dominant revolutionary discourse opposed 
the symbolic power of modernity, freedom, and rationality represented by western fashion 
and replaced a symbolic force of morality, chastity, and conceitedness. This symbolic power 
has since remained alive although contested in a variety of forms due to social and cultural 
changes. Although the form of Iranian women’s clothing after 1979 revolution remained a 
religious code, the aesthetics of woman’s clothing is still influenced by numerous cultural, 
social, economic, and political factors. The 
post-revolution discursive politics led to the 
homogenisation of women’s clothing in Iran 
denying the differences between clothing 
cultures.     
Keywords: Discursive politics, Iran, revolutionary 
transition era, women clothing   
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INTRODUCTION
It is important to know how dominant 
discourses in every period in the Iranian 
history have dealt with the issue of women’s 
clothing - whether the governments decide 
to take a stance or not - as it has made a 
significant difference on the aesthetics of 
Iranian women’s clothing. It is noteworthy 
how, in different epochs, politics and the 
state can effectively influence cultural 
attitudes and the culture of women’s 
clothing in both social and cultural systems 
and subsystems. Various aspects of culture 
(such as clothing) are tremendously 
influenced by the discourses and ideologies 
championed by governments. This role is 
better understood during regime changes, 
especially those cases fuelled by a mixture 
of cultural as well as political revolutionary 
motives. Such a study can open a window 
towards understanding the interrelationships 
between culture and politics by discovering 
the structuration and domination phases of 
a competing discourse. 
Clothing is an important sign of 
cultural identity: ‘Important indicators of 
cultural identity include popular rituals 
and ceremonies, festivals, eves, traditional 
values, clothes and dressing, architecture of 
buildings and places, customs, and national 
and local art’ (Varjavand, 1999 [1378]). Also, 
in creating one’s social identity, clothes play 
the same role as they do in creating one’s 
personal identity: ‘In many settings of pre-
modern cultures, appearance was largely 
standardised in terms of traditional criteria. 
Modes of facial adornment or dress, for 
example, have always been, to some degree, 
a means of individualisation; yet the extent 
to which this was either possible or desired 
was usually quite limited. Appearance 
primarily designated social identity rather 
than personal identity. Dress and social 
identity have certainly not become entirely 
dissociated today and dress remains a 
signalling device of gender, class position, 
and occupational status (Giddens, 1991).
Having been populated by various 
ethnicities, Iran is a multicultural society 
which has left its mark on the aesthetics 
and function of women’s clothing. ‘The way 
the Kurdish women in Khorasan (Kurmanj 
Kurds) dress and choose their clothes’ 
colour differs based on a number of factors 
such as the clan, age, and the presence 
(or absence) of a husband. A yellow skirt 
accompanied by a simple purple scarf, for 
example, indicates a virgin, while a scarlet 
skirt with striped margins and also a chador 
(Islamic covering) worn in a specific manner 
are signs that the woman in question has 
recently lost her husband’ (Papoli-Yazdi, 
2002). ‘While having aesthetic attributes, 
the way Qashqai women dress relays some 
information about their age and personal and 
tribal status. Young mothers and wives wear 
clothes of vivid, light colours. However, 
they can now dress clothes in red or any 
colour of their choice with some design on 
them. Old women wear dress in black and 
grey’ (Amirmoez, 2002). 
Considering the religious, cultural, 
geographical, and ethnic characteristics 
of Iran, power centres and discursive 
signifiers have had a considerable influence 
on the changes of women’s clothing in the 
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discursive fields attended by this essay. 
Whereas the discourse of the Pahlavi 
regime revolved around modernity, the 
Islamic revolution focused on religious 
fundamentalism, and they both influenced 
women’s clothing, which has always been 
subject to the ruling power. While the 
former placed a woman unshackled from 
the binds of religion in the centre of its 
discourse, the latter introduced an ideal 
Muslim woman at the central point of the 
Islamic revolution’s discourse. According 
to Moghadam, gender relations play a 
pivotal role in culture, idealism, politics, 
and revolutionary societies, and the ‘ideal 
society’, as it were, implicates the notion of 
the ‘ideal woman’ (Foran, 1997). To counter 
the Pahlavi discourse, the revolutionary 
discourse during the transition phase (the 
1979-1981 Period) tried to formulate in 
its meta-discourse the features of the ideal 
Muslim woman, while going to lengths to 
once again promote the Islamic covering 
for women. Thus, a special form of clothes 
with a specific aesthetics was introduced 
for the revolutionary Muslim woman. 
This paper aims to examine this type of 
aesthetics in contrast to the one prevalent 
during the Pahlavi period, and determine 
its characteristics within the scope of the 
Islamic revolution discourse during its 
Transition Phase.
MATERIALS AND METHODS 
This  ar t ic le  aesthet ical ly  analyses 
women’s clothing according to the concept 
of discourse and its aesthetic function. 
Discourse ‘is a language or system of 
representation socially and politically 
developed to produce and distribute a 
coherent set of meanings about a critical 
subject; these meanings serve a part of 
society where the discourse originates and 
makes attempt to turn these meanings into 
the common sense through its ideological 
function’ (Mehdizadeh, 2005 [1384]). 
In the 1970s and 1980s, the concept was 
introduced, according to Foucault’s ideas, as 
a place where power and knowledge meet. 
Discourse analysis includes ‘a set of analytic 
techniques applied to uncover the patterns 
of understanding, beliefs, values and the 
structure of faith embedded in a discourse. 
It is an interdisciplinary field comprised 
of grammar, text analysis, cultural, and 
semantic studies’ (Connell & Galasinski, 
1996). 
Discourse in this paper is the analysis 
of thought systems in lingual forms 
(MacDonell, 1986) viewed from a critical 
vantage where power and ideology are 
dealt with as elements that go beyond the 
text. As Macdonell says, ‘All discourses are 
ideologically positioned; none are neutral’. 
‘Critical discourse analysis, as a qualitative 
methodology, studies language as a social 
action in relation to ideology, power, history, 
and society at the level of both written and 
spoken text’ (Agha-golzadeh, 2006 [1385]).
This paper seeks to analyse multiple 
discourses on women’s clothing in a specific 
period. According to Laclau and Mouffe’s 
theory, critical discourse analysis has a 
post-structural viewpoint, which ‘speaks 
of multiplicity of discourses and, more 
specifically, of tensions and discursive 
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contradictions within the texts. As a matter 
of fact, we no longer have a homogeneous 
text written based on a single discourse 
aimed at a homogeneous audience which 
produces a homogeneous response. The 
test itself is fraught with contradictions. 
This is where discourses are in tension and 
interaction. These are the nodes of which 
Laclau and Mouffe speak as ‘places where 
discourses relate to each other’ (Moghadami, 
2012 [1390]). 
According to Foucault, power is the main 
player in the field of discourse distributed 
across society, and the most general sense 
in which power is productive for Foucault is 
through knowledge. Knowledge, especially 
the social sciences, is closely implicated in 
the production of docile bodies and subjected 
minds. ‘Discourses’ is the term Foucault 
uses for these systems of quasi-scientific 
knowledge. Knowledge as discourse is 
not knowledge of the ‘real’ world as it 
exists prior to that knowledge. Although 
it presents itself as representing objective 
reality, in fact, discourses construct and 
make ‘real’ the objects of knowledge they 
‘represent’.  Knowledge is distinguished 
from other ways of apprehending the world 
and considered to be ‘knowledge’ of the 
objective world, because it is supported 
by practices of power. As Foucault sees 
it, knowledge involves statements uttered 
in institutional sites in which it is gained 
according to certain rules and procedures, 
by speakers who are authorised to say what 
counts as ‘truth’ in that particular context 
(Nash, 2010).
This paper considers the feminine 
body and, therefore, feminine clothes as 
the central signifier of the ruling discourse 
and/or rival sub-discourses in the discursive 
field. The prevalent signifiers put forth in the 
body of the discourses of the period are as 
follows: freedom, women’s rights, chastity, 
identity, feminine beauty, etc., each defined 
differently from the perspective of various 
discourses to reach different discursive 
meanings for women’s clothing that would 
ultimately exclude other definitions provided 
by rival discourses for these signifiers. 
Articulating the central and prevalent 
signifiers around the subject of dress in the 
discourses of both Pahlavi and the Islamic 
Revolution, accompanied by an analysis 
of the subject in the light of the discursive 
practices of the two fields, will lead us to 
determine how the aesthetics of women’s 
clothing was influenced by the definition 
of this central signifier by these discourses.
As this paper seeks to discover the 
discursive aesthetics of women’s clothing in 
different periods and communities, it makes 
use of the sociological approach as well. 
[This is because] sociology places immense 
importance for the aesthetics of clothes. In 
Veblen’s analysis, then, are the foundations 
of an approach that interprets fashion 
goods as aesthetically inscribed resources, 
collectively consumed by individuals whose 
primary rationale for purchasing particular 
ranges and types of garments is their use in 
the articulation of shared lifestyle statements 
(Bennet, 2005). Thus, in analysing women’s 
clothing during the Transition Phase of 
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the Islamic Revolution, theoretical and 
sociological aesthetic concepts act as the 
basis of our analysis and are made use of in 
our quest for effective discursive factors in 
these fields.
Methodology
The present study relies on the discourse 
analysis method, which is a popular 
qualitative method in various fields, due to 
its multidisciplinary character. Fairclough’s 
Critical Discourse Analysis suggests rather 
plainly how we might construct linguistics 
for the next century, which, in addition 
to its pervasively critical and explanatory 
focus, would require interdisciplinarity 
as a central principle, without, however, 
compromising in any way the central 
capacity to describe (Fairclough, 1980). 
The study seeks to recognise the aesthetic 
changes of women’s clothing before and 
after the Islamic Revolution and the way 
they appear in the society. Accordingly, the 
critical discourse analysis method is selected 
due to its practical advantages in the subject 
matter. Laclau and Mouffe extended the 
critical discourse analysis from linguistics 
to politics and social sciences and used it as 
a powerful means of their social analyses. 
This type of discourse analysis emphasises 
the role of power and ideology and aims 
to reveal the hidden relationships between 
the power and the ideological processes 
in the lingual texts that study the social 
applications of the language. 
Discourse is a historical phenomenon; 
thus, in this article, the aesthetics of women’s 
clothing in the transient revolutionary period 
is compared to the aesthetics of the women’s 
clothing in the preceding Pahlavi discourse. 
By identifying the discursive elements of 
the mentioned discourses and analysing the 
discourse of each period regarding clothing, 
the effect of the discursive elements and 
the type of their application to form and 
aesthetics of clothing are recognised as 
the central core of each discourse, and the 
results, including types of women’s clothing 
in each period, are explained.
The context of studying the type and 
aesthetics of women’s clothing in each 
one of the aforementioned periods is the 
study of texts about the Iranian women’s 
clothing in the subject periods, including 
‘textual’ and ‘visual’ documents, and 
putting them into qualitative analysis. The 
print texts like ‘news, speeches, interviews, 
and compilations’; ‘pictures and magazine 
images’ are regarded as the visual media 
sources, which prepare the ground for 
interpretation of the aesthetical cores 
of the aesthetics of women’s clothing 
through pictures Thus, beside special 
women magazines, all the issues of “Ettelat” 
and “Keyhan” newspapers –which were the 
main newspapers published in Iran during 
the mentioned era- were studied. 
Dominant (Hegemonic) and Rival 
Discourses during the Revolutionary 
Transition Era about Women’s Dressing
The 1979 revolution brought about a 
tremendous evolution in the Iranian society. 
One of its consequences was the changes 
in the rules of women’s dressing and the 
aesthetics of their clothes on a religious 
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basis. One of the reasons for this was the 
widespread and effective participation 
of women in the Islamic Revolution. 
During the formation of this revolution, 
women formed a large group of protesters 
(fighters) against the Pahlavi regime, but 
not all of them had religious attitudes. 
Nevertheless, the clothing and dressing 
of these women were distanced from the 
patterns of women’s clothing during the 
Pahlavi era, influenced by the religious spirit 
of the revolutionary period. However, as far 
as the Pahlavi’s discourse and the Islamic 
Revolution’s discourse are concerned, the 
influence of non-Iranian culture on women’s 
clothing continued to be observed. Yet, it 
was a phenomenon strengthened by the 
dominant discourse of the Pahlavi regime, 
and discarded and marginalised by the 
discourse of the Islamic Revolution. 
According to research on women’s 
performance and position in the world 
revolutions, ‘gender relations have 
tremendous contribution in revolutionary 
cultures, idealism, politics, and societies’. 
Hana  Papanek  main ta ins  tha t  the 
construction of the ‘ideal society’ entails a 
notion of the ‘ideal woman (Foran, 1997). 
In the meantime, and after the revolution, a 
system of language was formed that, on the 
one hand, was developing the values, and on 
the other hand, was a combination of Islamic 
values due to its religious background. 
To understand this system of obviously 
ideological language and its functions in the 
case of women’s clothing, the social texture 
of this system during the revolutionary 
period of 1979, 1980, and 1981 should be 
taken into consideration. 
The integration of politics and religion 
(government and religion) is the result of 
the new perception of the founder of the 
revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini, of the 
way of governance which was presented 
in the theory of ‘absolute authority of 
the jurisprudence’, brought about a great 
transformation in the history of Iranian 
governance and, as the theoretical basis 
of dominant discourse, redefined various 
social, cultural, economic, legal, judicial, 
administrative, and military relations of 
Iran, leading to the emergence of a new legal 
juristic political discourse that affected the 
issue of women’s clothing.
In the early months after the victory, the 
late leader of the revolution expressed clearly 
his opinion about the type of covering - and 
not the women’s clothing - that eventually 
led to the determination of a structure for 
women’s clothing in the society. Before 
the revolution, in an answer to a question 
about women’s rights after the victory of the 
revolution, he said that ‘the Muslim women 
have chosen to wear Chador because of the 
Islamic education. In the future, women will 
be free to decide on this; we will only ban 
the fripperies’ (Imam Khomeini, 1979a). 
His apparent position at the beginning of 
the victory of the revolution on the need 
to observe the Islamic limits as far as the 
women’s clothing is concerned led, after 
much ups and downs, to the ‘revolutionary 
state bureaucracy’ on this issue, and various 
perceptions of ‘Islamic Modest Dress’. 
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At the same time, popular and political 
groups were engaged in producing different 
discourses on this issue.
During the transition period of the 
revolution, ‘being revolutionary’, in the 
sense of denying past beliefs, was one of 
the most important paradigms of the Islamic 
Revolutionary Dialogue. In the important 
paradigm of being revolutionary in Iran 
in 1979, in addition to the proactive and 
thought-minded features that existed to 
establish this characteristic in individuals, 
some lifestyle characteristics were also 
considered effective to bring revolutionary 
appearance to one’s face, including the 
aesthetics of clothing as the closest object 
to the body of women and men that had 
undergone tremendous development in 
these years. 
At that time, the type of dress was an 
indication of the identity of a person as 
a revolutionary; therefore, many Iranian 
women who contributed to the formation 
of the revolution and its victory, as well 
as the women who followed it after the 
victory, tended to show their revolutionary 
identity through choosing a special type 
of dress. The Islamic Revolution had 
just come to a victory; thus, there was no 
chance for systematisation of the various 
aspects emerging from the revolution 
and the formation of political-cultural 
discourse. Therefore, it cannot be said that 
the women’s revolutionary dress was part 
of the discourse of the revolution, but more 
should be acknowledged that this kind of 
dress was naturally tied with the intellectual 
foundations of the revolution expressed by 
its leaders and rooted in Islamic beliefs that 
were also worn by religious women before 
the victory of the revolution. But these 
clothes - including Chador - were subject 
to structural changes in the context of the 
events of the revolution and in accordance 
with its necessities. On the one hand, the 
unanimous rise of most Iranian people, in 
conjunction with the revolution, created 
social conditions that made people in Iran 
lack any social class, except the supporters 
of the Pahlavi regime. Consequently, the 
revolutionary style had come to be enjoyed 
by all, a manifestation of which was in 
the form of women’s clothing. This was 
a kind of dressing that, combined with a 
comfortable and loose coat and a scarf, was 
a manifestation of feminine simple lifestyle 
and fighting spirit, even though jeans were 
seen among them. 
Of course, these particular conditions 
were related to the first months after the 
victory of the revolution. The statement of the 
leader of the revolution was the beginning of 
a discourse on the coverage of body by the 
women and ‘revolutionary dress of Muslim 
women’, which gradually distinguished it 
from other women’s revolutionary dresses, 
which did not necessarily adhered to 
the religious limits [of Hijab]. The basic 
principle in this discourse was the obligation 
of women to observe the limits [of Hijab]. 
Of course, the traditional religious class 
also had a special interest in the Chador as 
a Muslim woman’s modest dress. 
Women are considered key human 
elements in the victory of the Islamic 
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developments related to the type of women’s 
clothing after the Islamic Revolution, as 
well as some attitudes of the legislative 
institutions in the Islamic Republic of 
Iran regarding the status of women and 
men, Moghadam noted that ‘the signal 
importance of the woman question to the 
Islamist revolutionaries and state-builders 
and in particular the significance of veiling 
has been widely discussed in the (expatriate) 
literature on Iranian women.’ Afsaneh 
Najmabadi, for example, has discussed 
an editorial that appeared in a 1984 issue 
of Zan-e Rouz (Today’s Women), which 
described the veil as ‘a shield that protects 
[woman] against conspiracies aimed at her 
humanity, honour, and chastity’, as well as 
the means to protect Islam from cultural 
imperialism. The editorial maintains that 
the revolution ‘transformed everyone, all 
personalities, all relations, and all values’ 
and that ‘woman was transformed in this 
society so that a revolution could occur.’ 
Other publications of the Islamic Republic 
and speeches by its leaders indicate the 
importance of the family unit, and the links 
between veiling and family values: ‘hijab is 
a spiritual bulwark around the family which 
protects it against degeneration’ (45), and 
‘the family is the basic unit of the society 
and plays a crucial role in prosperity, public 
morals, and education of new generations, as 
well as social integration and social stability’ 
(Foran, 1997).
 Ayatollah Khomeini believed that the 
non-observance of the Islamic modest dress 
(Islamic hijab) is against religion and law 
and a disrupting factor for social affairs. 
As a matter of fact, he referred to this issue 
many years before the revolution’s victory. 
In 1962, in a critical review of the situation 
of that time, he said: ‘The uprising that 
took virtuous women’s headscarves was 
an uprising for personal gain; and now this 
matter which is contrary to religion and law 
is ongoing in the country’ (Khomeini, 2000 
[1379]b). 
He considered the lack of faith in the 
principle of hijab contrary to the laws of 
Islam and contrary to the principle of the 
right to freedom and said: ‘Is it possible for 
a person to be a Muslim, and on the other 
hand, be agree with not wearing hijab? ... 
Says you are free, but you should go to 
schools without Chador or scarf; is this 
freedom?’ (Ibid). 
Ayatollah Khomeini also did not know 
the Chador as the sole Islamic modest 
dress and did not consider any obligation 
to use Chador: ‘The Islamic modest dress 
means observing the limits [of Sharia’ 
(religion)] and wearing simple dresses..., 
not necessarily Chador’ (Ibid). 
Another key point is that Ayatollah 
Khomeini’s approach to the issue of Islamic 
modest dress was positive through inviting 
women to observe this kind of covering, 
not a negative approach: ‘Hijab ... does not 
oppose the freedom of [women] ... and we 
invite them to observe the Islamic hijab’ 
(Ibid). 
Although he also adhered to observing 
the regulatory rules in this regard: ‘the 
Islamic ministry is a place where no sin 
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should be committed. Women can go to the 
Islamic ministries ..., but they should wear 
hijab’ (Ibid. V. 6). 
Currently, the main challenge in 
respecting the scope of Islamic modest 
dress (hijab) was for the freedom of women. 
Thus, several clergies expressed their 
views and announced that the purpose of 
the invitation to wear hijab is not the social 
isolation of women, and women will enjoy 
all legitimate benefits and social rights. As 
a result, Ayatollah Khomeini focused his 
attention on the type of women’s clothing, 
not their social activity. He said ‘there is no 
obstacle to women’s working ... but they 
should observe the limits of Islamic hijab’ 
(Ibid). 
Contrary to the view that the type of 
women’s clothing during protesting against 
the Pahlavi regime was Islamic, and it is 
therefore necessary to observe the Islamic 
hijab, some others believed that the use 
of Islamic modest dress by a group of 
women in the Pahlavi anti-regime marches 
was symbolic and remonstrative, and had 
nothing to do with their religious beliefs. 
‘The street march involved a huge number 
of women who came to the streets while 
wearing hijab as a sign of opposition to 
the bourgeoisie or the Pahlavi westernised 
decadence. Many women who used hijab as 
protest did not expect the hijab to become 
mandatory’ (Moghadam, 1995). From this 
perspective, after the victory of the Islamic 
Revolution, this kind of covering (cloth) has 
lost its symbolic function and could have 
been replaced by any other clothing.
Prior to this, Ali Shariati expressed 
his view of Islamic hijab as a symbolic 
matter and appreciated it. He said: ‘Hijab 
belongs to a generation of consciousness 
who returns to Islamic modest dress; a 
generation that wants to say ‘no’ to western 
colonialism and European culture ... This 
person who consciously chooses the Islamic 
modest dress or hijab ... is a representation 
of a specific culture, a particular school, 
a particular intellectual party, a particular 
wing, and a particular front’ (Shariati, 2012).
After expressing the position of the 
dominant discourse on the type of women’s 
clothing (hijab) in 1979, the minority 
spectrum among government officials as well 
as the religious intellectual spectrum, with 
an emphasis on ‘no compulsion in religion’, 
emphasised the modesty in both men and 
women’s behaviour. Pro-revolutionary 
thinkers took positions and contributed 
to the formation of this discourse through 
sharing their interpretations of the words of 
Ayatollah Khomeini. They emphasised the 
correction of the appearance and inside of 
the government offices simultaneously and 
considered the observance of Islamic hijab 
as a change in the appearance. 
In deepening this discourse, conferences 
were held in Tehran with the presence 
of pro-active Muslim women, and the 
speakers of these conferences sought to 
formulate principles for the realisation 
of Islamic modest dress (hijab), which 
guaranteed the goals of the revolution in 
this regard and, at the same time, protected 
women’s rights. In addition, the production 
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of literature focusing on Islamic modest 
dress in the press, including the publication 
of the ‘Ettelaat Banovan’1, which was a 
weekly magazine focusing on women’s 
issues, was also aimed at strengthening this 
discourse.
The Practices of the Dominant 
Discourse during the Revolutionary 
Transition to Establish the Signifying 
Islamic Dress Code for Women
Given that the social developments in 
Iran are the outcome of two hegemonic 
discourses of traditionalism and modernity, 
it can be inferred that the traditionalist 
discourse deemed the obligation of Islamic 
dress code as the demand of the Islamic 
Revolution, and interfered with women’s 
choice of clothes, while the modernist 
discourse emerged as the opposing one. 
The dominant discourse openly 
announced their stance regarding the female 
dress code, but the differentiation between 
the pros and cons took a while to build up. 
Those women, who did not embrace the 
Islamic dress code, marched in February 
1979 to voice their dissent. Later, similar 
demonstrations were spotted in smaller 
scales, which were occasionally suppressed 
by the supporters of the Islamic dress code. 
Ayatollah Khomeini declared his opposition 
to disoblige women who did not wear the 
hijab, as did some other clerics, and even the 
then-attorney-general of Tehran said that in 
case of any insult to the women, the violator 
would face punitive acts. 
Seculars and religious leftists also 
declared their stands in this regard. The 
Marxist organisation called Peykar held a 
rather moderate ground and stated that the 
majority splinter of the People’s Mujahedin 
of Iran guerrillas would condemn the 
restraint of women’s social and legal rights, 
and would stand against any set of beliefs 
that degrades women to mere ‘dolls’. Their 
minority splinter as well condemned the 
compulsory Islamic hijab. The Tudeh Party, 
too, had a moderate stand. The Women’s 
Party of Iran and the Laborers’ Party of Iran 
expressed opposition to the demonstrations 
held against the compulsory Islamic dress 
code. Rahaaii-ye Zan Community was 
against the compulsion of the Islamic dress 
code. It goes without saying that in the years 
1979-1980, in the heat of the revolutionary 
atmosphere, leftist and nationalist parties 
were all about fighting the Arrogance 
(referring to the capitalism led by the 
United States and the Pahlavi Dynasty), 
and all other phenomena were defined for 
them within that context. Thus, the issues 
of Islamic dress code and woman’s rights 
were considered functions of this principle, 
and communities and parties took it into 
consideration, along with their interests, 
when taking positions. This was how female 
leftists accepted the Islamic dress code 
against their absence of religious beliefs, 
as they saw it as a symbol of opposition to 
the concept of the ideal woman in the west. 
Educated intellectual females, too, took it as 1It means ‘women information’
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the symbol of a revolution against the status 
quo and the undesirable rule of the Pahlavi, 
and they accepted it even though they were 
not religious.
Meanwhile, most people and Islamic 
parties and communities, who saw the 
practice of Islamic rules as the cause of their 
revolution, not only had already accepted 
the observation of Islamic dress code for 
women, but also demanded that this law 
should be put into practice. Religious 
traditionalist revolutionary people held 
peaceful rallies and issued statements and 
resolutions to further stress the importance 
of observing the Islamic dress code as the 
fortress of battle and the barrier of virtue. 
The discourse also used revolutionary 
press to propagate the Islamic hijab through 
literature and poetry.
After the official establishment of 
the rule of the Islamic Republic in April 
1979, the efforts made to establish the 
traditionalist discourse on women’s clothes 
grew more rigid. The revolutionary press 
started producing articles and graphics, 
publishing summons to call people to the 
rallies, and reciting the resolutions issued 
in the rallies. 
The solemn demand of the Revolution 
about the necessity of observing the 
Islamic dress code by the women was 
further established in July 1980, following 
the command of Ayatollah Khomeini, 
the leader of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran, to the government demanding the 
Islamisation of offices and organisations. As 
an answer, the announcement approved by 
the Revolutionary Council, which banned 
women without Islamic hijab from entering 
offices, was dispatched, and measures were 
taken and announced by the Revolutionary 
Attorney-General. Also, the government 
ministers and managers all circularised the 
regulations regarding the female employees’ 
dress code on July 5, 1980. The regulations 
instructed women to wear plain dresses 
with head scarves or long-sleeved outfits, 
pants, and head scarves. Also, the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs issued a circular to oblige 
women in the foreign missions to observe 
the Islamic code of conduct and dress code 
in public appearances. Figure 1 shows 
the network of the dominant discourse’s 
practices (Islamic Traditionalists) in the 
revolutionary transition era, and Figure 2 
shows the articulation of women’s clothing 
in Pahlavi and Islamic revolution fields of 
discourses (1926-1979).
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Figure 1. Network of the dominant discourse’s practices (Islamic traditionalists) in revolutionary transition era
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Figure 2. Articulation of women’s clothing in Pahlavi and Islamic revolution fields of discourses (1926-1979)
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Types and aesthetics of women’s 
clothing during the revolutionary 
transition
The women involved in the triumph of 
the Islamic Revolution of Iran came from 
a wide range of political and religious 
tendencies as ‘there were countless women 
participating in Iranian people’s uprising 
against the Shah during 1977-1979. Like 
any other social groups, they had their own 
reasons for opposing the Shah, such as 
economic deprivation, political repression, 
determination of Islamic identity, and a 
tendency towards a society with a socialistic 
future’ (Moghadam, 2011). Thus, women 
who belonged to various revolutionary 
groups wore distinct types of clothes, 
somewhat reflecting their tendencies. 
They presented themselves to society 
with clothing that had distinctive features. 
For example, girls and women in Marxist 
groups, such as Organisation of Iranian 
Fadaiyan-e-Khalgh Guerrillas, wore plain 
clothes (Figure 3), including a loose blouse, 
a coat, or a jacket, coupled with loose jeans 
or trousers, sometimes accompanied by 
a kerchief, which represented their ideal: 
defending the rights of the workers.
Another active political group with 
eclectic Islamic tendencies, which had 
numerous supporters among women, was 
the People’s Mujahedin of Iran. Supporters 
of this organisation wore ordinary clothes 
as most of their activities were covert 
and, therefore, it was necessary for them 
not to stand out. Since they considered 
themselves Shia Muslims, they emphasised 
the observance of Islamic coverings. 
Sometimes, especially during special 
occasions and political meetings, they wore 
green overcoats and white kerchiefs.
Figure 3. Fadaiyan-e-Khalgh Guerilla Women
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Moreover,  many of  the  women 
participating in the Islamic Revolution 
were Shia Muslims. These women, who 
were marginalised during the Pahlavi 
dynasty, found the opportunity during the 
Revolution to wear Islamic coverings of 
their choice, which were in accordance with 
their religious law, and chador was the first 
choice for many of them. At the same time, 
there were other groups of Muslim women 
who accompanied the Revolution without 
any political tendencies and participated 
in special occasions without full Islamic 
coverings. They wore common feminine 
clothes, but tried to cover more of their 
bodies using socks and long sleeves. This 
effort was a result of the revolutionary spirit, 
as Islamic coverings still were not a legal 
requirement. Like the years of the Pahlavi 
reign, during the revolutionary transition, 
more traditional women preferred to wear 
chador, while wearing kerchiefs along 
with common women’s clothing was also 
prevalent among religious women.
Large kerchiefs became very popular 
during the revolutionary transition. 
Kerchiefs were used as a piece of clothing 
along with home and party dresses and 
were not part of a uniform. They were 
either ready-made or were sewn by women 
themselves. They were even decorated 
with embroidered flowers on the back and 
ribbons on the edges. Women who adhered 
to Islamic coverings used kerchiefs to cover 
their foreheads and extended their sides to 
cover their shoulders, while other women 
did not cover themselves fully and parts of 
the hair and neck were visible. Since most 
religious women wanted full coverage of 
the front hair and adherence to the religious 
boundaries of clothing, an attempt was made 
to secure the sides of the kerchiefs. This was 
done through a rubber band attached to the 
kerchief at the forehead sides – like a prayer 
maghna’e’ (wimple) – which provided full 
coverage of the hair. Securing the kerchief 
under the throat using a pin and covering 
the whole upper body using its sides were 
observed in special occasions, such as 
military parades. Aside from kerchiefs, 
another type of head covering used was 
called a ‘maghna’e’(wimple). Wimples 
were originally a piece of head covering 
women wore under their chadors during 
prayers. This head covering is like a very 
short chador covering the shoulders; it has 
a closed front, and is secured on the head 
using a rubber band. Underneath, the chin 
is covered with a triangular piece so that full 
Islamic covering is observed during prayers. 
Different forms of Iranian women’s wimples 
in 1979 and 1980 are shown in Figure 4.
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During the Islamic Revolution, wimples got 
popular amongst the women, to the extent 
that sometimes they wore prayer wimples in 
the public, though this was very rare. Many 
of the women used plain or black textiles to 
make wimples, which were longer than the 
prayer wimples, and stretched a band fixed 
underneath the wimple around their heads 
to make it look better. Besides several types 
of headdresses, the women used to wear 
sunglasses, which sometimes functioned 
like a mask to cover their faces. Since the 
sunglasses were relatively large at that time, 
they provided a better coverage for beauty 
of the face. 
In those years, chador was one of the 
major garments of the Muslim Iranian 
women. The chador used in Pahlavi era had 
a semi-circular pattern, and, when worn, 
covered from the head to the feet. Usually 
both hands were used to hold the chador, and 
normally one hand brought the chador up to 
cover the lower half of the face, almost to 
the nose, which was called ‘face-covering’; 
only a small part of the eyes and the nose 
remained uncovered. During the Pahlavi’s 
reign and the first year after the revolution, 
in addition to the black chadors, some 
less official thin cotton chadors, known as 
‘Kudari’, were also used by urban women. 
The black chadors were usually made of 
non-cotton heavy fabrics and were held on 
the head by hands. When women needed to 
use their hands, they would hold the chador 
by their teeth. Of course, the cotton chadors 
were lighter, and this method was more used 
more for the black chadors.
The chadors were not fixed on the head; 
but later, women who participated in the 
demonstrations, made some changes to their 
chadors to fix them on their heads. One of 
these methods was to sew a long rectangular 
band to the upper edge of the chador to the 
front of the forehead, which was tied behind 
the neck and fixed the chador on the head. 
Later, this band was replaced by an elastic 
tape, which did not need to be tied and 
was also more flexible. Different types of 
wearing chador in 1979 and 1980 are shown 
in Figure 5.
Figure 4. Women’s Wimples in 1979 and 1980
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In other creative methods, measures were 
taken to release the hands when using the 
chador. The front part of the chador was 
stitched to the bottom of the chin, and a 
triangular piece was added to the chin to 
allow only the ‘face’, which is permitted 
under the Islamic dressing code. The two 
sides of the chador around the forehead 
were tied behind the head using an elastic 
tape or a band. In the elbow area or lower, 
two slots were made on the front of the 
chador to pull out the hands. This solution 
was especially useful for releasing the 
hands when chanting, taking banners and 
handwritings, and holding weapons - which 
were often symbolic. The front part of the 
chador was stitched, and two sleeves were 
added to them. A triangular piece was placed 
under the chin and the two sides of the 
chador around the forehead were tied behind 
the head using an elastic tape or a band.
In 1979 and 1980, women’s clothing 
faced changes, which were known on one 
side, and unknown on the other. Most 
women, being exposed to the religious 
atmosphere of the Islamic Revolution, 
tended to follow the clothing style of the 
fighting women; the clothing which were 
possibly not chador, but close to the Islamic 
dressing codes. These clothes were selected 
from the ordinary and the most commonly 
used clothes, which were more covered, 
were not fancy looking, and complied with 
the active revolutionary environment, while 
allowing more mobility. This analysis is 
based on the case study of the clothing 
style of women who participated in the 
demonstrations, which spread all over the 
country, especially to the big cities, and 
created the dominant atmosphere. In other 
places and environments, the woman’s 
clothing still consisted of clothes which 
were popular before the revolution. Before 
the late leader of revolution decreed that 
the women must observe the Islamic 
dressing code, there were no concerns 
about the women’s clothing. Therefore, the 
same pre-revolutionary clothing was used 
Figure 5. Different types of wearing Chador in 1979 and 1980
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by the women with the aforementioned 
considerations. The late leader’s remarks 
attracted attention to woman’s clothing 
and led to reflections on types of clothing 
that could meet the Islamic Revolution 
requirements. The women who did not wear 
chador wore trousers or socks, and covered 
their hair by scarf to respect the Islamic 
dressing code to some extent. Of course, 
there were some women who kept on their 
original clothing style without covering 
their hair.
Up until this time, there was no 
structured outfit for women, and they 
dressed just the same way as the men 
did, with similar variety. There were few 
exceptions, including certain rituals or 
ceremonies, where the women’s clothes 
would be harmonised in one way or another. 
For instance, on those occasions when 
women would march with weapons, all 
would dress uniformly with head scarves 
and jackets of the same or similar colour 
and shape. The ends of the head scarf would 
drape over the chest, or chador was worn. 
All in all, it is safe to say that most 
women wore the ‘revolution outfit’, which 
was characterised by being plain, long, 
and loose, free of any flashy colours. It 
reflected the spirituality which emerged 
in revolution, and avoided the common 
attractions attributed to the female clothing 
styles in the previous regime.
The development in the aesthetics 
of female clothing styles during the 
revolutionary transition that can be 
examined is part about the structures used 
in these styles, which are strongly influenced 
by the boundaries of the Islamic dress 
code. The type of clothes used by women 
at this time was mainly the same as the 
old styles: several types of feminine outfits 
modelled after the European and American 
fashions, which were common during the 
Pahlavi’s rule. The choice of outfit for 
traditional women’s social appearance was 
chador. Those women who participated the 
revolutionary rallies and meetings in the 
heat of the revolution would wear chador 
or would cover their heads and hair with 
diverse types of head scarves or wimples. 
Yet some women would take part in rallies 
without hijab. After the revolution, too, 
women’s clothing style, on occasions other 
than revolution-related meetings, was the 
same style, using the same clothing items. 
In other words, since there was no obligation 
regarding the observation of the Islamic 
dress code, women would opt for Islamic 
outfits at their own discression. The clothing 
items were not new, but in the context of 
the revolutionary culture, they came to 
be used in new combinations inspired by 
revolutionary values. In other words, a 
new aesthetic perspective was emerging 
which belonged to the Islamic traditionalist 
discourse. In this discourse, the regulations 
of the dress code were decided by the 
majority revolutionary groups and were not 
officially issued. They would gain symbolic 
power as certain categories of revolutionary 
clothes would mark the person wearing them 
as a member of certain groups or parties. 
Men would also wear revolutionary 
clothes, but since the women’s clothes were 
of particular Islamic features, the female 
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revolutionary outfit of 1979-1980 was 
obviously distinct from other categories. 
The regulations pertaining to this clothing 
style created aesthetic principles of their 
own. As we know, beauty is a subjective 
entity, and can be influenced and changed 
by several factors. Women’s revolutionary 
clothes would bring with them a certain 
type of aesthetics, which was acceptable 
in accordance with the newly emerging, 
mainly Islamic mindset and values. Thus, 
it was collectively accepted, and scores of 
women would be happy to adopt it. 
All in all, the aesthetic aspect of 
women’s clothes during that period was 
down to the covering and veiling of the 
body. This was observed by the women 
who donned the revolutionary clothes or 
supported the revolutionary discourse, 
insomuch as it sometimes breached the 
celebrate principles of aesthetics. It must 
be considered, however, that the heat of the 
revolution would not in fact call for the time 
or opportunity for a thought-out change in 
the structure and model of clothes while 
considering the aesthetic aspects. Thus, 
the demanded issues would be put on an 
agenda, and then put into practice in an 
equally urgent manner. An example of this 
was the chador designed and made under 
the name hijab chador, which was like the 
ordinary chador, except that it was stitched 
and sewn on the front side as well and had 
two openings to let the hands out up to 
the elbows or wrists. The formal structure 
of this outfit was nowhere near the visual 
aesthetics, but it was received and used well 
since it made possible the practical use of 
chador as the revolutionary outfit, which in 
turn reflected commitment to the Islamic 
practice as a common value. 
Also, when it came to tying the head 
scarves, all that was considered was the 
issue of coverage around the face, and thus 
the quality of the formal proportions made 
were absolutely ignored. In other words, 
during this course, the aesthetic function of 
clothes was overshadowed by the symbolic 
and ideological functions. 
In the heat of the revolution, which 
corresponded a particularly cold winter, 
the winter coats provided another choice 
of clothing. Normally long and loose, these 
common outfits of the winter later inspired 
the design of another Islamic outfit called 
Mantou, which was especially meant 
for female office workers, and gradually 
came to be accepted and used for public 
appearance along with chador. Another 
piece of clothing that was considered as a 
part of revolutionary attire was the glove. 
This is yet another example that depicts the 
symbolic and aesthetic values of the time. 
Use of gloves, together with sunglasses 
that further covered the facial beauty like 
a mask, was the new fashion for some 
women. At that time, women’s clothes in the 
metropolitan streets were not meant to add 
to the structural beauty or to complement 
their feminine beauty but were the outfits 
to present the revolutionary character of a 
woman and highlight her support for the 
revolutionary forces and the spirit of the 
revolution.
In the revolutionary discourse, use 
of chador was not mandatory, so the new 
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outfit and clothing style were a matter 
of various interpretations by different 
authorities. Confusions about the type of 
clothing style for women which would fit 
the paradigm of the discourse in question 
is evident in the regulations and circulars 
issued, even though they all highlight the 
necessity of eliminating the dressing style 
from the previous regime referred to as 
Taquti (equivalent to ‘tyrannical’). Various 
government offices and other official entities 
would define the acceptable dress code for 
female employees as long-sleeved Mantou, 
pants, and plain head scarves, bare of 
accessories which might draw attention to 
the user, appropriate for the workplace, and 
distinct from party dresses (Figure 6). Some 
organisations, such as the former Ministry of 
Health, gradually started to design their own 
uniform clothes for the female employees.
Figure 6. Diverse clothes of Iranian women during Revolutionary Transition Era (1979-1981)
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CONCLUSIONS
A set of values related to a discourse leads 
to development of certain principles for 
clothing style of the social groups related 
to it. Some of these principles are general 
rules. For instance, in a religious discourse 
with an Islamic approach, the principle of 
conceitedness and concealment is a general 
clothing rule, while in a non-religious 
discourse the main principle might be beauty 
and attractiveness. In the time of Pahlavi 
I, the state tended to change the women’s 
clothing based on the Non-Iranian and Non-
Islamic patterns, relying on the authoritative 
power. In the time of Pahlavi II, the state 
discourse for development of Pahlavi I 
discourse was inevitable for adopting a 
cultural approach; because, relying on the 
authoritative power was proven inefficient 
in the time of Pahlavi I. 
In the Islamic Revolution discourse, 
the symbolic power of modernity, freedom, 
and progress in the form of western fashion 
which was derived from Pahlavi discourse, 
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was replaced by the symbolic power of 
chastity and conceitedness in form of 
the revolutionary clothing, which was 
influenced by the Islamic Revolution 
discourse. This symbolic power is still 
alive, although it has appeared in a variety 
of forms due to the social and cultural 
changes that have been taking place for 
years. This study investigated the transverse 
discursive currents in clothing style of the 
Iranian women from 1979 to 1981, which 
were rooted in the religious, ideological, 
or aesthetic tendencies of the social groups 
and led to some controversies. It is a 
subject that involves Iran’s contemporary 
cultural society as well, and requires 
serious investigations. Pahlavi and Islamic 
Revolution discourses both focused on 
antagonism to consolidate their approaches 
towards women’s clothing; but, considering 
the fact the two-year transient revolutionary 
period had inherited the women’s clothing 
culture from the 50-year Pahlavi state, 
the Islamic Revolution discourse stressed 
specifically on this antagonism. Therefore, 
the emphasis on observing the Islamic 
dressing code by women a few months 
after the revolution targeted the most the 
antagonism towards Pahlavi discourse and 
manifestations of the anti-religion state. 
At that time, most of the Iranian women 
observed the Islamic dressing code and 
liked it. By the way, marginalisation of 
Pahlavi discourse in women’s clothing, 
which was still represented by a small part 
of the Iranian women, made it necessary 
for Ayatollah Khomeini to point out the 
necessity of observing the Islamic dressing 
code by everyone. 
There is certainly a close interrelationship 
between the cultural system and the political 
system in the field of dominant discourses. 
In most cases, culture acts beyond politics 
and covers the realm of power, so that the 
politics are derived from the culture. For 
this reason, the political systems of the 
dominant discourses may cause changes 
in the cultural approaches and prepare 
the ground for emergence of new cultural 
thoughts, but cannot develop or annihilate 
a culture relying on their power. 
We believe that the aesthetics of 
women’s clothing, having confronted various 
discursive alternations, and a combination 
of post-revolutionary negotiations and 
resistance, led to certain differences in 
types and levels of covering the body. 
Although the form of women’s clothing, 
as a religious code of the Iranian society, 
remained a function of social-political 
circumstances after the 1979 revolution, 
the aesthetics of woman’s clothing was still 
influenced by numerous cultural, social, 
economic, and political factors, which 
are sometimes in line with (negotiation) 
and sometimes against (resistance) the 
clothing aesthetic approach of the dominant 
discourse. Sedghi (2007) refers to the issue 
of gender for the state and politics and 
explains how urban women in Iran under 
different states veiled in the early 1900s, 
unveiled from 1936 to 1979, and re-veiled 
after the 1979 Revolution. The studies show 
that the discursive policies and emphasis on 
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the antagonism of the Islamic Revolution 
discourse towards Pahlavi discourse led to 
a type of homogenisation of the women’s 
clothing in the post-revolutionary Iran. The 
Islamic state built itself on the ruins of the 
old regime, that it succeeded (Sedghi, 2007, 
p. 276). The revolutionary Islamists in Iran 
felt that “genuine Iranian cultural identity” 
had been distorted by Westernization or 
what they called gharbzadegi (a coinage 
literally suggesting “West-struck” or 
“Westoxicated”). The unveiled, publicly 
visible woman was both a reflection of 
Western attacks on indigenous culture 
and the medium by which it was affected. 
Following the policy of homogenising 
women’s clothing, the differences between 
the clothing cultures of various ethnic 
groups were not considered. This was 
an outcome of disregarding the natural 
diversity of type and level of clothing in 
different contexts and different cultural-
social grounds. Neglecting the fact that 
the cultural functions changed the dressing 
style years after the transient revolutionary 
period, it led to a kind of turmoil in the 
dressing system and women’s clothing in 
Iran, and it is foreseen that it will cause 
further problems in the future.
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ABSTRACT
The primary objective in scientifically examining social problems is preparing the grounds 
for solving them. One of the essential steps in designing concrete practical measures to 
address social problems is determining the order of priority between social problems, as 
social problems are innumerable, while a society’s resources in resolving them are limited. 
Iranian researchers have made several attempts at prioritising Iran’s social problems. Yet, 
in addition to being very few, they suffer from several methodological flaws that drastically 
diminish their credibility. In the article at hand, we will first analyse the key concepts of 
social problem and methodology. Thereafter, we will examine the various methods and 
criteria used in the most credible studies available that have attempted to prioritise Iran’s 
social problems. From this examination and analysis, we have inferred five principal 
theoretic steps that need to be observed in the prioritisation of social problems so as to 
ensure the credibility and practical applicability of the article: (1) deciding who determines 
the priorities, (2) defining a particular theoretic approach, (3) drafting a comprehensive 
list of prospective social problems, (4) ensuring the homogeneity of the proposed social 
problems, and (5) defining a clear and distinct criterion for prioritisation.    
Keywords: Iran’s social problems, methodology, 
prioritising, social problems   
INTRODUCTION
Social problems have existed since the very 
beginning of human social existence. With 
the advent of modernity, however, there 
has been a drastic escalation in the degree 
and variety of social problems owing to a 
wide range of reasons, including epistemic 
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transformations, social upheavals, and 
demographic shifts. In response to this 
escalating trend, social scientists have 
made it their primary concern to study and 
address these problems (Moidfar, 2008, p. 
11). Social issues partake of certain qualities 
and features that prevent scientific research 
regarding them from ever reaching the point 
of exhaustion; their volume and variety 
continues to increase rather than decrease. 
Some of these qualities and features are as 
follows.
(1) In most societies, social problems 
are always growing. We would be 
hard-pressed to locate a society that 
has succeeded in eliminating or even 
reducing its social problems.
(2) Social problems tend to expand, 
constantly encroaching on new areas 
of social life.
Moreover, it is important to acknowledge 
that the capacity of human societies in 
addressing and resolving social problems 
is limited. It is nearly impossible to expect 
that societies should be able to find the 
theoretical solutions to social problems, 
translate these solutions into practical 
measures, and implement them while 
keeping pace as the problems emerge and 
develop. Furthermore, another factor to 
keep in mind is the order governing the 
relations of the theoretical solutions and 
the consequent practical measures to one 
another. The theoretic engagement in 
scientific endeavours to find the solution 
to some problems can pave the way for 
finding the solution to further problems, 
just as implementing the solutions to and 
eliminating some problems can potentially 
lead to the practical resolution of other 
social problems or at least to a reduction 
of their intensity. Considering these two 
factors—the disparity between the rapidity 
with which social problems develop and the 
pace at which societies can address them, on 
the one hand, and the different sequence of 
relations that hold between social problems 
and their solutions, on the other—in addition 
to the aforementioned qualities and features 
of social problems help us better understand 
the critical importance of prioritising social 
problems and determining the appropriate 
order in which they must be addressed.
The study of the social problems of 
Iran—a country with a rich history and a 
dynamic and vibrant culture—naturally 
faces the same challenges highlighted above. 
Additionally, however, two key facts render 
an examination of Iran’s social problems 
even more difficult. The first is that until 
a decade or two ago, compared to political 
and economic problems, social problems 
received very little attention in Iran. Second, 
once social problems rose to the same 
level of prominence as that of political and 
economic problems, they faced yet another 
obstacle, which was the fact that the methods 
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used to deal with them suffered from serious 
problems, in theoretical investigation as 
well as in practical implementation. One 
problem, in both theory and implementation, 
relates to determining the order of priority 
between social problems, compounded by 
a chronic failure to duly acknowledge the 
strong relation that ties them together. In 
conducting theoretical examinations and 
in implementing the practical measures 
intended to address social problems, little 
concern has been given to prioritising them, 
and when there has been some level of 
prioritisation, the criteria and factors used 
have lacked sufficient comprehensiveness. 
Furthermore, there has been a persistent 
failure to realise that social problems are 
inextricably interrelated and that there is 
more than one way in which two social 
problems can be interconnected. These two 
general shortcomings about the theoretical 
examination of social problems and the 
practical measures taken to address them 
have severely impaired and limited their 
effectiveness.
The available studies on social problems 
in Iran can be grouped into two general 
categories. One category comprises studies 
that scrutinise one or more social issues in 
a descriptive or explanatory methodology 
and offer solutions for them. The second 
category consists of studies that conceptually 
analyse a social problem and consider how 
it can be addressed. The latter studies are 
generally considered to precede the former 
studies. Studies of social problems in Iran 
generally fall into the first category. The 
present study, however, belongs to the 
second category. What we seek in this article 
is specifically to study the methodologies 
underlying the available prioritisations of 
social problems in Iran so that by comparing 
and contrasting the relative advantages and 
disadvantages of each, we may arrive at a 
better understanding of the most appropriate 
method in prioritising the social problems in 
Iran. With the better understanding, we can 
hope to solve these problems. The better 
understanding is first step to solve them. 
To this end, we will analyse the meaning of 
social problem and methodology, look at the 
available prioritisations of social problems 
in Iran, and scrutinise the criteria and 
factors underpinning these prioritisations, 
enumerating their comparative pros and 
cons. We will then present five steps that we 
perceive as essential to any study that aims 
to prioritise Iran’s social problems. 
Research Background 
In this section, it is provided an overview of 
the studies that have attempted to prioritise 
Iran’s social problems in table format to 
simplify. 
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MATERIALS AND METHODS
Conceptual Definition 
Methodology
The terms method and methodology are 
often used interchangeably, and this is a very 
unfortunate mistake (Blaikie, 2000, p. 8). As 
defined by Blaikie, method consists in the 
techniques used for gathering and analysing 
data. Methodology, on the other hand, refers 
to discussions of how research is done, or 
should be done, and to the critical analysis 
of methods of research. Methodology also 
deals with logics of enquiry, of how new 
knowledge is generated and justified…
Methodology includes a critical evaluation 
of alternative research strategies and 
methods. (Blaikie, 2000, pp. 8-9).
Giddens accepts research methods as 
real techniques used to study social life 
(Giddens, 1993, p. 676), but he defines 
methodology as the study of logical 
questions relating to research (p. 679).
Therefore, it would be correct to 
describe methodology as a second-order 
knowledge that reflects on another piece of 
knowledge, which means that methodology 
is logically subsequent to method. There is 
no discipline, no science, no research that 
is devoid of method. After the fact, once 
the scientific research and investigation 
has been undertaken, the method that the 
researcher utilised in the process and the 
path that he traversed is re-examined and 
reflected upon, and it is this re-examination 
and reflection that constitutes methodology. 
As such, methodology is the observation of 
the ways in which a research is produced 
(Jawid, 2012, p. 8). That, therefore, is what 
this article is about. The available research 
projects that have been done on determining 
the order of priority among social problems 
presuppose various factors and criteria and 
proceed via different methods in pursuing 
their subject of research. This article aims 
to critically evaluate the methods pursued in 
these research projects, and so this article is 
a methodological investigation in the proper 
sense of the term.
Social Problem
As pointed out in the introduction, the current 
state of research on social problems in Iran 
suffers from two shortcomings: one, lack of 
due consideration of their order of priority, 
and two, a chronic disregard for the fact that 
social problems are often interrelated in many 
ways, theoretically as well as practically. In 
addition to these two shortcomings, the 
available prioritisations are plagued by 
some fundamental flaws, and it is precisely 
these methodological flaws that we intend to 
examine in the present article. Considering 
the aforementioned flaws and shortcomings, 
there are two primary reasons that compel 
us to consider—here and in the process 
of our methodological examination of the 
available prioritisations—the definition 
of social problem. Prior to specifying 
these two reasons, however, it is worth 
mentioning that the existing definitions of 
social problem are of one of two kinds: they 
are either general definitions or definitions 
arising from specific theoretical standpoints.
The first reason that inclines us to 
examine the meaning of social problem 
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relates to the difficulty that is caused by 
neglecting the importance of prioritisation. 
In many general definitions of social 
problem, one particular feature is highlighted 
despite the wide-ranging differences, which 
is “to motivate people to eliminate the 
problem” (Crone, 2011, p. 1; Loseke, 2017, 
pp. 6-7). The motivation to eliminate social 
problems ipso facto leads to the subject 
of prioritisation, as there are naturally 
many problems in every society, not all of 
which can be eliminated simultaneously. 
As such, people, generally, and a society’s 
leaders, specifically, are bound to prioritise 
their social problems with recourse to 
clear criteria to be able to meaningfully 
strive to eliminate them. Thus, the need 
for prioritising social problems is included 
within and highlighted by the general 
definitions of social problem.
The second reason for analysing the 
definition of social problem is related to 
the flaws of the available prioritisations. 
Prioritising social problems naturally begins 
with preparing a list of the problems. To 
prepare a list, we must first identify the 
problems, which in turn requires that we 
have a clear definition of what a social 
problem is. Identifying actual problems is 
impracticable without being in possession 
of a clear definition. Thus, the first step in 
any attempt at prioritising social problems 
is to offer a clear and distinct definition 
of what a social problem is. One of the 
fundamental problems that bedevil the 
research projects that attempt to prioritise 
Iran’s social problems is their inherent 
ambiguity concerning what a social problem 
is.
We will now briefly consider several 
definitions informed by different approaches 
concerning what constitutes a social 
problem, and, by comparing and contrasting 
them and showing how their differences 
affect the process of identifying social 
problems, we will demonstrate how each of 
these definitions impacts how we prioritise 
social problems (For the seven definitions 
of social problem, which stem from seven 
different approaches, we draw on The Study 
of Social Problems: Seven Perspectives 
by Earl Rubington and Martin Weinberg 
(2003)).
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The aim in specifying these various 
approaches to defining social problem is 
to demonstrate the fundamental impact 
that one’s approach has on the proffered 
definition and, in turn, the latter ’s 
fundamental impact on identifying social 
problems. To shed more light on this, we 
will compare two approaches along with 
their suggested definitions. We will take 
the pathological and the constructionist 
approaches as two samples. According to 
the social pathology approach, society is 
an organism that can be considered healthy 
when it properly performs its functions. 
Desirable social behaviours indicate that the 
society is in good health, and undesirable 
behaviours signal its disease. In this light, 
a social problem consists of the act of 
defying society’s moral expectations, and 
the main cause for the occurrence of this 
disease in society is an individual’s failure 
in socialising. The constructionist account, 
however, of the definition of social problem 
and its cause is drastically different. This 
approach views a social problem, regardless 
of what is taking place in a society, as that 
which the people of a society identify and 
define as a social problem. Whether there 
is an objective circumstance that may 
or may not exist in society, and may or 
may not have caused a certain conception 
of a social problem to take shape in the 
minds of the people, is irrelevant to how a 
social problem is defined. The pathological 
approach is strongly attentive to objectivity, 
whereas the constructionist approach has 
little concern for objectivity. The key point 
to bear in mind here is that depending 
on which definition we side with, the 
social problems we identify will look very 
different. As such, failure to acknowledge 
the significance of how we conceptualise 
social problems will undoubtedly impair our 
attempt at prioritising them and will distort 
the results we seek to obtain because of 
such prioritisation. There are ample samples 
of such distortion in the available research 
projects that have sought to prioritise Iran’s 
social problems.
Research Method
There are a variety of ways in which we can 
define our method of research. From the 
viewpoint of the variable of setting, this is a 
library research. From the viewpoint of data 
material, it is a qualitative research. From 
the viewpoint of the object variable, it is a 
theoretic foundational research. In terms of 
its substance, it is exploratory-descriptive. 
The method of data collection used in this 
article is content analysis. The instrument 
employed in data collection is cataloguing 
(For an explanation of terms, see Jawid, 
2012, pp. 85-98).  For our critical evaluation 
of the methods used in research projects 
concerned with identifying social problems 
in Iran, it has been our sincere intention to 
reconstruct the internal logic of the criticised 
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material and to truly penetrate the meaning 
intended by the authors. Naturally, however, 
the interference of the writers’ personal 
convictions and biases cannot be entirely 
ruled out, but we have tried our best.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
A Critical Analysis of the Available 
Prioritisations of Iran’s Social Problems
In “Owlawiyyatbandi asibha wa masa’el 
ejtema’i dar iran” (which would translate as 
“Prioritisation of Social Problems and Issues 
in Iran”), Hadi Motamedi (2007) takes the 
views of the officials and the employees 
of Iran’s State Welfare Organisation as the 
basis in determining the order of priority of 
Iran’s social problems. After two rounds, 
he presents a list of social problems in 
Iran and then goes on to determine which 
problems have priority. He divides social 
problems into three classes: social problems, 
family-related problems, and miscellaneous 
problems. He attempts to prove that the 
social phenomena he points to are in fact 
social problems by citing their frequency in 
the body of statistical data that he presents.
There are several severely damning 
points that we can elaborate in our critique 
of this study.
 (1) Quantity and frequency are inadequate 
measures for proving the validity of 
a thesis. Solid theoretic grounds—
including, among others, a clear and 
technical definition of what a social 
problem is—are required for this 
purpose.
(2) Should a researcher deem it appropriate 
to presuppose frequency as the criterion 
for identifying a social phenomenon as a 
problem, he must unambiguously assert 
this, rather than merely touching on it 
in passing and amid an overwhelming 
volume of explanations and data that 
can only be confusing to the reader.
(3) In order to statistically demonstrate that 
a purported social problem is in fact 
a social problem, the researcher must 
have access to a sufficient statistical 
database. In the research in question, 
the researcher lacks such a sufficient 
database, and the statistical resources 
that he has at his disposal are insufficient 
in proving that the social phenomena he 
cites are in fact constitutive of social 
problems.
(4) The research fails to offer a clear 
definition of what constitutes a social 
problem, and the researcher fails to 
identify any approach as underpinning 
the research. For this reason, in addition 
to the fact that it is unclear whether the 
cited phenomena are social problems, 
the relations between the purported 
social problems are not at all clear, and 
therefore it is difficult to pass judgment 
as to whether they are in fact social 
problems or not. 
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(5) Due to the fact that the presented list 
of problems was obtained “in various 
meetings with experts in the form of 
brainstorming sessions” (Motamedi 
2007, p. 337), the list can in no way be 
considered exhaustive.
(6) The problems listed in this study are 
not consistent and congruous. The 
researcher fails to distinguish between 
subjective problems and objective 
problems, major problems and minor 
problems, and general problems and 
particular problems. For instance, the 
problem of runaway girls is placed 
alongside joblessness, dropping out of 
school, and such overarching rubrics 
as youth problems, unstable families, 
and prisoners. Such indiscriminate 
assortment of social problems renders 
a meaningful comparison of these 
problems impossible.
(7) Many of the cited problems are grossly 
overlapping, such as running away from 
home and runaway girls.
(8) The presented classification lacks any 
logical theoretic pattern as its basis. This 
is evident in the juxtaposition of social 
problems and family problems, which 
is not supported by any sound theoretic 
or technical justification. Even worse is 
the class of “miscellaneous problems”, 
which is devoid of any substantive 
meaning and content and thus cannot 
be assigned any true value, and as such 
one cannot arrive at any results by 
comparing it to its two counterparts.
(9) The respondents offer orders of priority 
solely based on their distinctive personal 
views and opinions without there being 
a shared understanding as to common 
criteria for prioritisation. Considering 
the stated objective, this flaw alone 
suffices to undermine the credibility and 
validity of the research.
Ali Yusefi and Hoseyn Akbari (2011) base 
their research article entitled “Ta’ammoli 
jame’eh shenakhti dar tashkhis wa ta’yin 
owlawiyyat masa’el ejtema’i iran” (which 
would translate as “A Sociological Reflection 
Aimed at Identifying and Determining the 
Order of Priority of Iran’s Social Issues”) 
on a secondary analysis of two available 
surveys: (1) a three-wave survey entitled 
“Arzeshha wa negareshhaye iranian” 
(which would translate as “Values and 
Outlooks of Iranians”) that determines how 
the Iranian people prioritise social problems 
and (2) another survey documenting how 
the Iranian elite, government officials, and 
the intelligentsia, view and prioritise social 
problems.  The two researchers adopt the 
constructionist approach in defining social 
problems, and they clearly indicate this 
choice: “In the constructionist approach, 
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identifying and prioritising social problems 
is done either by a considerable number 
of ordinary people or by a number of 
prominent figures. Both classes (the people 
and the elite) play a significant role in 
shaping, identifying, and prioritising social 
issues” (Yusefi & Akbari, 2011, p. 207).
Several notable points may be specified 
by way of critiquing this study.
(1) The theoretic approach of the study is 
inconsistent with the practical method 
that the authors pursue. How can 
one expect to arrive at the subjective 
constructs of the people, the officials, 
or the intelligentsia by means of a 
questionnaire comprising of closed-
ended questions?
(2) The problems cited in this study, like 
the previous study, lack congruity and 
consistency. Such disparate problems 
as dearth of cultural centres, theft, and 
tenancy are grouped together, and in the 
final analysis these problems are placed 
side by side with such general rubrics 
as the problem of democracy, social 
problems, and defining religious role 
models.
(3) The authors of this article fail to 
demonstrate how the cited problems 
correspond to the theoretic definition 
and approach purportedly undergirding 
their research.
(4) The criteria used in determining the 
order of priority of social problems 
remains unclear and undefined.
(5) When there is no clear criterion for 
prioritising, it would lend greater 
credibility to the survey if there is more 
homogeneity among the respondents. 
This, unfortunately, is not the case 
regarding the study in question. The 
respondents of the basic study—the 
three national surveys that serve as the 
basis on which the study in question 
relies—are random individuals from 
various towns, villages, and regions, 
who may, depending on their peculiar 
living conditions, have distinct criteria 
and factors in mind for the prioritisations 
they suggest.
(6) In addition to geographic dispersion, the 
lack of a unifying timeframe diminishes 
the credibility of the study even further. 
For example, the inhabitants of villages 
in the three national surveys have 
offered their responses at different 
timeframes, while it is genuinely 
possible that the national and regional 
circumstances may have undergone 
some change in the different timeframes 
in which the surveys were conducted, 
and this exacerbates the aforementioned 
problem of geographic discontinuity.
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“Moshkelat ejtema’i dar owlawiyyat 
iran” (which would translate as “Social 
Problems of Priority in Iran”) by Hasan 
Rafiyee and Saeed Madani is presumably the 
most credible of the available studies. It was 
conducted in accordance with the Delphi 
method and in four rounds. In the first round, 
the authors presented their definition of 
social problem to the panel of experts. The 
presupposed definition of social problem in 
this study is that ratified by the High Council 
of Social Welfare and Security:
A social problem is an undesirable social 
phenomenon that adversely impacts quality 
of life and the most significant values agreed 
upon by the [Iranian] society and that, due to 
its harmful social causes or consequences, 
requires social intervention to be rectified, 
mitigated, or contained (Rafiyee & Madani, 
2008, p. 197).
In the second round, with the help 
of the experts, they devised two separate 
lists, one of the proposed social problems 
and the other of the proposed criteria. By 
criteria, they mean “the rules or criteria 
for identifying the social problems that 
partake of a higher priority insofar as social 
planning and intervention are concerned” 
(ibid). After proposing and settling on 
the agreed-upon list of social problems 
and prioritising criteria, they prioritised 
the social problems following the matrix 
model. The experts on the Delphi panel were 
selected purposefully rather than randomly 
from among individuals with at least one of 
two characteristics:
1. Having written an article or a book or 
conducted a research project related to 
the study subject, or 
2. Having professional experience pertinent 
to the study subject or administrative 
exper ience in  a  government  or 
nongovernment organisation involved 
in work related to the study subject 
(Rafiyee & Madani, 2008, p. 195).
In other words, two groups of experts 
have participated in determining the order 
of priority: academic professionals and 
experienced administrators.
Three critiques come to mind in relation 
to this study.
(1) One shortcoming in this study is its 
sole reliance on the opinions of the 
experts in drafting the primary list of 
social problems instead of providing 
the experts with a comprehensive and 
accurate list as a tentative list they could 
work from, which makes it possible 
that the experts may have missed some 
important social problems. A case in 
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point is that based on the definition 
presented in more traditional works in 
the field of social issues and problems in 
Iran, such prevalent habits as lying and 
flattering may have been added to the 
list, but they were left out presumably 
since the experts were not working from 
a tentatively drafted comprehensive list.
(2) Some of the listed problems—such 
as joblessness and joblessness of the 
educated class—overlap.
(3) The problems grouped together lack 
compatibility and congruity. Objective 
problems—such as joblessness—are 
listed next to such subjective problems as 
lack of social confidence and declining 
social capital. The list juxtaposes such 
non-legal problems as malnutrition and 
traffic congestion with such largescale 
legal problems as organised crime.
This study is relatively successful in 
defining social problems and in identifying 
them considering its proposed definition, 
and it can also be considered successful in 
setting forth and consistently implementing 
clear and distinct criteria for prioritisation. 
That which detracts from the credibility of 
this study more than anything else is the 
inconsistency pervading the social problems 
it enumerates, and this inconsistency 
naturally harms the accuracy of the order 
of priority that it posits, for in the process of 
prioritisation it compares problems that are 
not genuinely comparable and that cannot, 
correctly speaking, be considered rivals 
competing at the same level. The various 
social problems that this study lists should 
be assigned to different arenas and their 
order of priority examined in their respective 
arenas, and it is only when we view them 
from this perspective that we can properly 
devise and carry out plans to satisfactorily 
address them.
The above three articles critiqued, are 
as far as we will go in this article by way of 
examining the conducted studies of social 
problems in Iran. We cannot cover all the 
conducted studies, for we are constrained by 
the limited size of this article and some of the 
conducted studies are unavailable. Several 
the conducted studies were commissioned 
by governmental or private organisations 
that have refrained from publishing their 
studies, and so these studies are inaccessible. 
Furthermore, several the available studies 
are either regional in scope, and thus do 
not cover all of Iran, or lack even the 
minimal standards of professionalism and 
acceptability. Yet, in order that our readers 
should have at least a general idea of these 
studies, we offer a cursory evaluation in the 
following chart.
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Five Proposed Steps Essential to a 
Credible and Effective Prioritisation of 
Social Problems
1. Deciding Who Determines the 
Priorities
The first step in the process of prioritising 
social problems is determining the objective 
sought by the prioritisation, and the objective 
is determined by those undertaking the 
prioritisation: the various groups of people 
who bring their preconceptions and their 
experiences—as products of their social, 
economic, and cultural standing—to bear 
on what social phenomena they identify 
as social problems and how they arrange 
them in order of priority.   In the various 
research studies conducted in Iran, the 
researchers have sought out different target 
groups. Some of these studies distinguish 
three target groups: the general public, 
the officials and administrators, and the 
experts. These studies also indicate the 
order of priority preferred by each target 
group (Mohammadi, 2001; Table 1). These 
studies highlight a very important point, and 
that is the noticeable difference between the 
prioritisations each of these three groups 
proposes.
Now, as already mentioned, one of the 
essential factors that compel us to prioritise 
social problems is the need to take practical 
measures to resolve these problems. As the 
subject of this study is a methodological 
examination of the conducted prioritisations, 
we are compelled to inquire concerning the 
following question: To what extent can we 
rely on the different prioritisations offered 
by these three target groups in drafting 
a comprehensive plan to address, in a 
national capacity, Iran’s social problems? 
Put differently, each of these groups regards 
society from its own distinct perspective 
and in line with its own peculiar outlook, 
and it is in light of this distinct perspective 
and peculiar outlook that the members 
of these groups identify and prioritise 
social problems. It would seem then that 
relying solely on one of these three groups 
for identifying and prioritising social 
problems would seriously undermine the 
practical results that we seek from any 
given study. Serious problems can result 
if, for instance, we decide to identify social 
problems based exclusively on public 
opinion. One possible problem is that 
studies that rely solely on public opinion 
tend to overlook the problems and priorities 
of the minorities. If our identification of 
social problems is directed only by the 
most general expectations and opinions of 
the general public, there is a good chance 
that we will fail to notice the special needs 
of such minorities as people with physical 
disabilities or impairments. Another 
possible problem is that relying solely on the 
opinion of the general public tends to distort 
social studies and administrative plans and 
causes them to lose sight of “the existing 
social order,” for, generally speaking, 
macrostructures tend to remain hidden to 
the general public, which is more inclined 
to see the objective, the particular, and the 
behavioural and is less likely to discern 
the macrostructures.  Therefore, in their 
attempt to define, identify, and prioritise the 
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problems of a society as vast as a country, 
they must bear in mind that their study must 
take the vastness of the administrative task 
into consideration and thus include the input 
of all social groups in Iran so as to ensure 
comprehensiveness.
2. Defining a Particular Theoretic 
Approach
The second step in the process of prioritising 
social problems is defining what a social 
problem is. Our definition of social problem 
is in large part determined by the theoretic 
approach governing our study. A very 
frequent problem that plagues most of the 
studies that attempt to prioritise Iran’s social 
problems is the failure to clearly indicate 
the adopted approach. Without a clearly 
specified approach, it is impossible to have 
a definition, and without a definition, any 
attempt at identifying social problems would 
result in failure, for in the absence of a clear 
definition of social problem, the researchers 
and the participants lack a clear criterion for 
determining which social phenomena are 
problems and which are not. Furthermore, 
without first drafting a list of potential social 
problems, it would be a waste of time to 
embark on prioritising them. As shown 
above, a number of the studies conducted in 
Iran fail to offer a clear definition of social 
problem and, consequently, they identify 
and prioritise social problems based on 
personal and subjective views.
In addition to the importance of the 
adopted theoretic approach for defining 
social problems and the importance of the 
definition for the process of identifying 
social problems, it is critical to be mindful of 
the close connection that binds the first and 
second steps in the process of prioritisation. 
To arrive at a correct order of priority of social 
problems, the adopted theoretic approach 
and the defined objectives of a study must 
correspond. When two researchers or two 
organisations embark on prioritising social 
problems for entirely different objectives, 
the respective approach they choose must be 
consistent with their objectives, and so they 
cannot necessarily adopt the same approach. 
As an example, the mayor’s office and the 
judicial branch of the national government 
are charged with entirely different duties 
and responsibilities in the Iranian society. 
Yet, both are in some way responsible for 
social problems, and so in this respect they 
share a common sphere of activity while 
also shouldering clearly distinct functions. 
Thus, it is only natural that if these two 
government entities commission studies to 
identify and prioritise social problems to use 
the results in improving their effectiveness, 
they are pursuing different objectives 
and are searching for different sets of 
problems, for their responsibilities and 
functions are different. Thus, owing to their 
disparate functions, they seek different 
social problems, and this difference in the 
choice of social problems is the result of 
differing definitions, and this difference in 
definition, in turn, is the result of adopting 
different theoretic approaches (it is worth 
noting that different approaches inevitably 
produce different definitions, but it is 
not necessarily true that having the same 
approach will yield the same definition.). 
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As such, a very important point that must 
be taken into consideration in selecting a 
method for prioritising social problems 
is the correspondence between a study’s 
objectives and its approach. If a researcher 
fails to bear this key point in mind, the 
results that his or her study produces may 
not translate into practical measures that 
can realise the objectives for the sake of 
which he or she conducted the study in the 
first place.
3. Drafting a Comprehensive List of 
Possible Social Problems
The third step in prioritising social problems 
is drafting a list of social problems in view 
of the chosen definition. At this stage, there 
are two important methodological points 
that need to be observed. The first point is 
that it is crucial that the drafted list of social 
problems be exhaustive, and the failure to 
ensure the exhaustiveness of the list will 
have a direct impact on the prioritisation 
process. It is on the basis of this list that 
social problems are prioritised, and this 
means that if this list is not exhaustive, the 
credibility of the consequent prioritisation 
of social problems will be undermined 
considerably. For, the absence of even a few 
important social problems on this list will 
mean that they will not be included in the 
order of priority, and this methodological 
flaw will then carry over and become evident 
in the practical stage when the results of 
the prioritisation are put into practice. To 
succeed in satisfactorily preparing such an 
exhaustive list, the researcher, in addition 
to adopting the right theoretic approach 
and the appropriate definition to correctly 
identify social problems, must be careful 
to choose a method that is most effective in 
diminishing the possibility of missing any 
social problems. For instance, it would be 
insufficient to base our list of prospective 
social problems on, as seen in some of 
the conducted studies, surveys of limited 
groups of people or the brainstorming of 
some individuals, and then use this list in 
prioritising social problems, which will 
in turn be utilised in establishing practical 
policies to implement in addressing social 
problems.
The second point is that the researcher, 
having given his chosen definition of 
social problem and having identified social 
problems in light of the chosen definition, 
must demonstrate that the social problems 
he has identified are in fact social problems. 
What takes place in this process is that 
in light of his chosen definition, which 
develops out of the adopted theoretic 
approach, the researcher comes up with 
a certain criterion that he then uses in 
designating certain social phenomena as 
social problems. It is very natural to expect 
that the researcher ought to clearly delineate 
his reasons for identifying the particular set 
of problems that he has identified so as to 
allow those reading his study to know on 
what basis he has made his choices and to 
possibly engage in a meaningful critique of 
his methods.
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4. Ensuring the Homogeneity of the 
Proposed Social Problems
The next key point that a researcher must 
bear in mind, after drafting an exhaustive 
list of prospective social problems based 
on his chosen definition and in light of his 
theoretic approach, is to make sure that the 
problems on this list are homogeneous. 
This homogeneity requirement is dictated 
by a clear logical principle. To legitimately 
compare two discrete phenomena, they 
must be consistent and congruous so as to 
be logically comparable, for if two things 
lack logical comparability, we cannot 
legitimately make judgments based on their 
juxtaposition. It would be a mistake, for 
example, to place social problems pertaining 
to subjective and cultural matters next to 
those concerned with objective matters or to 
compare large-scale and structural problems 
with small-scale problems and then proceed 
to prioritise them. The distinct groups of 
social problems must be homogeneously 
categorised in view of their proper scope 
and prioritised within the context of their 
specific scope. To indiscriminately list all the 
incongruous social problems together would 
definitely preclude a meaningful study that 
would result in effective practical measures. 
How can we meaningfully compare the 
weak work ethic in Iran with the problem 
of runaway girls and prioritise between 
the two? They are fundamentally two 
incongruous problems that are incomparable. 
The crucial methodological point that any 
study must take into consideration is to 
ensure the congruity and consistency of the 
studied problems, in the absence of which 
no sound comparison or conclusion can be 
drawn, and so to ignore this crucial point 
would drastically diminish the credibility 
of the study.
One of the ways in which the failure 
to observe consistency and congruity in 
the prepared list of social problems based 
on clear and logical categorisations (by 
incorporating, for instance, such distinctions 
as subjective vs. objective, material vs. 
cultural, small-scale vs. large-scale) can 
distort the results of the study is that the less 
noticed but still very important problems 
tend to be eclipsed and side-lined by the 
more visible social problems, whose degree 
of importance is not necessarily any more 
than the former.  For instance, the absence 
of the cultural tendency to honour the law 
is sure to be overshadowed by such salient 
social problems as joblessness, poverty, 
opioid addiction, government corruption, 
and divorce. Due to this methodological 
flaw, the role of the researchers or study 
participants who are responsible for 
the prioritisation takes on an increased 
importance compared to a situation in 
which the right methods are used, for they—
working from their personal experiences 
and preconceptions—tend to give greater 
priority to those social problems with 
which they are more intimately engaged, 
unaware that many of the problems they 
have considered are not even comparable 
as they pertain to widely different domains.
In the process of prioritising social 
problems, ensuring the consistency and 
congruity of the social problems under 
consideration functions as the crucial link 
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that connects the third step—preparing 
an exhaustive list of prospective social 
problems—with the last step, which is the 
actual prioritisation of social problems is 
critical. Without this crucial link, even if the 
first three steps of the prioritisation process 
are executed flawlessly, the entire process 
would be jeopardised, thus fundamentally 
undermining the legitimacy of the results 
of the prioritisation.
5. Defining a Clear and Distinct 
Criterion for Prioritisation
The fifth and final step in the process of 
prioritising social problems is determining a 
clear and distinct prioritising criterion. One 
of the more impactful and frequent errors 
that occur in the available prioritisations 
of Iran’s social problems is the absence of 
a clear and distinct prioritising criterion. 
The importance of heeding this condition 
is logically obvious. When faced with a 
prioritised order, the first question that 
may arise is what criterion underlies the 
prioritisation. A study that cannot answer 
this very preliminary question clearly 
suffers from a fundamental methodological 
error. Of course, there need not be only one 
criterion. It is possible to apply multiple 
methods and then feed all methods into a 
matrix diagram to arrive at one uniform 
order of priority. The key point is to define 
one or more criteria and to consistently and 
meticulously apply them in the prioritisation 
process.
There are numerous criteria that can be 
utilised in prioritising social problems. The 
extent of a problem’s reach, the severity of 
its harm, and the degree of its social impact 
are a few examples of possible criteria. If 
we choose to work with the extent criterion, 
it is essential to have comprehensive and 
accurate statistical data of the target society 
in order to determine the extent of every 
social problem’s reach to thereby prioritise 
social problems. If we instead opt for the 
severity criterion, the social problems that 
cause the greatest and most irreparable injury 
will take precedence. As such, homicide, 
fatal accidents, and other such injuries 
that result in loss of life will occupy the 
very top of the order of priority. The social 
impact degree criterion is analogous in 
meaning to Durkheim’s definition of crime 
as an offence to the society’s “collective 
conscience.” Certain social problems—such 
as rape and paedophilia—strongly affect the 
society’s sentiments, and so naturally people 
expect a swift and severe punishment for 
the perpetrators. Now, when considering 
which of these criteria one should use in 
the process of prioritisation, the researcher 
must take several factors into consideration. 
Arguably, the most determining factors are 
the objectives of the study and its theoretic 
approach. Yet, determining our research 
criteria is always a complex issue and 
therefore cannot be simplified in the form of 
universal formulas. We cannot, for instance, 
say that whoever takes such-and-such 
approach in defining social problems must 
by extension adopt such-and-such criterion 
in prioritising social problems.
A very critical flaw affecting the 
available prioritisations of social problems 
in Iran, to which an allusion was made in 
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the introduction, is neglecting the web of 
interconnections between social problems. 
A very helpful criterion for use in a study of 
the order of priority that is meant to serve 
as the basis for a comprehensive plan to 
address a country’s social problems is the 
degree to which a problem can impact other 
social problems. Taking this criterion into 
consideration can considerably increase a 
plan’s efficiency and efficacy in combatting 
social problems. For example, a very 
prominent social problem in Iran that merits 
a top place in the order of priority of social 
problems in view of many criteria is the 
high volume of motor vehicle crimes and 
road accidents. It is a problem that entails 
a host of other social problems: from the 
bankruptcy of Iran’s insurance industry, 
to the excessive rate of fatalities, and to 
numerous emotional, psychological, and 
behavioural problems from which families 
suffer as a result of losing one or both parents. 
Neglecting the web of interconnections that 
exists between these problems, government 
officials and administrators tackle the motor 
vehicle problem with a one-dimensional 
approach: they considerably raise the 
monetary value of traffic fines every year 
and expand the amount of inner- and inter-
city roads monitored by traffic cameras in 
the hope of reducing motor vehicle crimes 
and accidents. A more holistic approach, 
however, would be to acknowledge the often 
multi-pronged interconnections of social 
problems, to prioritise social problems in 
view of this criterion, and to thereby address 
the loaded problem of motor-vehicle-related 
crimes and accidents in a more fundamental 
and long-term fashion by laying emphasis 
on and devising plans to strengthen the 
social sense of respect for law, a key cultural 
factor that can help in reducing many crimes 
and resolving many other social problems.
CONCLUSION
Vigorous attempts are being made in Iran 
to fundamentally and scientifically address 
the existing social problems. To succeed 
in these attempts, there needs to be a 
fundamental re-evaluation in conducting the 
studies dealing with social problems. Simply 
addressing one or more social problems 
will not go a long way in resolving social 
problems. The sociological studies that are 
conducted to this end must aim to shed light 
on the conceptual interconnections of social 
problems. One of the best ways in which 
this can be achieved is studying the order of 
priority between social problems.
In examining the research that has been 
conducted in Iran so far, we considered seven 
studies concerned with the prioritisation of 
social problems in Iran, three of which we 
analysed in depth. What our analysis showed 
was that the available studies are, for the 
most part, methodologically flawed, and 
this greatly diminishes the credibility of 
their prioritisations and undermines their 
conclusions.
After examining the available studies of 
social problems in Iran, we presented five 
key methodological points that are critical 
in ensuring the integrity and credibility 
of any study that aims to prioritise social 
problems. These five are, in summary, 
as follows. (1) It is important to bear in 
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mind that depending on the social group 
we consult in determining the order of 
priority of social problems, we will arrive 
at different results. Furthermore, if we wish 
to survey the views of all the three main 
groups of people—general public, academic 
experts, public administrators—there 
are certain methodological requirements 
that ought to be observed. (2) Due to the 
existence of drastically different approaches 
to social problems and the separate ways in 
which they impact our identification and 
prioritisation of social problems, it is crucial 
to define a specific approach according 
to which we carry out our prioritisation 
of social problems. Neglecting this key 
point will obviously result in theoretical 
flaws that will show themselves in the 
practical results that we wish to draw from 
our study. (3) A comparison between 
social problems to determine their order of 
priority is incomplete and ineffective if done 
without fist drafting an exhaustive list of all 
prospective social problems in view of the 
approach adopted in the above-mentioned 
second point. Once we have such a list, we 
can then legitimately embark on prioritising 
the social problems by comparing all 
or, where sanctioned by a sound logic, a 
selected number of them. (4) Examining 
and prioritising social problems without 
first ensuring that the social problems 
under consideration are consistent and 
congruous can potentially lead to a lopsided 
and inconsistent prioritisation. When the 
social problems being considered are 
made consistent and congruous, the results 
are more accurately distinguished, more 
logically cogent, and more practically 
efficacious. (5) For an effective and sound 
prioritisation, it is necessary to work on 
the basis of a carefully defined criterion, 
for various criteria produce various results, 
and the absence of a determinate criterion 
will render the conclusions of our study 
unreliable. 
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ABSTRACT
Access to justice as a procedure and practice-based concept is defined as the capacity of 
people to access judicial organisations and institutions. While having the problem of access 
to justice is ordinary among different groups of people, women may be affected more 
frequently for accessing these institutions and organisations, as they have to overcome 
many socio-political, economic, and structural barriers that reinforce this inaccessibility. 
This article emphasizes on women’s access to family justice in Iran. It explores the 
perspective of women who have experienced Iran’s judiciary system in terms of divorce, 
custody, dowry, and alimony in the family court. The data were collected through the 
women referring to the family courts, and data analysis was conducted based on thematic 
framework. The participants acknowledged low levels of legal awareness, feminisation of 
poverty, and low self-esteem because of the masculine hegemonic structure as the major 
barriers in their access to family justice.   
Keywords: Access to justice, barriers, Iran, judiciary system, women   
INTRODUCTION
Access to justice is recognized by the 
Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran 
within the just trial provisions; yet there is 
an increasing concern that “justice for all” 
does not apply to every Iranian and in all 
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cases. There is unequal access to justice 
between the different groups of people in 
the most societies, characterized by gaps 
among the socioeconomic status of citizens, 
level of education, gender, religion, and 
so on. Therefore, the main contribution of 
this paper is to attempt to present a general 
understanding into women’s access to 
family justice in Iran. It analyses a range 
of challenges that women confront when 
trying to take legal action to settle their 
problems. It further emphasizes that the 
step-by-step recognition of women’s rights, 
access to equal legal remedies, and legal 
empowerment are key aspects in shaping the 
prospects for better access to family justice 
for Iranian women.
An instant review of current problems 
to women’s access to family justice 
reveals three priority fields of concern: 1) 
Discriminatory legal structures. Despite 
improvement in different areas, Iran has 
legal provisions that discriminate against 
women. For example, Iran has laws that 
place men as head of households and legally 
expect wives to obey their husbands, prohibit 
a woman from getting a passport without 
her husband’s permission, and has legal 
restrictions on what types of jobs women 
can do. 2) Limited justice sector capacities 
to dispatch family justice for women. 
Unresponsive justice organizations continue 
to discourage women from seeking family 
justice. In many cases, conventional justice 
revisions have effectively postponed the 
justice needs of women. For example, Iran’s 
family justice sector often disregard inner 
household and community disputes, because 
it sees them as private matters and outside 
the fields of public dispute resolution. 3) 
Exclusion and disempowerment of women 
in the family justice. In spite of the fact that 
there is an increasing recognition of the 
noteworthiness of women’s inclusion, they 
are often excluded from fully participating 
in and benefiting from different dimensions 
of law, justice and development work. 
Geographic, financial and political distance 
from justice structures hinders women 
from claiming and realizing their rights. 
Iranian women face additional barriers due 
to discriminatory social and cultural norms 
and practices.
Women’s access for getting the justice 
is changing. The aim of this study is to 
examine the status of women with access 
to family justice processes. Resorting to 
judicial organisations’ authority, urban 
transportation facilities, poverty, economic 
concerns in petitioning to the courts, 
masculine hegemony in structure, access to 
legal information, illiteracy, and inequality 
in everyday life are some of the elements 
that alter the position of women in their 
access to family justice processes.
Theoretical Background
Access to justice
Access to justice is the subject matter of 
the difference between existing laws and 
the implementation of the same laws in 
two areas of social life and legal and social 
studies. Access to justice also provides 
opportunities for discussing the equality 
efficiency scale against the law which is 
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one of the principles underlying modern 
law (Rhode, 2004).  It is very important to 
look at the gender issues as well as access 
to justice, along with the discussion of 
classes and social groups, because this is a 
topic that deals with the ambiguity between 
equal rights and inequalities in society. 
In daily life, mechanisms based on the 
principle of equality were not successful 
in solving the problems and differences 
arising from gender inequality. For example, 
the feminization of poverty or inequality 
in social activities affects access to justice 
(Morris, 1999; Sandefur, 2009).
Women’s access to family justice
In her book “Justice, Gender, and the 
Family”, Susan Moller Okin defines family 
justice as a range of issues from child 
custody and terms of divorce to physical 
and sexual abuse of women and children. 
She believes that family justice must be of 
vital importance for social justice (Okin, 
2008, p. 8 / 101).  Eekelaar also remarks: 
‘Family justice is concerned with more than 
simply bargaining, fairly or otherwise. It is 
concerned with upholding some elemental 
features of personal relationship. Family 
justice cannot do this without the law and 
effective means of upholding it’ (Maclean, 
Eekelaar, & Bastard, 2016).
As many socio-legal researchers pointed 
out, most issues are disposed of elsewhere in 
the family justice system while the judiciary 
remains at its core. This is because, quite 
simply, the purpose of a justice system 
is ultimately to safeguard people’s legal 
rights. This does not, of course, mean that 
these legal rights should be pursued or 
defended in that way. There may be many 
occasions when the responsible thing to do 
is to compromise, or even abandon, one’s 
legal rights. This could be inherent in a 
full concept of responsibility (Eekelaar & 
Maclean, 2013). However, it is one thing to 
make a responsible decision to compromise 
or abandon one’s legal rights, it is another 
thing to yield without any knowledge of 
what rights are or if they are known, to 
yield under pressure due to lack of means 
to protect them.
The justice system is there to try to 
prevent those things from happening. A 
justice system is anchored in the judiciary.
However, attention should be paid to 
the women’s challenging conditions in the 
context of family justice. For example, 
Singer (2009) has observed that the goal 
of maintaining relationships conflicts 
with another objective, often thought to 
be desirable, of bringing about a ‘clean 
break’ between the parties. She surmises 
that maintaining relationships favours men 
because women are likely to receive less 
money than under a clean break settlement 
and are more restricted in what they can do.
Iranian women’s experience in the 
justice routes
The fear of being alone in a society like 
Iran for a divorced woman is pervasive. 
Being a mother in a family, many rights 
are sacrificed in the favour of inappropriate 
law. Sometimes, women, for getting custody 
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rights, give up other rights (especially 
financial rights like dowry or Mahriyeh).
The fear of separation, the fear of 
being alone, and the fear of how society 
views divorced women are among the 
hardest conditions that divorced women 
can experience in Iran. Such a condition 
is clearly visible in family courts. Many 
women from different social classes and 
backgrounds have experienced these 
circumstances. Therefore, many people have 
complained through talking and interviews 
about ignoring motherhood by courts’ staff, 
topped by judges. Another major issue 
ignored by these family courts is the social 
position of women, which goes unnoticed. 
‘Maryam’, a 20-year-old woman with 
a pale face sat on the bench of family court 
on the campus. After asking her whether she 
agreed to be interviewed, she started to cry 
and ‘screeds out of her damn life’ (this was 
her own expression). Having some papers 
and files in her hands, she said: ‘I cannot 
continue this life. I married him at 16, and I 
was pregnant at 17. Before finishing my high 
school, I had given birth to my daughter. 
Now, my daughter is my life, but the judge 
said the custody was the right of the father 
and I could not live with my daughter after 
I got a divorce.’
Maryam’s husband, is seven years 
older than her, is a drug addict. She is also 
a battered woman because her husband did 
beat her many times.
The judge dealing with her case believes 
that ‘according to the existence of evidence 
of case, there are not acceptable reasons 
for a divorce order. Her husband has a job 
and provides economic demands of life 
for Maryam and her children. The only 
acceptable reason in terms of what the 
court sees is unemployment caused by the 
husband’s drug abuse.’
However, Maryam could not prove in 
the court to what extent she had suffered 
from her husband’s violence; and, therefore, 
she had no choice but to give up all 
financial rights (which include her dowry 
and alimony) to get the judge to issue her 
divorce. 
There are no approved laws on marital 
violence in Iranian family courts; hence, 
women are not able to prove violence 
perpetrated against them. This forces 
women to give up all their financial rights 
stated by the family law to get their divorce. 
According to the Iranian family protection 
act, women cannot claim for a divorce in the 
family court; only men can do it.
‘Sara’ is a lawyer in family justice 
cases; she believes ‘any woman according 
to her family backgrounds has an especial 
experience of justice path.’
She said many women, for reasons 
related to their reputation and their children, 
would give up initiating a divorce claim. 
Many women give up this right, especially 
in the case of infidelity claims for divorce 
in the family court. However, there is no 
considerable support for them in the current 
family law.
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The  s t a t i s t i c s  o f  the  Na t iona l 
Organization for Civil Registration in Iran 
suggest that 13.3 % of all divorces happen 
during the first year of marriage, while 47.2 
% take place during the first five years of 
marriage (2015). In Tehran, there happens 
one divorce out of every three marriages. 
Also most divorces happen for men and 
women between 25 and 29 years of age. 
Though this news is irritating, but it would 
increase attention to raise and discuss the 
problem and rethink strategies applied to 
prevent more problems in family justice 
matters through a gender-sensitive approach 
with a special emphasis on women as a 
vulnerable group in Iran. 
Methodological framework
A methodological framework provides a 
framework for both data collection and 
data analysis, which basically encompasses 
all the aspects involved in planning and 
executing the research (Bryman, 2012, 
p. 46; D’Cruz & Jones, 2004, p. 84). 
Besides this framework, understanding the 
research purpose helps the authors pick an 
appropriate theoretical framework. This, 
then study was conducted in Iran with the 
purpose of identifying the family justice 
barriers faced by women, assisted with 
the participation of the ‘Research Centre 
of Judiciary’ in Tehran. The data were 
gathered through interviews and reviews of 
secondary sources (Bryman, 2012, p. 70).
Overall, 50 women (Table 1) were 
interviewed from June to August 2016 in 
Tehran Family Courts (Shahid Mahallati; 
the second branch of family court). Some 
of the in-depth interviews could be recorded 
by a recorder, yet a few of the participants 
did not satisfy with recording some part of 
the interviews. All the women interviewed 
had passed through a court experience 
in the civil or criminal courts earlier. All 
of them had sat for litigations or hearing 
sessions in the family court. The authors 
used a semi-structured interview that 
taken to account questions to emphasize 
the most important problems related to the 
legal system, conventional justice systems, 
courts, prosecutors, police, legal aid, and 
determinant socioeconomic elements 
regarding the law. In other words, the 
questions of interview were designed to 
focus on the women’s basic legal knowledge, 
their familiarity with legal procedure, 
their perceptions of cultural barriers, the 
issues that influence their preference for 
mechanisms of dispute solutions, and 
their level of satisfaction with their chosen 
courses of action.
The data analysis was initiated with open 
coding, where categories of information 
about the phenomenon being investigated 
were formed (Robson, 2002, p. 194). The 
transcriptions were read by the researcher, 
and codes were given to the statements in 
the data. Related codes, which arguably 
represented the pre-determined themes, 
were then grouped under the same category 
or categories, and later were gathered under 
themes (Saldana, 2013, pp. 10-13).
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Analysis and Main Themes
While the barriers to access to justice are 
ordinary for various groups, women may 
more frequently suffer from these barriers 
and suffer more to prevailing them due 
to the structural elements contributing to 
inequality. Such structural components 
of inequality for women is available in 
ownership, inheritance, rights, employment 
and family law. Women may experience 
obstacles to access judicial organizations 
that is more than anything else aggravate 
by poverty. Institutional barriers are caused 
by masculine hegemonic proceedings 
and security institutions and male officers 
worsen the situation and propel an increment 
in the complaints of women. In addition, 
proceedings are followed up with fears, 
including shame of being stigmatised, 
particularly in such issues as domestic 
violence and rape. Also, elements like 
working at home, poverty, being elderly, and 
childcare have been considered as creating 
a dearth in time and resource for women in 
the processes of legal claiming. It is crucial 
to target certain conditions as well as on 
problems with regarding justiciable event 
while considering women’s access to family 
justice. 
According to the output resulting from 
the women’s interviews in the family courts 
of Iran, there are five main themes related to 
their access barriers to family justice in the 
judiciary system (Table 2). 
Table 1 
Demographic characteristics of the interviewees
Background variables Abundance Total
Age (year) 18-25 9 50
25-35 24
35-45 12
45-55 5
55-60 -
Education level Under diploma and diploma 28 50
Undergraduate and bachelor 18
Masters and higher 4
Economic class Low 16 50
Medium 30
High 4
Employment status Employed 15 50
Unemployed 35
Marital status Married 12 50
Divorced 14
Married with a life separate from the spouse 23
Widow 1
Type of litigation Civil cases 30 50
Criminal cases 20
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Legal awareness
Legal awareness is a socio-legal term that 
mentions to the knowledge of the law and 
legal organizations, together with attitudes 
towards them between the members of 
the public. It helps the authors realize 
the importance of the people attachment 
to the law in relation to their everyday 
matters. Legal awareness is in the tight 
bond with popular culture, which depicts 
law, lawyers, and judges in the media and 
the arena of life that involves norms and 
expectations of behaviour, including morals 
and laws. According to the American Bar 
Association (1989), Commission on Public 
Understanding, legal awareness is ‘the 
ability to make critical judgments about the 
substance of the law, the legal process, and 
available legal resources, and to effectively 
utilize the legal system and articulate 
strategies to improve its legal literacy’.
The output of the interviews, however, 
reveals an awareness of justice sector 
problems that grown consistently up 
alongside with a higher educational 
base. Most interviewees were unable to 
distinguish among criminal and civil cases 
or civil and criminal courts. According to the 
definition of the Canadian Bar Association 
(1992, p. 23), awareness of rights and legal 
processes is useless if a user of justice 
does not have adequate awareness of the 
legal organizations that regulate public life 
(Maranlou, 2015; Wan, 2014). 
‘Hamideh’, a 25-year-old woman, has a 
master’s degree in Accounting but is jobless. 
She had claimed a divorce six months ago 
because of her husband’s infidelity, and now 
she lives in her parents’ house with them. 
She is economically dependent on her father, 
but before starting her divorce’s claim, she 
gave up her job in a private organization 
as an accountant (without unemployment 
insurance) due to depression. She says: ‘I 
did not know what I should do, and because I 
had no money to hire a lawyer, I had to apply 
for free legal advice in the family justice 
court, but it was not helpful …’ 
Table 2 
The items of main barriers to women’s access to family justice in Iran
Central item Main item Basic concepts
Main barriers to 
women’s access 
to family justice 
in Iran
Legal awareness Inability to distinguish between criminal and civil 
cases, false resources and wrong addresses, lack of 
access to sources of awareness in the public media and 
lack of awareness of the lawsuit in practice
Language Lack of access to legal language (lawyer language)
Cultural stereotypes The behavior of relatives and acquaintances, the way 
society looks at divorced women
Feminization of poverty Rental housing, low job pay, lack of job opportunity, 
insurance problems and employment discrimination,
Hegemonic masculinity 
in the justice path
Discriminatory behaviors and norms against women in 
family justice institutions
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The lack of knowledge of the legal 
organizations is a crucial matter, since the 
public’s awareness of the judicial system 
is an important prerequisite of their path to 
justice (Hough & Roberts, 2005, p. 71). It 
is an obvious fact that the police or courts 
have the most responsibility to protect the 
rights of the people and keep social order up. 
This pervasive blindness of the legal system 
impresses women’s perceptions of justice. 
‘Zohre’, a 27-year-old woman who initiated 
a dowry case before her divorce order case, 
does not know anything about the procedure 
of her judicial case affairs, and her mental 
condition is not good; she is stressed out and 
has many worries about her only daughter 
after divorce. She says: ‘The court staffs’ 
behaviour is not good with me, and my case 
affairs have witnessed numerous delays in 
progress. I have an attorney for my case 
(alimony), but I would come to the court for 
some papers work myself. At first, all I knew 
about such a case was little information 
from my relatives. I was not familiar with 
the process of my case; I was just confused 
in a place like this.’ 
Language
All over the world people ‘perform’ their 
roles within society and become socialized 
by using language as one of the many 
ways. Language filters whatever one wants 
to see and, by doing so, he/she influences 
what is communicated to others. The 
communication people have with others 
gradually creates social conventions and 
norms, which subsequently, affect what 
language is deemed proper and suitable in 
certain situations (Kramsch, 1998).
In its widespread sense, gender-neutral 
language is achieved by avoiding ‘gendered 
generics’, which are masculine or feminine 
nouns and pronouns used to refer to both 
men and women (Curzan, 2003). The 
constant use of male-gendered generics to 
show all people can have a psychological 
effect on women by making them feel 
excluded and by strengthening traditional 
gender stereotypes – even when that effect 
is not predestined (Chew, 2014). Social 
science research illustrates that language 
is a social force that can have an impact 
on how women see themselves and are 
seen by others. The ‘Linguistic Relativity 
Hypothesis’ argues that ‘culture and 
language are interconnected and that the 
words that people use affect the way they 
view both the world and their self-concept’ 
(Sniezek & Jazwinksi, 1989).
Fourotan did a content analysis of 
educational system books in Iran. He divided 
words and key concepts representation 
in these books into two groups (male 
and female). The content analysis results 
revealed that 65% of these words were 
dedicated to the male group while only one 
out of three words referred to the female 
group (Fourotan, 2014, p. 133/155).
 ‘Bani’, a 57-year-old woman, lives in 
Qom with her daughter after her ex-husband 
died in Tehran; her case is financial (marital 
inheritance and alimony). She speaks both 
Farsi and Arabic. She must come from 
Qom to Tehran to follow her case in the 
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family justice court. She says: ‘I came to the 
family court’s free advice centre to pursue 
the matter but I could not understand the 
language, and I became more confused.’
Cultural stereotypes 
Regarding ‘The Analysis of Culture’, 
Williams (1963, 2009) demarcates the 
‘three common categories in the definition 
of culture’. First, there is the ‘ideal’ in which 
culture is a process of human perfection in 
terms of certain universal values. Second, 
there is the ‘documentary’ record: the living 
texts and practices of a culture. Third, there 
is the ‘social’ definition of culture in which 
culture is an explanation of a way of life.
Based on this definition there are three 
new ways of thinking about culture: A) the 
anthropological aspect, which views culture 
as an explanation of a way of life; B) the idea 
that culture represents special meanings and 
values; and C) the claim that the work of 
cultural analysis should be the illumination 
of the meanings and values implicitly and 
explicitly in a way of life, a culture.
The considered whole paradigm of 
social definition of culture, the importance 
of culture in gender differences constructing 
is received centrally. This paradigm of 
socialisation theory - in explanation of 
boys’ and girls’ different behaviour from 
the first years of childhood- is faced with 
the public interest. The educational system 
is a laudable part of this process, so it guides 
boys and girls to different activities and 
achievements. In a recent analysis on gender 
and culture, there has been a major emphasis 
on literature and on deconstructing the 
Theory of Derrida (Derrida, 1967) and the 
discourse analysis of Michael Foucault. The 
central emphasis here is turning to creating 
context, representations, and discourses, 
which would make the conceptions of 
gender (Weedon, 1987). In this approach, 
the authors will talk about the differences 
among both women and men and between 
women; here, the concept of ‘being woman’ 
has a messy understanding itself. 
Unfortunately,  the existence of 
hegemonic masculinity in the context of the 
legal space of Iran emphasizes only ‘those 
differences that could lead to stereotyping’ 
(Martin & Nakayama, 2010, p. 182) (that 
women are emotional or that men are 
rational). As these stereotypes of gender 
differences persist, it may be pervasive 
because of the stereotypical of women 
everywhere in media and specially in Iranian 
movies.
The attitudes and stereotypes adopted 
by the Iranian community regarding claims 
against a husband by his wife do not only 
affect the woman’s individually but often 
leads to discrimination towards certain 
groups of them, especially many poor 
women who lack financial resources.
In Iran, although statistics show that the 
divorce rate has gone up steadily, yet divorce 
is pondered a social taboo (Maranlou, 
2015). Women are more stigmatized by 
divorce, as indicated in a Persian proverb: 
‘A woman enters her husband’s house with 
a white wedding dress and they should be 
in husbands’ house till burial shroud’. This 
means that the women they think living with 
their husband and being with him is better 
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to divorce. ‘Sharare’, a 33-year-old woman, 
was dumped with her two children by her 
husband without any financial support: ‘My 
father helps us in our daily costs, but I do 
not like to depend on him. What would other 
people think of me … Many of my relatives 
blame me, the court’s staffs blame me, too. 
The judge told me: ‘If your husband pays 
for your food, it is enough, but he could 
not understand I have many demands like 
emotional ones, financial progress and 
other …’. 
Cultural stereotypes in the judiciary in 
Iran have more impact on the judges’ views 
in issuing sentences, especially when the 
case is related to family justice. Such a view 
can leave a case pending for more than three 
years in the family court without any final 
verdict. ‘Zahra’, a 45-year-old woman from 
Abadan (620 miles from away Tehran), sat 
at the family court campus crying, and said: 
‘This year is my third year of attending in 
the family court; I am the fourth wife of 
a man that had three other wives before 
marrying me. He lied to me about everything 
related to himself and his life …. During 
these three years, every time I try to file a 
demand of confiscating his property so that 
I would claim my marriage due (Mahriyeh), 
he comes to the court and talks to the judge, 
then the judge comes to this belief that he 
has three more wives and that he is the bread 
winner of all of them and his children. At 
the end, I get zero marital financial support 
because the confiscation order is rejected 
by the judge.’
Feminization of poverty
As Mahoozi (2015) shows in his research, 
there is a multi-dimensional poverty in Iran 
for four distinct groups (rural households 
with a male head, rural households with 
a female head, urban households with a 
male head, and urban households with a 
female head) for each of the 30 provinces 
in Iran. The poorest groups in each province 
are rural households, mostly the rural 
female-headed households. Poverty is more 
prevailing among the rural households 
compared with the urban households of 
the same region. The reason could be the 
inequality of welfare distribution in favour 
of urban areas, or could be the immigration 
of wealthier rural households to urban areas. 
But then, there is rather less poverty among 
the male-headed households (in both urban 
and rural areas) in comparison with the 
female-headed households, which shows an 
increasing risk of female-headed households 
falling into poverty, particularly in rural 
areas and the poorer provinces.
Mahoozi’s study underlines three 
dimensions of inequality in Iran: provincial 
inequality, gender inequality, and regional 
inequality (Mahoozi, 2015). So, there is 
a phenomenon in Iran in the name of the 
‘feminisation of poverty’1. Iranian women 
are more educated than men. A recent report2 
1“Feminization of poverty” address Increasing 
poverty among women in Third World countries, 
deprived women and women of minorities in Europe 
and United States. This term was first used by 
American sociologist “Diane Pearce”.
2http://www.mehrnews.com/news/2364001/
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shows that nearly 70% of the university 
intake is female. Yet, statistics show that 
80% of governmental jobs are assigned 
to men. Also, official reports say: ‘There 
are two million and 500 thousand female-
headed households, which means 80% of 
women are unemployed and 60 thousand 
women per year are added to them. So, 
these increasing statistics of female-headed 
households lead to many serious problems 
in society.’These statistics acknowledge 
an increasing number of divorces as a 
significant determinant in the feminization 
of poverty in Iran. Divorce adds to number 
of female-headed households in the country. 
‘Samira’, a 23-year-old woman with 
no children, only six months after her legal 
marriage registration had claimed a divorce 
against her husband in the family justice 
court. She now lives with her parents. She 
has no job and is dependent on her father 
economically; she said: ‘The costs of my 
lawsuit were so high, my father was able to 
provide them. But if a woman had no money, 
she would not have been able to do anything 
in the family justice court for her marital 
rights or court matters in Iran.’
In this context, women’s poverty 
negatively affects their ability to invoke the 
family justice courts to redress themselves, 
and the attitude of the court clergy judges 
in the family court of Iran is, generally, 
reluctant to use their discretion in women’s 
favour. ‘Zoleikha’ is a 48-year-old woman 
who has two children. Her case started 14 
years ago. The reason for this long-lasting 
case is because her husband left home 
without any support for living costs and she 
has no idea of his whereabouts. She is a gym 
coach in a club for women in Tehran; she 
said: ‘I have two children who are 21 and 
18 years old, I don’t have an employment 
insurance and I provide my children with 
living costs. There isn’t a governmental 
support group. I do not know anything about 
my husband or where he lives; he is always 
fleeing from his responsibilities towards me 
and our children. I am so tired, our home is 
rented; both rental payment and other costs 
of living have been a trouble that I had to 
deal with in hard conditions. Alongside 
these difficulties, the judge dealing with 
my case told me you should first publish 
an advertisement in the newspapers to 
announce your husband’s disappearance and 
wait for his coming to the court. During this 
time and delays, I have had many financial 
concerns.’ Factors like this discourage 
women from enforcing their rights in the 
family justice courts.
Hegemonic masculinity in the justice 
path
As Connell mentioned, ‘hegemonic 
masculinity’ is part of the gender order theory, 
which recognizes multiple masculinities that 
vary across time, culture, and the individual. 
Hegemonic masculinity is defined as 
the current configuration of practice that 
legitimizes men’s dominant position in the 
society and justifies the subordination of 
women, and other marginalized ways of 
being a man (Connell, 2005). Conceptually, 
hegemonic masculinity suggests to explain 
how and why men preserve dominant 
social roles over women, and other gender 
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identities, which are perceived as ‘feminine’ 
in a certain society.
According to Connell, the politics 
of gender (in this case, of gender and 
law) arises from the always-contested 
nature of men’s power and the ever-present 
possibilities of resisting and contesting the 
present gender arrangements. It is a key 
feature of the thesis, in short, that hegemonic 
masculinity is never, finally, closed, fixed or 
resolved (Collier, 2010, p. 454).
The  concep tua l  beg inn ings  o f 
hegemonic masculinity represented the 
culturally idealized form of manhood that 
was socially and hierarchically exclusive 
and concerned with bread-winning; that 
was anxiety-provoking and differentiated 
(internally and hierarchically); that was 
brutal and violent, pseudo-natural and 
tough, psychologically contradictory, and 
thus crisis-prone; economically rich and 
socially sustained (Donaldson, 1993).
The hegemonic masculinity within the 
Iranian family justice system seems to be 
pervasive. A male hegemonic system for 
accessing justice is closely linked to the 
capacity of law enforcement agencies to 
provide non-effective legal remedies for 
women. A male hegemonic system and 
discriminatory norms seem to pervade the 
administration of justice, and therefore, 
create more multi-dimension barriers that 
women must get over to access the family 
justice. In this system, some policies are 
connected to the proportion of female 
staff too. The number of female personnel 
working within the justice organizations 
(such as judicial officers, judges and police 
in Iran), even though increasing, is still 
much lower than the number of male 
personnel (Maranlou, 2015). This hegemony 
is reverberated in the family laws that 
arrange gender relations and the rights of 
men and women. Islamic jurisprudential 
texts—which are the basis of Islamic laws 
in Iran, including family law—consider 
women as second-class citizens and locate 
them under men’s domination.
One result of these laws is the low 
representation of women as judiciary staff, 
especially barricaded from being judges. 
The prohibition began instantly after the 
1979 Islamic revolution. This practice was 
legitimized later by adding an article to 
the constitution, which demonstrated that 
only men may become judges. The law 
reformation in 1992 helped women to sit 
as assistant judges in some civil courts, but 
yet, women were prevented from becoming 
judges (Maranlou, 2015).
In the present work, most of the 
interviewed women during the field study 
gave priority to the fairness of the legal 
procedure. ‘Other parallel studies have 
also revealed that people attach a perceived 
fairness to processes that result in special 
decisions’ (Van den Bos & Miedema, 
2000). ‘Hoda’, a 32-year- old woman, has 
a master’s degree in law. She is an attorney 
in family justice cases and has a high social 
and economic position equal to that of her 
husband. She has not claimed a divorce, but 
has rather claimed for their son’s custody 
right in the family justice court. She says: 
My eleven-year-old son’s custody order 
was issued in my ex-husband’s favour, and 
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the judge determined 24 hours per week 
visitation for me; this is while I and my ex-
husband have equal situation economically, 
socially and …’
One of the considerable sample in 
the fieldwork given by the interviewees 
addressed the concern of whether a woman 
has been rendered the opportunity to voice 
her claim. The interviewees also noted that 
the male hegemonic framework of the court 
was a factor that influenced women’s trust 
in the family justice system. The framework 
of court and the settled hierarchy may cause 
women to feel fragile and discrimination. 
‘Shiva’, a 36-year-old woman, holds a 
high school diploma and has no job; she is 
economically dependent on her father now; 
before her divorce, she was dependent on 
her husband. She said: ‘My ex-husband 
had claimed divorce and the judge issued 
the order in favour of him. Before divorce, 
I only lived with him for the sake of our 
children but when a man claims divorce, the 
woman can do nothing about it. Now, I just 
came to the family court to pursue my dowry 
and alimony cases. The divorce order issued 
by the judge is something not in my hands 
and I cannot do anything about it.’ 
Within a context like this, in recent 
years, some of the Iranian news agencies 
announced the increase of ‘white marriages’3 
in Iran, especially in the metropolis. In 
this kind of cohabitation, the parties live 
without legally registered marriages. Some 
specialists argue that white marriage in 
Iran is the result of discriminatory laws 
against women, because many women, 
especially in the urban environments, are 
well-educated, and the current family law is 
not in accordance with the women’s socially 
changing conditions. On the other hand, 
marital life in the form of white marriage 
would make many problems for women 
and young girls in the current social context 
of Iran.
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
This study aimed to examine what kinds of 
obstacles are present for Iranian women so 
that they can access family justice. The case 
study and the interviews showed that wider, 
more complex factors have an impact on the 
identity and development of individuals. 
The results further revealed the fact that an 
individual can be greatly shaped by his or 
her wider environment to the point where 
he/she would not seek help for accessing 
family justice matters, became certain 
aspects mentioned as the main themes (legal 
awareness, feminisation of poverty, cultural 
stereotype, language, and a male hegemonic 
structure) discourage seeking support or 
accessing family justice. While the way an 
individual’s environment (context) impacts 
his/her view towards seeking aid for Iranian 
women in the family justice path, the general 
background of these women has no impact 
on the type of support they receive from 
some organizations or advisory centres in 
the family court.
3White marriage is a kind of cohabitation in Iran in 
which the couples have no legal commitment toward 
each other, but are heartfelt; the judiciary system in 
Iran considers it illegal as non-protected, especially 
for women, and against the Islamic values.
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Five main themes (Figure 1) as 
obstacles that prevent Iranian women from 
accessing family justice were emerged 
through the interviews and their outcome 
on women’s experiences in the family 
justice path. First, the lack of adequate 
legal awareness is a problem of access to 
family justice. Almost all women know little 
about legal organizations, procedures, and 
responsibilities to which they can refer to 
settle their legal issues. So, their awareness 
of their rights could not be converted into 
legal actions, because they are not aware 
of how they should use the family justice 
system.
 
Figure 1. Main barriers of Iranian women access to family justice
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The language barrier is one of the things the 
interviewee women frequently mentioned 
in their answers to the researcher ’s 
questions. Almost all of them referred to 
the humiliating language used by the court 
personnel or judges. Besides t is langu ge, 
there are other issues arising from cultural 
context; the complexity of legal technical 
language completely confuses many women 
in the family court. Many women, who have 
financial difficulties, would provide the 
attorney fees with the help of their families 
because of this legal technical language 
issue. 
Cultural stereotypes comprise a certain 
view based on the way in which gender 
roles are defined by a certain community in 
a given context. These stereotypes in Iran’s 
family courts have appeared mostly in the 
judges’ views, especially in the process of 
case sentencing. Many women interviewees 
said that both the judge and the court staff 
did not understand them. Many of thes  
judges see the men as the breadwinners, 
and the women should obey their husbands 
because they provide financial needs. 
Unfortunately, this view is the reason 
of much domestic violence occurring in 
different Iranian families. 
Feminization of poverty is a remarkable 
problem related to women’s access to family 
justice in Iran. There are many educated 
women, even more than men in some areas, 
in Iran, but there is no special mechanism for 
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equal and supportive employment of women 
in the society and law. So approximately 75-
80% of the governmental jobs are occupied 
by men, and women can only contribute to 
20%. As mentioned above, many women-
headed households suffer from poverty more 
than their male counterparts. On this path, 
high legal fees represent another barrier 
facing women’s access to family justice.
High cost of court fees could be another 
obstacle for women finding justice. Women 
who are unable to pay the fees might 
bow to the inevitable by giving up their 
rights. Also, long waiting time given to 
women for opportunity to present their 
case in court can cause them to lose faith 
in justice system. Often families intervene 
and try to solve the problem by passing the 
court. Enhancement of human resources 
and number of courthouses, judges, and 
prosecutors adjudicating family disputes 
will settle this problem caused by the high 
workload. 
A male hegemonic structure and many 
different obstacles within the procedural 
justice and sociocultural and cultural 
matters, play a more important role in 
preventing women’s access to family justice 
in Iran. As current study has shown, despite 
written approved law in family matters, it is 
already observed that, notwithstanding the 
protection provided by the law, women’s 
access to family justice in many different 
positions, has been ignored.
These obstacles and barriers will lead to 
a reduction of Iranian women’s self-esteem 
within the society’s different spheres. This 
decrease causes a fragile agency (Figure 
1), as a main mentally severe problem for 
women who are barred from any action 
to achieve their rights and access family 
justice. The lack of access to justice itself 
in a cyclic manner would result in a wider 
range of problems in both personal and 
marital life. 
The data retrieved through fieldwork 
also declare  that  I ranian women’s 
understanding of the justice system includes 
depriving feelings and unmet demands. To 
meet these demands and empower Iranian 
women, it is essential to adopt and apply 
a gender-sensitive approach both in law-
making processes and administration. In the 
law-making process, preserving a gender 
sensitive approach for anti-discrimination 
and making, adopting, and performing laws 
in accordance with this approach will sweep 
a main obstacle to women’s access to family 
justice.
The present research results present 
a number of absorbing views into the 
understandings of Iranian women of access 
to family justice. However, like any study 
about such a complicated subject, there exist 
a number of limitations, and it is crucial 
to identify these limitations and to make 
recommendations for future study. This 
research has also its limitations in terms of 
methodological framework and application. 
The interviews were limited by use of a non-
random sample. They were carried out in 
two main distracts of Tehran Family Court 
with an almost small population. Subsequent 
research about women’s understandings 
of access to family justice should overlay 
different cities in Iran. Furthermore, the 
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questions in the interviews were arranged 
based on the researchers’ knowledge of the 
existing issues about legal empowerment 
and access to family justice literature. So, it 
is fair to say that the result of this paper may 
reflect the interests and the concerns of the 
researchers as much as the interests and the 
concerns of the respondents. Nonetheless, 
the interpretations demonstrated based on 
the items came out from the interviewees’ 
answers seem to sufficiently indicate that the 
results of this study reflect the respondents’ 
views.
Ultimately, the previous study is the 
next study question, and this study is no 
exception. It is only one of the early efforts 
to explore the main barriers of access to 
family justice from the users’ view in Iran. 
For instance, this study has not covered 
the extent to which minorities or defendant 
or prisoner women have access to family 
justice. In addition, study would also be 
needed to present more up-to-date data 
in relation to these issues in Iran. Taking 
to account the lack of literature regarding 
access to family justice from the different 
Islamic perspectives, it would also be of 
great concern to examine how various 
schools of thought reflect on such a subject.
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ABSTRACT
This article shows, as Peter Berger’s desecularisation theory indicates, that the contemporary 
world is mainly religious as much as it was in the past, and although pluralisation somewhat 
loosens religious beliefs, people are largely religious. On a probability sample of a national 
survey in Iran, we show that Iranian’s people are mainly religious. However, they are 
not very comment to religious behaviours, especially in treatment with others and the 
affairs of everyday life. Also, education has a negative, but minor impact on individuals’ 
religiousness. However, it exerts a more impact on other dimensions of religious life, 
religious tolerance, and secularisation of individuals.    
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INTRODUCTION
Religion is a fundamental aspect of social 
life and the classical theorists of sociology 
have generally emphasised the importance 
of religion in society. August Comte (1849) 
tried to create a positivistic religion (religion 
of humanity) for modern society to fulfil the 
cohesive function of traditional religion. 
Emile Durkheim, in The Elementary Forms 
of Religious Life (1912), highlighted the 
social function of religion and its role in 
bringing social cohesion. Max Weber, 
in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of 
Capitalism (1985), emphasised on the role 
of religion in the rise of modern industry 
and capitalist economy. However, the 
classical theorists of sociology explicitly 
or implicitly saw the declining importance 
of religion in modern society. For Max 
Weber, the major specificities of modern 
society is rational action towards the target 
that implies a reduction in traditional action 
and value-oriented rational action, as vital 
features of religion. Durkheim’s emphasis 
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on the development of science in organic 
societies implies the decline of religion 
in modern society. According to him, 
religion is not only a system of behaviours 
and actions but also a system of ideas and 
beliefs whose aim is to express the world 
and scientific thinking and is, thus, evolved 
into religious thinking. Therefore, scientific 
thinking takes the place of religious thought: 
“Hence, it seems natural that religion should 
lose ground as science becomes better at 
performing its task” (Durkheim, 1995, pp. 
427-428).
The assumed decline of religion arose 
centuries ago, in the Enlightenment, when it 
was thought that the development of science 
replaced the supernatural (religious) with 
the scientific (natural). However, it was in 
1950s and 1960s that the idea of religion 
declined, as the theory of secularisation 
attracted theorists’ attention. The most 
famous of such theorists is Peter Berger, 
one of the major figures in the sociology 
of religion. Some writers (for example, 
Woodhead, 2001) recognise him as one of 
the sociologists who have contributed the 
most in the theoretical study of religion. 
Berger’s theoretical ideas were formed in his 
early work in the 1960s, especially in The 
Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise 
in the Sociology of Knowledge (Berger & 
Luckmann, 1966), which is a canonical 
work of the sociology of knowledge. It 
explores the relation between beliefs and 
social reality. He developed his ideas in his 
later work, Sacred Canopy: Element of a 
Sociological Theory of Religion (1967), in 
the realm of religion. Berger presented his 
secularisation theory in this book. According 
to him, there is an intrinsic link between 
modernisation and secularisation that means 
the former does necessarily lead to the latter.
However, religious movements in 
the closing three decades of the twentieth 
century, including the Islamic Revolution, 
Solidarity in Poland, the Church’s support 
of Revolutionaries Sandys in Nicaragua, 
and elsewhere in Latin America, are a 
reincarnation of religion, challenging 
secularisation theory. As a result, a new 
theory under “desecularisation” appeared 
(Casanova, 1994). Again, one of the most 
prominent theorists of desecularisation is 
Berger, who revised his previous opinions 
and saw secularisation theory was wrong. 
Now he believes the modern world is as 
religious as it used to be.
Therefore, given the importance of the 
relationship between modernisation and 
religion in sociology, this paper seeks to 
answer the questions of how religious Iran’s 
society is and whether education has a role, 
as a representative of modernisation, in the 
secularisation of people. The authors have 
tried to derive appropriate assumptions 
from Berger’s theories (secularisation and 
desecularisation) and test the empirical credit 
of the authors’ theoretical response to these 
questions in Iran, which has experienced 
modernisation, especially with the spread 
of public education and higher education 
for several decades.
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
Secularisation Theory
Berger defines secularisation as the process 
of separating the sectors of society from 
the dominance of religious institutions and 
symbols (Pfadenhauer, 2013). Secularisation 
in the history of the modern West is the 
separation of fields that had previously 
been dominated by the Christian church, 
including the separation of state from 
church, confiscation of church lands, and 
separation of education from religion. 
Berger sees secularisation as a wide process 
which influences all cultural life and is 
the unpopularity of religious themes in 
arts, philosophy, literature, and, above 
all, sees it as the emergence of science as 
an independent and completely secular 
worldview (Berger, 1967).
Berger argues that secularisation 
includes not only the social institutes and 
cultural spheres, but also the minds of 
people: “Secularisation is … a decline in 
religion both in society and in the minds 
of individuals” (Pfadenhauer, 2013, p. 56). 
Thus, secularisation has two interrelated 
dominations: (1) institutional secularisation 
(or, in Berger’s terms, social structural 
secularisation), which means the removal 
of religion from the realm of public 
institutions; and (2) individual secularisation 
(or, in Berger’s phrase, secularisation of 
consciousness), which means individuals 
not resorting to the interpretation of religion 
in their behaviour and thought. According to 
Berger, the modern West has raised growing 
number of individuals who look upon the 
world and their own lives without recourse 
to religious interpretations (ibid). 
Berger sees the modern economy, 
industrial capitalism, as the main cause of 
secularisation. Hence, different segments 
of modern society, based on their closeness 
to or remoteness from the process of 
secularisation, are affected differently. Very 
secular segments emerge in the immediate 
vicinity of these processes. In other words, 
the modern industrial society has created 
a central sector that is free from the realm 
of religion. Secularisation has expanded 
from this sector to influence other social 
sectors (Berger, 1967). Thus, even though 
secularisation is the general phenomenon 
of modern societies, it does not distribute 
uniformity within society and affects 
different groups differently. For example, 
the impact of secularisation is greater on 
men than women, on middle-aged people 
than the very young and very old, on 
urban than the rural, on the classes that 
deal directly with the modern industrial 
production (especially working class) than 
traditional occupations groups (such as 
artisans or small shopkeepers), and on the 
Protestants than the Jews and the Catholics, 
etc (ibid).
In Berger’s view, another key factor 
in the secularisation of individuals 
(secularisation of minds) is pluralisation. 
He argues that throughout much of human 
history, religious organisation has had a 
monopoly over legitimising individual 
and collective lives. Religious institutions 
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defined the world, and going out of this 
religiously defined world was stepping 
into chaotic darkness, anomalies, and 
possibly madness, on the one hand, and 
deserved harsh punishment, on the other 
hand. However, Modern life is segmented 
and this segmentation and pluralisation not 
only is on the level of social conduct, but 
also on the level of consciousness (Berger, 
1974). According to Berger, the pluralisation 
of social life-worlds has grave effects on 
religiousness. Now, different parts of social 
life are under a different semantic system 
and it is difficult for religious institutions 
to have a single meaning for this plurality 
of social life. Moreover, the subjective 
consciousness of the individual threatens 
the plausibility of religious definitions of 
reality, too (Berger, 1974). Pluralisation 
forces individuals to recognise others with 
different meanings, values, and beliefs. 
Thus, pluralisation causes the secularization 
of society and minds (Berger, 1974). 
The main feature of all pluralist 
situations is that religious institutions 
cannot take the loyalty of the people for 
granted any more. Loyalty is voluntary 
and, therefore, less certain itself. Thus, 
religious tradition that was already firmly 
imposed should be marketed. The religious 
tradition must be levied onto individuals 
who are no longer programmed to bear it. 
Particularly, the pluralist situation is the 
“market situation”. In this situation, the 
religious institutions become marketing 
institutions and religious traditions become 
consumer commodities. In this situation, 
any type of religious activity is subject to the 
logic of the market economy. Pluralisation 
changes the relationship between religious 
institutions in line with ecumenical and 
interfaith tolerance (Berger, 2014).
Plural isa t ion makes previously 
monopolising religious groups become 
competitive marketing firms. Previously, 
religious groups were organised, so they had 
control over their followers. However, now 
religious groups must organise themselves in 
competition with other groups that have the 
same goal to attract people. Success in this 
competitive situation involves rationalisation 
and bureaucratisation of religious structures. 
Expansion of bureaucratic structures in the 
religious institution makes all religious 
institutions, regardless of their different 
faith traditions, socially like each other. 
This pluralisation in a religious market 
situation requires increasingly friendly 
cooperation between religious groups. The 
affinity causes religious rivals to no longer 
be considered “enemy”, but peers with 
shared issues. Pluralisation makes religious 
institutions lose earlier monopoly privileges. 
Now, they have to compete without use 
of coercion. There are pressures toward 
restricting the competition, which makes 
a degree of cooperation practical (Berger, 
2014).
Thus, in everyday life, the individuals 
subjectively tend towards uncertainty about 
religious affairs, because in everyday life 
they are objectively exposed to a wide 
variety of religious and other factors, which 
define reality and compete with their loyalty 
or, at least, their attention, and none of these 
factors can make them loyal (Woodhead 
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et al., 2001). In short, pluralisation, as the 
infant of modernisation, inevitably leads 
to subjective secularisation (individual 
secularisation).
Desecularisation Theory
Beginning in 1974, Berger began to doubt 
the secularisation theory and came to 
believe that many observers of the religious 
scene have over-estimated the degree and 
irreversibility of secularisation (ibid). Bruce 
stated conservative and evangelical church 
growth in the United States, the decline 
of the liberal church, the continued trend 
of religion in western countries, and the 
continued existence of religion in the rest of 
the world as reasons for this doubt (Bruce, 
2001). In the late 1990s, Berger came to 
completely reject the secularisation theory 
and recognized the biggest mistake of those 
who worked in this field in 1960s to be that 
they thought the modernity inevitably to 
result from weakening of religion (ibid).
Berger rejected the secularisation theory 
under the discussion of the desecularisation 
of the world (Berger, 1999). He discarded 
the notion that living in a secular world 
is unsound: “most of the world today is 
as religious as ever it was, and in a good 
many locales, more religious than ever” 
(Woodhead et al., 2001, p. 91). Now, Berger 
argues that although the term “secularisation 
theory” related to the works of 1950s and 
1960s, in fact, the basic idea of this theory 
can be found in the Enlightenment with 
this simple idea that “Modernisation does 
necessarily lead to decline of religion both 
in society and in the minds of people”, and 
precisely that this main idea that was wrong. 
Certainly, modernity has some secularising 
effects, but it has also led to powerful 
movements of counter-secularisation. 
Secularisation on the societal level is not 
necessarily leading to secularisation on the 
level of minds (Berger, 2013).
According to Berger, a main reason 
for desecularisation is that modernity 
usually undermines the taken-for-granted 
certainties. This is not pleasant to many 
and is not tolerable for some, and religious 
movements that claim to give certainty have 
a lot of charm for these people” (ibid).
Berger holds two exceptions for 
desecularisation. First, is Europe, especially 
Western Europe, where, the old secularisation 
theory would hold (Berger, 2013). Second, 
is an internationally secular subculture 
which is carried out by the western-educated 
as a main carrier of progressive values 
and beliefs, and enlightenment ideas. This 
subculture includes the progressive beliefs 
and values of Enlightened. The number of 
its bearers is small, but they are strongly 
influential. They control the institutions 
which determine the official definitions of 
reality, especially the educational system, 
the media of mass communication and the 
legal system (Berger, 2013).
However,  Berger  con t inues  to 
stress the influence of pluralisation on 
the secularisation of individuals, albeit 
with some modifications. According 
to Berger, modernisation has created 
very heterogeneous societies and great 
intercultural mutations that together make 
the two factors in the line of pluralisation 
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and not the line of establishing (or re-
establishing) religious monopoly (Berger, 
1999). He recognises that this was wrong 
about secularisation but was not wrong 
about pluralisation. According to him, 
pluralisation does not necessarily lead 
to individuals’ secularisation, but it does 
undermine all religious certainties, as it does 
in other areas of life (Woodhead, 2001).
Later, Berger (2014) came to concede 
that the secularisation theorists are not quite 
as wrong as he previously thought: ‘I now 
understand more fully the global reality of 
the secular discourse, not just in Europe 
and in faculty clubs all over the world, 
but in the lives of many ordinary believers 
who succeed in being both secular and 
religious” (Berger, 2014, p. 20). Berger sees 
some of the main processes of modernity 
(industrialisation, urbanisation, migration, 
education) move religion out of much of the 
institutional order (Berger, 2014). Also, he 
argues that pluralism undermines the taken-
for-grantedness of religion (Ibid).
Berger believes modernity produces a 
secular discourse, which compels people 
to deal with many areas of life without 
reference to religious definitions of reality 
(ibid). This discourse exists both in the minds 
of individuals who deal with everyday world 
without any supernatural presuppositions 
and in the society. The implication of this 
for individuals is simple and very important: 
“For most religious believers, faith and 
secularity are not mutually exclusive modes 
of attending to reality; it is not a matter of 
either/or, but rather of both/and (Berger, 
2014, p. 53). In short, people generally 
have religious beliefs, but they are secular 
in daily life. Some, such as Warner (1993), 
acknowledged that, today, Berger’s theory 
about the relationship between pluralisation 
and religion is such a central issue in the 
community of religion that it has become a 
new paradigm in the sociology of religion.
Hypotheses 
Based  on  the  l a t e r  Berge r ’s  idea 
(desecularisation) which holds most of the 
world today is as religious as ever it was, 
the authors conclude that religiousness 
is prevalent in Iran’s society (First 
hypothesis). In other words, the authors 
expect that the vast majority of Iranian 
people are religious. In fact, in a non-
European society like Iran, there is not 
a strong force such as Enlightenment 
subculture that can struggle religious beliefs 
and weaken it. Therefore, people generally 
are religious.
From Berger ’s argument on the 
expansion of pluralisation in contemporary 
societies and that people are faced with a 
wide variety of religions and other factors 
that define human realities in everyday 
life leading to uncertainty about religious 
affairs, it could be concluded that people do 
not have very strong commitment to follow 
religious instructions and duties or neglect 
to. In other words, people’s commitment to 
practice religious rulings, duties, and rites 
is not very strong (Second hypothesis). 
Again, based on the above reasoning, 
the authors expect that people tolerate 
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perceived non-religious subjects or acts. 
This means, non-religious actions and 
non-religious people are tolerated. In other 
words, religious tolerance is prevalent in 
Iran’s society (Third hypothesis), too.  
From Berger’s argument that science is 
a completely secular view of the world, and 
his emphasis on the existence of a secular 
culture in the world among those with high 
education, the authors expect that people 
with higher education are less religious. In 
other words, there is an inverse relationship 
between education and religiousness 
(Fourth hypothesis). However, it is a 
weak one, because, as mentioned above, 
there are not any variables with strong 
inverse relationship with religiousness. 
Also, it could be expected there to be an 
inverse relationship between education and 
commitment to practice religious duties 
and rites. Furthermore, based on above 
reasoning, the authors expect there to be a 
direct relationship between education and 
religious tolerance. 
METHODS
To test the hypotheses, the authors did a 
secondary analysis of a survey, “Values 
and Attitudes of Iranians”, which is a 
national survey based on a large probability 
multistage cluster sample on the 15-65-year-
old people who lived in the capital cities of 
the Iran provinces. In that sampling, in the 
first stage, the blocks have been selected by 
random sampling proportional to the size 
(population) of each block and in the second 
stage, individuals have been selected by 
random sampling from the selected blocks.
As is manifest based on the hypotheses, 
the authors’ discussion about secularisation 
in this article is limited to the subjective 
dimension of it; that is, secularisation 
of individuals, not the institutional 
secularisation, which is a vast subject area. 
Following Berger’s argument, the authors 
define subjective (individual) secularisation 
as the abandonment of religious rulings, 
duties, and rites in treating with people and 
issues (for different definitions of secularism 
and the history of its use (Robertson, 1970).
In this article, religiousness and other 
variables are measured by single items 
or indicators consisting of several items. 
Religiousness is measured by this simple 
self-assessment statement: “How religious 
are you?” with these options as its answer: 
not at all, little, somehow, very, and very 
much. 
Commitment to practice religious 
rulings, duties, and rites has two indicators: 
obligatory prayers and participation in 
religious rituals. Obligatory prayer (Namaz) 
is required from every Muslim that needs 
to be performed along a special ritual five 
times a day. This variable is measured 
by this self-assessment statement: “Have 
you prayed regularly during the past 
year?” with these options as its answer: 
never, seldom, sometimes, most often, and 
always. Religious rituals are measured 
by an indicator includes variables which 
are participation in Muharram (Tasua and 
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Ashura) rites, in the religious ceremonials 
(Hey’ats), and other rites.
Religious tolerance is measured by 
two indicators, too: tolerance toward non-
religious behaviours and secular attitudes. 
The first indicator is composed of four items: 
“how do you encounter with an unveiled 
lady (Bad Hejab)?”, “how with friendship 
between boys and girls? “, “how with mixed 
party?”, and “how with the strip and illegal 
movies?” with five options: (1) I intervene, 
(2) I report to police, (3) I warn, (4) I am 
opposed to but do not intervene, and (5) 
never mind. The indicator scores range from 
1 (low tolerance) to 5 (high tolerance). The 
indicator of secular attitudes is composed 
of four questions, requesting a response 
regarding the opinion about each phrase: 
“we must not associate with who is non-
religious”, “the religious affiliation must 
not be considered in employment”, “secular 
individuals must not be at high position” 
and “we must prevent non-religious books 
and movies.” The indicator scores range 
from 1 (non-secular attitude) to 5 (secular 
attitude). These variables are mainly at the 
ordinal level, but are considered interval 
to calculate the average of a set of them 
as an indicator of the concepts within this 
research (this is acknowledged by experts; 
for example, Borgatta & Bohrnstedt, 1980, 
pp. 155-160). These indicators construct a 
continuum from the very religious to non-
religious (or secular). (Discussion about the 
dimensions of religion and its operational 
aspects is one of the topics in the field of 
sociology of religion; for example, see 
Glock & Stark, 1965).
RESULTS 
Religiousness
Table 1 indicates that the vast majority 
of people are religious (they consider 
themselves religious) and only a little bit 
(1.4%) consider themselves not religious at 
all. However, religiousness does not have 
a uniform distribution, and the majority 
(58.9%) of people consider themselves 
somewhat religious, although nearly one-
third (29.2%) consider themselves very or 
very much religious.
This data shows that religiousness 
is common among people and only very 
small proportions among them are secular. 
This finding confirms the first hypothesis 
that “religiousness is prevalent in Iran’s 
society”. In other words, the vast majority 
of people in Iran are religious, although not 
very religious. 
Table 1 
Distribution of religiousness
Religiousness Frequency Percent
Not at all 65 1.4
Little 476 10.4
Somehow 2698 59.0
Very 1080 23.6
Very much 257 5.6
Total 4576 100.0
Commitment to Practice Religious 
Rulings, Duties, and Rites
Obligatory prayer, which is the most 
important religious obligation in Islam, is 
also largely prevalent among people. Table 
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2 shows that more than two quarters (43.5%) 
of people say they pray regularly, although 
nearly a third (30.5%) of people prays 
sometimes, seldom, or never. Religious 
rituals is rather common among people 
(Figure 1), although its publicity is less than 
that of the obligatory duties. In general, 
these two indicators show that people are not 
strongly committed to religious practices, 
especially religious rituals. Therefore, it 
can be concluded that the second hypothesis 
(commitment to practice religious rulings, 
Religious Tolerance
The two indicators of religious tolerance 
suggest the prevalent of it among Iranian’s 
people. Figure 2 indicates a broad tolerance 
with non-religious behaviours. Also, figure 
3 shows that the secular attitude is relatively 
common among people. Thus, these findings 
confirm our Third hypothesis, that religious 
tolerance is prevalent in Iran’s society.  
Table 2 
Distribution of obligatory pray 
Obligatory pray Frequency Percent
Never 239 5.3
Seldom 345 7.6
Sometimes 802 17.6
Most often 1186 26.1
Always 1979 43.5
Total 4551 100.0
Figure 1. Histogram of religious rituals
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Figure 1. Histogram of religious rituals 
 
Religious Tolerance 
The two indicators of religious tolerance suggest the prevalent of it 
among Iranian's people. Figure 2 indicates a broad tolerance with non-
religious behaviours. Also, figure 3 shows that the secular attitude is 
relatively common among people. Thus, these findings confirm our Third 
hypothesis, that religious tolerance is prevalent in Iran's society.   
 
duties, and rites is not very strong) is 
somewhat confirmed.
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Figure 2. Histogram of tolerance toward non-religious behaviours
 
18 
 
Figure 2. Histogram of tolerance toward non-religious behaviours 
Figure 3. Histogram of secular attitudes
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Figure 3. Histogram of secular attitudes 
 
Religiousness and Education 
As Table 3 shows, there is a negative correlation between religiousness 
and education (r = -.172). This means that with increasing education, the 
religiousness decreases. Also, here is seen the inverse relation between 
religious practices and education (r = -.100), which means that with 
increasing education, the level of commitment to religious duties 
decreases. Again, as expected, there is a reversed correlation between the 
religious rituals and education (r = -.114). These findings confirm forth 
hypothesis, "religiousness has an inverse relation with education". 
Education plays a role, however small, in the secularisation of people. 
Religiousness and Education
As Table 3 shows, there is a negative 
correlation between religiousness and 
education (r = -.172). This means that with 
increasing education, the religiousness 
decreases. Also, here is seen the inverse 
relation between religious practices and 
education (r = -.100), which means that 
with increasing education, the level of 
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commitment to religious duties decreases. 
Again, as expected, there is a reversed 
correlation between the religious rituals 
and education (r = -.114). These findings 
confirm forth hypothesis, “religiousness 
has an inverse relation with education”. 
Education plays a role, however small, in 
the secularisation of people.
Table 3 
Correlation between education and other variables 
Variable Religiousness Obligatory pray Ritual Tolerance Secular Attitude
Education -.172 -.100 -.114 .168 .239
N 4576 4539 4565 4539 4556
Note: All Correlations are significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)
On the other hand, as seen in Table 3, there is 
a positive correlation between education and 
tolerance toward non-religious behaviours 
and secular attitudes (r = .168), as well as 
between education and secular attitudes 
(r = .239). This means, as expected, that 
education plays a role in religious tolerance 
and secularisation of people.
DISCUSSION
The findings of this study indicate that the 
Iranian people mostly believe in religion. 
This is just according to Burger’s argument 
that the people of the world are generally 
religious. The religious beliefs are prevalent 
among the Iranian people, because in Iran, 
like most of non-European societies, there 
is not a strong force such as Enlightenment 
subculture to struggle with religious beliefs.
However, religious tolerance is prevalent 
among Iranians, too. People mostly tolerate 
non-religious behaviours. Also, secular 
attitudes are relatively common among 
people. These findings are in line with 
Berger’s pluralism theory which argues 
that modernity leads to pluralism as people 
are confronted with different religions and 
perspectives.
This leads to unreliability in religious 
affairs, and inevitably, people do not resort 
to religious interpretations in their everyday 
lives and tends to deal with many issues by 
a secular approach.
Anyway, the general  prevail ing 
religious beliefs among people generally 
prevent social variables from playing a 
role in religiousness, with the exemption of 
education. The findings show that education 
has an inverse relation, though weak, 
with religiousness and a direct relation 
with religious tolerance in Iran. These 
correlations are also in line with Berger’s 
view that there is an internationally secular 
subculture which is carried out by the 
western-educated proportions of population. 
He sees education as one of the main 
processes of modernity forcing religion 
out of much of the institutional order. The 
empirical researches confirm this sort of 
correlation, too. For example, James Leuba 
(1916; 1934) shows in the early twentieth 
century that scientists have less religious 
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beliefs than ordinary people and the gap 
will grow over time. Larson and Witham 
(1998) show that almost all leading natural 
scientists are atheist. Ecklund and Scheitle 
(2007) show that academics in the natural 
and social sciences are less religious than 
general public. Pahlevan Sharif and Ong 
(2018) show that education weakens the 
relationship between spirituality and the 
quality of life and stress.
CONCLUSION
The idea of the decline of religion is traced 
back to the Enlightenment, when it is 
thought the spread of science makes the 
scientific (natural) replace the supernatural 
(religious). By the 1950s and 1960s, this 
idea evolved into secularisation theory, 
which claimed that modernity necessarily 
leads to secularisation, a process by which 
sectors of society and culture are released 
from the domination of religious institutions 
and meanings. Secularisation is a decline in 
religion in the minds of individuals, which 
means that individuals do not resort to the 
interpretation of religion for their behaviour 
and thoughts.
However, some decades later, and 
following the rise of religious movements 
a r o u n d  t h e  w o r l d ,  t h e  t h e o r y  o f 
desecularisation emerged, holding that the 
contemporary world, with few exceptions 
(a tiny layer of educated Western Europe 
and worldwide) is as religious as it was 
in the past. The experimental data on 
Iran informs this view: almost all people 
recognise themselves as religious, although 
most people consider themselves somewhat 
religious, and just under a third of people 
consider themselves very religious.
Modernity may not necessarily lead 
to secularisation, but it ends the religious 
monopoly and leads to pluralisation in 
contemporary societies the consequence of 
which is religious tolerance (less adherence 
to those beliefs and rituals). The empirical 
data show that religious practice (duties 
and rituals) is common among people, but 
not as highly as before. Instead, tolerance 
is generally accepted in dealing with 
seemingly non-religious behaviours. 
Moreover, since science is a purely 
secular view and there is a secular 
international subculture among a small 
group of the educated around the world, 
the authors speculate that education makes 
people rather secular. Again, the findings 
support this hypothesis. On the one hand, 
religion is related inversely to education: 
religiousness decreases with the increase 
in education. Also, the generalisation 
of religious practices has an inverse 
relationship with education. On the other 
hand, religious tolerance (tolerance in 
dealing with seemingly non-religious social 
behaviours as well as people) is directly 
related to education as religious tolerance 
increases with the increase in education.
However, in all cases, the role of 
education in undermining religious 
orientations and creating secular attitudes 
among people is minor. As a result, it can 
be said that education has a role in the 
secularisation of minds, but this role is not 
great. 
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ABSTRACT
Altruism is a voluntary action aiming to help others without reward expectation. In this 
type of action, the individual cares for others’ interests rather than those of his own. This 
type of behaviour that goes beyond social norms falls into the sphere of morality. The 
frequency of such actions in society promises ethical behaviour. In this regard, the role of 
the family as one of the most important agents of socialisation is highlighted. This article 
seeks to examine altruism among the Iranian families and show its process of change over 
a decade (from 2005 to 2015). The findings of a longitudinal study were used to achieve 
this objective. This survey was done in 2005, for the first time, and was repeated in 2015, 
for the second time, in two developed and less developed regions of Tehran, using cluster 
sampling. The results show that the number of people showing altruistic actions declined 
by 7percent between 2005 and 2015 (from 26 percent to 19.2 percent). The number of 
people having high altruistic attitudes was higher in 2005 compared to 2015 (90.9 percent 
versus 86.6 percent). Also, the number of people with high cultural capital was more in 
2005 compared to 2015. Accordingly, altruism among Tehranian citizens has declined 
within a decade, while the economic and social capital has slightly increased. In both 
surveys, there is a noteworthy relationship between social capital and altruistic attitudes 
with altruistic actions, specifically regarding marital status.    
Keywords: Altruistic action, altruistic attitude, cultural capital, economic capital, social capital   
INTRODUCTION
Altruism is a voluntary action done to help 
others without the expectation of reciprocity 
or compensation. In this type of action, the 
individual places the interests of others 
before his or her own. The person who 
does altruistic actions goes beyond social 
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relations corresponding to social norms 
and social responsibilities into the realm 
of morality. Altruistic actions can be done 
in temporary and stable forms. In the first 
type, the person may have an accidental 
altruistic action, but in the second type, he or 
she acquires an altruistic worldview. These 
people create patterns, which are not based 
on social norms, but on beliefs and values 
that are intrinsic to the worldview. The scope 
of altruistic worldview is all humanity, not 
a small insider group. 
According to Rushton (1981), a 
person who has an altruistic worldview 
internalises universal standards of justice, 
social responsibility, moral reasoning, and 
wisdom. He or she empathises with the 
pains of others. This gives the person an 
emotional and motivational perspective 
to the world. He or she is motivated to do 
things like helping the poor, providing peace 
for others, and saving others from adverse 
conditions (Anderson, 1989). Based on 
Daniel Baston’s researches, helping others 
may have altruistic or selfish motivations 
(Batson, Fultz, Vanderplas, & Isen, 1983). 
Baston believes that the person who reacts to 
others’ pain has selfish motives to alleviate 
his own pains.
Accordingly, altruistic actions help the 
individual committing the actions achieve 
peace rather than being focused on the 
needy person. Archer (1981) established 
a link between motivation, helping others, 
and sympathy. He believes a selfish desire 
to avoid others’ negative judgments is a 
motivation for altruistic actions (Anderson, 
1989). However, the altruistic action itself 
is important regardless of many motives. In 
other words, the functions and consequences 
of altruistic actions are more important than 
the motives. The presence of these actions in 
the community promises moral behaviours, 
and the lack of them is a threat to social 
order. Family is one of the institutions 
that teaches these behaviours. Family as 
the primary institution of socialisation 
plays a key role in the development and 
institutionalisation of moral and altruistic 
actions. Therefore, successful family life 
increases the occurrence of such behaviours. 
Many studies confirm the above claim 
(Einolf, 2006; Wilson, 2000). 
Some studies indicate that married 
people are more likely to perform altruistic 
actions than singles (Einolf, 2006). This 
seems to also be true for people having 
more children than those having no children 
(Einolf, 2006).
Accordingly, it is proved that the more 
nuclear a family, and the more people and 
children born in the family, the higher the 
probability that altruistic actions will occur. 
This paper is primarily aimed at examining 
the status of altruism among married, single, 
and divorced or widowed Tehranian people 
in the developed and underdeveloped 
regions, and explains altruism among these 
three groups.
MATERIALS AND METHOD
Altruism is a voluntary action done to help 
others without expectation of reciprocity 
or compensation. In this type of action, 
the individual places the interests of others 
before his or her own. The person who 
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does altruistic actions goes beyond social 
relations corresponding to social norms 
and social responsibilities into the realm of 
morality. Different theoretical approaches 
have investigated the concept of altruism 
from diverse perspectives.
Sociological Approach 
Rational Actor Theories
Rational actor theories maintain that human 
beings are profit-driven by nature. Some 
theorists believe that altruistic actions are 
in fact self-interest. According to them, the 
purpose of helping others is social prestige. 
Some other rational choice theorists argue 
that people may not expect material rewards, 
but do gain internal emotional rewards by 
helping; the positive feeling of emotional 
solidarity with the helped person, and 
the avoidance of the emotional costs of 
feeling pity or guilt that would come 
with not helping (Einolf, 2006). Many 
rational actor theorists argue against the 
existence of pure altruism by pointing out 
that all helping behaviours bring the helper 
either a material or psychological reward, 
but Mansbridge (1990), working from a 
rational-actor perspective, argues that the 
mere existence of some reward does not 
render a helping behaviour non-altruistic. 
As Mansbridge points out, it would be 
surprising indeed if helping behaviours 
were not usually rewarded; since helping 
behaviour is beneficial to the functioning 
of a society, it is rational for societies to 
reward helping behaviour when it occurs 
(Schervish & Havens, 2002). Some rational 
actor theorists try to explain altruistic 
behaviour through “identification theory”, 
which argues that altruistic acts are rational 
because altruistic people identify strongly 
with others. According to this theory, 
individuals who give to others are engaging 
in a rational, self-interested act, as they are 
giving to an extended version of themselves 
(Schervish & Havens, 2002). 
Monroe  (1996 )  o f f e r s  a  more 
sophisticated version of this, arguing that 
the single distinguishing characteristic of 
altruistic individuals is a universalistic moral 
perspective. Monroe states that altruistic 
people view all humankind as members of 
their moral and social community. Whereas 
typical individuals consider themselves 
morally obligated only to help family 
members and close friends, altruists consider 
themselves to be morally obligated to help 
all people. Because altruists identify all 
human beings as an extension of their family 
or their “self”, their helping behaviours are 
a self-interested and rational action (Einolf, 
2006, p. 13).
Social Exchange Theories
Social exchange theorists regard rewarding 
as a form of social exchange that facilitates 
social solidarity and creates a hierarchy of 
power. The most useful theory of gift-giving 
as social exchange is that of Blau (1964), 
who sees helping behaviour as a type of 
social exchange which both creates social 
solidarity and places an obligation upon the 
recipient of the help to reciprocate in the 
future (Einolf, 2006).
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Collins and Hickman (1991), working 
from the standpoint of conflict theory, 
propose a similar theory of charitable action, 
arguing that participation in charitable 
activities is the primary means of “status 
legitimation” in societies that lack a single 
dominant religion. While the desire for 
prestige and power motivates some giving 
and helping behaviours, social exchange 
theory can point to another motivation 
for altruistic action, that of generalised 
reciprocal obligation. The term “generalised 
reciprocal obligation” describes the feeling 
that some individuals have that they are 
obligated to make a repayment for the good 
fortune that they have received in life. To 
these people, assets and good fortune are 
a blessing from God or society; since there 
is not a possibility of compensation to the 
source of this good, they try to help others 
to compensate for this blessing indirectly 
(Einolf, 2006).
Biological Approach 
Altruistic behaviour can be argued to 
originate both at the beginning of the 
human lifespan and from the beginning of 
human history (Huneycutt, 2013). Rushton 
and Sorrentino (1981) define altruism as 
sympathetic instincts correlated with the 
evolutionary theory of Charles Darwin. 
Darwin’s theory “proposed that humans 
were biologically disposed to behave 
socially, cooperatively, and helpfully to 
one another” (Anderson, 1989; Rushton & 
Sorrentino, 1981).
In their book, Super Cooperators: 
Altruism, Evolution, and Why We Need Each 
Other to Succeed, Nowak and Highfield 
(2011) argue that cooperation was and is 
necessary for human survival. They propose 
that in addition to mutation, competition, 
and natural selection, cooperation was a 
major player in the evolution of man. Just 
as humans are wired to compete, humans 
are also wired to cooperate, and helping 
each other could therefore be something 
human beings are driven to do. The ability 
to cooperate is presented as a major reason 
human beings were able to survive in a 
variety of climates and compete with a 
variety of other species arguably more 
physically suited to survival (Huneycutt, 
2013; Nowak & Highfield, 2011). Indeed, 
there is evidence to suggest cooperative and 
altruistic behaviour begins very early in life 
and appears to be intrinsically motivated 
(Huneycutt, 2013, p. 9). 
Developmental psychologist Michael 
Tomasello argues that human altruistic 
behaviour is intrinsically motivated from 
infancy. Multiple trials observing infant 
helping behaviour found that neither the 
addition of tangible rewards or prompting 
from mothers increases the helping 
behaviours of infants, suggesting that 
such behaviour is intrinsically rewarding 
(Huneycutt, 2013).
According to some theorists, motivation 
to participate in altruistic activities, including 
volunteering, has been found to be higher 
when the participant takes part for intrinsic, 
rather than extrinsic, reasons. Warneken and 
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Tomasello (2008) found that the addition of 
extrinsic rewards for altruistic behaviour led 
infants to help less than they had when there 
was no reward (Huneycutt, 2013).
Another biological explanation of 
altruism states that a sacrifice done by 
altruism is not a sacrifice but an investment in 
a system of interdependence that maximises 
an altruist’s genetic compatibility. Such 
behaviour challenges the theories claiming 
different species evolve because climate 
change maximises genetic adaptation. 
Efforts to link altruism with gene selection 
theory indicate that altruists maintain 
genetic compatibility by helping those who 
have a genetic link with them or are trying 
to preserve the species to which they belong 
(Edwards Wynne, 1962).
A limitation of these two approaches is 
that sometimes the people receiving help 
are genetically like the helper. Evolutionary 
research forms a useful background for this 
study, but is of limited use in explaining 
variations among individuals in the level 
of altruistic motivation or action. Since 
all human beings evolved from primate 
ancestors, evolutionary theories cannot 
explain why some individuals act differently 
from others, the focus of this dissertation 
(Einolf, 2006).
Psychological Approach
The psychological approach maintains that 
the biological basis for altruistic actions is 
not essential. Psychologists do not involve 
themselves with the survival of altruism in 
natural species. Several theories of social 
psychology seek to fill the void of biological 
approaches. With an emphasis on social 
learning and the role of parents, they explain 
the difference in people’s altruistic actions. 
According to the learning theory, people 
learn to help by getting a boost and seeing 
others help. Psychologists have examined the 
experiences of early childhood, particularly 
focusing on parenting styles and how moral 
norms are learned from parents, schools, 
religious institutions, and the community. 
These childhood experiences and influences 
motivate adult altruistic behaviour through 
the development of empathy, and through 
the development of internalised moral 
norms of helping (Eisenberg & Fabes, 1989; 
Eisenberg & Mussen, 1989; Lapsley, 1996).
Wuthnow (1985) found that school 
clubs, community organisations, and 
religious organisations were all important 
in teaching moral norms of helping and 
recruiting young people to the actual 
practice of volunteer work (Einolf, 2006).
Researchers have argued about the 
importance of characteristics of parents 
and norms learned in childhood affecting 
altruistic behaviours in adulthood. Colby 
and Damon (1992) criticise the emphasis 
on characteristics of parents and childhood 
experiences, and state that the choices 
people make in adulthood, the self-
reinforcing nature of altruistic behaviour, 
and the lifelong development of a moral 
orientation are more key factors than 
childhood experiences in determining 
altruistic behaviour. Wuthnow (1985) goes 
farther, postulating that nearly all people 
learn basic values of caring in childhood, 
and that service experiences in adolescence 
Saeedeh Amini
184 Pertanika J. Soc. Sci. & Hum. 26 (T): 179 - 196 (2018)
and early adulthood are the determining 
factors in adulthood altruistic behaviour 
(Einolf, 2006).
However, Mustillo, Wilson and Lynch 
(2004) found that parental modelling of 
volunteering has a considerable influence 
on the volunteering habits of young adults, 
but not at later stages of life. 
In other words, in the process of re-
socialisation that usually follows the stage 
of adolescence, the role of institutions of 
socialisation, such as schools, media, and 
peer groups, are more important than family. 
In other words, the role of social networks is 
more prominent than family in the process 
of re-socialisation. People who participate 
in various social networks develop social 
awareness. These people have a higher 
social capital that increases the probability 
of altruistic actions. Wilson and Musick 
(1997) focused on the impact of social and 
cultural capital on altruistic actions. They 
define social capital as the access to social 
networks that help people learn charitable 
deeds and cultural capital as the skills and 
education of the person. Bourdieu worked on 
cultural and social capital while he believed 
the two are determined by economic capital 
(Einolf, 2006).
These are noteworthy points investigated 
in this paper. The authors examined the role 
of economic, social, and cultural capital and 
altruistic attitude on altruistic actions of 
three groups of people of Tehran: married, 
single, and divorced or widowed.
Hypotheses
There is a significant relationship between 
marital status and altruistic action.
There is a significant relationship 
between social capital and altruistic action 
based on marital status.
There is a significant relationship 
between altruistic attitude and altruistic 
action based on marital status.
There is a significant relationship 
between cultural capital and altruistic action 
based on marital status.
There is a significant relationship 
between economic capital and altruistic 
action based on marital status.
Validity and Reliability
In order to measure and evaluate the ultimate 
questionnaire, 30 primary questionnaires 
were distributed among respondents and 
pre-test was done; lastly, the outputs were 
examined and scales were finalized.
Construct and face validity were used 
to evaluate the validity and reliability of 
the research. Factors of the variables were 
identified using factor analysis and varimax 
rotation, consistent with and derived from 
theoretical discussions. The factor analysis 
determines validity and supports reliability 
of the research. Factor loadings, which 
show the correlation of each item with the 
desired factor or scale, are mentioned in the 
table of operational definition of variables. 
To determine face validity, viewpoints of 
several social scientists and teachers were 
asked, and the questionnaire was finalised 
after two pre-tests.
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The population, sample size and 
sampling method
The population was selected based on the 
2005 study of the index of development 
of twenty-two districts of Tehran, from 
men and women 18 years old and above, 
from regions 3 and 19 as the least and most 
developed districts of Tehran. The sample 
size was 419 and calculated using the 
Cochran formula. In 2015, the research was 
conducted with the same sample size and 
multi-stage cluster sampling in four stages 
as follows:
First: Choosing two regions from 
existing districts of Tehran based 
on development index.
Second: Selecting several apartment blocks 
from each district randomly based 
on a random numbers table.
Third: Selecting households from the 
residents of each block from the 
list.
Fourth: Choosing eligible people from the 
sample households.
Operational and Theoretical Definitions
Altruism is a voluntary action done to help 
others without expectation of reciprocity 
or compensation. In this type of action an 
individual places the interests of others 
before his or her own. The person who 
does altruistic actions goes beyond social 
relations corresponding to social norms 
and social responsibilities into the realm of 
morality. Generalised emotional attachment 
and generalised commitment are dimensions 
of altruism. Items in the Likert scale would 
assess the 1scale. 
Economic Capital
Economic capital describes financial 
resources possible to convert into cash and 
institutionalised in the form of property 
rights (Smith, 2001). Economic capital is 
the total assets that determine the economic 
power. This concept is investigated by 
asking about the income, house, and vehicle. 
Social Capital 
Social capital is the aggregate of the actual 
or potential resources linked to possession 
of a durable network of institutionalised 
relationships of mutual acquaintance 
and recognition (Bourdieu, 1986; Field, 
2003). Putnam (2000), Effeh, and Fuches 
views on the dimensions of social capital, 
and three-dimensional association binds, 
consciousness, and generalised trust were 
considered. Items of the scale were assessed 
using a Likert scale.
Cultural Capital
Cultural capital is the aggregate of 
relationships and knowledge and privileges 
that the individual acquires in the process 
1In this article the likert scale number is 1=too high, 
2=high, 3=moderate, 4=low, 5=too low. According 
to this scale, low number means high altruism or 
social capital, and so on. Moreover, in scales, for 
instance, if we had 4 items, the minimum was 4 and 
the maximum  was 20.  Accordingly, 4-10=high and 
too high, 11-13=moderate, and 14-20=low and too 
low.
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of socialisation from family and formal 
education and helps to achieve or maintain 
a social status. Three forms, “objectified”, 
“embodied”, and “institutionalised” states, 
are considered for cultural capital. Questions 
in a Likert scale were used to measure the 
scale.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
It is a survey; research and data were 
collected using questionnaires. The 
hypotheses were tested using one-way 
ANOVA and LSD test. 
According to data obtained, 52.5 
percent of respondents in 2005 and 51 
percent in 2015 were female. 47.8 percent of 
respondents in 2005 and 49 percent in 2015 
were male. The age range of respondents 
in 2005 was from 17 to 89 years old and in 
2015 from 17 to 81. Age was categorised 
into three groups: 17-29 (young), 30-50 
(middle-aged), and 51-89 (old). In the 
2005 sample, 44.2 percent of respondents 
were 17 to 29 years old, 35.6 percent were 
30 to 50 years old, and 2.20 percent were 
51 to 89. In the 2015 sample, 36.8 percent 
of respondents were 17 to 29 years old, 
51.4 percent were 30 to 50 years old, and 
12 percent were 51 to 89 years old. In the 
2005 sample, 39.3 percent were single, 
57.3 percent were married, and 3.4 percent 
were divorced or widowed. In the 2015 
sample, 32.7 percent were single, 65 percent 
were married, and 2.3 percent divorced or 
widowed.
The educational status of 34.6 percent 
of the respondents in 2005 was bachelor’s 
degree. In 2015, 42.3 percent of the 
respondents had a bachelor’s degree, 
which was the most frequent answer among 
respondents. In the 2005 sample, 41.1 
percent of the respondents were employed, 
6.24 percent were housewives, 16.4 percent 
were students, 8.9 percent were retired, 
8.7 percent were unemployed, and 0.2 
percent of respondents marked the option 
“none”. In the 2015 sample, 44.6 percent of 
respondents were employed, 28 percent were 
housewives, 15.3 percent were students, 
6.6 percent were retired, 5.3 percent were 
unemployed, and 0.3 percent marked the 
option “none”.
In the 2005 sample, among 170 employed 
respondents, 15.5 percent had education 
jobs, 5.9 percent had technical jobs, 22.6 
percent had administrative jobs, 1.2 percent 
had farming and gardening jobs, 13.1 
percent were workers, 8.3 percent had high 
ranking jobs, and 2 people did not mention 
their jobs. In the 2015 sample, among 170 
employed respondents, 8.9 percent had 
education jobs, 22.2 percent had technical 
jobs, 8.27 percent had administrative jobs, 
11.2 percent were shopkeepers, 15.4 percent 
were workers, and 10.1 percent had high 
ranking jobs.
Final Description of the Main 
Indicators
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Results of the two surveys show that 
the number of people performing altruistic 
actions has declined by 7 percent from 2005 
to 2015 (26 percent in 2005 and 19.2 percent 
in 2015). The number of people having 
high altruistic attitudes in 2005 was more 
than that of 2015 (90.9 percent versus 86.6 
percent). Also, the number of people with 
high social and economic capital in 2015 
is slightly higher than that of 2005, while 
the number of people with high cultural 
capital in 2005 was more than that of 2015. 
Accordingly, altruism among Tehranian 
citizens has declined within a decade, while 
the economic and social capital has slightly 
increased.
Statistical Relationships
First hypothesis: there is a significant 
relationship between marital status and 
altruistic action.
Table 2 
Altruistic action and marital status
Independent variables Low Moderate High 
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Marital 
status
2005
Single 86 54.4 46 29.1 26 16.5 20.33
Cramer’s 
V=0.16
Sig=0.000
13.57
F=10.49
Sig=0.000
Married 78 33.3 83 35.5 73 31.2 11.97
Divorced or 
widowed
6 42.9 3 21.4 5 35.7 11.93
Marital 
status
2015
Single 79 61.2 28 21.7 22 17.1 11.00
Cramer’s 
V=0.16
Sig=0.027
9.9
Married 120 47.1 84 32.9 51 20 10.9 F=5.55
Divorced or 
widowed
2 22.2 5 55.6 2 22.2 12.4 Sig=0.000
Table 1 
Distribution of participants in terms of the main indicators
Variables Low Moderate High Total
2005 2015 2005 2015 2005 2015 2005 2015
1. Altruistic Action 41.7 50.9 32.4 29.9 26 19.2 408 395
2. Altruistic Attitude 0 0 9.1 13.4 90.9 86.6 397 396
3. Social Capital 29.2 27.1 65.7 67.4 5.1 5.5 353 328
4. Cultural Capital 81.6 73 16.5 25.4 1.9 1.6 369 337
5. Economic Capital 65.1 62.2 26.6 29 8.3 8.8 338 217
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Data from Table 2 shows that there is 
a significant difference between altruistic 
behaviours of the respondents based on 
their marital status in both surveys. Based 
on data from both surveys, altruism among 
single people is lower than married and 
widowed or divorced people. The findings 
of both surveys show that in a period of 
ten years, altruism among married and 
unmarried people has declined, although 
more severely for married than singles. 
The rate of married people having high 
altruism has dropped from 31.2 percent 
to 20 percent, from 2005 to 2015, and the 
percentage of married people having low 
altruism has risen from 33.3 percent to 47.1 
percent. According to chi-square test in 
two surveys (2005-2015), altruistic action 
and marital status are not independent of 
each other and there is correlation between 
them. One-way ANOVA testing shows that 
the hypothesis is confirmed at a 99 percent 
confidence level. Sheffeh & LSD post-hoc 
show that altruism of single and married 
people is different significantly but there is 
no significant difference between them and 
divorced or widowed people.
Second hypothesis: there is a significant 
relationship between social capital and 
altruistic action based on marital status.
Table 3 
Impact of social capital on altruistic action based on marital status
Marital 
status
Social capital Spearman Correlation & 
Kendall’s tau-b  Low Moderate High Total
2005 2015 2005 2015 2005 2015 2005 2015 2005 2015
Single Low Frequency 40 22 32 39 1 3 73 64 Sp: 0.19
Sig=0.029
Tau b: 0.18
Sig=0.019
Sp: 0.16
Sig=0.097
Tau b: 0.15
Sig=0.061
Percentage 63.5 73.3 51.6 54.2 16.7 60.0 55.7 59.8
Moderate Frequency 17 6 14 17 5 2 36 25
Percentage 27.0 20.0 22.6 23.6 83.3 40.0 27.5 23.4
High Frequency 6 2 16 16 0 0 22 18
Percentage 9.5 6.7 25.8 22.2 0.0 0.0 16.8 16.8
Total Frequency 63 30 62 72 6 5 131 107
Percentage 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Married Low Frequency 38 33 27 69 2 2 67 104 Sp: 0.34
Sig=0.000
Tau b: 0.32
Sig=0.000
Sp: 0.18
Sig=0.007
Tau b: 0.17
Sig=0.009
Percentage 45.2 58.9 26.5 48.3 10.5 15.4 32.7 49.1
Moderate Frequency 33 14 40 48 2 3 75 65
Percentage 39.3 25.0 39.2 33.6 10.5 23.1 36.6 30.7
High Frequency 13 9 35 26 15 8 63 43
Percentage 15.5 16.1 34.3 18.2 78.9 61.5 30.7 20.3
Total Frequency 84 56 102 143 19 13 205 212
Percentage 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
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The data from two surveys shows that in 
2005, 83.3 percent of singles with high 
social capital had moderate altruism while 
16.7 percent of singles with high social 
capital had low altruism. Also in 2005, 
78.9 percent of married people with high 
social capital had high altruism, 10.5 
percent moderate, and 10.5 percent had low 
altruism. In 2015, 60 percent of singles with 
high social capital had low altruism and 
40 percent of them had moderate altruism. 
Also in 2015, 15.4 percent of married people 
with high social capital had low altruism, 
23 percent had moderate altruism, and 61.5 
percent had high altruism. Based on the 
results of both surveys, altruistic action 
was significantly related to social capital 
according to marital status.
Third hypothesis: there is a significant 
relationship between altruistic attitude and 
altruistic action based on marital status.
Divorced 
or 
widowed
Low Frequency 5 0 1 2 0 0 6 2 Sp: 0.33
Sig=0.287
Tau b: 0.32
Sig=0.221
Sp: -0.76
Sig=0.135
Tau b:
 -0.72
Sig=0.000
Percentage 62.5 0.0 25.0 66.7 0.0 0.0 50.0 40.0
Moderate Frequency 1 1 1 1 0 0 4 2
Percentage 12.5 50.0 25.0 33.3 0.0 0.0 100.0 40.0
High Frequency 2 1 2 0 0 0 2 1
Percentage 25.0 50.0 25.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 20.0
Total Frequency 8 2 4 3 0 0 12 5
Percentage 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 100.0
Total Low Frequency 83 55 60 110 3 5 146 170 Sp: 0.29
Sig=0.000
Tau b: 0.27
Sig=0.000
Sp: 0.16
Sig=0.003
Tau b: 0.15
Sig=0.003
Percentage 53.5 62.5 35.7 50.5 12.0 27.8 42.0 52.5
Moderate Frequency 51 21 55 66 7 5 113 92
Percentage 32.9 23.9 32.7 30.3 28.0 27.8 32.5 28.4
High Frequency 21 12 53 42 15 8 89 62
Percentage 13.5 13.6 31.5 19.3 60.0 44.4 25.6 19.1
Total Frequency 155 88 168 218 25 18 348 324
Percentage 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Table 3 (continue)
Marital 
status
Social capital Spearman Correlation & 
Kendall’s tau-b  Low Moderate High Total
2005 2015 2005 2015 2005 2015 2005 2015 2005 2015
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In 2015, 57 percent of single people with 
“Agree” on altruistic attitudes had low 
altruistic actions, 23 percent had moderate 
altruistic actions, and 20 percent had high 
altruistic actions. 
Generally, in 2005, 27 percent of people 
with “Agree” position on altruistic attitudes 
had low altruistic actions, 33 percent had 
moderate and 40 percent had high altruistic 
action. Also, generally in 2015, 49 percent 
Table 4 
Altruistic attitudes and altruistic action based on marital status
Marital 
status
Altruistic action Altruistic attitude Spearman Correlation & 
Kendall’s tau-b  Not agree Not agree/
Agree
Agree Total
2005 2015 2005 2015 2005 2015 2005 2015 2005 2015
Single Low Frequency 1 - 1 21 23 57 25 78 Sp: 0.11
Sig=0.159
Tau b: 0.11
Sig=0.142
Sp: 0.16
Sig=0.065
Tau b: 0.16
Sig=0.039
Percentage 16,7 - 8,3 75.0 17,2 57.0 16,4 60.9
Moderate Frequency 2 - 1 5 41 23 44 28
Percentage 33,3 - 8,3 17.9 30,6 23.0 28,9 21.9
High Frequency 3 - 10 2 70 20 83 22
Percentage 50,0 - 83,3 7.1 52,2 20.0 54,6 17.2
Total Frequency 6 - 12 28 134 100 152 128
Percentage 100.0 - 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Married Low Frequency 0 - 3 12 69 106 72 118 Sp: 0.09
Sig=0.155
Tau b: 0.09
Sig=0.138
Sp: 0.13
Sig=0.831
Tau b: 0.13
Sig=0.833
Percentage 0.0 - 17,6 50.0 32,5 46.5 31,3 46.8
Moderate Frequency 1 - 6 7 75 76 82 83
Percentage 100.0 - 35,3 29.2 35,4 33.3 35,7 32.9
High Frequency 0 - 8 5 68 46 76 51
Percentage 0.0 - 47,1 20.8 32,1 20.2 33,0 20.2
Total Frequency 1 - 17 24 212 228 230 252
Percentage 100.0 - 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Divorced 
or 
widowed
Low Frequency - - - 0 5 2 5 2 - Sp: 0.00
Sig=1.00
Tau b: 0.00
Sig=1.00
Percentage - - - 0.0 35,7 25.0 31,3 22.2
Moderate Frequency - - - 1 3 4 3 5
Percentage - - - 100.0 21,4 50.0 35,7 55.6
High Frequency - - - 0 6 2 6 2
Percentage - - - 0.0 42,9 25.0 33,0 22.2
Total Frequency - - - 1 14 8 14 9
Percentage - - - 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Total Low Frequency 1 - 4 33 97 165 102 198 Sp: 0.11
Sig=0.026
Tau b: 0.11
Sig=0.022
Sp: 0.16
Sp: 0.09
Sig=0.07
Tau b: 0.09
Sig=0.06
Percentage 14,4 - 13,8 62.3 26,9 49.1 25,8 50.9
Moderate Frequency 3 - 7 13 119 103 129 116
Percentage 42,9 - 24.1 24.5 33,1 30.7 32,6 29.8
High Frequency 3 - 18 7 144 68 165 75
Percentage 42,9 - 62,1 13.2 40 20.0 41,7 19.3
Total Frequency 7 - 29 53 360 336 396 389
Percentage 100.0 - 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
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Table 5 
Cultural capital and altruistic action based on marital status
Marital 
status
Altruistic action Cultural Capital  Spearman Correlation & 
Kendall’s tau-b  Low Moderate High Total
2005 2015 2005 2015 2005 2015 2005 2015 2005 2015
Single Low Frequency 39 8 34 8 11 0 84 16 Sp: -0.13
Sig=0.880
Tau b: 
-0.12
Sig=0.872
Sp:
 -0.17
Sig=0.378
Tau b: 
-0.16
Sig=0.346
Percentage 60.0 47.1 51.5 61.5 73.3 0.0 57.5 53.3
Moderate Frequency 18 4 19 3 3 0 40 7
Percentage 27.7 23.5 28.8 23.1 20.0 0.0 27.4 23.3
High Frequency 8 5 13 2 1 0 22 7
Percentage 12.3 29.4 19.7 15.4 6.7 0.0 15.1 23.3
Total Frequency 65 17 66 13 15 0 146 30
Percentage 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 100.0
Married Low Frequency 50 14 15 1 1 1 66 16 Sp: -0.90
Sig=0.213
Tau b:
 -0.83
Sig=0.194
Sp: -0.23
Sig=0.219
Tau b: 
-0.22
Sig=0.131
Percentage 37.0 51.9 30.0 100.0 10.0 100.0 33.8 55.2
Moderate Frequency 43 5 18 0 5 0 66 5
Percentage 31.9 18.5 36.0 0.0 50.0 0.0 33.8 17.2
High Frequency 42 8 17 0 4 0 63
Percentage 31.1 29.6 34.0 0.0 40.0 0.0 32.3 27.6
Total Frequency 135 27 50 1 10 1 195 29
Percentage 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Divorced 
or 
widowed
Low Frequency 2 1 2 0 0 0 4 1 Sp: 0.22
Sig=0.513
T a u  b : 
0.209
Sig=0.451
Sp: 0.50
Sig=0.667
Tau b: 0.50
Sig=0.221
Percentage .6 50.0 50.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 36.4 33.3
Moderate Frequency 2 1 1 1 0 0 3 2
Percentage .6 50.0 25.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 27.3 66.7
High Frequency 3 0 1 0 0 0 4 0
Percentage 42.9 0.0 25.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 36.4 0.0
Total Frequency 7 2 4 1 0 0 11 3
Percentage 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 100.0
Total Low Frequency 91 23 51 9 12 9 154 33 Sp: 0.007
Sig=0.895
T a u  b : 
0.007
Sig=0.893
Sp: -0.15
Sig=0.256
Tau b:
 -0.14
Sig=0.213
Percentage 44.0 50.0 42.5 60.0 48.0 60.0 43.8 53.2
Moderate Frequency 63 10 0 4 8 4 109 14
Percentage 30.4 21.7 0.0 26.7 32.0 26.7 31.0 22.6
High Frequency 53 13 0 2 5 0 89 15
Percentage 25.6 28.3 0.0 13.3 20.0 0.0 25.3 24.2
Total Frequency 207 46 120 15 25 1 352 62
Percentage 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
of people with “Agree” altruistic position 
had low altruistic actions, 31 percent had 
moderate and 20 percent had high altruistic 
action. Statistical tests suggest a significant 
relationship between altruistic attitude and 
altruistic action in both surveys.
Fourth hypothesis: there is a significant 
relationship between cultural capital and 
altruistic action based on marital status.
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Results of the two surveys show there 
is not a significant relationship between 
cultural capital and altruistic action based 
on marital status.
Fifth hypothesis: there is a significant 
relationship between economic capital and 
altruistic action based on marital status.
Table 6 
Economic capital and altruistic action based on marital status
Marital 
status
Altruistic action Economic capital  Spearman Correlation & 
Kendall’s tau-b  Low Moderate High Total
2005 2015 2005 2015 2005 2015 2005 2015 2005 2015
Single Low Frequency 23 23 32 14 13 5 68 42 Sp: -0.03
Sig=0.710
Tau b:
 -0.03
Sig=0.721
Sp: -0.07
Sig=0.533
Tau b:
 -0.07
Sig=0.529
Percentage 59.0 54.8 57.1 60.9 54.2 55.6 57.1 56.8
Moderate Frequency 10 7 20 6 6 2 36 15
Percentage 25.6 16.7 35.7 26.1 25.0 22.2 30.3 20.3
High Frequency 6 12 4 3 5 2 15 17
Percentage 15.4 28.6 7.1 13.0 20.8 22.2 12.6 23.0
Total Frequency 39 42 56 23 24 9 119 74
Percentage 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Married Low Frequency 43 46 22 15 5 4 70 65 Sp: -0.05
Sig=0.496
Tau b: 
-0.04
Sig=0.496
Sp: 0.09
Sig=0.302
Tau b: 0.08
Sig=0.292
Percentage 38.4 50.5 31.0 37.5 31.3 44.4 35.2 46.4
Moderate Frequency 32 30 28 17 4 4 64 51
Percentage 28.6 33.0 39.4 42.5 25.0 44.4 32.2 36.4
High Frequency 37 15 21 8 7 1 65 24
Percentage 33.0 16.5 29.6 20.0 43.8 11.1 32.7 17.1
Total Frequency 112 91 71 40 16 9 199 140
Percentage 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Divorced 
or 
widowed
Low Frequency 4 1 2 0 0 0 6 1 Sp: -0.37
Sig=0.268
Tau b: 
-0.32
Sig=0.229
-
Percentage 66.7 100.0 50.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 54.5 100.0
Moderate Frequency 1 0 1 0 0 0 2 0
Percentage 16.7 0.0 25.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 18.2 0.0
High Frequency 1 0 1 0 1 0 3 0
Percentage 16.7 0.0 25.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 27.3 0.0
Total Frequency 6 1 4 0 1 0 11 1
Percentage 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 100.0
Total Low Frequency 70 70 56 29 18 9 144 108 Sp: 0.00
Sig=0.913
Tau b: 0.00
Sig=0.917
Sp: 0.02
Sig=0.742
Tau b: 0.02
Sig=0.740
Percentage 44.6 52.2 42.7 46.0 43.9 50.0 43.8 50.2
Moderate Frequency 43 37 49 23 10 6 102 66
Percentage 27.4 27.6 37.4 36.5 24.4 33.3 31.0 30.7
High Frequency 44 27 26 11 13 3 83 41
Percentage 28.0 20.1 19.8 17.5 31.7 16.7 25.2 19.1
Total Frequency 157 134 131 63 41 18 329 215
Percentage 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
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According to data from both surveys, 
there is not a significant relationship between 
altruistic action and economic capital based 
on marital status.
CONCLUSION
Altruism is a voluntary action aiming to 
help others without expectation of reward. 
In this type of action, the individual cares 
for others’ interests rather than those of his 
or her own. This type of behaviour goes 
beyond social norms and social relations 
of social responsibility and falls into the 
sphere of morality. In other words, a person 
behaving pro-socially puts himself in 
another person’s shoes. The frequency of 
such actions in the society promises ethical 
behaviour, and the lack of it is a threat to 
social order. In this regard, the role of the 
family as one of the most important agents 
of socialisation is highlighted. Children 
mimic many right and wrong behaviours 
of their parents in observational learning. 
Therefore, parents with altruism have 
children with such behaviours. The main 
conclusion of this article is:
Results of the two surveys show that the 
number of people having altruistic actions 
has declined by 7 percent from 2005 to 2015.
The number of people with high altruistic 
attitudes in 2005 was more than that of 2015. 
It shows that the gap between morals and 
ethics has been increased in that decade. The 
decrease of altruistic actions threats social 
order. The increase of egoism, instrumental 
rationality and bureaucratisation of human 
relationships have influenced caused the 
declining altruistic actions.
Also, the number of people with high 
social and economic capital in 2015 is 
slightly higher than that of 2005, while 
the number of people with high cultural 
capital in 2005 is more than that of 2015. 
Accordingly, altruism among Tehranian 
citizens has declined within a decade, while 
the economic and social capital has slightly 
increased. 
Based on data from both surveys, 
altruism among single people is lower than 
married and widowed or divorced people. 
This result is similar to the findings of 
some researches like Wilson and Musick 
(1997), Rotolo (2000), and Einolf (2006). 
This seems to also be true for people having 
more children than those having no children 
(Smith, 2001).
The findings of both surveys show that 
in a period of ten years, altruism among 
married and unmarried people has declined, 
although more severely for married than 
singles.
The rate of married people having 
high altruism dropped between 2005 and 
2015, while the percentage of married 
people having low altruism has risen in this 
decade. The data from two surveys show 
that in 2005, 83.3 percent of singles with 
high social capital had moderate altruism. 
16.7 percent of singles with high social 
capital had low altruism.78.9 percent of 
married people with high social capital had 
high altruism, 10.5 percent had moderate 
altruism, and 10.5 percent had low altruism.
In 2015, 60 percent of singles with 
high social capital had low altruism and 
40 percent had moderate altruism. 15.4 
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percent of married people with high social 
capital had low altruism, 23 percent had 
moderate altruism, and 61.5 percent had 
high altruism. Based on the results of both 
surveys, altruistic action was significantly 
related to social capital according to marital. 
According to Putnam (2000) social networks 
and associations encourage charitable and 
philanthropic activities. This networks 
reinforce empathy and consider the welfare 
and comfort of others. In his view, the 
active people in these networks more than 
nonactives allocate their money and time 
to charity affairs. Generally, in 2005, 27 
percent of people with “Agree” altruistic 
attitudes had low altruistic actions, 33 
percent had moderate and 40 percent had 
high altruistic action. Also, generally in 
2015, 49 percent of people with “Agree” 
altruistic attitudes had low altruistic actions, 
31 percent had moderate and 20 percent 
had high altruistic action. Statistical tests 
suggest the significant relationship between 
altruistic attitude and altruistic action in both 
surveys.
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ABSTRACT
The massive entrance of Iranian women into the labour market and higher education has 
formed a type of women’s experience of modernity in Iran, which is followed by many 
consequences for women who are both educated and employed. Women with traditional 
identities and roles, above all, were defined within the home environment and with 
traditional sexual roles. It was within this traditional framework that most important 
religious socialisation and practices of women were defined. The main subject of the 
present article is the consequence of women’s reflexive identity on their religious and 
spiritual identity. For this purpose, interviews and ethnographic methods were used. The 
reflexive identity of Iranian women has led them to move out of traditional roles and 
find a combination of traditional roles (housekeeping, motherhood, and wife-hood in 
the traditional sense) and new roles (defined by individualism and realisation of self and 
reflexive identity) as a result of higher education and employment experiences. Field data 
indicate the shift by this group of women from traditional spirituality as the realm dominated 
by traditional religious institutions to modern spirituality and consequential redefinition of 
individual assignments and inner life accordingly. The results show that Iranian women’s 
choice to achieve social ideals through education and employment and by following the 
principle to consecrate life have transformed the spiritual aspects of their lives.     
INTRODUCTION
Women, Cultural Changes, and 
Religious Identity
Identity is a dynamic process constructed 
diversely in various layers and forms and is 
Keywords: Female identity, higher education, reflexivity, spirituality  
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constantly relative and transient. Meanwhile, 
social identity cannot be reduced to a single 
fixed form because the entire socio-cultural 
factors can exert great impact on our identity 
through the processes and the ways in which 
various identity resources influence us. This 
was the concern of various investigations 
in contexts where cultural transformation 
is on the agenda. This phenomenon is more 
tangible in Iran where women encounter 
broad socio-cultural transformations due 
to their novel experiences in education and 
employment.
Religion, as an institution, shapes 
one of the identity’s central resources and 
make up the religious and spiritual layers 
of both individual and social identity. 
Religious experiences are considered 
among the main influential elements 
on women’s identity experiences. If we 
accept religious and spiritual principles as 
temporary and inconsistent resources, then 
we expect to observe diverse categories 
of religious acts. Religious conceptual 
frameworks demonstrate relative and, at 
times, fundamental transformations that are 
indicative of corresponding transformations 
in religious outlooks as a result of applying 
process-oriented conceptions of identity that 
emphasise the mutual impacts of structure 
and action.
Because transformations in various 
social strata could influence the individual 
and social dimensions of women’s identity, 
intensity of religious and spiritual identity 
could crystallise the ways in which this 
construct could transform. In other words, 
this aspect of women’s identity has, in the 
meantime, encountered and challenged many 
transformations daily. Women’s identity 
expansion and boundaries have transformed 
greatly and were investigated pluralistically. 
However, in the current study, we focus on 
the ways that women reflect on traditional 
identity and its connections to their personal 
reflection on this identity. On the one hand, 
religious identity could be reflected as a 
principle of social identity in analysing 
the ways that women’s new identities are 
constructed. Intellectual development, 
inclusive of religiosity and spirituality, could 
influence the social transformation. Various 
studies have demonstrated the significant 
relationship between religion and identity. 
These studies reveal that religiosity plays a 
major role in diverse aspects of commitment 
by and determination of identity, which is 
more robust in modern times compared to 
the past (Oppong, 2013). 
Social Identity: Discourse of Religion 
and Society
Considering diverse theories on religion, 
religiosity, and its various categorisation for 
the study on individuals and communities, 
there is not a universal criterion in relation 
to the form and extent of religiosity. Here, 
we evaluate women’s religiosity with 
emphasis on Glock and Stark’s (1966) 
theory where women’s own perception 
of spirituality and religiosity are taken 
into account. Social actors experience 
religious identity through beliefs, rituals, 
religious experiences and knowledge, and 
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its consequences (Khodayarifard et al., 
2012). This was prominent in our religious 
approach to the Iranian Muslim women and 
was investigated previously from another 
perspective (Rafat Jah & Rouhafza, 2012). 
Various studies have explored the effect of 
globalisation on religious identity and have 
observed its effects on diverse dimensions 
of religiosity. Components of globalisation 
challenge religious identity as a result 
of expanding people’s experiences. This 
informs the transformation (Tajik Esmaeili 
& Tajik Esmaeili, 2015).
Women’s view on their own religious 
identity is modified by social, individual, 
gender-based, and structural positions 
and situations. The structural factors and 
the multiple social roles are influential in 
eliminating gender-based discrimination. 
In addition, education and employment 
result in women’s participation in socio-
economic realms beyond the confines of 
their home. All of these have contributed to 
the relearning of a woman’s identity (Safiri 
& Nematollahi, 2012, p. 29). Women’s new 
experiences have made them aware and 
transformed their traditional perspectives 
about the ideal woman through the gaining 
of new ideals and values. The variety of 
women’s social roles and the expansion of 
social experiences have formed a proper 
backdrop to reflect on women’s religious 
and traditional roles and identities.
Higher education is one of the novel 
experiences that change women’s perception 
of life. The experience of student life in 
university is one of the factors that contribute 
to the development of individuality because 
of independence (Dehghani et al., 2015). 
Over the past decades, scholars like Michele 
(1968-1976) have rejected the idea of stable 
orientations and personality characteristics. 
They have observed behaviours as personal 
expectation and explanations, with an 
emphasis on cognitive and social learning 
rather than the qualities of a fixed personality 
Inglehart. Other studies on the relationship 
of education and religious attitudes indicate 
that personal attitudes toward religion, 
in terms of traditional definitions, are 
decreased with the increase in education. 
Higher educational  levels,  such as 
undergraduate or graduate studies, generally 
reduce women’s religious attitudes. If we 
accept social identity as an interactive 
process that is reconstructed in all spheres 
of life, then religious transformation is 
also indispensable. Every religious identity 
frame is also subject to culture. In such a 
perspective, religious identity is social and 
constructed.
Religion introduces a special form of 
ideology, which, in turn, establishes the 
value frames for us. All of these religion’s 
cultural manifestations in the form of rituals 
are considered as part of religiosity. Religion, 
as a socio-cultural issue, has a significant 
relationship with social behaviours through 
the social construction. On the one hand, 
religion is the product of culture and, on the 
other hand, it is the producer of the very same 
culture (Hamilton, 2008). Weber’s view of 
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religion as a semiotic system is affected by 
individual choices (Weber, 1970, p. 122). 
Accordingly, the cultural phenomena that 
are the outcome of lived experiences are 
the same incentives for an individual’s acts 
and behaviours, where most people are 
voluntarily engaged. Hence, religion forms 
the main and most fundamental semiotic 
resource in people’s daily lives.
Today, i t  is  not acceptable that 
materialistic values are replaced by the 
traditional, spiritual ideologies of life. 
Inglehart, though, recounted three reasons 
for the decrease of socio-religious and 
gender-based traditions in modern societies. 
First, there is an increase in the sense of 
security, which lowers the need to depend 
on the absolute norms and people’s need 
to make sure of the events. Furthermore, 
there is no need for security due to the 
regulation in metaphysical perspectives, 
because all kinds of dispersion essentially 
result in kinds of insecurity and anxiety. The 
second reason is the applicability of norms. 
Its firmness decreases in modern time 
because most socio-economic dimensions 
of life is spent outdoors. The educational 
spaces were transformed via families, 
and the functionality of the concepts were 
lost. Therefore, these transformations do 
not necessarily mean a change in values. 
People’s opposition to these norms does not 
suggest they are bad or good as it is not a 
value decision. These norms could weaken 
for various reasons. The third reason is the 
cognitive similarity through which people’s 
ideology becomes identical with their daily 
experiences.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
The Ethnography of Women Who Seek 
Transformation
The current study is conducted with an 
ethnographic approach using deep interviews 
and participatory observations in the field. 
Ethnography is not only a data collection 
method, but a research approach comprised 
of social understanding and people actions 
in the field. It is done through its known 
approach of close relationships and actual 
participation in people’s lives (Duranti, 
1997). Applying an ethnographic approach 
and grounded theory, the current study 
investigates women who fulfilled multiple 
social roles as spouses, mothers, employees, 
and university students simultaneously. 
Deep interviews were applied as the 
main data collection technique, and the 
interviewee was selected on the basis of 
theoretical sampling from the city of Tehran. 
This article emphasises women as active 
and reflective subjects and acknowledges 
their creativity. Through targeted sampling, 
the experience of 35 women and their ways 
of religious identity construction were 
analysed. First, data were examined and 
textually categorised through comparison 
to reach the frequency of concepts. Then, 
data were codified through the process of 
representation. Open-ended interviews were 
applied to make people free in narrating 
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their personal life experiences. Encouraging 
people to talk was very crucial in this study, 
so the interviews were open-ended to make 
participants feel free to articulate their own 
feelings.
The subjects of the study were 30-year-
old women who have fulfilled several 
social roles at the same time. They were 
randomly chosen without considering 
their university majors and school campus. 
Finally, we focused on understanding 
women’s religious identity transformation 
after graduation and in response to the 
role system, and we reached it through the 
grounded theory approach with the aim of 
building a conceptual framework (Corbin & 
Strauss, 2013). To analyse the data, we used 
the approach of open, central codification. 
First, we examined the data and textually 
categorised them. Then, the codification 
and data reduction were applied (Table 1). 
In the final stages of data analysis, 
these categories, strategies, the intervening 
conditions, and their consequences were 
modelled three-dimensionally to form the 
theoretical model of the research (Figure 1). 
Codifications of categories were represented 
as “women’s reflexive identity in redefining 
spirituality”. The study enjoys an analytic 
paradigm that helps the collection and 
maintenance of data to make sure the 
structure and process go hand in hand.
Women in this study included middle 
class, Iranian women living in Tehran, who 
grew up in a traditional women identity 
process, in homes and environments 
dominated by the Iranian traditional culture. 
These women also had religious parents. 
These women went to school and were 
married at the age of 17. Their marriages 
were arranged by their families and parents. 
Therefore, their main space for individual 
and social identity was indoors. Home 
was the main context for their identity 
construction. After doing interview, we 
used coding strategy to identify main codes 
and make the final theoretical model. This 
model should explain the impact of reflexive 
identity on women`s spiritual identity. 
Multiple roles: Motherhood, employee 
and student
Bahareh, the 37-year-old graduate student 
of economics and university teacher, stated 
that, “My husband has never helped me in 
the household chores because he has his own 
beliefs in this regard, and he believes that 
the household woman should be feminine, 
and husbands should be masculine. I did 
not have a problem with this matter, as 
from childhood, I have seen my mother 
do all the tasks without any difficulty. I 
was raised in a religious, extended, and 
large family. Nothing was surprising or 
new to me. I only had to do my housework 
chores in the best possible way through 
my household management, for which I 
was empowered”. The girl’s identity after 
marriage, the identity of a woman, a wife, 
and a mother is constructed for her through 
family and the encompassing social systems. 
Throughout the study, the term traditional 
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identity refers to the traditional approach 
to identity construction in the home that 
includes female traditional roles.
These women personally decided to 
continue their education based on their 
situations. Their studies were approved 
and supported by their husbands originally, 
but later resulted in their husbands’ covert 
discontent because the gradual engagements 
in education made these women fall behind 
in household chores and taking care of the 
children. These women were employed 
in low-ranking jobs and could gradually 
manage to pass graduate and PhD studies. 
These two experiences have taken them 
out of the confinements of the home and 
allowed them to experience modern new 
roles. Fariba, a 35-year-old graduate 
student employed in a magazine, believes 
that, “Maybe the working condition has 
tempted me not to back off, because I felt 
an emptiness in the working environment 
and I had to work hard for my personal 
improvement. At first, this was really 
difficult. My husband used to tell me that 
he would help me, but he did not ever help 
through this. First, he told me that he would 
support me but, practically, he did nothing 
to help. This was really difficult until my 
kid grew and I started my MA studies. At 
one moment, I was on the verge of quitting 
my studies because my husband did not 
cooperate with me”. Such transformation 
from indoor spaces to university and 
employment outdoors is the main root of 
these women’s identity transformation in 
various dimensions.
From these women’s perspectives, the 
“primary identity” is constructed through 
family, friends, schooling, and experiencing 
the institutionalised female roles as mothers 
and wives. The hybrid identity is rooted in 
mental aspects of value, with an emphasis on 
collective norms, and in terms of feelings, 
based on family and kinship, and interaction 
between the roles of mother and wife, the 
dominant stereotypic norms.
“The secondary identity” is also the 
identity constructed through women’s social 
participation in educational and working 
roles. It is the continuation of the primary 
identity and a combination of the primary 
identity and women’s voluntarily roles, 
which are mentally based on a self-governed 
constructed identity, values and personal 
norms, and are sensationally in compliance 
with eminence and personal development.
In fact, “role” and “space”, in a 
concurrent combination, construct the 
fundamentals of primary and secondary 
identities. Nonetheless, we do not accept 
the inevitable overlap of all modern and 
traditional identities due to the existing 
contradict ion of  women’s  ident i ty 
segregation in a stereotypic dichotomous 
division of identity into traditional and 
modern. However, our justification of 
such division is that it classifies women’s 
interaction with two roles of mother and 
wife in the primary identity and a social 
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role in the secondary one. A role border of 
being wife and mother in a social process 
is determined and simultaneously selective 
and voluntary. This means that within 
the traditional frame of identity, women 
consider marriage and childbearing as 
social imperatives and the ideal form of 
identity, while in the secondary identity, they 
continue to experience the traditional roles 
but in a whole new selective and voluntary 
process.
Women have turned their homes into the 
optimal form through their institutionalised 
roles of wife and mother and have started to 
create their own secondary identities from 
within the very same space and role. In their 
secondary identity, women choose a new 
approach to their social identity construction 
as creative, active, and reflective actors.
This identity transformation, especially 
from the home indoor space to the outdoor 
space through employment and university, is 
not suitable politics for the Islamic Republic 
of Iran. In terms of legislation, all women 
activities in the realm of employment 
and education should be in line with their 
primary objectives of motherhood, being 
wife, and being confined to the home. From 
this perspective, family is the fundamental 
element of the Islamic society and women 
are its fundamental elements. Therefore, 
the Islamic constitution has paid specific 
attention to the issue of family in the 
detailed negotiations of the Parliament 
and in the Constitution, Volume 1 (p. 440). 
Therefore, women’s employment is not 
appreciated by the Constitution in the sense 
that women employment may harm their 
family integrity. The underlying philosophy 
is recounted in the Council of Experts under 
the terms of preventing family decline. 
Therefore, these transformations are to be 
regarded as enjoying the covert function and 
the consequence of women’s unnecessary 
employment and education.
This transformation not only leads to 
the changes in the individual and social 
identities, but also has a significant effect on 
religious transformation and the redefinition 
of spirituality in women’s mentality and 
practices. The housewife, within the confines 
of the home and household interactions, 
and motherhood, as the source of optimal 
family identity, are the female desired 
symbols. The experience of religiosity in 
such a context and the sacred roles as the 
construct identity has its roots in religious 
principles and customs where motherhood is 
the crucial metaphor of social identity. The 
cherished principles of the primary identity, 
which are rooted in religious rituals, are 
exemplified in motherhood, wifehood, the 
hijab, observing rituals, and contribution 
to family peace. Although home is always 
the suitable stage for this kind of identity, 
as stated earlier, women’s ideal social 
expectations are in close proximity and a 
severe resonator of the primary identity. The 
simultaneous birth of the ideal socio-cultural 
stereotypes is formed around the existing 
social themes and women who have found 
a novel experience of modernity choose 
to reflect this by devising novel social 
approaches.
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Table 1 
Main ideas and issues within interviews
The Selected 
Categories
The Main 
Categories
Open Categories (Second Level)
Interested in 
making dreams 
come true
Interested in education, continual activities, development, 
success, and understanding the joy of development; likes 
to prove oneself, searches for a way to turn to oneself, 
believes in personal capabilities
1
Self-oriented 
individualism
No need for others’ help, self-satisfaction, reflexive and 
re-thinking, individual strategies
2
Liberal mentality Voluntarily chooses values and norms, non-accepting of 
the structural imperatives, interested in innovation and 
deconstruction, accepting the logical affairs, critiquing 
the superstitions, norm violation, logical, analytical
3
Moral-oriented Observance of citizenship rights, human-oriented, 
responsible, committed, respecting, loyal, uniquely 
intimate
Faith Spiritual beliefs, respectful to others’ sacred things, 
social respect, welcoming the collective rituals, believes 
in God and the human mission, thankful to God
5
Individual religious 
Experiences
Voluntarily participation in religious rituals, redefining 
religious rituals, intending management of religious 
feeling, personally prioritizing religious duties
6
Primary identity The primary sociability (family, school, friends and 
institutionalised experiences), first experiences of women 
roles, emphasis on obeying collective norms, relying 
on family and kinship feelings, obeying the stereotypic 
norms of mothering 
7
Secondary identity Social participation in educational and occupational roles, 
self-oriented identity, construction of individual values 
and norms, relying on face logic, critical understanding, 
following goals and individual development, knowledge-
oriented 
8
Primary reflection Inevitable decisions, determining paths to social 
development, primary reflection, seeking transformation 
9
Realised reflection Self-conscious selection-solving strategies, continual 
re-thinking, institutionalisation of reflection, realised 
reflection
10
Secondary 
reflection
Intended acceptance of traditional aspects, synthesis of 
new and traditional approaches, identity independence, 
identity balance, relative adherence to value and 
normative aspects, intending end to the reflection in 
favour of family and society, committed to social and 
family stability 
11
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Women’s Religiosity and Reflexive 
Identity
In this part, we examine the ways religious 
transformation occurs and the way it is 
connected to women’s religiosity styles and 
identity transformation. In other words, we 
will examine the consequences of religious 
and spiritual identity through an identity 
transformation process and women’s 
experiences with modernity. University 
was able to direct women to the outdoor 
spheres through changing their position 
from women confined within the framework 
of tradition. Since popular and dominant 
discourses in science and employment 
often lead to contest and confusion, women 
are constantly confronted with numerous 
identity challenges due to the confrontation 
of their traditional identity roles and 
novel identities. Mahsa, a 38-year-old 
university student of psychology working in 
municipality believes that, “When you are 
both employee and student, you naturally 
come across many obstacles, like when 
the timing of the class intervenes with 
your working hours or you may have little 
time to study, or the works intervene with 
studies. Most of the time it is the lack of 
collaboration from your colleagues to take a 
day off”. Sara, a 37-year-old student of law 
who works in an insurance company says, 
“There are lots of universities and there is 
an easy way to get into the university. I did 
not want to be humiliated by others, despite 
all the hardships and difficulties I endured 
and am satisfied.” Therefore, understanding 
women’s religious identity from the pool of 
multiple discourse-based identities in Iran is 
the important objective of the study. 
We can also examine the issue completely 
regarding these women, too. Popular 
discourses reproduce women religious 
identity in terms of what can naturally and 
normally constitute a proper model of a 
religious woman. The spiritual identity and 
its social construction that women choose 
in terms of the simultaneous undertaking 
of four respective roles of spouse, mother, 
employee, and student, and a fragment of 
identity and the way these women construct 
their various layers of identity is the primary 
focus of this article. To know the religious 
transformation and religiosity styles of 
women, it is crucial to understand the two 
types of women’s identities and the ways 
they are distinguished from one another. 
Therefore, it is necessary to demarcate them 
within the identity boundary.
The Experience of Modernity and 
Reflexivity
In this study, our first priority was to find 
women’s new identity stimulus and their 
personal reflection on the traditional roles 
after fulfilling a) their primary female 
identity at the beginning of the identity 
transformation, and b) their reflective 
identity as its most optimal form. Fatemeh, 
a 27-year-old woman who pursues her 
graduate studies in information technology 
and works as a trade expert, says: “I cannot 
lock myself up at home to solely to get 
married and have children. I love to be in 
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line with society and its developments and 
I like to improve and live the life I desire”. 
If we consider this phase as the first stage 
of reflecting in women’s life, then the 
second step starts with motivations to freely 
choose their own role. These choices look 
minute and consciously decided on, but 
are, in fact, imperative. Women choose 
education as a way to prove themselves and 
to achieve social growth, but continuing 
their existing roles (spouse, mother, and 
housekeeper) would contradict employment 
and university study.
Roya, a 36-year-old woman studying 
education recounts, “I feel that women 
find their own identities through working 
and studying”, although in the end, these 
efforts and women’s problem-solving 
strategies lead to reflecting, or the “reflecting 
identity”, which is constructed as part of the 
women’s transformed identity. In other 
words, reflection is a kind of strategy to 
solve women’s challenges by confronting 
new roles with traditional ones, a strategy 
through which the combination of roles 
and priorities are created so that women 
are rescued from challenging situations and 
identity crises. Shima, a 37-year-old student 
of education and school principal says, 
“I had many problems in the beginning, 
but I gradually took control and could 
eventually manage it”. When women 
internalise the reflective identity as the main 
component of their identity, it is the time that 
transformation constructs a novel identity 
for them that is dynamic and continual.
Modernity, along with employment 
and education as its vital elements, has 
an important role in changing women’s 
mentality and meaning structures. In fact, the 
social backgrounds of identity transformation 
in modernity and globalisation mingle with 
the individual life and with her (Giddens, 
1999). What creates an identity balance 
and integrity in its most relative terms is 
a balance between social and individual 
affairs. This is the position where women’s 
individual discrimination tends to be similar 
to education and employment.
The Experience of University: An 
Introduction to Women’s Spiritual 
Transformation
Moulin (2013) believes that to understand 
the effects of education on religious identity 
construction, there should be a theory 
sensitive to the social background and 
context, the structural factors and to power, a 
theory that examines the way these elements 
are interpreted and enacted by individuals. 
In the present research, we exclusively 
examine the transformations that occur 
in the context of university and that have 
challenged women’s primary religious 
identity and changed their awareness 
through the emphasis on individualism, 
the freedom of thought, equality, and 
humanism. Women attempt to change 
their condition through establishing strong 
wills rooted in their modern feminine 
experiences. Brian Hastie (2007) believes 
that the student years is the phase when 
young people’s thoughts and beliefs are 
very vulnerable to change (Dehghani et al., 
2015). One of the consequences of women’s 
mental transformation is the combination of 
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awareness, reflective thinking, knowledge, 
and a kind of self-centred individualism; a 
continuum from individualism to narcissism. 
N.A., a 37-year-old student of social work 
who works in a welfare organisation, says, 
“I think everything changes with education 
and your thoughts would be logical and 
sanguine. You do not accept everything on 
the basis of their face value, and you would 
think about it twice before you decide. 
Studying makes you feel that the individual 
has a proper inference in life, behaviour, 
relationships, and everything. I have the 
same position regarding religious issues. 
I really cannot accept every superstition. I 
believe in things with the logic behind it, 
not by my feelings. I do not wear a Hijab, 
because I cannot find a logical reason 
for that, and I do not see any necessity to 
say my daily prayers, but I say my daily 
prayers and try to follow morality. All these 
issues are not directly related to studying 
and education. These are the same related 
to personal experiences. But, I generally 
believe that the behaviour of an educated 
person is not comparable to an illiterate.”
The effect of such transformation on 
women’s religious identity is analysable 
from the same perspective. Religious 
identity on the basis of traditional or 
personal religion and secularism can be 
categorised. People are exposed to new 
thought and behaviour patterns as they enter 
the university. Achieving a higher education 
can change the individual’s outlook toward 
her surroundings. Sh. A., a 35-year-old 
studying fashion designing, says, “My 
husband told me that I am unkind to our 
child and not a good enough mother. He 
expects me to devote myself to our child and 
then I would be an ideal mother. I believe 
his way of thinking is ossified.”
Our research results show that we 
are not faced with any motivations that 
are based on religious imperatives in 
dictating the process of realizing everything. 
Although, some personal ethical codes seem 
to stem from religious learning, such as self-
constructions and the pursuit of wisdom and 
knowledge, the author of this study believes 
that these are all in line with non-religious 
motivations and on the basis of personal 
development. In fact, there is no way a 
religion reference could be made. Mina, a 
43-year-old and graduate student of MBA, 
says, “Not at all, I do not like stagnancy, I 
like to improve like anybody else and have 
something to say”. The aspiration to the 
“realisation of goals and interests” is our 
primary theme on the basis of Table 1 and 
reveals the non-religious motivations behind 
these women’s motivations.
Consequences of Social Identity 
Construction for Modern Identity
The research findings revealed women’s 
identity dimensions in four areas of 
mentality, feelings, actions, and interactions. 
Presuming the hypothesis that identity 
structures in these four aspects are dynamic 
and constantly subject to change, the identity 
transformation will also occur within these 
dimensions.
Glock and Strak have enumerated many 
different specifications for religiosity and 
have introduced an operational definition 
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of religiosity. On the basis of their study, 
the five dimensions of religious identity 
are religious practices (rituals, prayer), 
religious experiences, religious knowledge, 
and consequences (Khodayarifard et al., 
2012). As mentioned, the components 
of social identity is in accordance with 
religious identity, just as every social 
identity construction might cut through 
religious identity in some point of its path. 
Therefore, women’s religious identity 
in the mental dimension leads to the 
transformation in the “religious knowledge 
and beliefs” dimension, and women’s 
perceptions of knowledge and spiritual 
attitudes are prone to change as a result. 
One of the main categories of the current 
research is the “faith” rooted in women’s 
found beliefs. Sima, a 32-year-old of 
management working in Telecommunication 
Company, says, “I see God as an observer of 
our deeds and I do not do anything against 
His will. I have God to rely on and I am 
satisfied with his will.” Although women 
have experienced more transformations in 
other aspects of religiosity, they purport 
strong faiths, respecting others’ beliefs, and 
value other’s collective rituals, spaces, and 
situations.
The other women’s transformation 
is in terms of “religious practices” and 
could be in line with the transformation 
in practices but is typically experienced 
in rituals. Maryam, a 39-year-old student 
of sociology, says, “I do not participate 
much in the religious rituals and I believe 
the way to worship God is not similar 
for all. I love to talk to God in my own 
way”. Some women determine the social 
behaviour in their relations with emphasis 
on logic and their own attitudes and respect 
their own independence and personal 
goals (Safiri & Nemaollahi, 2012). Women 
often expand their presence in religious 
rituals voluntarily towards their traditional 
religious identity or in compliance with the 
novel religious approaches in an innovative 
way. “Individual religious experience”, in 
the current study, reveals the redefinition 
of rituals and inventing methods among 
women. Women usually reveal their feelings 
in innovative and personal ways during 
religious ceremonies and rituals and their 
prioritisation of the rituals and presence 
in religious spaces is defined more on the 
basis of their personal rather than collective 
priorities.
Fariba, a 32-year-orld student of 
computer, says, “I prefer the religious 
rituals where I feel at peace and I can relate 
to God more in this way”. Here, the religious 
practice is decided on by women and is 
not dependent on the religious society. For 
instance, the way women relate to spiritual 
resources are categorised as prayer and 
religious worship and is not in compliance 
with women’s spiritual relations. At times, 
it can take innovative and creative forms. In 
“religious experience” as one of the main 
dimension, the individual regards herself 
to have a higher understanding compared 
to others (Khodayarifard, Faghihi, Ghobari 
Banab, Shokoohi, & Rahiminezhad, 2012). 
Women understand this experience in a 
proper model of womanhood, which is 
well defined for other people and in a social 
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perspective. These women still believe in 
religious ethical principles (commitment, 
loyalty, and virtue), while they might 
experience personal development, and any 
religious experience could also change their 
religious behaviours. Elham, a 35-year-old 
graduate student of management, says, “I 
define a good woman as one who is aware 
and chooses the best ways for solving 
problems. A good woman should be a good 
mother, be committed to her husband, 
follow the path of development while 
presuming chastity, and always follow 
development, just like society follows 
the very same factors. Society requires 
women who rear good children and use all 
their power to protect family”. Women’s 
religious identity ideals approximate to 
“personal development and the interest in 
realisation of goals and interests” and the 
construction of social participation in the 
ethical framework accepted by society 
replaces sheer religious experiences. These 
elements are comparable to social ethics 
within the dimension of religious ethics.
In the “religious consequence”, as 
another religious dimension that means the 
transformation of interaction where daily 
non-religious behaviour is supervised, 
interactions often sound like a religious 
identity, but sometimes are non-religious. 
Meanwhile, shared aspects of religion 
and society are not yet observable and 
this is exactly the moment when women 
choose personal strategies for their own 
objectives. Leila, a 36-year-old student 
of psychology, says, “I have a very good 
definition of myself. Although you might 
say this is really arrogant, I consider myself 
as a capable and successful woman. I 
could manage to perform several roles 
successfully and this is what makes me 
feel satisfied.” “Being ethical” represents 
a consequential dimension of redefining 
spirituality in women’s mind. Through 
abiding to human rights and citizenship 
rights, women show respect to others in 
social realms and remain committed to 
their responsibilities as the standards of 
humanity and spiritual prophecy to human 
rights through their interactions in social 
and individual realms. Mina, a 36-year-old 
student of English literature, says, “I think 
that everyone should be free and choose his/
her own religion freely just like respecting 
others’ privacy and rights”. Likewise, 
Zahra, a 37-year-old student of sociology, 
believes that, “We have to abide by and 
respect values, unless society looks at us in 
another way. Therefore, I think that every 
society should be abiding to these values. 
Therefore, when I do not wear a hijab, while 
this may be a personal decision, I think it 
should be abided to because it is a social 
value and is respected. But, in personal 
spheres, I could not obey that. But it should 
not be in a way that harms the society and 
leads to a series of problems”. Therefore, a 
combination of scientific understanding due 
to academic studies, logic resulting from 
higher education, and social understanding 
through data analysis in women’s daily 
problems gives the new constructed identity 
in our study. 
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As s ta ted,  the  e lements  of  mental 
transformation among women affects 
individual and social motivations and can 
alter women’s awareness of their rights and 
duties. This, in turn, leads to self-oriented 
strategies that are developing among 
women. Throughout time, women trust these 
strategies through a positive self-evaluation. 
The trust in change and improvement of 
mental analysis on the traditional aspects 
of their duties and responsibilities make 
them re-think the situation. In this way, 
Figure 1. The model for the process of redefinition of identity in women’s reflexive identity
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women make self-reliant decisions without 
considering others’ judgements (social 
indifference) and construct a novel identity 
for themselves. 
Lei la ,  a  34-year-old s tudent  of 
architecture, says, “Others define me as 
a determined and a very strong person. 
Although I do not care about other people’s 
opinions, it is important that I feel satisfied 
with myself. When I am satisfied with 
my deeds, other people will have a good 
impression of me”. As mentioned earlier in 
the section on religious identity, women’s 
religious dimensions change relatively. This 
identity transformation of the women under 
investigation is called “reflexive identity”, 
a kind of identity which is self-informative, 
and where it is necessary to be aware of 
one’s surrounding social structures. 
Therefore, through creativity, women 
change their traditional religious identity. 
The main theme of “free mentality” of 
women includes the voluntary selection of 
norms and values, rejection of the structural 
determination, the tendency to innovate 
and destruct the stereotypic structures, the 
logical acceptance of issues, the critique of 
popular beliefs about women in the name of 
“superstition”, and finally, logical mentality. 
Somayeh, a 39-year-old student of cultural 
affairs and a teacher, says, “What I believe to 
be my personal right is being free as a person 
who lives securely, freely, and without any 
preoccupation. It is my right to have a good 
life, live freely, be peaceful and secure, think 
freely, and face no limitation in my beliefs 
and speeches”.
CONCLUSION
Various Forms of Transformation in 
Women’s Religiosity Patterns
Spirituality transformation has positioned 
women of religious and mass-oriented 
identity within a mutual dialectic relationship 
and changed them to self-centred religious 
women with observable changes in their 
behaviour.
The consequence of women’s religious 
identity transformation is categorised into 
three dimensions of “traditional, combined 
and new”. The key point is that one’s 
inspiration toward any of these discourses 
is a personal choice. Even the back and 
forth of traditional religiosity and discourse 
of traditional religion is the result of their 
choices and the great challenge between the 
traditional and the modern. They sometimes 
increase their religious activities within 
and beyond these frameworks. In a “hybrid 
dimension”, which includes the majority of 
Iranian cases, women consciously accept 
some of traditional aspects of religion 
and intend not to abide by some of the 
new approaches to religiosity. In fact, a 
combination of traditional religion and new 
approaches are the product of their religious 
identity transformations. This stage happens 
during “secondary reflection”, where 
women reflect on their practices in order to 
protect their religious morality and reach the 
thought independently of religious matters. 
In this way, women reduce the challenges 
and harms of transformation to some extent. 
It seems that the identity damage is lower 
due to women’s adherence to religious 
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principles and beliefs. Meanwhile, these 
women have tried to balance their individual 
and social identity through the experience of 
individual religious independence.
The third dimension is the new form 
of religious identity transformation where 
women reflect on their previous decisions 
and approach a “new personal religion”. In 
fact, when the traditional values dominating 
the home are the consequence of their 
experience of modernity through university 
and employment, it leads to the commitment 
to individual values. These groups of women 
believe in the knowledge of religion and 
sometimes introduce it as the reason behind 
gender-based inequality, assuming that it 
prevents them from their personal rights as 
a free person. 
The meaning of humanity is not 
necessarily defined through the logic of 
religion. It seems that being a good citizen, 
in their perspective, is not necessarily in 
line with being religious, and religiosity 
does not solely have a religious definition 
and logic and is not actualised through the 
performance of shared practices. They also 
believe that being secular does not mean 
a total devoid of religious thought. This 
is not synonymous with irreligiousness. 
It worth mentioning that women of these 
ideas experience more harm and identity 
crises than other women due to the pressures 
that used to be bearable for them in their 
traditional religiosity but is unjustifiable 
now.
Family disruption, emotional separation, 
and the decision to change the individual life 
has put these women in a contradictory path 
where, at times, children constitute their 
sole connection to the family. Women’s 
minds are engaged in a kind of justice of 
the past and treatment of the dominances 
in (social and religious) outdoor spaces. 
Although, considering these individual 
identity crises in society are a necessity, 
truth is that these crises are almost due 
to individual difficulties in achieving a 
problem-solving strategy and reaching the 
main objectives and fundamental values. In 
fact, these are a potential for survival and 
independence that pinpoint value and norm 
crises. Therefore, the priority of personal 
benefits is not suppressed; rather, it is a 
safety regulator to avoid social destruction. 
We are not facing the social abnormality, 
but customary compatibility (Moeidfar, 
2011). The solution these women innovate 
is an individualistic choice that, at times, 
turns to a traditional religious identity, 
which is a combination of religious identity 
or a completely new one. The shared 
spaces for all these various identities are 
the centrality of individual choices in 
the religious ideology construction and 
women’s religious world.
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ABSTRACT
Drug addiction is a social problem that destroys families and communities. It has disastrous 
social effects, not only on the addicted individual, but also on their families. The present 
study is a sociological analysis of people’s experiences living in households with a drug 
addicted member. This research is based on qualitative investigation of these types of 
families with the focus on wives and daughters of the addicted member. It was conducted 
in Tehran, the capital city of Iran. To better understand these experiences, semi-structured 
interviews were conducted with 15 participants. The interviews were analysed using a 
qualitative framework. Our results show that these families have endured agonizing periods. 
The problems they encountered can be divided into two groups: (1) Problems related to their 
primary needs (i.e. shelter, food, health and treatment, education, security, and peace), and 
(2) The rest of their problems related to their relationships and interactions with the rest of 
the community. The experiences of families with a member who is suffering from substance 
abuse include tension, uncertainty, anxiety, indifference from the individual addict, threat 
to their livelihood, shame, damaged dignity, isolation, loneliness, deprivation of support 
from others, and feelings of pain and misery. Furthermore, these issues in addition to a 
lack of adequate social support (emotional, consultation, and financial) provide the ground 
for further social harms and other pitfalls for these families.    
Keywords: Addiction, drug, family, the sociological effects of an addict father   
INTRODUCTION
Reports indicate there is a rise in drug 
abuse worldwide. In Iran, drug addiction 
was an increasing trend over the past few 
years. Addiction does not only harm the 
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individual addict, but also has an impact on 
their family. In this type of situation, family 
members are usually neglected and not seen 
by society and, thus, they suffer from variety 
of problems. Despite the high level of harm 
experienced by these family members, they 
receive very little attention. Social services 
are primarily focused on the individual drug 
addict. In addition, these types of services 
only try to get the addict off drug use, and 
does not deal with the root of the problems 
that lead to addiction.
Generally, people do not consider 
addicts as citizens and, in fact, they are 
viewed as harmful and detrimental to 
society. Even drug addicts themselves do 
not believe that they are citizens and part of 
the society. People blame them for violating 
laws and undermining social norms. In these 
situations, families of addicts may become 
subject to exclusion too. Often, the potential 
effects of addiction on immediate relatives 
are overlooked. 
It is important to remember that, to this 
date, no solution was offered to effectively 
root out the addiction problem from our 
societies. In addition, substance abusers 
are not perceived as patients in need of 
medical and/or psychological care. If they 
were viewed this way, paths to treatment and 
prevention would open up. On the contrary, 
some violent policies were executed against 
them. In Iran, there is no official support 
from any government agency for the 
families of addicts and, as such, families 
are overlooked. Although there are some 
NGOs in Iran that help these types of 
families with their basic needs (e.g. food, 
clothes, etc.), the number of these NGOs is 
not adequate, and few people are covered 
by these philanthropic services. 
In our research, the effects of addiction 
on family members were studied. In the past, 
the damage of addiction on narcotic users 
were analysed in numerous studies (Boyd, 
1993; Brick, 2004; Newcomb & Bentler, 
1988; Shedler & Block, 1990). However, in 
some countries, the effects of drug addiction 
on family members were well documented 
(Arria, Mericle, Meyers, & Winters, 
2012; Copell & Orford, 2002; Copello, 
Velleman, & Templeton, 2005; Orford, 
Velleman, Natera, Templeton, & Copello, 
2013; Orford, Templeton, Velleman, & 
Copello, 2005; Orford, Velleman, Copello, 
Templeton, & Ibanga, 2010b; Ray, Mertens, 
& Weisner, 2007; Schäfer, 2011, Velleman 
& Templeton, 2007). In Orford et al. (2013) 
study, they developed the ‘stress-strain-
coping-support (SSCS) model’. According 
to Velleman et al. (2011), unlike other 
models in the addiction field, the SSCS 
model focuses on the experiences of affected 
family members and the consequences 
of drug use on them. It treats the affected 
family member as a person exposed to 
seriously stressful circumstances:
“…The SSCS model states that 
the behaviour of the substance 
misuser causes stress for the 
family member, that stress leads 
to strain (for example, physical 
and psychological symptoms) and 
that amount of strain any family 
member experiences from a given 
level of stress (caused as a result of 
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living with a relative with a serious 
alcohol or drug problem) will be 
mediated by two key factors: how 
they cope with this problem, and 
the amount and quality of social 
support that they can access...” 
(Velleman et al. 2011, p. 363).
Orford, Copello, Velleman, & Templeton 
(2010a) mentioned that previous models 
about substance misuse and the family 
attributed the issues of dysfunction or 
deficiency to families or family members. 
Copello et al. (2009) cited that the SSCS 
model rejects the idea that families or 
individual family members are pathological 
or dysfunctional. In the studies that were 
done in a number of countries during 
the last twenty-six years, Orford et al. 
(2010b, p. 44) found that, in these families, 
the relationship with a relative becomes 
disagreeable and sometimes aggressive. In 
these situations, conflicts over money and 
possessions grow. As a result, the experience 
of uncertainty becomes bothersome, worry 
about the relative increases, and home and 
family life is threatened. Another research 
done by Velleman and Templeton, (2007, p. 
80) demonstrates the negative experiences 
children and adolescents living with an addict 
parent may undergo, including high levels 
of violence, suffering from or witnessing 
neglect or abuse (physical, verbal or 
sexual), inconsistent, poor, and/or neglectful 
parenting by one or both parents, and having 
to adopt responsibility or parenting roles at 
an early age, along with feeling negative 
emotions, such as shame, guilt, fear, anger, 
and embarrassment. There may also be 
possible neurodevelopment consequences 
of substance misuse in pregnancy that 
may contribute to developmental delays 
or intellectual disabilities. In Schafer’s 
study (2011, p. 1), it was found that family 
members experienced various forms of 
family disruption, such as loss of custody of 
their children, loss of employment, marital 
breakdown, physical and psychological 
abuse, depression, and poor health. 
Most studies in Iran, such as Behravan 
and Miranvari (2010); Feizy, Alibabayi 
and Rahmati (2010); Gholami Kotnayi and 
Ghorbannejad Shahrodi (2014); Kianipoor 
and Pozad (2012); Moeidfar and Zamani 
Sabzi (2013); Motiee Langrudi, Farhadi 
and Zare (2013); Norozi, Khoshknab and 
Farhodian (2013), Rasekh and Panahzadeh 
(2012); Shamsalinia, Safari and Mosavizade 
(2014) have solely focused on the drug 
abuser’s problems rather than the problems 
faced by their family members. In reviewing 
the literature, few data were found on the 
difficulties of such families in Iran. Also, 
research conducted by Aghakhani, Mosavi, 
Eftekhari, Eghtedar, Zareei, Rahbar, 
Mesgarzade and Nikoonejad (2013); 
Mahdizade, Ghodosi, and Naji (2012); 
Manchery, Sharifi Nistanak, Seyedfatemi, 
Heidari and Ghodosi (2013) and have 
primarily considered certain psychological 
issues, such as depression, anxiety, and 
aggression. In Fereidouni, Joolaee, Fatemi, 
Mirlashari, Meshkibaf and Orford (2015, p. 
99) a few physicians studied the spouses of 
addicted men in Iran and four main themes 
were identified: (1) Heart-breaking news of 
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the husband’s addiction, (2) Coping alone, 
(3) Progressive deterioration and suffering, 
and (4) Disruption of family relationships 
and finances. Reactions after learning about 
the husband’s addiction involved shock 
and collapse, and/or fear, disbelief, and 
confusion. Spouses tried to hide the problem 
and to solve it alone, making them feel as 
if they were “walking in the dark” without 
any social support and exposed to stigma. 
As time went by, the spouses experienced 
distress and turmoil, and mixed feelings, 
including loss of trust and confidence in, 
towards their husbands, whose behaviour 
progressively became less reliable. This led 
to impairment in the relationship, financial 
stress, and a general degradation and 
disruption of normal family life, leading to 
strain for spouses, akin to a state of burnout. 
Still, much of the suffering experienced 
by these families remain undisclosed in Iran. 
Very few sociological studies (Fereidouni et 
al., 2015) have focused on the circumstances 
of these families. Social dimensions, such 
as the impact of the relative’s addiction on 
the social interactions of family members, 
the community’s view of such families, 
and its impact on social norms remain to be 
investigated. 
Drug abuse affects not only the addict, 
but also the whole social system. Not only 
does it have financial and administrative 
costs, but also, more importantly, it has 
heavy social costs. In a sociological study, 
the social dimensions of addiction in a 
family were analysed, including its effects 
on the interactions among family members, 
the quality of the interactions between the 
addict and his/her family with the rest of 
the community, and the children’s future 
family life, occupation, and education. 
For example, in these families, due to the 
negative attitude of the society toward 
their addicted father, children may not 
choose to model their behaviour after their 
father’s. Furthermore, it may harm the 
inter-generational relationships in a way 
that, later in life, children may act very 
possessively in their own marriages, and try 
to support and control their own children so 
obsessively that it could lead to restricting 
their autonomy. Also, people with substance 
abuse issues may feel alienated from their 
families and, as a result, prefer to socialise 
with other drug users, and engage in other 
antisocial activities. This sort of association 
gives them a false sense of support and 
strengthens them in their misbehaviour. 
Due to the scarcity of sociological 
studies on such families in Iran, these 
problems remain hidden. Therefore, this 
study’s aim is to gain a better understanding 
about the issues these families face in Iran. 
For this purpose, we used a qualitative 
method to observe the members of such 
families (wives and daughters) who live 
in the capital city of Iran, Tehran. We have 
raised two questions in our investigation: (1) 
What problems do family members (spouses 
and adult daughters) of an addict deal with, 
and (2) Do they receive any support when 
encountering these problems?
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Findings from this study will increase 
public awareness about the type of problems 
such families have and, therefore, direct 
public attention towards them. It will 
provide the background necessary for 
further research in identifying their needs. 
Additionally, it can gradually help to form 
intervention efforts that will decrease the 
suffering experienced by these family 
members, improve their situation, and 
prevent exacerbation of their problems. Our 
findings can also draw more attention to 
substance abuse issues, and lead to actions 
that would prevent drug addiction.
METHODS
This study used a set of qualitative, semi-
structured interviews with family members 
living with a drug-abusing father in Tehran, 
Iran, to investigate the challenges they face. 
The sample was selected purposively and 
was not intended to be representative of 
the wider population in Tehran. Snowball 
sampling technique was used. In 2014 and 
2015, the author selected participants who 
were living in families with a drug addicted 
member. Wives and adult daughters were 
family members that were the focus in the 
study. A woman who frequently participated 
in ladies’ religious events and had a diverse 
social relationship with women from her 
own and surrounding neighbourhoods were 
used to help identify a few families with a 
drug addict head of household. 
Participants described the problems 
they encountered. The sample included 15 
individuals, all of them females between 
the ages of 22 and 50 years. Since each 
participant could be interviewed more 
than once, this study used data from 24 
interviews. Each interview lasted for 
approximately 2 hours and was conducted 
in each participant’s home when the father 
was not there or was in a place that was 
safe for family members. Interviewing such 
families can involve certain difficulties. 
Due to the hideousness of addiction and the 
way it is generally viewed in the society, 
addicts and sometimes their relatives are 
unwilling to give out any information and 
find it necessary to hide it from others. 
Sometimes, family members are even 
forbidden by the addict to say anything 
about their situation to any stranger and will 
be punished if they did so. All of these issues 
contributed to the difficulties of conducting 
these interviews. Thus, it was necessary 
to anticipate these problems in advance 
and take preventative measures. So, the 
settings of these interviews were carefully 
selected, as we wished the interviewees to 
feel comfortable and be at ease. 
An overview of the participants’ 
characteristics is presented in Table 1.
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The interviews were tape recorded and 
transcribed verbatim for coding and 
analysis. Transcripts were analysed after 
each interview was completed. The author 
conducted all interviews. After each 
interview, the author listened to the tapes 
while writing the transcripts in detail. 
Transcripts were reduced to codes by 
line-by-line reading of the text. The audio 
taped interviews and notes were reviewed 
repeatedly to identify emerging themes and 
relationships among them. The objective 
was to offer a comprehensive summary of 
the challenges the interviewees face.
RESULTS
In this study, three participants previously 
experienced homelessness. None of them 
received any support from governmental or 
non-governmental organisations. During the 
interviews, they described their experiences 
of living in a family with an addicted 
Table 1 
Overview of participants
Number Age Gender Marital 
status
Literacy Employment 
status
Relation 
with the 
drug abuser
The number 
of interview 
sessions
1 34 F Single MA Employed Children 3
2 32 F Married BA Housewife Children 2
3 29 F Single High School 
Diploma
Housewife Children 1
4 43 F Married Illiterate Housewife Spouse 1
5 32 F Married Junior High 
School
Hairdresser work 
from home)
Spouse 1
6 33 F Married Elementary 
School
Janitor Spouse 2
7 42 F Married High School 
Diploma
Employed Spouse 3
8 43 F Married Elementary 
School
Tailor (work from 
home)
Spouse 1
9 22 F Single High School 
Diploma
Student Children 1
10 46 F Married Elementary 
School
Housewife Spouse 1
11 38 F Single Elementary 
School
Tailor (clothes 
production)
Children 2
12 30 F Single High School 
Diploma
Employed Children 2
13 35 F Married High School 
Diploma
Employed Children 1
14 30 F Married High School 
Diploma
Housewife Children 1
15 50 F Married Illiterate Housewife Spouse 2
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member. A few main themes were identified 
in the research data. Of course, some themes 
were overlapping. The effects of drug use 
were so intertwined that it is sometimes 
impossible to draw clear boundaries between 
them. This is especially obvious in quotes, 
where some quotes touched on multiple 
issues. In the following sections, some of 
the most important experiences of family 
members, who were affected by the drug 
addiction of their father, are expressed.
Tension
When family, which is regarded as a haven 
for peace, is affected by the behaviour of 
an individual member, who is under the 
influence of drug abuse, then it becomes 
the epicentre of tension, restlessness, and 
disturbance. The inability of an addicted 
father to satisfy the mental, emotional, and 
natural needs of his wife and children, his 
indifference, family disputes, verbal and 
physical violence, and related financial 
problems all cause tension in these types of 
families. It is difficult to talk about peace 
and calmness in these types of settings. 
In the following paragraphs, some of 
the statements made by three research 
participants are presented:
“He was always angry with me. 
When the children were small, he 
beat me a lot. He broke my teeth. ... 
At that time, we had just arrived in 
Tehran and the kids were small. But 
he would leave us by ourselves and 
be gone for days at a time. I didn’t 
know my way around. Sometimes, 
I had nothing to feed my children 
and I was afraid to go out on my 
own.” (15)
“When he is at home, he breaks 
things and I have to go buy them 
again. He has broken the windows, 
mirrors, and things in the closets 
many times. If he comes back from 
jail, I will suffer more; I prefer 
his absence. For example, after 
drinking tea, he’d throw away the 
cup or the sugar bowl, and this 
meant that he wants more tea. He 
wouldn’t say ‘Go get me another 
tea.’ He’d throw the cup.” (6)
Feelings of Insecurity and Uncertainty
Family members of an addict do not feel 
security (in terms of livelihood, shelter, 
emotional relationship, employment, 
marriage, etc.). Life for these families 
is always full of conflict and tension. 
Their health, livelihood, family, and social 
relations are threatened by this sense of 
insecurity. When one does not have a sense 
of security, it is easier for other individuals 
or a group in the society (like gangs, or other 
illegal groups, etc.) who offers them a sense 
of belonging to convince the individual to 
join them. 
The drug addiction of a father has an 
influence on the personality of his wife. 
Addicted fathers have devastating impacts 
on their children’s future, education, career, 
marriage, and family life. In these families, 
sometimes children drop out of school 
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as teenagers (due to poverty and lack 
of resources to pay for school fees, the 
demands of child labour, or lack of mental 
focus and intellectual discipline caused by 
the ongoing tension and conflict in their 
family environment). Lack of education 
has a long and short-term consequence for 
them, including the intensification of their 
sense of insecurity. In fact, in such families 
where there is always a high level of tension, 
risk, disorder, and conflict, it is impossible 
to think of a long-term investment in areas 
like education. Deprived of education, it 
is difficult to be hopeful for the mental 
development of these individuals and expect 
them to learn informal social subtleties, 
while obeying the laws of society. Of 
course, sometimes in these families, with the 
relentless efforts of the mother, children do 
stay in school and continue their education. 
As far as the prospects of marriage for 
these children is concerned, it is highly 
probable that they will remain single, 
especially the girls. Due to their father’s 
addiction and the stigma in the society for 
these types of individuals, people have very 
little desire to marry these girls. Even if the 
father has stopped using drugs for several 
years, people are still reluctant to marry the 
daughters.
Instability, uncertainty, disorder, and 
obscurity are the distinctive features of 
these types of families. The possibility to 
set certain goals for the future and reduce 
uncertainty is non-existent. The addicted 
father does not have much control over the 
affairs and is unable to make appropriate 
decisions on different issues. In families 
where the father is also involved in narcotics 
smuggling and distribution, there are 
additional worries for the family, including 
the possibility of the father’s arrest or further 
damage to the family’s reputation. These 
are additional reasons to be more uncertain 
about the future. 
“We weren’t sure if my father could 
pay the rent for our home and the 
store this month… or make any 
payments on his old debt… or if 
he’d have to borrow money again 
to pay for this month’s rent. The 
landlord had threatened to throw 
out our belongings. We weren’t 
sure if we would be in this house 
for another month or not. He comes 
home late at nights. Sometimes, he 
gets home at dawn. When he was 
using methamphetamine, he was 
awake till the morning. We couldn’t 
sleep well. He was making a lot of 
noise. Actually, there was no order 
in our lives. I couldn’t get much 
sleep at nights, so I couldn’t study 
well the next day.” (1)
Anxiety
Family members worry about what is 
happening to their addicted relative, the 
rest of the family, and themselves. The 
anxiety that the wife and children experience 
puts a lot of pressure on them. Anxiety 
can be created by an uncertain future, the 
breadwinner’s loss of job, threat to their 
livelihood, financial debt, the possibility of 
becoming homeless, mental and physical 
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effects of addiction on children, their 
health, education, future marriage and its 
related expenses, worries about the family’s 
reputation being tainted in the eyes of 
relatives, friends, and neighbours, and fear 
of being excluded from society. In cases 
where there is a separation in the family, 
the wife may worry about her and her 
children’s fate in the period after the divorce, 
their sustenance, and provisions, further 
increasing family anxiety. Issues related 
to the addicted individual also may cause 
additional concerns and worries, such as: 
anxiety about the addicted member changing 
the type of drug they use to synthetic drugs 
(causing more harm), return to addiction 
by the husband (or father) after quitting, 
changes in the appearance of the addicted 
member, their behavioural disorders, 
sleeping disorders, mental and physical 
illnesses, the possibility of acquiring certain 
infections such as HIV and Hepatitis (when 
drug use gets done by injections), and the 
possibility of death. 
Problems, anxieties, and worries 
increase more dramatically if family 
members are involved in other harmful 
situations, such as children escapade (which 
is another source of social harm), the mother 
becoming addicted too, pregnancy, children 
becoming addicted, children’s delinquency, 
and illegitimate sexual relationships of the 
spouse with other people.
“When I was younger, whenever 
my dad was having a fight with my 
mom, he’d always say ‘I’m leaving’. 
I thought he’d leave us and we 
would have no money. That’s why 
as soon as I finished high school, 
I went and got a job so that we 
wouldn’t ever run out of money 
and be stranded penniless on the 
streets.” (12)
“My father was a drug abuser. I 
have two brothers who became 
addicted too. When I was in fifth 
grade, my mother died. I wasn’t 
able to continue studying because I 
was worried about my brothers and 
sisters. I did all the house chores. 
I took a job in a production unit. I 
tried so hard to help my brothers 
quit drugs, but it was in vain. Once, 
I took pills to kill myself and then 
they promised to quit. I took them 
to NA [Narcotics Anonymous]. 
Now they acknowledge my toil and 
say that you went through so much 
trouble and hard work for us. You 
dedicated your life to us.” (11)
“My father got two marriage loans 
with our marriage certificate. He 
let us keep one for ourselves which 
we’ve paid it off already. He took 
the other one for himself but didn’t 
pay his payments. Three years 
passed, and the bank was calling 
once in a while, telling him to 
make the payments. I told my dad 
to please go make these payments, 
our reputation has become tainted 
in front of my husband. He says 
he’d do it. There were two people 
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who had signed off as guarantors 
on our loans; they were calling 
us repeatedly as well. Their pay 
checks were being cut and taken as 
payments. The bank manager was 
a relative of one of the co-workers 
at the place where my husband 
and I were working. So we were 
very embarrassed. At last, my 
husband felt bad for me and started 
making payments instead of my 
dad. Another time, he took a check 
from my husband and did not have 
enough money in due time to cover 
it. So the check was dishonoured 
and returned. My husband became 
very angry about it, because I 
was pregnant and any money we 
made was being spent on visiting 
doctors, sonographs, and medicine, 
and there was little money left for 
anything else and now we had to 
pay for that check as well. I became 
very nervous. One night my heart 
was pounding so hard. Two days 
later, my baby died prematurely in 
my womb. My doctor told me that 
it was due to fear and stress.” (14)
The Indifference of the Individual 
Addict
Family members witness an extreme 
indifference and lethargy from addicted 
members. Lack of adequate control over 
the family’s resources, weak or no sense 
of responsibility towards family members, 
their profession, the future, and children’s 
fate are other issues that these types of 
families face. A drug addict is not able to 
play the proper role of a father or a husband 
and tends to neglect his responsibilities. 
Thus, the suffering and anger increase 
for family members. In such families, 
the wife has heavy responsibilities and 
carries out her husband’s duties as well. 
Sometimes, children take on their father’s 
responsibilities and behave in a manner 
that does not suit their age. For example, 
they drop out of school and try to cover the 
family’s livelihood needs.
“We were experiencing a hard life. 
My father’s indifference to our 
life was at 90 percent. He didn’t 
pay rent several months in a row. 
He’d sleep in until noon, while his 
shop was closed. He used to have 
many customers, some from out 
of town and faraway cities. But, 
he gradually lost his customers. 
I knew he couldn’t afford to pay 
the rent for another house after 
this one, because the deposit rates 
for rentals had gone up and he 
couldn’t afford it anymore. Then, 
the landlord gave us an eviction 
notice since we had not paid rent for 
months. Ever since then, I lost my 
peace. We were in a state of crisis, 
expecting the landlord to evict us 
any day now. Nevertheless, due to 
Methamphetamine consumption, 
my father was carefree. I had never 
seen him so carefree. He had no 
worries even if the house collapsed 
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on him. So, eventually the landlord, 
with the help of a police officer, 
threw our stuff out on the street. 
My father put all our things in 
his friend’s back yard, and then 
rented the second floor of a small 
old house. A year later, the new 
landlord evicted us again.” (1)
“On my wedding, he gave us 
500000 Rials in an envelope as a 
gift. That night, as we were going 
home, he asked me to give him back 
the money since he was short on 
cash. Without letting my husband 
notice, I stealthily gave him the 
money. He didn’t come home till 
the next morning, as he was out 
indulging himself. He had bought 
me two carpets as my dowry. The 
sales person from the carpet store 
was calling me for a year to collect 
the payments for it. So, I told my 
father that you only bought me a 
carpet, but you haven’t paid for 
it, and because of that I want you 
to return it since I don’t feel right 
about it.” (13)
Livelihood in Danger
Loss of job, reduction or complete loss of 
income (as a result of an addict’s lethargy, 
and irresponsibility), spending money on 
drugs which further reduces the family’s 
resources (while the spouse’s and children’s 
needs get neglected), debt, the inability to 
provide the basic needs of the family (food, 
health, hygiene, etc.), not being able to 
pay the rent for the house, selling house 
items and wife’s jewellery, vagabondism, 
demanding (sometimes forcefully) wife’s 
little income (low wages from the work 
she does to help meet the primary needs 
of the family), and homelessness are some 
of the other problems such families deal 
with. In some of the mentioned cases 
in our interview sections, the wife (and 
sometimes the grown up children) is in 
charge of providing income to pay for the 
family’s expenses. If they are unemployed 
too, the family’s livelihood is in danger. 
If the addicted member gets imprisoned 
for smuggling or some other crime, the 
family’s economic insecurity and worries 
will intensify even further. In this situation, 
the wife’s and children’s employment is of 
vital importance. So, if the wife does not 
have the minimum necessary capabilities 
(literacy, skill, and the ability to be present 
in the society) for work and children are 
too young to work, then the family’s living 
conditions fall into a critical situation.
“He was jailed for five years. A 
week after his release, he committed 
another crime and got arrested 
again and is in jail for another three 
years. Since then, seven months 
have passed. He was out for one 
week between his prison terms. 
I’ve been doing housework for 
people, washing carpet, working 
for neighbours, cleaning glasses, 
and doing New Year’s cleaning. 
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Because my husband is in jail, 
I receive some aid from Emdad 
Committee. Also, I get the monthly 
subsidy from the government. I 
always give him his. He calls so 
much for it that it gets on my nerves. 
The day before yesterday I told him 
“Shame on you! Instead of greetings 
and asking about your children you 
call and ask for money”. When he 
is not in jail, I can do nothing. He 
doesn’t work and doesn’t let me 
work either. It’s better for me when 
he is in jail. Whenever he is home, 
he gives me a hard time, a lot. He 
was both a user and a supplier. 
That’s why he is in jail. If he comes 
back, he’d do it again. He was 
arrested many times, but he’d do it 
again. But no matter where he is, 
all household chores and our son’s 
responsibilities have always been 
mine. It’s all on my shoulders.” (6)
“He earns money from drugs but 
can’t pay his wife’s and children’s 
expenses, because he is spending it 
on his own drug use.” (10)
Shame and Damage to Self-Esteem
Due to the presence of an addicted individual 
in the family and his unusual behaviours, the 
wife and children may be embarrassed when 
they visit relatives, friends, acquaintances, 
and neighbours, or when they would go to 
public places. As a result, their sense of 
self-worth and self-confidence can become 
damaged. This affects their interpersonal 
and social interactions. Family members 
may try to disguise his addiction from 
everybody. They may become concerned 
about how other people view them.
“As I’d get older, I was feeling 
more pain. I’d notice the difference 
between my own family and my 
friends’ families. I was embarrassed 
for having such a father in front of 
our neighbours. Wherever we lived, 
after a while, people would find 
out that my father’s a drug addict. 
Maybe some of my classmates knew 
too. I was living in a miserable, 
tearful environment full of tension. 
Every night, I couldn’t fall sleep 
because of the grief I was feeling. I 
was in tears every night.” (3)
“Once my parents-in-law were 
visiting us from out of town. My 
father came over to see them. Then 
he asked me for a nail file. I gave 
him one. Then, for the whole one 
hour that he stayed with us, he 
was filing his nails, and not even 
looked at our guests while he was 
talking to them. This behaviour 
from him is due to his drug usage, 
especially methamphetamine. I felt 
so embarrassed. I’m glad my in 
laws don’t live in Tehran, otherwise 
they’d find out about his addiction.” 
(2)
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Isolation and Loneliness
The amount of interaction between these 
families and the rest of the people in society 
is negligible. They don’t have much contact 
with others. They want the addiction issue 
to remain disguised. This worry may last 
forever, even after the addict member quits 
the habit. When others discover the drug 
addiction of a head of a household, two 
situations may emerge. Some people may 
feel reluctant to interact with the addict’s 
family, and in some cases, it was observed 
that they are no longer invited to events, 
such as weddings or other ceremonies. 
The second scenario is the avoidance of 
people by the addict’s family in order not 
to feel more shamed and disrespected, or 
to avoid encountering other’s sarcasm and 
put-downs. Broadly speaking, it is highly 
probable that the addict and his/her family 
get excluded and isolated in their society 
(at school, in their neighbourhood circles, 
relative network, or workplace).
“As a child, we were always alone, 
didn’t have many guests, and didn’t 
go to many social gatherings. We 
had very little interaction with 
relatives. Now, I understand the 
reason. My father was an addict. 
Even now that I’m a grown up and 
don’t live with my dad anymore, I’m 
still worried. Worried that one-day 
my colleagues and friends discover 
the fact that my dad used to be an 
addict. If that happens, I’d lose my 
dignity.” (3) 
Deprived of Support and Help from 
Others
Often, the issues of drug abuse remain 
hidden within the family. Due to the fear of 
feeling shame and embarrassment, family 
members try to cover up. This situation 
causes them to keep the heavy burden of 
their issues and sufferings to themselves. 
This attitude leads to self-deprivation of all 
the help and social support they can receive 
from friends and relatives. It is worth noting 
that the relatives of our research participants 
were mostly in other faraway towns. In fact, 
these subjects migrated to Tehran years ago 
for job-hunting, and currently, they are far 
away from their relatives and hometowns. 
Sometimes, friends and relatives find out 
about the addicted individual, but shun the 
addict and his family. Either for the sake 
of keeping their self-perceived dignity 
intact, or their unwillingness to provide any 
financial help, they try to avoid the family 
of their addicted relative and make as little 
contact as possible.
Social service organisations pay 
very little attention to such families too. 
These organisations mainly pay attention 
(restricted and inadequate) to the addicted 
individual rather than their families. Drug 
rehab centres are very costly and usually 
addicts cannot afford them. Therefore, their 
rehabilitation gets delayed. Although drug 
rehab is necessary, it cannot solely function 
as a successful policy. First of all, the causes 
of addiction must be prevented to reduce the 
number of addicts and their at risk families 
in society. 
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Murder of Family Members 
A very important issue currently is the fact 
that, with the widespread use of synthetic 
drugs, the lives of family members are in 
danger too. One of the consequences of using 
new synthetic drugs is the development of 
hallucinations in the individual addict, and 
in that state of mind, the murder of the 
addicted individual’s wife and children has 
occurred on several occasions. 
“I had a sister whose husband was 
addicted to meth. Last summer, her 
husband killed her. Since then, I feel 
nothing anymore. My sister used 
to work so hard, her husband was 
useless, always sitting in a room. He 
used to lean back while she worked 
to be able to get him his drug. He 
hit her too, but not a lot. My sister 
was afraid of him so she tried not to 
make him angry. The last days, he 
had the hallucination that my sister 
was going to kill him. My niece says 
whenever her mother served food, 
he exchanged our plates saying we 
might’ve poisoned his food to kill 
him.” (5)
Feeling Pain and Misery
Considering the mentioned issues in these 
types of families, it is obvious that family 
members would feel constant pain and 
misery. Families in these situations are no 
longer a haven for peace and happiness. 
Members of such families rarely experience 
joy. When their children grow up, they 
suffer much more than before from their 
family’s state of disarray. They notice the 
differences when they compare themselves 
to others, including friends, neighbours, and 
relatives. This awareness adds to their grief. 
When in this type of situation, children may 
get separated because of getting married or 
running away from home, but they still do 
not feel happy because they remember their 
tragic past and the calamitous situation of 
their drug-addict relative and that saddens 
them. They rarely can be happy and have a 
good time again. They dream about a good 
family situation. But, some of them can 
never form a family and will keep yearning 
for it.
 “After that year, my father divorced 
his second wife. Then, he was with 
us all the time and I was happy 
about it, about our life becoming 
a bit normal again. But, after six 
months I noticed some changes in 
his behaviour; it wasn’t normal. 
Till I found out he was using a new 
substance (meth). He’d stay up all 
night. Sometimes, he spent several 
hours doing something, such as 
cleaning the kitchen. I remember 
his yelling and screaming angrily. 
At nights, I stayed up because he 
wasn’t coming home and I was 
worried. I was embarrassed in 
front of the neighbours for this 
situation. He had become a total 
careless person. I was tired of his 
ways and did most of my crying in 
that period.” (3)
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“I have everything now, education, 
a job, a house, and money. But, I 
don’t feel happy because I don’t 
have a family. Nobody likes to 
marry me. If someone would ask for 
marriage and then find out that my 
father used to be an addict, surely 
they’d change their mind. And, 
sometimes I think about my dad. 
He quit drugs. But he is by himself 
and alone. He is ill. I’m sure he is 
suffering from his loneliness. And 
sometimes I remember my mother’s 
pains and cry for her.” (1)
These mentioned family members feel a lot 
of sorrow. Sadness, crying, patience, and 
tolerance are some of their tactics to deal 
with their situation. Attempts to get the 
addict member rehabilitated are their other 
tactic. They really want this badly. To get 
the addicted member to go for rehabilitation, 
they use encouraging talks, arguments, and 
admonishment. If the family’s breadwinner 
is the addict member and they have no 
savings or any other source of income, 
the addicted member’s rehabilitation is 
postponed because if he doesn’t work for 
a while, then the family’s livelihood is 
threatened. Also, addicts have to pay some 
fees to these types of rehab centres. Drug 
rehabilitation centres have high costs and the 
addicted person is usually unable to pay for 
it. The effort made by the rest of the family 
members (i.e. wife and children) to cover 
the living costs is another strategy in these 
families. Both the wife (if she has any skills) 
and the children (if they are old enough) try 
to earn money. 
The studied women in our research do 
not think about divorce. That is due to the 
fact that divorce is considered to be vile 
and there is a great deal of social pressure 
on individuals after becoming a widow. 
The belief that a wife marries in a white 
dress and leaves after death in white is a 
traditional norm in Iranian society. So, there 
is a great deal of emphasis on the importance 
of maintaining the family and the marriage. 
Fear of being away from your own children 
and their future and the issues of becoming 
homeless and jobless after divorce also 
function as deterrents to divorce. Women, 
who do not have an adequate education and 
lack sufficient skills to support themselves 
and their children after divorce, don’t even 
think about it. But women with proper 
education and skill and a job to support 
their lives are likely to get divorced if their 
situation becomes really intolerable. 
“In our family, women are docile 
and content. Although my sister’s 
husband was a Heroin addict and 
she was miserable, she didn’t think 
about divorce. She used to work 
while her husband used to sleep 
carefree. Because of his addiction, 
they had so much debt too.” (7) 
“My first son got addicted too. He 
got married too. His wife was very 
young. After she learned about 
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his addiction, she left him. She 
was really young. The girl was in 
junior high when they met and got 
married. After she found out about 
his drug addiction, she left. They 
have a child too…” (8) 
DISCUSSION
Due to a  complex and intertwined 
relationship between narcotic addiction 
and the outbreak of certain social issues, 
drug addiction appears to be a major threat 
to society. “Women and other family 
members witnessing addiction of the head 
of their family tend to live in a situation 
that makes them really vulnerable” (Orford 
et al., 2013, p. 71). Findings of the present 
study confirm the results of similar studies 
in other countries. The addiction of the 
head of a family has counter-productive 
effects on other family members. The 
problems such families face can be divided 
into several groups. Certain problems are 
associated with their essential and basic 
needs (i.e. shelter, food, security, health, 
education), while some are related to their 
interactions and relationships with other 
society members. Members of these families 
experience tension, lack of security, lack 
of certainty, anxiety, the indifference of 
the addicted individual, threat to their 
livelihood (shelter, food, etc.), shame and 
low self-esteem, isolation and loneliness, 
deprivation of help and support from others, 
murder of family members, and the feelings 
of pain and misery. Also, sometimes certain 
conditions develop that lead to substance 
abuse by other family members. Although 
there are certain differences between Iran 
and some other countries, similar studies 
from other countries show that these types 
of families suffer from all the problems cited 
above (Orford et al., 2010b; Vellman et al., 
2011; Vellman & Templeton, 2007).
Unlike some countries, the participants 
in this study do not receive any particular 
social support. They were not members of 
any NGOs to receive their services. The 
obstacle in being referred to places like 
active NGOs is usually the unawareness 
of the existence of such centres, or it is the 
fear of incurring damage to their dignity 
and self-esteem. Overall, there are still 
not enough actions in Iran to improve the 
situation for these types of families. Unlike 
the subjects in other studies, none of the 
women in our study was divorced. The 
reason for it is the importance put on family 
maintenance in Iranian culture. The wives 
of addicted individuals, despite their many 
problems, do not abandon their families 
easily. Patience, tolerance, and attempts to 
send their addicted husbands to rehab are 
special characteristics of Iranian women. 
One of the other factors that prevent women 
from leaving their families is the negative 
view of divorce in society. Homelessness, 
as well as being unable to provide for their 
livelihood after divorce, deters some women 
(especially the poor and those without any 
support) from leaving their marriage. At 
the moment, Iran’s social security system 
does not offer much support for women 
after divorce.
Additionally, addiction prevention 
measures are very limited in Iran. In 
 The Effects of Drug Addicted Fathers on Families in Tehran
231Pertanika J. Soc. Sci. & Hum. 26 (T): 215 - 234 (2018)
organisations responsible for tackling 
addiction, treatment is more important than 
prevention. They don’t use very efficient 
methods in treatment practices either. In 
fact, they consider treatment only when 
the situation has turned into a crisis and 
undesirable effects have become quite 
apparent. Inattention to prevention confirms 
the principal of human life being dominated 
by events rather than humans dominating 
events. While prevention of social problems 
is very important, and without a doubt the 
first actions taken must be concentrated 
on prevention measures, the next step we 
must think of is treatment. To be successful 
in prevention efforts, we need to use new 
sciences and employ successful experiences 
of others in this area. It is vital to study new 
theories in the field, empirical research, and 
successful experiences and achievements of 
organisations and institutions that work on 
the prevention of addiction worldwide and 
adopt measures to prevent the expansion of 
drug addiction in Iran. 
CONCLUSION 
In this study, by using semi-structured 
deep interviews, we have come upon 
some findings about the experiences 
of family members encountering their 
father’s addiction issues. This study’s 
findings improve our understanding of 
these families’ problems and show that 
they experience and suffer from tension, 
uncertainty, anxiety, indifference from the 
addicted member, threat to their livelihood, 
shame and damaged self-esteem, isolation 
and loneliness, deprivation of support and 
cooperation from others, and the feelings of 
pain and misery. 
Creating awareness in the community 
about the dangers of drug addiction, 
especially related to mental disorders and 
their devastating consequences on the family 
members of the addicted individual, plays 
an essential role in addiction prevention. 
Informing the public through lectures, 
educational textbooks and academic 
materials, mass media, and various prints 
can make a difference as well. The Iranian 
state-run television, radio, and other media 
play a pivotal role in producing programs 
that reflect the repercussions for addicts and 
their family members. It is obvious that it 
is highly important to use the findings of 
sociologists, psychologists and cognitive 
science, and neuroscience experts in the 
production of such programs. 
Overall ,  paying attention to the 
empowerment of people is more important 
than any other issue. Attempts to empower 
people from their childhood are considered 
as an important step in addiction prevention. 
Formation of any kind of belief system 
(true or false) in humans is made possible 
by learning. Using some well-known 
scientific theories about learning and 
mental empowerment is fundamental 
to immunisation against  addiction. 
Undoubtedly the education system plays a 
critical role in this area. 
Children in these families are subject to 
various harms due to the carelessness of the 
head of the family. It is necessary to consider 
measures to support the families of addicted 
individuals. Their needs are not only 
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limited to material ones, but their emotional 
and spiritual needs may be more acute. 
Emotional and intellectual support systems 
for women and children in these families can 
prevent further harm. They need counselling 
to face the tensions arising from living with 
an addicted member and to find solutions. 
Knowing how to cope with emotional and 
mental pressures and finding some solutions 
to improve self-confidence and self-esteem 
can prevent depression. So, it is essential to 
develop and provide accessible inexpensive 
and high-quality counselling services in 
every neighbourhood, in order to reduce 
the side effects of living with an addicted 
member. Providing counselling services can 
definitely prevent certain harms among the 
family members, especially teenagers. 
Financial support is necessary, and it 
paves the way for the rehabilitation process 
of the addicted individual. Financial support 
is important in several ways. Money can 
be used for treatment and rehab costs, 
providing family’s living costs during the 
rehabilitation process of the addict (some 
fail to go to rehab centres due to their 
concerns about the livelihood of their 
family during rehabilitation), and initial 
seed money for those who seek to restart 
their old profession or those who set out to 
start a new business. Of course, as it was 
mentioned before, eliminating the causes of 
addiction in the society should be the focus 
of all efforts.
Further studies about how to prevent 
and eliminate the root causes of addiction 
in Iran are needed. Also, studies are needed 
on how to support the family members of a 
drug addict so that their exposure to harm 
and suffering is minimised. 
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ABSTRACT
Iran is one of the top refugee-hosting countries in the world. After the beginning of war 
in Afghanistan in the late 1970s and 1980s, Iran opened its borders to Afghan refugees. 
Unlike Pakistan, Iran allowed Afghans to enter the country and reside in the mainland, in 
cities, and villages, instead of accommodating them in border camps. That was an unusual 
decision that was not effectuated by Iran’s government during the 1990s ongoing wave of 
immigrations. This paper explores the main causes for the open door policy adopted by Iran 
in the mentioned period and investigates the consequences that resulted from this policy. 
Unlike many scholars who claim the immigration policy of the time to be the result of either 
ideological or calculated decisions, this paper argues that there was no other alternative 
for the new government in the peculiar circumstances of a post-revolutionary country.
Keywords: Afghan refugees, border camps, economic competition, immigration policy, Islamic revolution, 
refugee accommodation, split market, UNHCR   
INTRODUCTION
A report, published by UNHCR Refugees 
Magazine in 1997, introduced Afghan 
refuge in Iran as an “Iranian surprise.” 
The author stated that although Iran is an 
“isolated and less known” country, “it is one 
of the most generous countries worldwide 
in hosting refugees because, unlike many 
other countries, Afghans are allowed in 
to settle throughout the country instead of 
being settled in border camps” (Wilkinson, 
1997). In fact, the source of this refugee 
crisis in the region was the political turmoil 
in Afghanistan. After the 1978 coup, the 
People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan 
(PDPA) came to power which resulted in 
a set of drastic changes known as the Thor 
Revolution.
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The temporary and seasonal migration 
of Afghans to Iran was prevalent prior to 
1979, mainly due to poverty and drought at 
home and economic opportunities abroad. 
Most of these immigrants were from the 
western and central parts of Afghanistan, 
and it is estimated that nearly 600,000 
Afghans were in Iran before the 1979 coup 
(Rubin, 1996, p. 3). As a result, Afghan 
workers were familiar faces especially in 
eastern parts of Iran. However, after the 
communist surge in Afghanistan and USSR 
military intervention, an unprecedented 
migration of Afghans in terms of nature and 
magnitude took place. 
As PDPA took power,  the  new 
government put socialist reforms on agenda: 
the national flag of Afghanistan changed 
from the traditional green to something 
resembling the flag of Soviet Union, land 
reforms began, women were granted the 
right to vote, and similar reforms began 
to take hold nationwide. Reforms were 
not welcomed by traditional religious 
factions of the Afghan community, giving 
way to a mass exodus of angry Afghans to 
two neighbouring Islamic countries: Iran 
and Pakistan. Many traditional families 
considered reforms to be contradictory to 
Islamic teachings and preferred to leave 
Afghanistan. As Hoodfar (2004) points 
out, most of those who migrated to Iran 
were illiterate villagers irritated by the 
government mandatory education programs 
that forced families to enrol their daughters 
in public schools. Another reason for the 
anxiety was marriage laws, which required 
the bride’s consent and set the consent age 
for marriage at 16. For many, these were 
signs of the Soviet agenda to eliminate 
Islam.
With the establishment of the communist 
government, internal conflicts between 
PDPA and Islamic groups rivalling to 
overthrow the government began. In 1979, 
with the intensification of war between the 
Mujahedeen and the central government, 
the Soviet Union, fearful of the anticipated 
loss of a major ally in the South, started a 
military intervention in Afghanistan. One of 
the outcomes of the invasion was the flow 
of Afghan refugees toward the borders to 
evade war, because of which about 600,000 
Afghans arrived in Iran and Pakistan within 
a week. As Kakar (1995) puts it, targeting 
Mujahedeen and ordinary people through 
rocket attacks on civilians, the destruction 
of the infrastructure under the shared control 
of the Mujahedeen and people, retaliatory 
attacks of Soviet forces, targeting farmers 
at the harvest time, confiscation of farmers’ 
crops and livestock, and forced evacuation 
of villages, made life so insecure that many 
Afghans decided to leave.
The rate of refugee departure from 
Afghanistan in 1980-81 was about 180,000 
migrants per month; in 1982-85, the rate 
decreased to 15,000-20,000, and in 1987 it 
was further reduced to five to six thousand 
(Goodson, 2001, p. 149). As the population 
arrived at Iranian borders, they were 
transferred to Iran’s cities and villages after 
simple and short administrative procedures.
Unlike Pakistan, Iran permitted the 
refugees to reside in different cities and 
villages without any restrictions. Refugees 
Afghan Refugees and Iran’s Open Door Policy
237Pertanika J. Soc. Sci. & Hum. 26 (T): 235 - 252 (2018)
had access to the labour market and allowed 
to stay in Iran until the end of war in 
Afghanistan. Most of the refugees with 
a rural background entered the market as 
low-skilled workers in urban and rural areas, 
occupying the location at the lowest layer of 
Iran`s working class.
In November 1981, an Iranian Interior 
Ministry official told media that the number 
of Afghan refugees was about 1.5 million; 
most of whom were settling in two main 
provinces in eastern Iran (Sorouroddin, 
1981). With the arrival of new Afghan 
refugees, the figure increased annually, 
reaching an unprecedented number of 
four million people in 1991. Not all these 
refugees were Afghan, however, since 
by that time, Iran had hosted around 2.2 
million Iraqi refugees from western borders 
(Hosseini, 1993, p. 277). Although most 
Iraqis returned to their country, Afghans 
remained in Iran and, today, there are 
nearly three million Afghan refugees and 
immigrants living across the country. 
After the flow of Afghan displaced 
population toward its borders, Iran welcomed 
them with an open door policy; a policy 
that provided Afghans with access to its 
labour market while the government had to 
provide the immigrant population with basic 
education, medical services and subsidized 
food like Iranian nationals. The open door 
policy had many short-term and long-term 
consequences. The sudden settlement of 
millions of refugees in the eastern provinces 
of Iran led to some domestic problems at 
the time and sparked dissatisfaction among 
local communities (British Refugee Council, 
1987; Pahlavan, 1988). In the long term, the 
presence of refugees in various regions 
of Iran and the following non-integration 
policies aimed at persuading the refugees 
to return to Afghanistan caused Afghan 
refugees to lose hope for access to Iranian 
citizenship rights. The open door policy and 
settlement of refugees in cities and villages 
had such severe implications for the Iranian 
government that in 1990s under similar 
situations, Iran refused to let Iraqi and Azeri 
refugees to cross its borders. 
The main question here is why such an 
uncommon refugee policy was implemented 
by Iran in the 1980s. Several answers have 
been given to the question. Some believe 
that it was a calculated decision by Iran to 
replace labour force shortage agriculture 
and the construction industry in a time when 
many young Iranians were sent to the war 
front in western borders beside using afghans 
as political tools to influence the situation 
in Afghanistan (Milani, 2006). Others 
emphasise on the ideological character of the 
new revolutionary government in Iran and 
attribute the reason behind the policy to the 
Islamic principles of the new government 
(Yarbakhsh, 2018).  This paper argues 
that Iran’s generous policy toward Afghan 
refugees should be understood, considering 
the specific features of a post-revolutionary 
era after the 1979 Islamic Revolution and 
the newly established government. Locating 
the policy at the social and political context, 
this article shows that the decision to open 
borders was the result of the impossibility 
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of other practical alternatives rather than a 
rational calculation of the perceived benefits 
or any other revolutionary agenda. 
Moreover, the consequences of this 
policy at that time are investigated to show 
why the government did not implement 
same policy in similar situations a decade 
later. A close look at Iran’s conditions in 
the early years after the Islamic Revolution, 
including the engagement in an imposed war 
with Iraq, and the internal political power 
struggles, shows what factors shaped the 
open door policy and what implications 
it had for the Iranian government, native 
population of Iran, and Afghan refugees in 
next decades.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
This article uses a qualitative approach in the 
study of its subject matter. So far, any study 
of Afghan refugee presence in Iran has been 
made possible only by second-hand sources. 
This study, however, takes advantage of 
the access to the recently declassified 
official documents, tries to clarify the new 
dimensions of the situation at the time under 
discussion. The main source of information 
in this research are the official documents 
and letters related to Afghan refugees during 
1980s. A total of 2,175 documents, official 
letters, and reports issued to Zanjan, Qazvin, 
and Markazi Provincial Governments 
during the 1980s were accessed at the 
Documentation Centre of Iran`s National 
Library. The documents were declassified 
as limited access since 2014 and the authors 
gained authorization to view them following 
an official agreement between Tehran 
University and Iran`s National Library. Each 
document that seemed to be relevant for the 
purpose of the study were photographed by 
authors and coded following the procedures 
of the National Library (documents in this 
paper are cited with their document number 
in the National Library). Moreover, all the 
official comments and interviews published 
in newspapers about Afghan refugees and 
immigration policies at the time, were 
gathered and analysed as supplementary 
sources of information; the newspapers 
kept in the National Library of Iran Archive, 
and Etelaat Newspaper Archive, have 
been the main sources of this data. In 
addition, reports released by international 
organisations (including UNHRC, the 
Refugee and Immigrant Committee of 
the United States, and British Refugee 
Council) on the status of Afghan refugees 
and immigrants or the policies of the 
Iranian government have also been gathered 
through their official websites. All the 
Data gathered from different sources, were 
analysed by qualitative content analysis 
approach. First, all data were categorized 
in a chronological order. For each year, 
all data were classified under six main 
categories: 1) number of refuges (legal and 
illegal) and official statistics, 2) refugee’s 
access to healthcare, education, and so on, 
3) refugee’s accommodation and travel, 4) 
refugee entrance policy and deportation, 
5) job market policies and regulation, 
and 6) tensions with local Iranians. Some 
documents were simultaneously located 
in two or more categories based on their 
contents. Every piece of information was 
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labelled with a code showing the date (year 
and month) and the main theme. Second, 
based on the available data for each year, a 
narrative was formed covering the important 
aspects of the refugee presence focusing 
on 1) official policies, and 2) the condition 
of refugees. The final report was written 
by combining different segments into an 
integrated text. The first part of the report 
explores the causes of open door policy 
and the second on the consequences of this 
policy for Iran. Three main themes were 
extracted from the data for the second part, 
including identification of refugees and 
security issues, refugees and Iran labour 
market, and the problem of repatriation 
which is discussed in the following section. 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Settlement of refugees in Iran
As stated before, during late 1970s and 
1980s, Iran opened its borders to afghan 
refugees and permitted them to reside in 
the mainland country instead of border 
camps. The reasons for accepting millions 
of Afghan refugees should be analysed 
according to the circumstances of the 
newly established government and social 
atmosphere of a post-revolutionary country. 
As explained further in this section, 
unconditional admission of refugees was 
the only option that could be implemented 
at that time, due to the complicated situation 
of the country and the newly established 
revolutionary government. All in all, it can 
be argued that three major factors resulted 
in the adoption of an open door policy by 
the Iran government of the time.
First is the collapse of bureaucratic 
structures and decision-making procedures 
after the Islamic Revolution. Following 
the Revolution, the government structure 
underwent a fundamental change and the 
entire system of decision-making and 
administration was radically transformed. 
At that time, it was not possible to address 
all national issues with structured and 
calculated decision-making processes. The 
newly established administration, which was 
involved in internal political conflicts and, 
a year later, imposed war with Iraq, all of a 
sudden faced the flood of Afghan refugees 
into the country. In such circumstances, the 
new government chose the easiest solution: 
to admit and settle Afghans in cities and 
villages without any restriction. In fact, the 
new and somehow inexperienced young 
bureaucrats wasn’t prepared to decide on 
the matter based on the rational calculation 
of predictable outcomes of the open door 
policy. 
Second, the new government was 
busy with more serious problems than 
Afghan refugee arrival; the main focus was 
on consolidating power and fighting the 
imposed war with Iraq. In a situation where 
the country was involved in internal conflicts 
during the period of power construction 
after the 1979 Revolution, the onset of the 
war and its consequences did not actually 
leave room for attention to the issue of 
Afghan refugees. The war resulted in the 
displacement of a large part of the Iranian 
population residing in western areas (near 
the border with Iraq). In this context, the 
management and settlement of internally 
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displaced people became the top priority 
of the government. As a result, the country 
was so involved with internal and external 
problems that there was no opportunity to 
consider the issue of the arrival of foreign 
war refugees. The Minister of Interior, 
during his visit to Sistan and Baluchistan 
province in April 1981, explicitly stated to 
reporters “Unfortunately, due to government 
engagement with the imposed war, we have 
not yet been able to decide on the issue 
of refugee settlement”1. He assured local 
residents that the issue of Afghan refugees 
in eastern provinces would be properly 
addressed soon by the central government. 
Therefore, at that time, the situation was 
such that, on one hand, the state’s energy 
was spent on the war with its costs and 
consequences, and on the other hand, after 
each Soviet bombardment, thousands of 
Afghans fled to the Iran border.
Third, the lack of sufficient funds 
to build border camps in the absence 
of international assistance was a major 
factor in implementing open door policy. 
In contrast, Pakistan’s success in settling 
refugees in the camps was largely due to 
the Western aids, considering Pakistan’s 
role in equipping Mujahideen in the fight 
against the Soviets. Unlike Pakistan, Iran 
did not have the necessary facilities for 
building refugee camps; therefore, allowing 
them in the country was inevitable. The 
country faced with enormous costs of the 
war with Iraq, and there was practically 
no possibility for building and equipping 
camps and accommodating more than 
one million refugee population in a brief 
period. Relations between Iran and Western 
countries became hostile after the occupation 
of the US embassy in Tehran in November 
1979, exactly a month before the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan. 
Political tensions with the West denied 
Iran international assistance in the problem 
of refugee settlement. Iran’s reluctance to 
trust international institutions due to the 
fear of intelligence operations under the 
cover of assistance (Halliday, 2001, p. 5) 
was another obstacle to receiving assistance 
from the UNHCR. Between 1979 and 1990, 
Pakistan received about $850 million in 
international assistance, while Iran’s share 
of international aids was slightly over $100 
million (Eisenberg, 2013, p. 15). Moreover, 
UNHCR donations were handed based on 
the population residing in the camps, not 
those active in the labour market. 
In addit ion to these three main 
causal factors, there are two facilitators 
that made open door policy work and 
created a favourable social and political 
climate for refugees in the country. First 
is the ideological approach of the newly 
established revolutionary state in Iran at 
the time: a revolution that defined itself as 
an advocate of the oppressed people in all 
parts of the world with the announcement 
of its mission defying the Eastern and 
Western imperialism. The Islamic Republic, 
right from its establishment, considered its 
duty to protect the oppressed and back all 
1Afghan refugees will be accommodated in Iran, 
said interior minister (1981, April 10), Keyhan 
newspaper.
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liberation movements in the world. Based on 
this attitude, the phrase “Islam does not have 
borders” quoted from Ayatollah Khomeini 
was the legitimating basis for the open door 
policy. It was for this reason that for many 
years the term “Afghan brothers” were used 
in Iran to address Afghan refugees.
In fact, for the government, sheltering 
Afghan refugees was more of a religious 
duty and an emphasis on the commitment 
of the Islamic Republic to play a leading 
Islamic revolutionary role in the region 
and worldwide. Recently, a former Afghan 
government official in Iran claimed that at 
the beginning of the arrival of Afghans in 
Iran, the incumbent Prime Minister was in 
favour of settling refugees in border camps; 
the idea was rejected by the “scholars 
of the Islamic Republic and especially 
Ayatollah Khomeini” (Afzali, 2014). He 
quoted Mohammad Montazeri, a high-
rank revolutionary cleric, to have said, 
“There is no difference between Iranians 
and Afghans. Here in Iran, Islam rules. Let 
them come, work, and learn. Why stopping 
them?” It is not easy to verify the quotation, 
since there is no evidence to confirm; but 
based on the revolutionary rhetoric of the 
time, however, it could be said that the 
“revolutionary” section of the government 
had a welcoming approach toward Afghan 
refugees. Meanwhile, it should be noted 
that even if the pragmatic section of the 
government had a different view on the 
issue, practical options to do otherwise 
were feeble. 
The second faci l i ta tor  was  the 
revolutionary atmosphere of the Iranian 
society in the early years after the revolution, 
which provided the social context for the 
acceptance of Afghans. After the revolution, 
the social mood created a sense of fraternity 
and solidarity in the society, which facilitated 
the acceptance of foreign refugees in Iran. 
The importance of the revolutionary social 
atmosphere of the early 1980s on the Afghan 
refugee’s situation in Iran is undeniable 
since in the following decade, distancing 
from the early revolutionary atmosphere, the 
living conditions of Afghans worsened as 
the public acceptance of refugees declined.
In addition to the factors discussed 
above, some researchers pointed out two 
other issues in explaining the open door 
policy and accommodation of refugees 
inside the country. One claim is that the 
beginning of the war with Iraq, and Iran’s 
desperate need for human workforce, means 
that Iran’s refugee policy was a pragmatic 
decision rather than an ideological approach. 
To be more precise, the cheap labour force 
of Afghans workers would compensate 
the workforce shortage in a time when 
part of Iran’s manpower was deployed on 
the battlefields. According to the claim, 
the presence of Afghans in Iran when the 
country was involved in the heavy war had 
great benefits for the country.
The second claim is that the presence of 
Afghans in Iran has enabled the government 
to form multiple organisations of Afghan 
fighters who could later be used in the 
political and domestic power struggles of 
Afghanistan. Milani (2006) believes that 
Iran used the “Afghan Card” as a means 
to put pressure on the Soviet Union and 
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halt the transfer of Soviet weapons to Iraq 
during the eight-year war. In his opinion, 
Iran supported marginalised Shi’a groups, 
like the Hazaras and Qizilbash, to create a 
sphere of influence in Afghanistan and tried 
to organise them in the form of unified forces 
(p. 237). During the Soviet occupation of 
Afghanistan, Iran was a base for armed 
resistance in Afghanistan, but still different 
from Pakistan in some respects. In Pakistan, 
the government openly supported resistance 
to the Soviet axis and worked closely with 
local and international groups to provide 
political and military support to the Islamic 
fighters (Bhatia and Sedra, 2008, p. 45). 
However, Iran could not take an apparent 
position toward Afghanistan because it was 
fighting at home and its relationship with the 
Soviet Union was strategically important.
However, many Afghan resistance 
groups were operating in Iran who enjoyed 
less freedom of action and received less 
support compared to their peers in Pakistan 
(Wannell, 1991). The presence of Afghan 
refugees in Iran made it possible for Iran to 
train militias for a right moment to deploy 
in Afghanistan (Milani, 2006, p. 237). 
According to Harpviken (2009), the role 
of these organisations became particularly 
apparent after the end of the Iran-Iraq war, 
when Iran tried to influence the Mujahedeen 
government and later used them in the war 
against the Taliban (p. 84).
To what extent have the two above-
mentioned arguments been a decisive 
factor in the adoption of Iran’s Open Door 
Policy? The importance of these arguments 
cannot be ignored but what matters here 
is whether these factors can be considered 
explanatory factors behind Iran’s open door 
policy; the two arguments seem to be rather 
a function of open door policy rather than 
the reason behind it. As argued before, the 
open door policy was not adopted based 
on the precise calculation of economic 
and political benefits of Afghan refugees’ 
presence in Iran, but was largely due to 
unique social, political, and bureaucratic 
situations in a revolutionary condition. In 
fact, basic requirements for a rational and 
calculated approach toward the issue of 
Afghans entering the country were absent. 
In the context of the socio-political contexts 
of post-revolutionary Iran, it is evident 
that at the time, there was no other way 
for decision-makers but to adopt refugees 
without restrictions.
Rajaee (2000), in examining Iranian 
refugee policies, shows that after the 
stabilisation period, Iran managed to create 
a balance between its constraints and the 
urgent need for a response to the refugee 
crisis; for example, during the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict in 1991, the war between 
the Azerbaijan and Armenia, hundreds 
of thousands of people were displaced, 
causing the Azeri refugees to rush to the 
Iranian border in 1993. However, Iran’s 
policy towards this group of refugees 
was not opening the country’s doors but 
creating camps inside Azerbaijan that 
worked under the supervision of the Red 
Crescent. For this purpose, several camps 
were constructed by the collaboration of two 
sides. In 1995, one of the interior ministry 
officials explicitly stated that Iran did not 
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allow Azeri refugees to enter Iran because 
of what the government learned from the 
experience of Afghan refugees. He explicitly 
stated that if they could enter, their return to 
their country would be difficult (pp. 52-55).
Once again, in 1994, during the clashes 
between the two Kurdish Iraqi parties, KDP 
and PUK, many leaders and supporters of 
PUK fled to Iran. The result was the flooding 
of more than 200 thousand people to Iranian 
borders. Iran, whose new policy was to 
deny refugees entrance, declared that it was 
ready to accept refugees, with the condition 
of receiving international help. Eventually, 
Iran allowed 75,000 people to enter the 
country but settled them in border camps. 
This time, Iran asked for major international 
institutions aid and, as a result, was able to 
receive a great deal of assistance (ibid, pp. 
53-55).
Consequently, Iran’s policy of accepting 
refugees in later decades was different 
from the 1980s. In fact, all the factors that 
previously led to the open door policy were 
either absent or had diminished drastically. 
The bureaucratic apparatus was stabilised, 
and the policy environment and decision-
making procedures were different from 
the period of the revolutionary excitement 
of the early years. The social environment 
also did not support refugee admission due 
to economic issues, especially at a tough 
economic setting of the late 1980s. 
Predictors of Change from Open Door 
to Closed Door Policy
The open door policy was the easiest 
solution for a newly formed revolutionary 
government dealing with domestic issues 
and a war with a neighbouring country. 
Acceptance of millions of refugees helped 
many Afghans survive fatal violence 
and gave them the opportunity to escape 
poverty and drought in their country. But 
for government in Iran, enormous issues 
started to appear over time as the proportion 
of refugees in local communities grew. The 
cheap Afghan labour force helped the Iranian 
economy in different sectors of agriculture, 
construction and manufacturing in a hard 
economic period. But these economic 
benefits costed dearly for the government 
and led to dramatic policy changes in later 
decades. The main negative consequences of 
open door policy for the Iranian government 
were as follows:  
1-Identification of refugees and security 
issues
The identification of refugees in Iran was one 
of the issues faced by the government from 
the beginning of the crisis. Afghan refugees 
crossed the borders into Iran without passing 
any special legal procedures. They were only 
registered at the border and were deployed 
to any area they wanted to reside. As a 
result, there were no definite figures and 
information about the individuals entering 
or how they scattered in the country. 
According to official documents reviewed, 
in August 1979, a letter (Interior Ministry, 
1980) was sent from the Ministry of the 
Interior to the governorates of all provinces, 
in which the need to identify Afghans was 
indicated and the issuance of identity cards 
was emphasised. The directive calls for the 
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establishment of a “Coordinating Council 
for Afghan Refugees Affairs” in each 
province to identify Afghan refugees and 
encourage them to register and receive ID 
cards. These ID cards were supposed to be 
issued to every household and the names 
of other household members were to be 
mentioned in the profile of the family head.
According to one official  letter 
(Mazandaran Provincial Government, 
1980), in October 1980, the Ministry of 
Interior ordered that the issued ID cards 
be printed with the phrase “no specific 
rights for the cardholder” at the bottom. 
This action shows that the government 
considered refugees’ temporary guests and 
made it clear to Afghans that the ID card 
did not indicate a permanent residence 
permit. The first identification attempts by 
the government having failed, the issuance 
of the first identification documents began 
the following year; in 1981, ID documents 
were issued for each head of household in 
the form of large white folders containing 
information of all household members. 
These documents were prepared by 
the Interior Ministry and were filled by 
officials at mosques in different cities. This 
plan was the first government action to 
identify and regulate the Afghan refugee 
population in Iran, which distinguished 
legal refugees from unauthorised Afghans 
entering the country. These documents 
were not issued for every individual, and its 
size made it difficult for refugees to carry, 
made it difficult for Iranian security forces 
to control IDs. Moreover, given the fact 
that these documents were completed only 
at the request of the applicant, and there 
was no database to control all the recorded 
information, it was possible for refugees 
to obtain several identity documents for 
each household in various parts of the 
country. This attempt to identify Afghan 
nationals somewhat reduced the problems of 
identification and improved public services 
for refugees but was not much of a success 
due to poor documentation. 
The complexities of identity issues added 
to the government’s problems in meeting the 
basic needs of refugee population. During 
the Iran-Iraq war, because of financial 
constraints and the difficulties in importing 
goods caused by the siege of Khorramshahr 
and insecurity of other ports, the government 
monopolised the distribution of primary 
goods. For this reason, an organisation 
called Basij-e Eghtesadi  (Economic 
Mobilisation) was established with many 
headquarters throughout the country. The 
duty of this organisation was to ration and 
distribute basic goods through the coupon 
mechanism. With the increase in the number 
of Afghan refugees, the general needs of this 
population were also placed on the agenda 
of the headquarters and the legal refugees 
were registered. The major problem in 
providing Afghan refugee supplies was a 
poor identification system and a lack of 
reliable statistics.
With problems that gradually became 
evident in governing a large population 
of refugees, the first national refugee 
identification plan was implemented in 
1984. Under this plan, an ID card, known as 
the White Card, was issued to each person. 
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Contrary to the previous plan, this time, by 
filling out a special questionnaire by each 
person, a file was issued for every individual 
that was archived in the governorate of the 
area. To enjoy public services, including 
receiving coupons, enrolling in schools, 
using healthcare services, and obtaining 
work permits, one ought to have an ID 
card. Cards would expire in one year, but 
it took almost two years to replace it with 
the new Blue Card. In 1988, a program 
was implemented entitled the “Electronic 
Identification of Afghan Refugees” (Interior 
Ministry, 1988),  which failed in the 
development of electronic database due to 
the shortage of funds, but the registered data 
in this plan remained the main source of 
information of Afghan refugees until 2000. 
One of the consequences of the lack of 
precise identification of Afghan nationals 
was a security problem in the country. It 
is not surprising for the security forces to 
face a variety of social disorders, security 
threats, and high levels of crime in a society 
where over two million people have no 
identity documents. In official documents 
and media reports, there have been many 
reports of security problems in the eastern 
parts of the country. Limited control over 
the borders would increase the possibility of 
smuggling guns and narcotics to the country 
which caused social discontent among the 
local population. In fact, it was the failure 
of the government to identify and regulate 
the refugee population that resulted in 
some social disorders. However, for many 
local people, Afghans were responsible for 
the crimes and wrong-doings which most 
of the time were exaggerated by media. 
Abdi (1988) has shown that during 1980s, 
the homicide rate among Afghans was 
higher than the national average. But the 
point he made was that firstly, killers and 
victims were usually both Afghans, and 
secondly, failure of judicial courts in Iran 
to resolve disputes among Afghan refugees 
resulted in higher homicide rates among 
them. Therefore, the negative stereotyping 
of Afghan refugees in Iran, still prevalent 
today, is mostly the remnant of the chaotic 
situation in the 1980s where the power of 
government to control the situation was 
very limited.
2- Refugees and Iran labour market
The settlement of refugees in cities and 
villages, rather than border camps, gave 
Afghan refugees access to Iran’s labour 
market right from the beginning. The issue 
that gradually grew from the presence 
of many Afghan workers in Iran was the 
economic competition between Afghan 
workers and local labourers, leading to 
dissatisfaction among the local population. 
From the beginning, there was competition 
between immigrants and locals for primary 
goods and housing, especially in the two 
eastern provinces where most immigrants 
resided, but the labour market competition 
was the main source of local tensions.
A sizable portion of the Afghan 
immigrants who generally were low skilled 
was employed as simple workers in various 
rural and urban sectors and was welcomed 
by employers due to their hard work and 
low wages. The preferences by Iranian 
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employers for Afghan workers enabled 
them to gradually gain a greater share 
of the local labour market and made the 
competition intense. With the intensification 
of this conflict, the government was forced 
to intervene and in 1984, a directive was 
issued by Iran’s Ministry of Labour titled the 
“Implementation Procedures for Temporary 
Employment of Afghan Refugees” (Labour 
and Welfare Ministry, 1985). The directive 
only allowed for specific occupations to 
be delivered to Afghan workers, including 
twelve job categories like brick laying, 
urban construction, loading cargos in 
ports, tannery, agriculture, mining, glazing, 
poultry, small industries and plastic melting, 
road construction and canalisation, and 
leather manufacturing. Later, in 1986, 
four other job categories were added to 
this list, including work in stone cutting, 
mosaics, discharging and loading in silos, 
and concrete masonry unit manufacturing. 
In addition, the new directive banned the 
employment of Afghan workers in bakeries, 
referring to the “importance of public 
health” and the “poor health” of refugee 
workers (Zanjan Office of Labour and 
Welfare, 1985). According to the directive, 
the employers should receive a work permit 
from the government by filling out specific 
questionnaires along with showing identity 
documents issued for the Afghan workers 
to officials.
After the government’s efforts to 
identify Afghan nationals and providing 
identity cards for refugees, efforts to draft 
laws and regulations on the employment 
of Afghan citizens became a top priority in 
regulating the presence of Afghan refugees 
in Iran. The “Implementation Procedures 
for Temporary Employment of Afghan 
Refugees” enlisted Afghan workers in 
most simple and generally hard jobs and 
emphasised the need for a work permit from 
the Ministry of Labour. These occupations 
were generally labour-intensive and low-
paid jobs that replaced Afghan labourers 
for Iranian workers from the start of their 
arrival. In many cases, the entry of this 
workforce has led to the withdrawal of 
Iranian labour from these professions, and 
vacancies in many areas have become a 
monopoly of Afghan workers. In fact, the 
directive officially recognised the split 
labour market (Bonacich, 1972) that had 
been developed over time. According to the 
split labour market theory, immigrants enter 
labour market at a cheaper rate since “they 
have fewer economic and political resources 
and less information and because they 
are willing to put up with worse working 
conditions and they avoid labour disputes 
in the short term” (Kunovich, 2017, 1965). 
A large differential in price creates racial/
ethnic “antagonism” between local workers 
and immigrants which in some cases results 
into “caste” system.
According to the directive, for each 
region, a maximum threshold of 40 percent 
of the labour force was allocated to Afghan 
workers, and it was only possible to issue 
a work permit for local governments if it 
follows the limit. But in practice, many 
employers did not limit themselves to 
this quota, causing the increasing share 
of Afghan labour force and therefore 
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the intensification of job competition 
among locals and refugees. The directive 
aimed at regulating the employment of 
Afghan workers in the labour market and 
supporting domestic labour; but in practice, 
the employers did not accord the law. In fact, 
a significant part of the temptation of the 
refugee workforce was the fact that it was 
outside of the formal labour regulations, 
which greatly reduced the direct and indirect 
cost of manpower for employers.
During the 1980s, the Ministry of 
Labour and local authorities spent much 
of their efforts regulating Afghan workers 
and preventing them from engaging in 
unauthorised or unlicensed jobs. There 
are numerous documents of the time that 
indicate the correspondence between 
the administrative departments and the 
units of production employing Afghan 
workers. Manufacturing units were seeking 
permission to use more Afghan workers, 
while the government agencies pushed 
manufacture units to keep the Afghan labour 
force below the 40 percent.
3- The problem of Repatriation
Iran and Pakistan refused to recognise 
the status of “refugees” accorded in the 
1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol 
for Afghans. Although Iran signed both 
documents, it only agreed to recognise the 
Afghans as “immigrants”, because refugee 
admission required the granting of rights and 
access to services and, more importantly, the 
requirement for the government not to return 
refugees to their country of origin without 
a legitimate legal basis. Therefore, Iran 
preferred to declare its assistance to Afghan 
refugees as humanitarian and Islamic action, 
instead of a legal obligation (Safri, 2011, p. 
591). Moreover, Afghan refugees in Iran did 
not enjoy the rights of the refugees obligated 
by the Convention, and the principle of 
“return” from the outset was complementary 
to the open door policy.
As mentioned in the previous sections, 
Iran opened the country’s doors to refugees 
in the 1980s, but from the outset considered 
it an emergent, temporary residence. This 
insistence on the necessity of a return of 
refugees to Afghanistan was clear both 
from public comments made by the Iranian 
authorities and the rules and regulations set 
for Afghan population in Iran.
For example, in the early years after 
the arrival of refugees, the government 
insistently blocked the purchase of land by 
Afghans. According to Iran’s civil code, 
trading by foreign nationals is subject to 
strict rules, and the legal possibility of 
land ownership is very limited. In a media 
interview with Etela`at Newspaper an 
official in the Interior Ministry announced 
that “Iranian people will be soon be warned 
to refrain from selling homes, farms, 
workshops, etc. to the refugees” (Bashir, 
1983). This warning suggests that from the 
very beginning, concern about the return of 
Afghan refugees back to Afghanistan was 
very serious. 
In fact, the difference in welfare 
condition in Iran and Afghanistan led many 
refugees to be reluctant to return home. For 
this reason, the government tried to control 
the privileges of this population in Iran to 
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a degree that it would not eradicate their 
motivation to return. But the dispersion of 
this population in every part of the country 
and its powerful links with the labour 
market had undermined the government’s 
chances of deporting them. The issue of 
return was not the main problem of the 
Iranian government during the 1980s, since 
the internal situation in Afghanistan did not 
allow the refugees to return. But, a decade 
later in 1990s, the issue became the top 
priority in Iran’s immigration policy. From 
the beginning, however, it was clear that 
the permission to live in the urban and rural 
areas would make it almost impossible to get 
the refugees back to their country. 
As mentioned before, there is a well-
known statement from Ayatollah Khomeini 
that emphasises on the idea of Islam without 
borders. This sentence has been the main 
idea legitimising the presence of refugees 
in Iran so far. According to that, the national 
geographical and national boundaries do 
not matter in the unification and solidarity 
of Muslims. The basic question is how 
this religious approach has been aligned 
with official policies and insistence on 
the return of refugees to their country. An 
official in the Interior Ministry explained 
this apparently paradoxical situation in a 
newspaper interview way:
Our general policy is … while 
in Islam, the borders do not have 
the conventional meaning, and all 
Muslims are considered a unitary 
nation, but this does not mean that 
when Muslims were invaded in one 
part of the planet they have to leave 
the front and flee to other Islamic 
countries. Although we accept that 
Afghans are now in the house of 
their brothers, but you acknowledge 
that brother’s house is not one’s own 
house, so they should not forget that 
they must return to their homes one 
day and they should constantly try 
to clear their homeland of unwanted 
enemies. We hope that one day all 
Afghans return to their country 
(Sorouroddin, 1981). 
In many official comments in that period, 
the phrase “the house of one’s brother is not 
one’s own home” is repeatedly mentioned 
and the necessity of eliminating “material 
attractiveness” of Iran for refugees was 
emphasised. All of that indicates the two-
sided approach of the Iranian government 
exercising the principle of brotherhood and 
the necessity of returning simultaneously.
What  mat ters  most  here  i s  the 
interpretation of the phrase “Islam doesn’t 
have borders”, which was presented by 
Iranian officials in the quotation above. If 
the foundation of the immigration policy 
had been based solely on this fundamental 
religious principle, then speaking of Iranians 
and Afghans as different nationals or 
insisting on the return of Afghans would 
have been meaningless. It is clear that at 
the executive level, this slogan could not 
be the only criterion for deciding on the 
future of refugees in Iran. What made this 
principle moderated and, of course, largely 
ineffective, was the importance of “not 
leaving the Muslim front” mentioned in the 
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quotation above. In fact, with the argument 
that whenever Muslims were attacked and 
forced to leave their land, they should 
return and retrieve the lost land, there 
will be a complementary principle to the 
principle of “Islam has no borders”. The 
practical result of this combination was 
that Afghan refugees are temporary guests 
at their brother’s home. Therefore, it can 
be concluded that the introduction of the 
principle of Islam with no borders was to 
provide legitimacy for a policy for which 
there wasn’t any alternative at the time.
CONCLUSIONS
During the 1980s, Iran witnessed a unique 
experience of hosting millions of refugees 
from the neighbouring country. The 
specific policies and actions of government 
within this period could only happen in a 
revolutionary society that defines itself as 
the representative of all oppressed people 
in the world. This article tried to answer 
two main questions: 1) why did Iran’s 
government in the early 1980s apply the 
open-door policy in the Afghan refugee 
crisis and settle them in cities and villages 
instead of border camps? and 2) what 
were the consequences of this policy for 
Iran that led to closed door policy in later 
decades? These two questions are important 
because Iran did not repeat this policy in the 
following years, but the results of this policy 
are still evident in the country.
Three possible explanations have been 
offered by scholars for the implementation of 
open door policy. Some authors emphasized 
on the importance of afghan labour force 
for Iran during 1980s when many young 
Iranians were fighting in western borders 
with Iraq (UNHCR, 2004). Others argue that 
afghan refugees gave Iran the opportunity 
to train and mobilize afghan fighters to 
influence power balance in Afghanistan 
(Milani, 2006). The third explanation 
focuses on Iran’s revolutionary attitudes 
of the time and its openly stated support 
for all oppressed people (Abbasi-Shavazi 
et al., 2005; Yarbakhsh, 2018). Although 
all these parameters worth noting but this 
paper argues that with close examination of 
the situation it is evident that the open door 
policy was not the result of any calculated 
decision or a solely ideological one.   
It is emphasized that open door policy 
should be analysed in the light of socio-
political contexts of the post-revolutionary 
Iran. The fundamental transformation 
of the bureaucratic system after the 
Islamic Revolution and the dismantling 
of the previous regime’s decision-making 
apparatus left the revolutionary government 
few options in evaluating its immigration 
policy. Moreover, being engaged in domestic 
political affairs and the imposed war with 
Iraq, it was not possible to decide other 
than to open the borders to Afghan refugees 
and let them settle throughout the country. 
Funds were limited for the construction 
of camps and the international institutions 
did not contribute much due to hostile 
relations between Iran and the West. The 
revolutionary atmosphere of the Iranian 
society at that time, and the importance 
of defending the oppressed population of 
the world as a universal strategy of the 
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revolutionary government, was also two 
facilitating factors in opening the borders 
and legitimising the acceptance of the 
Afghan population. In the years to come, 
all these conditions changed, and as a result, 
the open door policy gave it`s place to a 
closed door policy in similar circumstances 
in 1990s.
The consequences of this refugee policy 
should also be analysed considering the 
economic conditions of the Iranian society 
in the 1980s. Economic pressure resulting 
from engaging in war with Iraq and hostile 
relationships with Western powers made 
it difficult for the government to provide 
the primary needs of its population. In this 
situation, hosting millions of refugees was 
a generous action by the government. In a 
situation where the country was suffering 
from a shortage of goods and acute economic 
problems, local dissatisfaction with the 
presence of Afghan citizens and their use 
of the country’s resources and services was 
a common phenomenon, especially in the 
eastern provinces. Competition over limited 
resources, goods, and job opportunities had 
resulted in a hostile confrontation between 
locals and refugees on some occasions. 
Wide public dissatisfaction with Afghan 
immigrant’s presence in local communities 
especially in eastern Iran is supposed to 
be a main force in restrictive immigration 
policies in later decades. 
As ethnic competition theory suggests, 
antagonism toward immigrants among 
ethnic majority members intensifies as 
the competition over scarce resources 
such as jobs, housing and welfare grows 
(Scheepers et al., 2002; Schneider, 2008). 
Phizacklea and Miles (1980) showed that 
the working class can play a central role in 
the problematisation of immigrants through 
projecting their misfortunes to the migrant’s 
presence. Limited evidences available from 
1980s and presented in this paper indicate 
social pressure on the authorities to handle 
the refugee situation and control the size 
of afghan population in local communities. 
Toward the end of this decade, despite the 
ongoing insistence of political leaders on 
their support for the earlier refugee policy, 
opposition grew stronger especially in the 
parliament.    
Later in the 1990s,  the official 
immigration policy changed dramatically, 
and constraints on Afghan refugees 
intensified. Refugees became problematized 
by the government to the extent that 
repatriation policy led to violent actions 
at some points (Monsutti, 2005). Up to 
this time, Afghan refugees have remained 
a socially excluded population in Iran; 
with the failure of the repatriation policy, 
their living conditions requires much more 
attention from scholars and policymakers. 
The lack of available data on Iran`s 
refugee policy during 1980s was the main 
limitation of this study. There are thousands 
of official documents related to afghan 
refugees in Iran`s National Library which 
are still classified under limited access 
documents. Access to these documents can 
reveal more about the situation and clarifies 
the reason for policies and regulations of 
the time.  
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ABSTRACT
Folkways and Rituals as one of the central aspects of culture in every society have 
entertained the minds of anthropologists and sociologists. Researchers have analysed rituals 
in religious and mythological frameworks, but the current article has taken a different 
approach toward the phenomenon by articulating it within the important sphere of economy, 
hence ritual economy. The analytical framework of the current research is based on the 
formulation of two embedded and disembedded economies as scaled on the ideal type 
economy. The specification of ideal type market in the present study is a combination of 
Karl Polanyi’s theoretical approach toward the embeddedness of economic activities within 
the pre-modern economy and its disembededess toward the modern one, with a glance at 
Weber’s ideal type of traditional and modern economies. The findings of the study show 
that the economic action of bazaaris has transformed from the ritual, embedded economy 
toward a disembedded one. The inherent changes could be analysed to have resulted from 
the conventional order, action orientations, conventional forms of interaction, and the logic 
behind action in bazaar. The findings indicate that modern economy is imposing its logic 
onto non-modern economies.     
Keywords: Bazaar, disembedded economy, economic anthropology, economic action, embeddedness, ritual 
economy   
INTRODUCTION
One of the interests of anthropologists from 
early on was the understanding of material 
specificities of cultures and societies. It is, 
however, a few decades since the interest 
has been systematically pursued in the 
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economic anthropology discipline. The 
subject of this field of inquiry is the study 
of events and techniques of production, 
distribution, and consumption, various 
models of consuming material and symbolic 
commodities, the predominant economic 
order in each society, norms of social 
exchange activity, and different models 
of economic embeddedness in society and 
culture (Depuy, 2006, p. 8). Despite all the 
recent transformations in Iran’s traditional 
economy, in the face of modernity, the 
consequential emergence of new economic 
forms that have their own, sometimes 
contradictory, mechanisms, the scientific 
inquiry into the issue is even more necessary. 
Still, the discipline has been glossed over 
in Iran. The mentioned transformation in 
the Iranian traditional economy, including 
Iran’s market, increasingly challenges the 
idea of an economic order exempt from 
cultural, social, and political constraints, and 
counterposes economy as interwoven with 
diversifying cultural contexts and social 
structures. In this way, economy, economic 
activity, and its requirements are defined 
and understood within social and cultural 
constraints with all their varieties. What 
is concerning in economic anthropology 
is the traditional institutional mobility of 
the society and the encounter with a series 
of inevitable modern elements that are 
defectively internalised to create or become 
replaced by interrelated, hybrid products, 
urging scientific studies more than ever 
before. The current article acknowledges 
the demand and intends to analyse the 
qualitative transition of a crucial socio-
economic phenomenon in Iran, the grand 
bazaar, that has long been one of the most 
powerful and influential social fields and 
whose tradesmen used to stand as the front, 
leading social and economic agents of 
contemporary Iran. The analysis takes place 
with an economic anthropological approach 
aiming to understand the economic action 
based on a systemic backdrop. 
The central concern of this article is 
whether Iranian tradesmen action is an area 
independent of socio-cultural constraints. To 
answer the question based on ritual economy, 
it tried to demonstrate that economic activity 
is not an independent activity from the rest 
of social life aspects, including culture; 
it is, rather, an activity embedded with 
the social structure and cultural models, 
however unstable it seems to be nowadays. 
As a result, the main questions of the study 
are “what socio-cultural principles affect 
the bazaaris’ action as an instance of ritual 
behaviour?” and “what changes have these 
patterns undergone within the past few 
decades?”
The significance of the present study lies 
in its analysis of one of the most important 
economic fields of Iran with a long historical 
background and as a main importing and 
distributing economic pole. Resulting 
from modern transformations, bazaar is 
detached from its original logic without yet 
adopting the requisites of modern economy. 
The analysis of bazaar demonstrates how 
traditional economies shift to modernity, 
discharging a series elements and replacing 
new ones.
Anthropology of the Shift from Embedded to Shapeless Economy
255Pertanika J. Soc. Sci. & Hum. 26 (T): 253 - 270 (2018)
METHODS
The present study is methodologically 
influenced by Bourdieu’s research program 
in which ontological, epistemological, and 
methodological layers are different from 
the usual conventions of social sciences. 
Ontologically, the approach toward social 
reality is relational. Here, the study of 
social facts requires evading the reductionist 
mentality of structure/agency, subject/
object, and objective/subjective dualities. 
As such, the method of the present study 
is synthetic. In this way, statistical data 
can be combined with direct observation 
and through interactive, discursive, and 
documentary interpretation. The significance 
of synthetic methodology comes from the 
usual holistic approach of anthropological 
studies that necessitates the consideration 
of bazaar as an entire social phenomenon. 
Unlike the quantitative methods, the holistic 
approach attempts to promote the process 
of breaking off and diagnosis of the social 
phenomenon, unify various and farfetched 
aspects of phenomena, and present a holistic 
panorama for enhancing observation and 
diagnosis. Synthetic methodology provides 
the scope of rich data and information for 
the researcher. 
The data for the current research are 
gathered by qualitative methods such as 
constant observation, in-depth interviews 
and conversations, and documentary 
analysis, especially of bazaar activists’ 
media interviews, print material about 
bazaar, and the available information and 
statistics about bazaar and Iran’s economic 
field regularities. In the following, these 
methods are concisely reviewed. 
a) Observation: this technique is used for 
“the discovery of new lands” (Rafipoor, 
2003, p. 56). The aim at this stage 
is gaining an initial understanding 
of the environment in bazaar. For 
constant observation, the researcher 
frequented bazaar for a duration of six 
consecutive months. This method of 
somewhat temporary living in bazaar 
could be called “encamping”. With 
this method, all events ad observations 
about the stream of daily life in bazaar 
are recorded. The technique here has 
been a combination of participant 
and non-participant observations. 
The understanding of bazaar, and 
that the traditional bazaar with its 
specific formal structure and resulting 
complexities and relationships, seems 
so improbable that pure observation 
becomes unavoidable. Gradually, by 
observationally confronting it, the awe 
of bazaar disappears, and the alien 
atmosphere becomes research friendly. 
Without this observational experience, 
the analysis of bazaar regularities and 
activities was almost impossible. 
b) Interview: the interviewees of this 
article are divided into two groups. 
The first group includes persons who 
have stable positions in bazaar and are 
trading there. These are inclusive of and 
retail bazaaris in various guilds (textile, 
carpet, blanket, gold, etc.) who are 
informed about everything that goes on 
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in bazaar. They are selected randomly, 
and it was attempted to include different 
age groups. The second group consists 
of persons who are apprenticed in 
bazaar. The dialogue with this group 
who were introduced by a middleman 
was so beneficial for the study and 
produced a knowledge that could not 
be attained through the interviews with 
first group bazaaris. 
 The form of interview was decided 
by the interviewer and interviewee’s 
limitations, and was, therefore, changing 
between predetermined questions, semi-
determined questions, free chats, and 
conversations. The last item was a sort 
of un-determined question that allowed 
for the untold and shadowy points to be 
revealed and new hints to be made. 
c) Document analysis: since a proportion 
of questions in the current study had a 
historical outlook, document analysis 
seemed inescapable. “Document” 
indicatesthe bazaaris’ interviews 
archive, surveys conducted on bazaar 
and bazaaris, and the rulings and 
principles running in bazaar.
This research relies on qualitative content 
analysis. “The qualitative content analysis 
is a method that applies a qualitative 
approach and uses various techniques to 
systematically analyse the data gathered 
through interviews, diaries, observational 
records, and documents” (Hariri, 2012, p. 
264). Qualitative content analysis fitted 
the flexible nature of the research plan in 
this study best because, in comparison with 
other qualitative analytical methods, it is 
well structured and always allows for the 
review of categories in accordance with the 
accumulating data. Here, the purpose of 
analysis is not counting predetermined, exact 
categories, but reaching deep interpretive 
and cognitive layers of texts. Therefore, 
the authors tried to divide the text into 
analytical units in a systematic and step-
by-step manner, so that categories emerge 
based on the theoretical grounds under 
consideration. The category extraction was 
done based on summarisation technique, 
where the inductive categories were reached 
by reducing, interpreting, and generalising 
the inter-related parts of texts. The parts with 
less relativity and the phrases with similar 
content were ignored, and the identical 
descriptions were grouped then summarised; 
lastly, the analysis was performed on the 
extracted categories and according to the 
theoretical concepts. Constant observation, 
extended contact with the environment, and 
evaluating the many aspects of the subject 
are the main strategies for improving the 
validity of the survey. 
Review of Literature
Bazaar is a term with a variety of meanings 
including a physical space for the exchange 
of goods and an abstract concept suggesting 
a whole economic system. Various 
researchers have studied bazaar based 
on these two dominant understandings 
without presenting a certain definition in 
the majority of cases. Farbia Adelkhah 
(2000) is among such researchers. Skocpol 
(1982) defines bazaar as a socio-economic 
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world, while Keshavarzian (2007) gives 
four images of bazaar including bazaar 
as the traditional market, bazaar as a 
class, bazaar as an informal network, and 
bazaar as the product of informational 
dearth. Ashraf (1988) defines bazaar in the 
Islamic cities of Iran as shopping centers 
placed in old neighbourhood, a platform 
for social interaction outside of family, a 
socio-cultural atmosphere in traditional 
urban life, a quarter for Shiite religious 
conglomeration, and a front for political 
mobilisation. Slater and Tonkiss (2002) 
divides bazaar into geographic and abstract 
forms, the latter of which is attached with 
theorizing functionality in modern social 
thought. Classic economists hypothesized 
bazaar as equivalent to the physical and 
geographical space, and in consequence, 
with underscored productive, as against 
the exchange aspect of bazaar, to come 
to its abstract conception (Swedberg & 
Granovetter, 1992, p. 257). 
The review of literature leads us to the 
conclusion that bazaar has been grasped in 
three main definitions: bazaar relations as 
a practical pattern of exchange, geographic 
bazaar as a socio-cultural platform, and 
bazaar as a rather formal pattern of economic 
order and the centrepiece of studies. In the 
present article, by bazaar is meant a socio-
cultural space in which exchange takes 
place. 
Empirically, in Iran, the traditional 
market of Tehran is understood as the 
geography of exchange. Such studies 
generally view bazaar in an anthropological 
approach and as a geographic space for 
exchange, where, at the same time, certain 
features like architecture, material skeleton, 
merchants’ moral system and their relations 
with the state, the condition of each guild 
like the sale rates of carpet sellers or gold 
sellers, are not out of sight. The general body 
of studies indicate that the economics of 
traditional bazaar is an aspect of the general 
traditional economy. In these studies, 
bazaar is understood as a socio-cultural 
institution in connection with tradition and 
a manifestation of traditional economy. 
The association of economy with religion 
and state manifested in form of the skeletal 
conjunction of bazaar with the Jame’ 
mosque and Arg square are particularly 
under consideration - although it has 
changed as a result of the transformation 
of traditional order. The outlook of bazaar 
is functional and founded on integrity and 
convergence among bazaaris. 
Theory 
The rationality of market order and personal 
action is a shared concept adopted by 
economics and social sciences. Anyhow, the 
historical background of the two disciplines 
shows a divergence between the two in 
the distinction they made between rational 
and irrational behaviour, back in the early 
twentieth century (Samuelson, 1955, p. 
90). Rationality was, by then, defined as 
the rational calculations that were allegedly 
to be found in the marketplace, hence 
making the subject of economics different 
from that of social sciences. Economics 
occupied itself with the rational action, or 
the optimisation of profit in the market, and 
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left the irrational to the sociologists and 
anthropologists. This reductionist definition 
was severely challenged by those within 
sociology and economic anthropology. 
Although there is hardly a consensus 
over a unitary definition of the nature and 
function of the market in economics, there is 
a single general principle therein that says the 
market functions in a distinctive realm and 
enjoys acceptable degrees of autonomy from 
other socio-political structures. Sociologists 
and anthropologists, however, hesitate to 
inform the idea. The two define the market 
as a social institution and its relationships as 
a prolonged chain of mutual social actions. 
With this perspective, economic activity 
is constrained in a web of non-economic 
networks, institutions, and interactions that 
produce a kind of fundamental relationship 
between social and economic processes; 
therefore, market interactions are born to 
the wider social networks and inclinations 
(DiMaggio, 1994; Granovetter, 1985; 
Polanyi, 1992). In addition, interactions are 
formed within more durable social frames, 
as “economic institutions are built via the 
mobilisation of resources through social 
networks” (Swedberg & Granovetter, 1992, 
p. 18). Numerous congregational bodies 
like financial institutions, corporations, 
banks, malls, fairs, and more prepare 
tools for producing and maintaining social 
interactions. Economic action is irreducibly 
a social action and economic organisations 
are similarly the same as social formations. 
“The model that uproots the market 
is challenged in two ways. First, the 
interpretation that alleges the market as 
a distinctive alternative of provisioning 
and exchange is criticised. In this group, 
the work of well-known anthropologist 
Karl Polanyi is remarkable. Second, is 
questioning the logic by asking if the modern 
market economy is multidimensionally 
estranged from its roots more seriously 
than other types of economic structuring 
in other societies are” (Slater & Tonkiss, 
2002, p. 157). 
Plani’s reading of economic roots 
provides an anthropological interpretation 
of market relationships, according to which 
market exchanges are rooted in the grander 
social exchanges, while market behaviour 
is connected to the more general cultural 
models and norms of integration. The 
social and cultural roots of the developed 
market economy have been noticed in later 
works as well. Although the social roots 
of economy are turned to the centrepiece 
of sociology and anthropology, the idea is 
being replaced by another valuable concept, 
namely the “economy as instituted process” 
(Polanyi, 1992, p. 33). This interpretation 
of market as an instituted process presumes 
that market interactions should be explained 
based oncertain social institutions and legal 
and political strategies (Slater & Tonkiss, 
2002, p. 175). 
Theoretical framework
The current article uses the ritual economy 
approach to analyse the shift of the Tehran 
bazaar from the ritual to the shapeless 
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economy1. Within economists’ established 
approaches, economy is declared to be 
independent of religion, rituals, worldview, 
and social morality, just the way politics 
and science are independent of these. 
Economic principles are not considered 
embedded in cultural, historical, and 
social structures and specificities, but are 
fathomed to befixed, universal, timeless, 
and all-encompassing. Its rules areassumed 
to be as physical and mathematical as 
natural and biological rules are. This 
perception is challenged in sociology and 
anthropology, where an attempt is made to 
invent theories to analysethe economy in 
substitutive systematic studies. One such 
theoretical approach is ritual economy. 
Ritual economy is a theory of economic 
anthropology according to which worldview, 
economy, power, and human agency are 
interconnected rather than distinct spheres, 
independent of each other. Ritual economy 
demonstrates the process of how worldview 
becomes material; therefore, according to 
this approach, ritual activity shapes the 
economic behaviour without determining it 
(McAnany & Wells, 2008, p. 1). The idea of 
ritual economy is not a new one, especially 
when it is used for explicating economic 
motives and choices. Anthropologists and 
sociologists such as Firth (1939); Godelier 
(1978); Malinowski (1922); Weber (1978), 
and Rappaport (1984) earlier elaborated on 
the connection of economic choice with 
religion and mythical behaviour under the 
debates of ritual behaviour (McAnany & 
Wells, 2008, pp. 1-16). Christian Wells tried 
to explain three common understandings of 
ritual economy:
1) Provisioning, storage, and consumption 
which Douglas (1979); Karl Polanyi 
(1944); Malinowski (1922); Marcel 
Mauss (1925); Weber (1978) and held. 
The emphasis in this approach is on 
the embeddedness of economy in 
social institutions. Here, it analyses 
provisioning and consumption not 
based on the common standards and 
norms of price and income, but by 
the informal requirements of culture 
and society. These thinkers postulate 
that the analysis of provisioning 
based on feelings, meanings, habits, 
heritage, traditions, attitudes, social, 
and economic consciousness precede 
the formal and normative assumptions 
held by economists.
2) Materialising the worldview through 
rituals either formally or informally; 
Bourdieu (2000); Rappaport (1984); 
Wells and Salazar (2007) and are in this 
camp. They highlight the transformation 
of  habi tus  because ofeconomic 
conditions; Bourdieu created the 
term economic habitus to explain the 
structural role of situations, preferences, 
and regulations in shaping the economic 
choice and action. Economic habitus 
1The author has invented shapeless economy to 
describe the current patterns and order of Tehran 
bazaar as an unregulated market exempt from ritual 
and traditional economy where tradesmen activity 
was entirely embedded inside culture, politics and 
society, and simultaneously remain devoid of the 
characteristics of disembeddedness. Therefore, 
bazaar is referred to as shapeless economy until it is 
settled in either extreme. 
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are internalised through family, social 
participation, social class, and personal 
experiences of daily life.
3) Constructing meaning and interpretation. 
In Well’s opinion, ritual economy tells 
about the decisions people make and 
motives that push them to do so. In other 
words, ritual economy problematizes 
the structural causation of meaning and 
interpretation construction. Althusser’s 
structural causation (1970) and Eric 
Wolf (1990), and Marshal Sahlins’ 
structural power (1981) fall under this 
category. (McAnany & Wells, 2008, pp. 
1-16).
The theoretical framework of the present 
study is influenced by the research program 
of Karl Polanyi (1944). His main teachings 
could be summarized as follows. In his 
opinion, the economic life, when it is not 
based on market, is formed around social 
institutions, giving way to values and norms 
other than those ruling the market economy. 
Polanyi’s second teaching is the rejection 
of essentialist modern economy relying 
on the idea that the behavioural pattern of 
avidity due to the restriction of resources 
is not human nature, but arises from the 
adaptation of methods that institutionalise 
economic activity. From this, Polanyi’s 
third teaching evolves stating that the world 
is transitionary; we are not destined to 
thrive in narrow avaricious and materialist 
societies as it is perceived based on some 
superstitious beliefs about natural order and 
human essence. This situation is brought 
about by changes in social structuration and 
the linearity of development. Polanyi’s last 
teaching is that earth, work, and capital are 
three components of societies and necessary 
in people’s subsistence and functioning 
of family and persistence of society and 
social order. When the three transform into 
commodity (or pseudo-commodity), the 
whole society, including individuals and 
communities, and moral norms and values 
are determined by market determinants. 
The market-based economy transform into 
the market-based society (Sedaghat, 2010, 
pp. 36-45). 
The analytical framework of the current 
research is based on the formulation of two 
embedded and disembedded economies 
with reference to the ideal type economy. 
The specification of ideal type market in 
the present study is a combination of Karl 
Polanyi’s theoretical approach toward 
the embeddedness of economic activities 
within the pre-modern economy, and its 
disembededess from the modern one, 
with a glance at Weber’s ideal type of 
traditional and modern economies. The 
ideal type composed of the embedded and 
disembedded economies are configured 
as Table 1 shows. The table could be 
inclusive of further specifications but 
the idealisation processes of distinction, 
unification, abstraction, and generalization, 
restricts us to the following. 
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FINDINGS
Definition of Bazaar
The historical study of the skeletal 
development of Tehran city shows that 
the growth of Tehran texture is determined 
by the skeleton of bazaar. Tehran bazaar 
is the space-based concentration of main 
economic, social, and cultural bodies. Today, 
52 percent of wholesale units, five percent 
of retail units, seven percent of production 
units in Tehran are located within bazaar 
in an area of 110 acres. The daily traffic of 
approximately 400 thousand people in it has 
made Tehran bazaar the urban centre of the 
city (Yousefifar, 2011, p. 50). As a result, 
even the widespread transformation in the 
economic, social, and cultural structures 
of Iran have not undermined the role and 
function of bazaar in the urban life of Tehran 
citizens. 
Presently, bazaar is located in the 12th 
municipal region of Tehran in an area of 
about 110 acres surrounded by 15 Khordad 
in the North, Khayam in the West, Molavi 
in the South, and Mostafa Khomeini in the 
East. 
Reportedly, there are more than 37,240 
units including shops, hojreh2, workshops, 
and warehouses in bazaar. These units are 
active in both wholesale and retail forms. 
In wholesale, textile and clothing claim the 
highest share of bazaar exchanges with 49.5 
percent, followed by home appliances (12.1 
percent), bags and shoes (10.1 percent), 
foodstuffs (8.4 percent), and stationary 
(6.9 percent). In retail, textile and clothing 
takes the first rank with 31.2 percent of 
total exchanges, followed by 27.5 percent 
in carpet retail, 11.5 percent in home 
appliances, and 11.5 percent in stationary. 
Tehran Bazaar Skeleton: The Skeletal 
Order Embedded in Socio-Cultural 
Structures
Tehran bazaar’s outward is built upon a 
thoughtful order that suggest its compliance 
with the constraints of society, culture, 
and economy. The location of rudimentary 
Table 1 
The characteristics of the embedded and disembedded economies
Categories Embedded Economy Disembedded Economy
Skeletal order Identity giving and meaning 
giving to space
Pragmatic function
Institutional order Institutional ethical regulations Institutional competition-based 
regulations
Action orientation Economic orientation Economic orientation
Action quality Economic action embedded in 
Social structure
Economic action disembedded 
rom social structure
Social structuration of bazaar Pluralist, based on powerful 
group and network
Individualist, based on weak 
group and network
2The business area of tradesmen and merchants 
(Dehkhoda, 1995: 7706), a small space usually 
placed within sara, tims and timchehs. 
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urban elements of the central mosque, 
Arg historical complex, and bazaar, all 
beside each other, represents the interlink 
between three religious, political, and 
economic areas. The contemplation on 
Tehran bazaar skeletal specificities indicates 
the importance of social, cultural, and 
political significance of the bazaar beyond 
the perceptive economic import. 
The evolution of the skeletal form and 
economic nature of Tehran bazaar from the 
date of its construction in early 13th hijri 
century (late 19th century) up until now, 
shows that it has undergone up and downs 
during its history, the gravest of which took 
place during the Pahlavi era. In this era, 
the escalation in urbanisation and the need 
for new urban interactions of trade guilds 
separate from Tehran main area urged the 
government and its affiliate organisation 
to pay attention to it. The scatteredness 
of the Tehran trade centres began from 
the bazaar at this time. Pahlvis favoured 
modern models of urban development, 
hence the indifference toward the Tehran 
bazaar and its skeletal development. As the 
Pahlavi era modernisation progressed, the 
urban communities, including that of the 
bazaar, witnessed structural changes; the 
construction of modern streets adjacent to the 
bazaar transformed its general structure and 
disturbed the social and cultural integrity of 
the bazaar and its neighbourhood. Because 
of these changes, the natural process of 
guilds expansion and positioning of trade 
elements therewith paused, and bazaar 
trading activities in the surrounding streets 
diminished. Several crucial guild line-
ups, like Lab-e Khandaq Bazaar, Chicken 
Bazaar, and Tobacco Bazaar, disappeared 
in this period (Yousefifar, 2011, p. 29). 
The other major transformation of the 
period was the relocation of Arg as the 
heart of the political power to another part 
of the city, thus disrupting the traditional 
bazaar-politics interconnectedness. The 
skeleton of Tehran bazaar transmuted 
once again under second Pahlavi, when 
industrial and semi-industrial workhouses 
either migrated into the existing bazaar 
building or were annexed to it. The changes 
gradually gave a new character to parts of 
the bazaar. The economic boom of 1340s 
(1960s) entailed the demand for greater 
areas inside the bazaar and demolished 
the residential neighbourhood by giving 
them commercial functionality. Modern 
public and administrative constructions 
soon erected in the adjacent areas and space 
transitions for the sake of improving access 
to urban facilities and utilities--with all the 
emerging values accompanying them--took 
precedence (Sultanzadeh, 1991, p. 444). 
The skeleton of the Tehran bazaar 
possesses an inward character, too. The 
inward atmosphere of the Tehran traditional 
market maintains an order that administers 
the bazaaris’ action. This very skeletal 
order has brought the bazaar its distinction 
and individuation and created identities 
appropriate to each guild and profession. 
The identity might have faded during the 
interactive and structural changes of the 
bazaar; yet, it maintains its significance 
and identification repute by constituting 
parts of the bazaari historical memory. The 
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architecture of the bazaar and the methods 
of locating guilds, like rasteh3, charsouq4, 
tim & timche5, etc., gave it an inward 
environmental order and functionality that 
claims meaning and is vital for understanding 
the bazaaris action. Enclosed, maze spaces 
imply complexity, ambiguity, conservatism, 
originality, and traditionalism of the bazaar, 
by which the bazaaris’ particular action 
system is influenced. Along with functional 
changes in the bazaar, its texture tends to 
dispossess of meaning. This clearly signifies 
the nature of changes in the bazaar, its 
inherent currents, the general traditional 
market of Tehran, and its actors. Even 
though the traditional bazaar of Tehran has 
endured in skeleton, it has lost its habitual 
meaning. 
Peculiarities of Embedded Economic 
Action in Tehran Bazaar
This research sketches the characteristics 
of ritual economy by referring to issues 
of the institutional order of the bazaar, 
the bazaaris’ worldview, and the social 
structure stemming from ethnic, religious, 
kinship, and local rationality. The totality 
of peculiarities shows that the analysis of 
the bazaaris’ actions—with emphasis on 
economic action—based on the established 
economic analytical frameworks of modern 
economics is by no means viable; therefore, 
the economics of the Tehran traditional 
market could, leastways, be analysed based 
on its once ritual economy. The concession 
is made because structurally, the Tehran 
bazaar has not attained an independent 
structure from the community, politics, and 
culture; this is informed by its performance 
and functionality throughout the years. 
In action, bazaaris, as the main body of 
the Tehran economic actors, have not 
been economically rational humans whilst 
chasing optimal profits, particularly the 
way the established economics purports 
economic action. Evidences show the shift 
from this traditional approach. 
Shift from Customary Institutional 
Order to Quasi-Formal Institutional 
Order
Institutional order in the bazaar indicates 
trends that rule the bazaar through informal 
conventions and formal regulations, and 
guide bazaar interaction norms. This 
institutional order is constructed in two 
models. The conventional, customary 
model is an order that is generated with the 
bazaar by adhering to the traditions; it is 
constitutive of a set of indicators and aspects 
including trust and morality, as the ones 
concentrated on in this study. A major reason 
for the strength of the bazaar in the past 
has been the confidence and trust system 
3Rasteh (direction): is a main street or pathway in 
the traditional market on two sides of which rows 
of retailshops are placed. The term has several 
meanings in bazaar including, for example, guild. 
(Yousefifar, 2011, p. 31) 
4Charsouq (intersection): is a Persian word applying 
to parts of bazaar where two rastehs meet (ibid: 35). 
5Tim and timche: are two major bazaar trading 
elements that imply the concentration of several 
trade offices and wholesale merchandise centers in 
which expensive and voluminous exchanges take 
place (ibid, p. 35). 
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of bazaaris among themselves and toward 
customers. This characteristic has nowadays 
disappeared among bazaaris except for 
carpet sellers, who continue to observe the 
traditional professional requirements. The 
belief in informal regulations that shaped 
bazaaris’ relationships together and made 
up their social capital has transformed with 
the passage of time. It is, thereby, included 
that the Tehran bazaar is shifting from a 
worldview that is built on trust and moral 
adherence, to earning halal and taking each 
other’s hand, to one that cherishes legal 
mechanisms of credence and optimisation 
of profit.
Earning is bestowed by God and He 
considers all when He hands out. 
Formerly, bazaaris used to pass 
customers to each other. Nowadays 
it is interrupted, and things are not 
like before (garment seller, 54 years 
old, 30 years bazaari). 
The former bazaar was a bazaar 
that concerned people and was 
trusted by them, it participated 
in social activities like building 
underground cisterns or schools. 
If you see, most old schools were 
situated beside bazaar because 
the founders were bazaaris. But 
nowadays, to earn, and that at 
any rate, comes first. Money is 
everything for today bazaaris 
(bazaari, 79 years old, more than 
60 years bazaari).
An element in the endurance of the 
Tehran bazaar was the protective guild 
relationships founded on seniority. Guild 
relationships adjusted the self-regulation of 
the bazaar and protected it against crises; if 
a problem emerged, it took moral grounds 
resembling the seniority system to resolve 
it. This system, most of the time, prevented 
the bankruptcy of individual bazaaris. In 
contests and clashes, the elderly society 
played their unrivalled role in preventing 
the escalation of problems. The exemplary 
attention of the senior bazaaris to the sick 
or troubled, taking the lead in visiting or 
pooling assistance, spontaneous moves in 
facilitating youth’s marriage ceremonies, 
valuing kinship in the bazaar, and celebrating 
national and religious occasions prospered 
the morale for cooperation and intimacy, and 
discouraged clashes. The traditional market 
of Tehran was respectable to people and its 
dominating moral system was reproduced 
into the whole society. Thanks to the guild 
societies, self-regulation was an unwritten 
rule of the bazaar that invited all bazaaris 
to respect principles that countermanded 
formal institutions’ intervention. Today, 
this is changing in the bazaar to take on 
formal dispositions. Contrary to the past, the 
transforming bazaar of Tehran is replacing 
intimate, informal, kin relationships with 
formal strangeness. 
Bazaaris relationships with customers 
were, by then, centred on informal, moral 
approaches that normalised relationships by 
encouraging truthfulness in exchange and 
observing mutual interest. The persistence 
of this system among some guilds, like 
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carpet sellers, has guaranteed them a 
stable atmosphere of healthy rivalry. The 
principle for prominent bazaari tradesmen 
is mutual trust. Trust is best exemplified 
in the regulation of trade and financial 
relations inside gold and carpet guilds. 
Here, an individual’s word supersedes any 
formal agreement, and many contracts, 
payments, and loans are carried out verbally. 
In the Tehran carpet bazaar, high-volume 
exchanges are accomplished only by phone 
contact. Such incidences, for better or 
for worse, are being substituted under 
circumstances where formal demands of 
bank notes guarantee the health of the 
exchange. Sometimes, even bank notes 
could not guarantee the health of the 
exchange. The emerging mechanisms are 
symptomatic of the shift from outward, 
trust-based, moral social capital into a 
closed, restricted, and inward condition 
within the bazaar. 
Shift from a Potent Group-Potent 
Network to an Impotent Group-
Impotent Network
For systematising inter-cultural analyses, 
Douglas (1996) has taken advantage of 
concepts like group and network. He divided 
the inter-relation between the two into four 
conditions of potent group-potent network, 
impotent group-impotent network, potent 
group-impotent network, and impotent 
group-potent network. “Group” means 
the experience of a consistent social unit 
and “network” means a set of regulations 
that link individuals on a self-relying basis 
(Moore, 2010, p. 333). In the current article, 
the classification of Tehran bazaar relations 
and transformations is put to analysis based 
on this conceptual framework. A group-
network analysis is a method for finding 
out a spectrum of beliefs that are interlinked 
inside a framework of relational patterns. 
These beliefs should not be considered, per 
se, but they do cause action. The Tehran 
bazaar is experiencing a shift from the 
potent group-potent network condition into 
an impotent group-impotent network. In 
conditions with the former specifications, 
individuals’ social experience is defined 
first by the social border between the group 
and the outside world, and second by terms 
of the well-established behaviour norms 
among members. Individual behaviour is 
controlled in the name of group and there 
are completely defined fractions inside each 
group that might possess expert roles and 
have, thereby, varying degrees of access to 
resources. There is also a set of mechanisms 
to get out of problems in the event of a 
disagreement. Such a combination could 
endure longer in the case of internal fissure. 
It also enacts restrictions upon members 
for optimising survival. However, there are 
occasions applying to impotent groups and 
networks when, under no circumstance, 
individuals’ social experience is lined up 
by external forces, and neither does the 
assigned class base confine individuals. 
In such situations, interpersonal relations 
become vague, their duties get implicit, 
and individuals interact in void; as a result, 
a demand for the supervision of some 
personal behaviour, like the regulations for 
the prohibition of the violation of contracts, 
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evolves. The benchmark of the success is 
the number of its followers and customers. 
Cruel rivalry and struggle for survival 
purported by individuals is demonstrated 
in worldviews that show symptoms of 
anxiety and cherish rewards and benefits as 
characteristics of rivalry. The Tehran bazaar 
has moved away from a structure that was 
founded on ethnicity, religious identity, and 
kinship networks, and is transforming to 
shaped atomic identities and producing an 
impotent network. Ethnic, local, religious, 
and kinship devotions are determining 
social factors that regulated bazaaris. As the 
national hotspot of capital and commodity, 
the Tehran bazaar has always entertained 
guild activists, and, during the migration of 
regional and ethnic groups, has established 
networks of lingual, dialectical, and local 
associations incorporated by the larger socio-
economic body of bazaaris; the presence of 
ethnic minorities with different dialects has 
always been substantial in the bazaar and 
throughout guilds. Intimate, face-to-face 
relations of people in the bazaar created 
social, cultural, and economic associations 
inside guilds or among shareholders and, 
as such, one could speak of the ethnic and 
local identities of the bazaar. Traditionally, 
potent group and network identity led to 
the formation of the bazaari identity in 
pursuance of shared interests, and whose 
function against state and political structures 
more indicated their group and network 
might. Without doubt, these identities played 
crucial roles in maintaining trade between 
the Tehran bazaar and bazaars of other major 
cities of Iran. Nonetheless, the permanence 
of traditional trading functions in Iran has 
assisted the tradesmen in utilising lingual 
and local resources for fulfilling their needs 
and distributing commodities inside Tehran 
and beyond. The bazaaris’ economics and 
interactions both together and outside of 
Tehran were obviously facilitated in a 
socio-cultural backdrop of shared lingual, 
historical, and cultural grounds. 
T h e  o t h e r  p o w e r f u l  e l e m e n t 
strengthening the idea of the bazaar as a 
potent group and a potent network was the 
social interchanges through kinship. The 
importance of this factor has diminished 
during the presumable shift to the impotent 
group-network. In the past, trade relations 
in the bazaar were consolidated by strong 
kinship links. The bazaar was of a larger 
kinship network than today; among bazaaris, 
endogamy was preferred to exogamy. 
Endogamy turned bazaaris into the human 
capital of a single family. Trade relations 
and economic exchanges prospered, and 
new marriages were entailed (Karimi, 2008, 
p. 114). The preference of bazaaris for 
enriching their family’s professional skills 
in managing the chamber, accumulating 
wealth within the family, and improving 
a social face in the marketplace were all 
effective in the embrace of endogamy. 
Although the rich social environment of 
the bazaar still demands endogamy and 
kinship, the past three decades’ multi-
faceted changes have undermined the 
system (Keshavarzian, 2004, p. 25). In the 
passage from the potent group-network to 
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the impotent group-network situation, the 
shape and type of relations have altered. 
Today’s bazaaris prefer to not supersede the 
professional relations with guild colleagues 
and evade extra-guild interactions. Formerly, 
networks of social relationships in bazaar 
took place through patterns of kinship 
expansion in form of endogamy or by 
attendance in civil and religious occasions 
of charities, mosques, tekiyeh, and the 
like. Not only were these networks the 
source of individual interactions with each 
other, they also provided frameworks for 
resolving problems, reaching consensus, 
facilitating cohesion within the bazaar, 
awareness-raising, widespread coordination 
in matters, bargaining with authorities, and 
exerting influence over power relations. 
Consequently, the traditional market of 
Tehran shaped its own social network 
through various institutions and administered 
its activities therein, too. 
Shift from Social Orientations of Action 
to Economic, Instrumental Ones
A major issue that the established economics 
takes with sociologists and anthropologists 
is the logic behind the action of economic 
actors. Ritual economy approach as an 
alternative within anthropology aims to 
analyse this logic in socio-cultural terms. 
For this reason, it emphasises the diversity 
of the actors’ choices in different settings 
to highlight specific rationalities as the 
logics of action. Based on this approach, 
one can hardly expect rational (in the sense 
of calculating) behaviour from the side of 
actors by always assuming they rely on the 
provision of ultimate profit. Social structures 
and relations have a significant share in 
economic decision-makings and, in many 
cases, the actors’ choices cannot be explained 
by the frameworks the established economy 
suggests; this is because action orientation 
does not concern the optimisation of profit, 
but the social motives of maintaining a social 
face and preserving social capital. Bazaaris 
used to maintain an ideology, meaning that 
they were not calculating their profits all 
the time; beside economic gains and by 
adhering to traditions, they fulfilled their 
social duties of assistance to peers, passing 
customers to each other, public benefit 
activities, running charities, participation 
in religious delegations, feeding the poor, 
etc. These were generally performed during 
rituals and did not necessarily pertain to 
economic orientations; as a result, this part of 
bazaaris’ actions could not be analysed with 
instrumental rationality tools–even though 
evidences indicate a turn in the bazaaris’ 
action-orientation toward instrumental 
rationality. The following conversation 
clearly points to the transformation, taking 
place in the action logic among the Tehran 
bazaaris: 
 Author--how are things going regards 
with charity in bazaar?
 Interviewee--it is not like before. These 
have faded away. These have polluted 
bazaar.
 Author--who do you assist and whom 
do you invite to assist?
 Interviewee--whenever there is the need, 
we ask others to participate to help. 
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Look, this is a roster we made some 
day ago and helped a needy family. 
Haj Agha called me and said me about 
a needy family and asked me to assist. 
I referred to colleagues and gathered 
430 thousand Tomans. Two persons 
from this guild and the rest from other 
guilds. These are all youthful and fresh. 
They don’t care.
Contemporary bazaaris’ action-orientation 
in Tehran is egoistic and individualistic. 
Under these circumstances, personal profit 
and the optimisation thereof is the goal. 
The following quotation shows the shift in 
orientations among bazaaris:
“Earning is bestowed by God and 
He considers all when He hands 
out. Formerly, bazaaris used to pass 
customers to each other. Nowadays 
it is interrupted, and things are not 
like before” (garment seller, 54 
years old, 30 years bazaari). 
CONCLUSION
The Tehran traditional market has not been 
merely an economic institution but has 
maintained social, cultural, and political 
missions, besides economic functions; that is 
why it is called “the institution of the bazaar”. 
Recent evidences indicate the mitigation of 
the bazaar institutional function. The Tehran 
traditional market as the epitome of the 
traditional economy of Iran has witnessed 
changes in the past decade and evidences 
indicate orientations other than what ruled 
it previously are emerging as the dominant 
mode of action. The current article tried to 
analyse the transformation of the Tehran 
bazaar by using the ritual economy approach 
and the theory of embedded economy. 
Accordingly, the traditional specificities 
of the Tehran bazaar, presumably under 
the influence of elemental ritual economy 
factors, were conceptualised. The main idea 
among such specificities are the bazaar’s 
wholehearted embeddedness in social, 
political, cultural realities, and currents. The 
observed currents, however, are indicative 
of the incomplete disembeddedness from 
non-economic realms of society, politics, 
and culture. The new situation could not be 
understood as a fixed condition. What goes 
on in the Tehran bazaar and how it conducts 
its orientation is a question that remains to be 
answered in future studies. The traditional 
bazaar with its powerful history embedded 
in kinship, ethnicity, religion, and the like 
is a unique instance that needs adaptation 
methods for modern requisites in a way that 
entails the least economic damage. 
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